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ABSTRACT 
 
In order to illuminate the role written documents played within medieval monastic life, 
this project takes as a case study the monastery of Cluny and some associated houses 
during the central Middle Ages. I approach these documents as signs, drawing on 
anthropological and philosophical work on semiosis, and as media technologies, using 
history and cultural studies centered on orality and literacy, and conclude that the 
monastic use of texts was essentially ritual, and as such exerted an important influence 
on the development of literacy as a tool and a set of practices. Nor did this influence flow 
in just one direction: as monastic ritual transformed the use of documents, the use of 
documents also transformed monastic ritual.  
To study the relationship between document and ritual, I examine what medieval 
documents reveal about their production and use. I also read the sources for what they 
directly report about the nature of monastic life and monastic ritual, and the specific roles 
various documents played within these contexts. Finally, these accounts of changing 
monastic scribal and ritual practice are laid alongside a third—that of what the monks 
themselves actually enunciated, both directly and indirectly, about their own 
understanding of semiosis and its operation in their lives. 
Ultimately, my dissertation connects valuable theoretical and philosophical work 
on ritual, semiosis, and orality and literacy with manuscript studies and with a wide range 
of recent historiography on the complex transformations remaking society inside and 
outside the cloister during the Middle Ages. It thus serves to bring these disparate yet 
mutually indispensable lines of inquiry into better contact with one another. And in this 
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way, it approaches an understanding of human sign-use, carefully rooted in both material 
and institutional culture, during a key period in the history of human civilization. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
My goal in this project is to show how the material form of documents used in 
and around Cluny in the tenth through mid-twelfth centuries influenced the ideas they 
communicated and the power they exercised. From the view of research devoted to 
orality, literacy, and textuality, my work here is a case study, illustrating the play of these 
forces as it appears in a particular historical setting and thereby introducing a greater 
degree of attention to historical, institutional, and cultural vagaries to such approaches. 
Conversely, from the view of medieval history, where my actual training predominantly 
lies, I follow leading historians of medieval literacy in taking this period to be a decisive 
one for the development of literate modes in the West. Here, my historiographic goal is to 
draw attention to the monastic prehistory of later key medieval intellectual and cultural 
developments. In the historical setting in which I work, as I will show, monastic 
disciplinary practice vis-a-vis writing and text developed into a revolutionary paradigm 
for remaking the human individually as well as socially. Besides its obvious importance 
for our understanding of high medieval Latin monasticism, I suspect that this 
development was also a vital antecedent to scholasticism, to the explosion of later 
medieval lay spirituality, and even to the ideological and social paroxysms of the 
Reformation and early modern period. While this remains an argument for a future work, 
as a tentative early hypothesis it has arisen from and guided the current project.  
The primary conclusion I have drawn from the present research is that the co-
development of monastic ideas about writing and monastic uses of documents produced, 
by the turn of the twelfth century, a conception and a practice of behavior (conversatio) 
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as something coherent, discrete, legible, transcendental, and salvific. My work is devoted 
to the role played by cultural and intellectual—or, more properly, ideological—factors in 
this process, such as the history of the monastery as an institution in Francia and its 
mediation by the Carolingian project and subsequently by that of Cluny. Indeed, it is the 
special nature of the Latin monastery as an institution that has called my attention to it in 
the context of questions about literacy, praxis, and the revolutionary new conversatio 
arising from their combination therein.  
Especially from the Carolingian period onwards, the Latin monastery slowly 
emerged as a closed and hierarchical institution that highlighted behavior within a 
disciplinary regimen of training. Crucially, moreover, this behavior was centered on 
written texts: the Rule of Saint Benedict as the community’s constitution, and the book of 
Psalms as the heart of a dizzyingly complex cycle of daily prayer that it was the 
community’s social—and Christian—duty to perform. While the rank and file members 
of these communities likely had rather minimal direct personal interaction with actual 
written documents, their behavior, with all its cosmological and soteriological 
ramifications, remained based on such artifacts as mediated to them through various 
specialists. Ideas and practices concerning the use of texts, some implicit and some 
explicit, thus inundated monastic life. It is these ideas and practices, at least as they 
appeared at Cluny, that my research excavates, examines, and relates to the parallel 
history of the documents’ physical forms. 
A vital concern of this project has always been to overcome facile distinctions 
between the “material” and “cultural”; accordingly much of my analysis is devoted to the 
physical form of written documents, which exerted its own decisive power in the 
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processes under consideration. But the overcoming of such distinctions requires much 
more than injecting such obviously “material” (a term usually meaning only “available to 
the sense of touch; tactile”) concerns into cultural and intellectual history. As a result I 
have also included in this work a relatively lengthy consideration of the metaphysics 
undergirding the rejection of these distinctions. This consideration focuses on the 
concepts of experience and practice, important to modern cultural history, and integrates 
them with the philosophical tradition of the semiotician and pragmatist Charles Sanders 
Peirce (d. 1914), semiotic anthropology, and Peirce’s modern disciple John Deely. 
 To functionally connect this preparatory philosophical work (my second chapter) 
with a project that will, eventually, appear broadly familiar to historians in its form and 
approach, as well as to make sense of the relevant aspects of monastic life, I employ the 
concept of ritual. As this term has rightly been the subject of much analysis and debate 
among both anthropologists and medieval historians, in my second chapter I review some 
of this discussion in the course of developing a clear definition of ritual and statement of 
how this concept operates in the present work. To whit, ritual at Cluny served to build 
community, to bridge a transcendental (and soteriological) gap, and to train its 
participants in the use of signs. As such it was one key locus where practice, semiosis, 
and institution combined, and thus it served as the crucible in which the new conversatio 
was forged. Following this chapter, I briefly survey the historiography of Cluny with a 
particular eye to the nature of monastic and church reform and provide an overview of 
some recent key studies on the history of medieval literacy and documentary culture. 
 In my fifth chapter, I analyze the so-called Cluny Bible as an ideological 
statement. As a codex made in the image of the famous Giant Bibles produced under the 
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Carolingian scholar Alcuin of York, this artifact makes important statements about 
tradition and genre by its mere physical form. But it also includes a selection of short 
Carolingian and patristic texts as a kind of prefatory pamphlet, which I read as a 
consciously-created manifesto on medieval monastic semiotics, sociology, and, of course, 
Bible-reading. Its imposing size, Carolingian associations, and key role within the 
monastic liturgy all figure the document as a central point for the elaboration of core 
monastic principles. This fact, combined with its likely age—the manuscript probably 
dates from the early eleventh century and is thus one of the earlier documents I 
consider—makes it an excellent place to begin my analysis of the sources. 
 A short chapter discussing Ralph Glaber’s Historiarum Libri Quinque follows. At 
first glance, this is a relatively idiosyncratic choice for my purposes, as such a chronicle 
(not even really focused on Cluny) is relatively far removed from the ritual and liturgical 
pragmatics of monastic life. But my reading of Glaber’s chronicle pursues the author’s 
stated devotion to omens and signs, and thus reveals a surprisingly detailed and even 
philosophically grounded sense of semiotics, at least as understood by one Cluniac monk 
in the early-mid-eleventh century. This analysis thus complements the similarly 
ideological investigation devoted to the Cluny Bible. 
 My analysis then shifts, with two closely-linked chapters devoted to the 
hagiography of Cluny’s second abbot, Saint Odo. Here, I analyze the monk John of 
Salerno’s Vita prima et maior sancti Odonis, revealing the often vexing text as a proto-
customary: an early experiment at capturing in written form the local elaborations and 
variations on the Rule of Saint Benedict characteristic of a given monastery. Through a 
close reading of this text, comparison with the revised version of it produced in the 1120s 
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by the Cluniac monk Nalgod, and examination of the high medieval manuscript contexts 
in which it is found today, I chart the slow shift of emphasis from the life of an individual 
holy man to the customs of a true community, itself not reducible to any particular 
individual practice or ethic. In the process, we observe how genre itself operates as a 
functional form or technique, shaping expectations and uses. Similarly, we also see how 
the literary device of the persona of the holy man could serve an unexpected purpose, as 
the organizing principle for an emerging notion of codified and institutional behavior. 
These two chapters thus represent a perspective converse to that of my analyses of the 
Cluny Bible and Glaber’s chronicle: while my consideration of those manuscripts dealt 
primarily with explicit ideology, semiotics, and so on, in the Vitae Odonis we observe 
instead the functional role and history of texts and written documents. From these two 
views—devoted respectively to the ideological and the practical, the explicit and the 
implicit, the cultural and the material—we may triangulate the development of 
conversatio at Cluny during the tenth, eleventh, and early twelfth centuries. 
 My final chapter brings these two perspectives back together in examining the 
great and revolutionary customary of the otherwise anonymous Cluniac monk Bernard, 
produced in the later eleventh century. This virtuoso compilation of Cluniac behavior, the 
culmination of a century of Cluniac customaries, is utterly unfettered by biographical 
framing, and elaborates more clearly than any earlier text the new sense of exhaustively 
detailed, legible, transcendental conversatio emerging at that time among the monks of 
Cluny. Bernard’s text is examined through detailed analyses of two rituals related therein 
and then contrasted in its approach to human behavior with the Rule of Benedict, of 
which it is theoretically an elaboration. These readings reveal the development of a 
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flexible sense of ritual, which can move beyond communal performance to accompany 
certain individual monks on dangerous extended forays into the fallen world beyond the 
cloister walls. A short conclusion follows.
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CHAPTER I: EXPERIENCE AND SEMIOTICS 
 
 
This is a study rooted in the specific, asking about the use of documents to control people 
and behavior at Cluny and monasteries associated with it in the period between the great 
house’s founding in 910 and the first tentative steps towards its transformation into a true 
order taken during the reign of Peter the Venerable (1122–1156). I foreground this use, 
rather than those who did the using, quite intentionally—for while concerned with such 
individuals, I lower them to the level of their tools and methods, studying all these 
together without prior metaphysical assumptions about who, or what, used who. Thus this 
topic yields three lines of inquiry: first, how did the human actors involved understand 
their tools and the ends to which they put them; second, how did all the particular 
technologies and forms of medieval documents make their irreducible material realities 
felt; third, what changes in these two sets of phenomena appear over my chosen period, 
and what correlations or disjunctions between these two sets can be observed? 
As its title suggests, this project is one of cultural history, by which I mean that it 
is a history both of experience and of the structuring of that experience, in all their natural 
dialectical tension. Cultural history has sometimes suffered from a profusion of varying 
and idiosyncratic theoretical frameworks. But this formulation captures what is most 
useful about the field in all its breadth and, furthermore, invites integration with insights 
from other disciplines in an extremely useful way. Useful, that is, specifically in 
overcoming the broad gulf between scholars and approaches that seek to answer 
“material” or “objective” questions, on the one hand, and those that pursue discursive or 
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constructivist ones, on the other. The yawning of this gap is troubling, for it risks dividing 
our understanding of a complex world into abstract notions of “cultural” and 
“material/real,” thereby precluding an understanding of the myriad, co-constitutive 
interactions between these realms of human being. Hence, experience: an experience 
which is always of something—an animal, a meadow, a building, hunger, poetry, 
industrialization—and which integrates, far below the apprehension of consciousness, the 
physical structures of the biological human sensorium with the cultural ones of language, 
praxis, and convention.  
Much of the work of semiotician John Deely is devoted to closing this gap, 
precisely by focusing attention on experience and its structuring. In his article 
“Philosophy and Experience,” Deely addresses the continuing philosophical debate 
between realism and idealism by considering the history of Western philosophy.1 He 
argues that, if realism has focused on the role of sense data in inquiry about the world 
while idealism has emphasized the role of purely mental concepts and processes (such as 
rationalism), both have continued to aim ultimately at reality.2 In doing so, they have 
failed to grasp the true nature of experience, either invoking transcendental phenomena to 
explain the enduring intelligibility of the world or falling into a Cartesian solipsism 
incapable of explaining why and how it understands (as it unfailingly does). In response 
                                                 
1 John Deely, “Philosophy and Experience,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 66 (1992): 299–
319.  
2 It is clear that Deely is not really interested in generally simplistic and polemical arguments about whether 
or not a real or objective world can be said to exist irrespective of humans, or of whether or not it can ever 
be apprehended and to what extent. Nevertheless, he adopts the—to my mind, incontrovertible—position 
that all inquiry must begin, and can never ultimately or finally depart, from the realm of experience. John 
Deely, The Human Use of Signs, or, Elements of Anthroposemiosis (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1994), 11 and 82. 
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to this problem, Deely characterizes experience as a network of signifying relationships 
that integrates a person and the world of things, neither fully mind-independent nor 
wholly constituted by the knowing subject, that lies before it.3  
This integration is made possible by the triadic account of the signifying 
relationship that Deely has taken over from Charles Sanders Peirce. Here, an object 
(signified) is represented by a sign (signifier) always for or by a third element, named by 
Peirce the “interpretant.”4 The import of this structure for the current discussion is that 
signifying relationships are indifferent to the status of their terms, and to relationships 
between their terms with which they may overlap, as either mind-dependent or mind-
independent phenomena.5 For example, a fire causes smoke, but smoke can only signify 
fire to someone; in so signifying, however, it operates in just the same way as the most 
artificial, man-made sign, such as a written word or a mathematical symbol. The 
experiencer is thus always a part of essentially the same kind of relationship with the 
entities encountered within his world, whether he is engaged in farming or debate, 
manufacture or song. Certainly, we may stipulate after the fact, so to speak, that these 
things here are independent of our experience of them in a way that those others over 
there are not, but on the fundamental ground where we always first and most 
fundamentally encounter anything, this distinction is never already made. It follows after 
the signifying. Therefore, in pursuing this most basic ground where everything human 
                                                 
3 Deely, “Philosophy and Experience,” 309; “Then indeed the whole of experience . . . is a continuous 
network, tissue, or web of sign relations,” ibid., 314. 
4 Charles Sanders Peirce, “Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs,” in Philosophical Writings of Peirce 
(Mineola, NY: Dover, 1955), 99.  
5 Deely, “Philosophy and Experience,” 307–308. 
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and everything that can exist for humans must be found, we can neither bracket off some 
phenomena as cultural and others as material. Nor can we assume that what we find on 
that ground is distributed according to economic, or political, or physical, or discursive 
principles. Rather, what exists there is always first and foremost signs, and its distribution 
semiotic. 
So, if cultural history is to ask about experience understood as a network of sign 
relations that completely precede the distinction between mind-dependent and mind-
independent phenomena, it must also ask about signs and their operation, that is, about 
semiosis. In keeping with much of cultural history, this means practicing a historical 
inquiry that is heavily influenced by anthropological approaches to culture, specifically 
understood as a system of symbols or signs beyond and outside any particular individual. 
In his book, The Human Use of Signs, Deely works to ground anthropology and history in 
the study of human experience structured through signs—which he calls 
“anthroposemiosis.” This use is both conventionalist and materialist, and therefore 
essentially historical. Experience is conventional in the sense that the structures of sign 
relations that comprise it have many possible variants, and that one of their primary 
determinants is the partially implicit system of assumptions within a given human group 
that always precedes every individual.6 And it is material in the sense that the particular 
and mind-independent aspects of sign relations, such as the physical characteristics of 
particular sign-vehicles, also make their influence felt. Though not rigidly determinative, 
such characteristics are also not irrelevant to semiosis.7 
                                                 
6 Deely, The Human Use of Signs, 61–74 and 115–119. 
7 For a study examining the influence of material factors on material factors on semiotic processes, see 
John R. Skoyles, “Did Ancient People Read with Their Right Hemispheres?: A Study in 
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In this approach, Deely shares a great deal—most importantly, the commitment to 
Peircean semiotics—with semiotic anthropology. In an important series of articles and 
lectures, R. J. Parmentier has characterized semiotic anthropology as “the belief that, 
while the symbolic capacity is a human universal, the semiotic systems of particular 
cultures merit close study as necessary elements in understanding the nature of cognition 
and the variety of cultural products . . .”8 To show just what semiotic anthropology offers 
to the study of human culture, Parmentier surveys the ways thinkers from Kant to Lévi-
Strauss to Clifford Geertz have tried to make sense of human understanding and 
meaning-making. This tradition made many important advances: it recognized the role of 
understanding in shaping the human experiential world, the socially constructed nature of 
the terms available for that understanding, the cohesive force of such a shared culture, 
and the role of structure in making individual terms meaningful.9 But at the same time 
this tradition maintained, and in some cases widened, the gap between the material and 
the cultural. With Lévi-Strauss, it even sublimated that divide into the structuralist 
distinction between the individually irrelevant term and the omnipotent, ahistorical 
structure. Against these shortcomings, Geertz grasped the extreme richness and 
complexity of signs in culture, and the corresponding importance of the particular and the 
                                                 
Neuropalaeographoloy,” New Ideas in Psychology 3 (1985): 243–252. For reviews of such studies, 
including many with firm experimental bases, see Paul Saenger, Space Between Words: The Origins of 
Silent Reading (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 1–6; Nicholas Carr, The Shallows: 
What the Internet is Doing to Our Brains (New York, NY: Norton, 2011), 39–57 and 183–197; Maryanne 
Wolf, Proust and the Squid: The Story and Science of the Reading Brain (New York, NY: Harper 
Perennial, 2007), 24–78. 
8 R. J. Parmentier, “Theoretical Foundations of Semiotic Anthropology,” Semiotica 116 (1997), 2. 
9 Ibid., 2–15. 
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pragmatic in understanding their functioning.10 He thus came close to the full insights of 
semiotic anthropology. But Geertz’s method remained impressionistic: he described and 
analyzed episodes in the cultural life of his subjects with great insight, but outlined little 
that could be specifically adapted or expanded, and no system of inquiry in which claims 
could be compared or critiqued.11 
In a sense, by asserting the particular and the hermeneutical, Geertz threatened to 
render “culture” an opaque and indivisible term that would completely swallow the social 
and even, perhaps, the material. This was an understandable response to the overweening 
structuralism that in his time threatened to reduce culture to the level of social effluvia, 
the mere dreaming of a subject constructed by other, deeper forces.12 But a semiotic 
approach offers the possibility of studying the make-up and functioning of culture with 
the precision and detail lacking in the Geertzian method, while also maintaining a place 
for the material and yet subordinating neither term to the other. To this end, such an 
approach requires three moves, all of which are presented, whether by Deely or by social 
anthropology, as readings and applications of Peircean philosophy: first, adoption of the 
triad of object, sign, and interpretant, outlined above, that integrates the material and 
discursive so well; second, a strong and highly-articulated emphasis on the particulars 
(what Peirce would call the pragmatics), both social and physical/material, of specific 
signifying relationships; third, a displacing of the metaphor of language from its ultimate 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 12–13. 
11 Ibid., 13–14. 
12 The most familiar example of such thought being the caricature or distortion of Marxism commonly 
called “vulgar Marxism,” wherein economic or material “base” determines completely and absolutely the 
social or cultural “superstructure.” This ignores Marx’s continual tinkering with and appreciation for the 
manifold subtleties of the relationship between economic and cultural phenomena. 
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and commanding position within the modern study of culture and semiotics in general. I 
will expand upon each of these briefly before continuing to develop the insights of Deely 
and semiotic anthropology along specifically historical lines. 
I have already described the basic outlines of Peircean semiotics (or, in Peirce’s 
term, his “semiotic”) above: a sign, commonly called a signifier, indicates an object, or 
signified, to or in terms of something else, the interpretant. This third term, interpretant, is 
the particularly unique and important innovation in Perice’s semiotics, and can be 
understood as a stipulation of just how and in what regard a given sign signifies its 
object. Thus a very common example given of an interpretant is a specific individual’s 
specific understanding of a sign. For, of course, a sign does not signify the same thing in 
the same way for any possible observer. But an interpretant does not necessarily have to 
be the mental content of a particular person; it could also be some established socio-
cultural interpretation shared by many individuals and localizable to none of them. One 
might also think of certain interpretative tools, such as a dictionary or the I Ching, as 
interpretants. Another important aspect of Peircean semiotic is that a given phenomenon 
can function as different parts of this triadic structure in different situations: a dictionary 
might be a an interpretant, or it might be taken as representative of something else (thus a 
sign, in Peirce’s usage), or it might be the object that is being represented, as in this case 
by the English word “dictionary.”13 
Also important is Pierce’s famous division of signs into three types. These are the 
icon, index, and symbol.14 An icon resembles what it signifies in some physical way, 
                                                 
13 Peirce, “Logic as Semiotic.” 
14 Ibid., 104–115. 
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whether visually, as with a drawing of a dog, aurally, as with onomatopoeia, and so on. 
An index, in turn, signifies by actual and direct correlation with thing. This might be the 
smell of cooking food, or the use of various pronouns—“I” refers to something that is 
present in some sense, that is, whomever says or writes it, and only communicates 
identity by this correlation. Finally, symbols signify through convention. In general, 
words are symbols. For example, in English, “cat” is understood to mean the animal to 
which it refers through a kind of custom. Also important for symbols is the complex 
conventional web in which they are embedded, as thinkers such as Saussure and Derrida 
have emphasized. It is important that many of these definitions are broad, and not 
essentially exclusive.15 There are many ways in which an icon may physically resemble 
its object, and the whole point of indexicality lies in its reference to the particular context 
in which it appears. Even besides the ability of a sign to signify in different ways 
depending on the particular signifying relationship at hand (yelling “fire” in the presence 
of a fire uses the word as index, often communicated by tone or volume, while the world 
is also obviously a symbol when people are merely discussing fire or mentioning it in 
passing), signs can easily be more than one of these categories. This is demonstrated by 
the fact that different languages often employ radically different onomatopoeia—“woof” 
is in one important sense an icon, but the very different onomatopoeia used in Russian for 
the noise a dog makes (“gav”) shows the conventional, that is symbolic, aspect also 
present in such signs.16  
                                                 
15 Indeed much of Peirce’s actual semiotic functions by combining them; ibid., 115–119. 
16 Ibid. 
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It clearly follows from this schema that semiosis is not exclusively or even 
primarily linguistic. Both Parmentier and Deely are at pains to make this point against 
those theorists who tend to reduce all human signifying to the model of language.17 
Obviously, much meaningful human (therefore cultural) signifying takes place without 
recourse to words in any form, and there is no reason to assume that such signifying must 
necessarily operate in the same way as that signifying that does resort to words. Such a 
mistake leads to “translation errors,” wherein the researcher attempts merely to decode a 
ritual practice or other meaningful non-linguistic cultural phenomenon, substituting 
concepts for actions and images until he produces a garbled, overly rigid, syntaxless mess 
not unlike the output of automatic translation software. This approach can also facilitate 
the ahistorical assumption that meaning is generated in the same way at all places and 
times; this usually means reading the culture of the researcher into that of the object of 
research. Moreover, this pars pro toto fallacy is often taken a step further, when all 
linguistic signifying is reduced to the symbolic (that is, conventional equivalences 
between physical sign-forms and concepts).18 Citing the work of linguistic anthropologist 
Michael Silverstein, Parmentier argues that, though most words can be categorized as 
symbols—that is, signifying through convention and representative equivalence—their 
common use is heavily dependent upon indexical and iconic modalities.19 That is, their 
meaning relies less on generalized assigned equivalences and abstract grammatical 
                                                 
17 Parmentier, “Theoretical Foundations,” 16–19; Deely, Human Use of Signs, 99–102. In both cases the 
work of Jacques Derrida and, to a lesser extent, Geertz is taken as representative of this approach. 
18 Parmentier “Theoretical Foundations,” 17–18. 
19 Ibid., 18; Michael Silverstein, “Shifters, Linguistic Categories and Cultural Description,” in Meaning in 
Anthropology, ed. K. H. Basso and H. A. Selby (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press), 11–
55. 
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principles than on the tension present throughout the field of common uses (the customs 
of their use) and the particular situation in which they are encountered.20 As Parmentier 
writes, words “are the pragmatic sediment of discourse presupposition.”21 
Together, therefore, Deely and Parmentier provide a sophisticated theory for the 
study of experience as a structure of signifying relationships. This is also a historical 
theory, or at least the beginning of one. As Deely writes, “among the human sciences, 
semiotics is unique . . . in revealing the centrality of history to the enterprise of 
understanding in its totality.”22 This is the case because, according to Deely, humans are 
unique among animals (all of which use signs) in their awareness of signs as signs, and 
moreover of the arbitrary nature of signs—of the fact that both a given sign-form and a 
given interpretant could always be different. As a result human beings are capable of 
making “codes,” by which Deely means signifying relationships that are available to be 
shared between and reactivated by different individuals.23 Because it is these 
relationships that ultimately make up experience, that experience is therefore shared to 
some partial extent between individuals. Moreover, codes are not dependent on any 
specific individual for their existence as structures of experience. They thus have a 
partially independent existence that outlives any and all particular individuals and, 
indeed, forms the basis for the initial creation of each newborn individual’s lifeworld. 
Alongside this enormous influence, therefore, such codes themselves have a history. 
                                                 
20 Not so unliked Derrida’s theory of différance. 
21 Parmentier, Theoretical Foundations,” 18. 
22 Deely, The Human Use of Signs, 117. 
23 Ibid., 70–71. 
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These are the terms in which this study pursues the use of documents at Cluny: 
these documents were assemblages of codes, as well as themselves codes, given a 
particular type of physical embodiment (particular sign-forms) and placed within a self-
perpetuating and yet also mutable, historical, institutional culture of use. Because sign-
forms are weakly arbitrary, in that they could always take a different physical form, but 
not absolutely arbitrary, in that whatever physical form they actually do take is relevant 
as such to their semiotic functioning, I hypothesize that these particular forms exerted an 
influence in the structuring of monastic experience, and one that was only increased by 
the nature of the monastery as a total institution, wherein individuals often spent almost 
their entire lives, and which governed most or all of their basic daily processes and 
functions.24  
The most explicit aspect of these documents as particular signs and codes begins 
with their nature as language. According to Deely, language is “arguably equatable” with 
the use of signs subsequent to the realization that signs, objects, and signifying 
relationships are all distinct phenomena and that signs themselves are “stipulable,” that is, 
weakly arbitrary. Along these lines, Deely calls language “the species-specific human 
Innenwelt,” by which he means that language functions as a subjective map of an 
Umwelt, the environment created by a particular organism’s pattern of interaction with 
the world.25 As a complex system of codes, natural languages such as English, French, or 
                                                 
24 Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (New 
York, NY: Anchor Books, 1961). See also C. A. McEwen, “Continuities in the Study of Total and Nontotal 
Institutions,” Annual Review of Sociology 6 (1980): 143–185 and Christie Davies, “Goffman’s Concept of 
the Total Institution: Criticisms and Revisions,” Human Studies 12 (1989): 77–95. Refer also to my 
discussion of ritual in Chapter 2. 
25 Deely, The Human Use of Signs, 101–102. 
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Latin certainly exist independently of all individuals, thus already containing the germ of 
their own history and also of a determinative (partially, rather than totally) role in human 
history besides. 
My project specifically aims at another distinction: not that between language and 
no language, but between language in one independent-of-individuals, historical, 
determinative physical form, orality, and another such form, literality.26 The physical 
difference between these two forms is very great and of profound significance for the 
history of human experience (and therefore that of everything else human). This belief is 
based upon the work of scholars both outside the field of medieval history, such as 
Marshall McLuhan, Walter Ong, and John Skoyles, as well as of a number of influential 
medievalists who have approached medieval Europe as a particularly decisive place and 
time for the mutual development of these two forms or modes.  
Marshall McLuhan and Walter Ong root the implications of these two different 
modes in their radically different physical forms and the ensuing physiology of their use. 
As spoken, language is aural, having a spatial aspect only in terms of the range of 
hearing. It surrounds the speaker and the hearer as an event, and therefore functions 
through extension in time—it does not persist, but appears and then is gone as soon as 
speaking has ended.27 In contrast, writing is exclusively available to the visual sense, 
extends in space rather than in time, and thus is experienced not as an event but as an 
                                                 
26 Scholars usually use either “literacy” or “textuality” here—I reserve the former to refer to fluency in the 
use of written documents, and the latter for the mode of the “text” rather than of the written document (with 
which it is often confused or unfortunately combined). 
27 Walter Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Routledge, 
2002), 90. 
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object sitting in the world and waiting for the human to come and find it or go away and 
leave it.28 McLuhan argues that between the two modes there is a shift in the “ratio” of 
the senses. Oral culture unites all senses in a kind of “tactile synesthesia” that draws 
individuals into “active participation” with objects of perception.29 In this world, both 
people and objects are indivisible, possessed of a magical wholeness and significance.30 
But as this mode or ratio is replaced by writing with an increasingly visual focus, humans 
are “hypnotized” into experiencing the world as a “pictorial field” spread out before 
them, which they observe from a removed vantage point, and which has no coherency or 
even occupants beyond the play of disembodied forces and functions.31 The literate mode 
reifies words and language in general, showing these to the human as inert physical 
objects. By extension, it does the same to those phenomena for which its written symbols 
stand: as it transposes the aural world of spoken language experienced as immersive 
event into the fixed, external, and clearly localized visual object of writing, it similarly 
creates a space between the human and that world, laying that with which the human was 
once inextricably bound up amidst out before it as something that can be approached, 
abandoned, summed up, rearranged, and plundered.32 Thus the literate mentality 
                                                 
28 Ong, Orality and Literacy, 9–13, 31–36, 77–81; Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making 
of Typographic Man (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2011; first ed. 1962), 18–26. 
29 McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy, 46–49. 
30 McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy, 17–18, 26; Ong, Orality and Literacy, 38–39. 
31 McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy, 16–26, 47–51, 58–64. According to McLuhan, “Hypnosis depends on 
the . . . principle of isolating one sense in order to anesthetize the others”: thus the literate mode very 
literally hypnotizes by focusing on and overwhelming the visual sense, ibid., 29. McLuhan’s discussion 
here holds interesting resonances with the historical account of mimesis found in Max Horkheimer and 
Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, ed. Gunzelen Schmid Noerr, trans. 
Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002; first ed. 1947). 
32 Ong, Orality and Literacy, 100–104. 
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confronts a world of discrete entities, unproblematically fixed in self-identity and firmly 
arranged within a constellation of other such entities. At the same time, such entities, 
whether as “real” things or as words and symbols, may be pulled apart and analytically 
investigated in their composition, and there exist numerous clear principles for creating a 
stable, nested tree of subordination, contrast, and relation.33 
These two scholars in particular have argued that the differing physicality of the 
two modes drives major, even fundamental transformations in human consciousness. 
McLuhan goes so far as to characterize the literate human as doomed to schizophrenia.34 
As the literate mode increases and intensifies its sway, humans are more and more 
presented with a world outside and independent of themselves and everything heretofore 
“living,” “human,” or “real.” This is very unlike the human living in a primarily or 
exclusively oral culture, for whom virtually all semiosis indicates the real presence of 
some entity to which it might respond and which it might influence.35 Thus, the literate 
mode throws a net of the regular, concrete, homogenous, and independent over the 
seething mass of raw human experiencing. It introduces new principles of intelligibility: 
spatial distribution, consistency in terms and modes of argument, logical procession and 
grammatical subordination, adherence to highly complex and fully articulated code 
standards.36 The importance of this new phenomenon, the creation of an autonomous 
discourse operating according to very different internal rules and based upon completely 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 90 
34 McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy, 26. 
35 Ibid., 21–26. 
36 Ibid., 66–68; Ong, Orality and Litearcy, 97–99 and 102–104. 
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different social structures of authority, cannot be overstated. As this mode extends its 
sway, it presents the first possibility for the human to recognize, to even conceptualize, 
the possibility of “ultimate” (that is, abstract, unconditional) authority, power, and reality. 
Autonomous discourse for the first time presents the experience of something that 
determines without being determined. Though he deals with increases and changes in the 
use of writing, rather than its first appearance, Brian Stock puts it best when he writes  
 
. . . a new type of discourse evolved for communicating between individuals. Like 
the economy, it was governed by a set of abstract rules, which, like prices, were 
largely independent of human control. Literacy, like the market, insured that an 
entity external to the parties in a given interchange—the text—would ultimately 
provide the criteria for an agreed meaning. Just as the market created a level of 
“abstract entities” and “model relations” between producer and consumer, literacy 
created a set of lexical and syntactical structures which made the persona of the 
speaker largely irrelevant.  
As a result, a formerly qualitatively structured society began to show signs 
of quantitative structuring. Moral, economic, and social decisions began to appear 
in separate contexts. . . . The power over the concrete which abstraction yields 
was visible in the new optimism of “conquering nature” as well as in the rise of 
logico-empirical rationalism in law, philosophy, and theology.37 
 
                                                 
37 Brian Stock, The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the 
Eleventh and Twelfth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 86. 
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Working in the context of medieval history and along these lines, Stock explores a 
number of changes in social organization and intellectual culture that, he argues, sprung 
from changes in the use of writing. But this is getting ahead of ourselves. 
Within the development of written language and its implications for human 
experience, McLuhan and Ong emphasize two technological innovations in particular: 
the alphabet and the printing press. According to them, the alphabet, by representing 
individual sounds, rather than whole word-concepts or syllables, atomizes and 
instrumentalizes language to a significantly greater extent than logographic writing (of 
which Chinese is the most well-known example).38 By showing words as divided into 
units that are, taken individually, virtually meaningless, alphabetic writing encourages the 
tendency of written language to analytically pull apart holistic concepts. Alphabetic 
reading and writing are also much easier to learn, as the reader can “sound out” a word he 
has never encountered in writing before, and in that way recognize it from spoken/heard 
experience. John Skoyles attributes a “democratic” tendency to alphabetic writing, as it 
degrades the exclusivity of a priestly or scribal class’s access to the written word by 
making writing easier to learn.39 Of course, one can just as easily emphasize the socially 
atomizing effects of this phenomenon: every individual is left alone before the text, 
without conjurers or intercessors. Indeed the logographic nature of classical Chinese 
script has often been cited as a factor in that civilization’s tendency towards political 
                                                 
38 McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy, 21–26; Ong, Orality and Literacy, 84–91. For a somewhat more 
empirical approach, see Wolf, Proust and the Squid, 61–69. 
39 John R. Skoyles, “The Origin of Classic Greek Culture: The Transparent Chain Theory of 
Literacy/Society Interaction,” Journal of Social and Biological Structures 13 (1990): 321–353. 
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unity: speakers of mutually incomprehensible dialects could all use the same script for 
their different tongues.40 
Especially for McLuhan, printing heralds a total revolution in all aspects of 
human being.41 Both the consciousness of the individual and the nature of human social 
being are transformed, and with them all art, politics, science, philosophy, religion, and 
even basic sense perception.42 The most important aspects of printing for driving these 
changes, for both McLuhan and Ong, is the increase in discursive autonomy that springs 
from machine production. “Writing” is now produced much faster and, moreover, by a 
machine rather than merely by the hand of another. The regularity of the text, too, is 
greatly increased, as machine precision replaces the variety of personal hands. The 
written word becomes ever more thing-like, even as it assumes the reliability and 
proliferation of a natural constant.43 Another important element is the layout of the page 
identified with the book as it appears in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, with 
wide and clear margins, regularized spacing between words, page numbers, running 
titles, and so on.44 However, while McLuhan and Ong are convincing concerning the 
importance of this layout, it cannot be attributed to printing. Rather, it was developed 
over the Middle Ages in the context of manuscript culture.45  
                                                 
40 See, among many others, Mark Edward Lewis, The Early Chinese Empires: Qin and Han, History of 
Imperial China, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
41 Another major, if perhaps less influential, work along these lines is Elizabeth Eisenstein’s massive The 
Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural Transformations in Early Modern 
Europe, 2 vols. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
42 McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy, 41–54 and throughout; Eisenstein, The Printing Press. 
43 Eisenstein, The Printing Press. 
44 Ong, Orality and Literacy, 121–127. 
45 Saenger, Space Between Words.  
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This layout, which as this study will show is really a bundle of numerous 
independent or weakly related developments and innovations, greatly increases the ability 
of a reader to scan for relevant words or passages. The significance of this style of 
reading may be difficult for the modern reader to grasp, for it is such a common and 
fundamental aspect of modern reading as to appear the natural component of a universal 
practice. But this style requires a number of technological innovations in writing to be 
feasible; only a thousand or so years ago, writing, at least of any significant length, was 
constructed with a much slower and more meditative form of reading in mind, in which 
the point was less to rapidly extract particular information from a text and more simply to 
be reading it.46 Thus, besides elaborating a new social world of methods and functions for 
reading and writing, this new layout, as it slowly developed, bit by bit, did much to 
increase the sense of distance and spatial precision already inherent in the development of 
written language.47 It also did much to encourage the perception of writing as a container 
of information, a binary in which an outer form expressed an inner essence, rather than as 
a monist, single-tiered phenomenon.48  
These scholars thus provide the next step in approaching the history of the 
structuring of human experience through semiotic codes with a particular eye towards the 
material aspects and relevance of such structuring: operating within the linguistic subset 
of Deely’s anthroposemiosis, and the Peircean approach of semiotic anthropology, my 
study therefore takes this physical/material distinction between orality and literality the 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 6–14. 
47 Ong, Orality and Literacy, 102–107. 
48 Ibid. 
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fundamental one from which to proceed. This does not mean the imposition of a 
totalizing or ahistorical binary, and this study will also build on the work of medieval 
historians who have challenged or rejected this distinction, such as Patrick Geary and 
Mary Carruthers.49  
This intention necessitates a few brief remarks on the nature of the oral/literate 
distinction and on the related question of continuity versus rupture, for if the former is a 
central bone of contention in media and literacy studies, the latter is also for the 
historiography of my chosen centuries. The central problem of the oral/literate split, 
indeed the problem of any theoretical binary intended to guide research, is the tendency it 
encourages to list a series of traits and broader social phenomena to be associated with 
each of the two terms that make up the binary, and then to reify the dividing line between 
these two lists into an impermeable barrier. This is what I mean by “totalizing”: some 
phenomenon conventionally associated with orality, such as, for example, a high 
valuation of and frequent recourse to memorization, comes to be associated absolutely 
and exclusively with its master term. As a result, scholars may seek to explain away or 
even outright ignore evidence that complicates this simplistic equivalency, in this case 
the extreme prestige and importance of memory as a learned technique particularly 
practiced among the hyper-literate Greco-Roman elites of antiquity and carried into the 
Middle Ages.50 This particular example reinforces and is reinforced by the assumption 
that “texts” and “literature” are, by definition, phenomena of “literate” culture.51 Here, 
                                                 
49 See my discussion of these historians in Chapter 3. 
50 Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 2008). 
51 Ibid., 11; Ong, Orality and Literacy, 10–15. 
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the very terminology works against grasping the irrefutable fact that texts and literature 
very much exist even in purely oral societies, as the adjective “literate,” taken to mean 
“competent in the reading of written documents,” seems to establish the closest possible 
possession of anything called “literature.” This is why I have modified the relevant 
terminology, using “literality,” rather than literacy, and “literalate,” rather than literate. 
I therefore approach the oral/literalate split first of all as a spectrum, and secondly 
as a necessary but not sufficient explanatory factor. As a spectrum, most of the mental 
and social phenomena associated with either oral or literalate culture are in fact present, 
at least to some extremely limited extent, at both ends, under both modes. To take a very 
basic example, Ong says that speech in an oral culture is experiential, that it functions as 
a transitory “modification of a total situation,”52 while writing is always abstracted from 
such particulars and thereby habituates humans to the experience and conceptualization 
of absolute truth, power, meaning, and so on.53 But even spoken language in a purely oral 
culture is an abstraction: the noise “dog,” despite all the context it invariably coexists 
with in such a setting, still calls up a wide range of experience and association by a short 
and simple phonetic-cultural tag. It is less context specific, after all, than the act of seeing 
or pointing at some particular dog, and obviously includes at least the barest kernel of a 
definition as something ideal and not-actually-existing in all the range of meanings it 
encapsulates or invokes. At the same time, all writing does rely on context: the rules of 
genre, as will be particularly important in my study, whether followed or broken; the 
                                                 
52 Ong, Orality and Literacy, 99. 
53 Ong, Orality and Literacy, 129–132. 
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associations of words and phrasings, intended or not; practices of reading, 
contemporaneous with the original act of writing or otherwise.  
As necessary-but-not-sufficient, the oral/literalate split represents the first 
branching in a complex and intertwined flowchart for categorizing and conceptualizing 
anthroposemiosis. It is a distinction between tags, the significance of which modifies and 
is modified by subsequent divergences between other characteristics. These other 
characteristics include a wide range of social, cultural, linguistic, and institutional factors, 
such as scriptural religion, sacred languages, monasteries, universities, writing materials, 
mercantile practices, and so. As medievalists who work on orality/literality and the 
history of literacy such as Michael Clanchy and Brian Stock, have noted, oral and 
literalate modes are plural. There are multiple kinds of each, and they always appear in 
hybrid array.54 Ultimately, this distinction is never about limiting and closing off possible 
social dynamics and cultural/semiotic forms, but about providing a clear and flexible 
schema for grouping, relating, and analyzing a constantly proliferating range of variations 
and combinations. 
One cannot really approach the oral/literalate split, and the broader question of the 
anthroposemiotic structuring of experience into which consideration of that split leads 
and from which it proceeds, without working out the relationship between change and 
continuity and without taking a position upon that relationship. Certainly, this is not a 
matter that is foreign to the modern scientific study of history. First-year university 
students are taught to approach historical inquiry with this most basic question: did 
                                                 
54 Michael Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record: England 1066–1307, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 1993), 1–21; Stock, Implications of Literacy, 3–11. 
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“things” change, or did they stay the same? The roots of modern history in the 
Enlightenment can be connected to the slow dawning realization in Europe of just how 
old and various human civilization truly is, making of change a rather more serious 
matter than it had previously been.55 Great Man history localizes change to the actions of 
(and reactions to) powerful leaders and famous thinkers. Marxism updates the ancient 
practice of dividing human history into stages, and roots the transformation of 
consciousness, even the lifeworld, in changing material-social arrangements. 
Structuralism challenges whether the conventional notion of change even exists, arguing 
for an almost-paradoxical account of “real” change as that which takes place 
imperceptibly over centuries and millennia.  
But to consider the issue only from within the tradition of modern scientific 
history is to miss its true scope; a wider view cannot miss that the issue of change versus 
continuity is present almost at the very opening of the Western tradition, and that this 
quandary may in fact constitute the fissure from which that tradition has been expanding 
ever since. According to Aristotle the distinguishing move made by Thales and the other 
“naturalists” (physiologoi), with whom the beginning of Greek philosophy around the 
turn of the sixth century BCE is conventionally associated, was to argue that explanations 
about reality and about things that happen are rooted in the nature (physis) of reality, 
rather than, as the older tradition of the “ancients” or “theologians” (theologoi) held, in 
                                                 
55 See Donald R. Kelly, Faces of History: Historical Inquiry from Herodotus to Herder (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1999) and, for related developments in the field of anthroplogy, George Stocking, 
Victorian Anthropology (New York, NY: Free Press, 1991). 
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the intentionality of a conscious and/or divine mind.56 This debate was frequently 
conducted in terms of common, what we would call natural, events. Does rain fall 
because some god wills it or as a side-effect of some other action a god takes, or does 
rain fall because of some property attached to whatever rain’s fundamental (unconscious, 
mechanical) nature may be? Such questions obviously include at least the potentiality for 
making an issue of change versus continuity, an issue that became explicit with 
Parmenides. Parmenides argued that it was logically impossible for entities to either 
come into or go out of existence, and that any experience of such events was necessarily 
a flaw located in human perception.57 Atomists such as Democritus tried to solve this 
problem by advancing the notion that reality was composed of the free play of 
microscopic and indestructible particles, known atoms, grouping themselves into various 
shapes and dissolving again randomly.58 And philosophy proceeded from there. 
All this is to say that the true nature of the issue of change versus continuity is 
largely overlooked when historians, either dismissively or humbly, term it theoretical. It 
is properly metaphysical in the truest sense, an issue on which we must take a stance 
before we engage in the modern scientific discipline called physics, and which we must 
take a stance on even when engaging in other disciplines far removed from that one, such 
as history. With this in mind, I draw upon David Christian’s valiant and, in my view 
largely successful, effort to practice “big history” (his coinage) from a truly metaphysical 
posture. Though Christian does not himself foreground this posture, his landmark Maps 
                                                 
56 Thomas A. Blackson, Ancient Greek Philosophy: From the Presocratic to the Hellenistic Philosophers 
(Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 13–18. 
57 Ibid., 19–23. 
58 Ibid., 24–29. 
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of Time surveys history from the Big Bang down to the present day and, pivotally, 
sketches from this account a rough developmental process that characterizes physical as 
well as chemical, biological/evolutionary, and cultural systems.59 Were the term not so 
out of fashion, all would agree that such a process is best described as a metaphysical 
theory. 
Accordingly, I summarize Christian’s metaphysics as follows: across systems 
characterized by varying density, density differentials tend to increase; as density 
increases, so does complexity. Nodes of increasing density/complexity eventually reach a 
tipping point, past which new laws manifest as emergent properties.60 Following 
Christian’s account, we see that the Big Bang represented a system of extreme density 
transforming itself (by exploding outwards), generating the emergent group of laws we 
call physics and in fact the physical universe. This system was itself already characterized 
by uneven density, wherein the more dense regions slowly, through the operation of 
gravity, coalesced—increased in density—until they became stars. Past this tipping point, 
a new body of emergent laws appeared: fission, fusion, and the production of more 
complex elements associated with chemistry.61 The density/complexity differentials 
produced by stars led to planets, where chemical complexity eventually produced life and 
the emergent systems studied by biology.62 One of these, evolution, drove increasing 
                                                 
59 David Christian, Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History (Oakland, CA: University of California 
Press, 2005). For an important related work, see Daniel Smail, On Deep History and the Brain (Oakland, 
CA: University of California Press, 2008). 
60 Much of this summary is my reading of Christian’s whole work; for Christian’s relatively more modest 
gesture towards an overview, see Christian, Maps of Time, 510–511 and his second appendix in general. 
61 Ibid., 17–56. 
62 Ibid., 79–138. 
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density/complexity so far that a system vastly exceeding in complexity any other ever 
observed by humans appeared: the human brain.63 From the human organism and its 
singular brain came the latest emergent system: culture, and the emergent laws and 
processes in turn studied by the discipline of history.64 
This metaphysics includes a number of striking dynamics. As my précis suggests, 
it can be subdivided into sets of systems characterized by the human discipline dedicated 
to studying the emergent processes and laws that govern them: physics, chemistry, 
biology, and history. Of course, each of these sets of systems are also governed by those 
from which they emerged and by those which emerged from them; dividing them into 
sequential order, based on the emergence of systems characteristic of each set (the 
universe for physics, stars and the complex elements they engender for chemistry, life for 
biology, culture for history) is only a rough conceptual tool that must not be allowed to 
escape its leash and distort the broader reality. The picture is only complete if our 
conceptual map of it juxtaposes a line with a pyramid. This nested nature includes the 
potential for events of subsequent levels and systems to transform those of prior ones, as 
when stars created new elements, or when the subset of human culture known as natural 
science unlocked the power of the atom for peace and war. 
Most importantly of these dynamics, intensification—the tendency for 
density/complexity differentials to increase—accommodates both continuity and rupture. 
Quantitative change, the mere increase or decrease of what already exists by processes 
and in settings that also already exist, at least within certain bounds, can generally be 
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identified with continuity. But Christian has shown how, at many levels of reality, 
sufficient intensification passes a tipping point, beyond which new phenomena (both 
entities and processes) appear. Essentially, enough quantitiative change becomes 
qualitative change. These tipping points can be identified with the ruptures observable, 
for example, in human history. 
Within the domain of human culture, this framework also makes sense of the 
oral/literalate split. Language, according to our current best theories, emerged from the 
Baldwinian evolutionary pressures of early hominids.65 The complexity of the human 
brain, and the increasing density of hominids in early groups, produced symbolic, that is, 
abstracted, communication. Language represented a new system produced by density-
fueled complexity’s move past a tipping point; but of course this new system also 
continued to operate through Christian metaphysics. Humans and thus the cultural system 
set continued to intensify, increasing in density and complexity until large cities 
appeared. Within these new urban systems—which Christian explicitly analogizes to 
stars, speaking of “social gravity”—density reached another tipping point (within, rather 
than transcending, the cultural system set), and through a kind of cultural or social fusion, 
written notation and eventually a comprehensive system for capturing the full range of 
symbolic language in writing appeared.66 Reproducing in microcosm the Christian 
dynamic, writing represented a new system with its own emergent set of laws, and it set 
about retroactively transforming the systems, human, cultural, and linguistic, that had 
produced it. As it and the broader cultural system set with which it was intertwined 
                                                 
65 Ibid., 160–173; see also Smail, On Deep History, 112–156. 
66 Christian, Maps of Time, 245. 
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developed alongside one another, writing continued to transform the human through the 
development of and elaboration of notational systems, material technologies, and 
strategies of use, such as the vocalic alphabet so important to Skoyles, the regularized 
inter-word spacing so important to Saenger, and the printing press so important to 
McLuhan.  
This notion of change and continuity thus reinforces my understanding of the 
oral/literalate split as a spectrum. From the broadest perspective, language can be seen as 
a system of human communication, therefore falling within the cultural system set. It 
operates according to the basic metaphysical process which I have drawn from the work 
of David Christian, wherein density-fueled complexity naturally intensifies, driving the 
emergence of new systems and laws as certain tipping or inflection points are passed. 
Writing and literalate culture in general are intensifications of tendencies already inherent 
in language from the most ancient prehistory, even from periods we are more inclined to 
approach in the context of evolutionary biology than in that of historical scholarship. This 
is not to minimize or ignore the very important differences between oral and literalate 
modes—those differences and their historical development after all being the central 
object of this study—but to properly contextualize them. Thus, as our view “zooms in” 
on language as an intensifying process within the cultural system set, differences too 
small to register from a cosmic perspective become first visible and then transformative. 
Though the work on the oral/literalate split associated with McLuhan and Ong 
builds primarily upon the basic physical distinction between these two linguistic modes, 
it remains concentrated on the patterns of thought and experience that stem from this 
physical distinction, rather than upon the finer details of language’s many, highly various, 
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physical manifestations. Ong oganizes these patterns or characteristics of thought and 
culture using a list of “psychodynamics.”67 He never precisely defines this term, though 
its meaning is fairly clear: a psychodynamic is a characteristic of language that stems 
from the physical nature of discrete linguistic semiotic units as oral, literalate, or, 
presumably, one of many possible hybrid forms. As a characteristic of language, 
however, pyschodynamics clearly have implications far beyond the brute material reality 
of particular signs or sign-vehicles; essentially, it is the concept of the psychodynamic 
that actually links the material forms of langauge with culture, language, and thought in 
such a way that, for example, writing may be said to “restructure consciousness.”68 Along 
these lines, Ong cites a large body of research from various fields to present a list of 
psychodynamics of orality. These usually contrast explicitly and obviously with 
psychodynamics of literality, such that, for example, orality is “additive rather than 
subordinative.”69 This means that oral language or text tends to use a relatively limited 
repertoire of grammar and vocabulary devoted to establishing precise, explicit, and 
hierarchichal syntactic relationships. Instead of, as in literalate modes, “If . . . then . . . but 
. . . thus . . . yet . . . ,” one encounters “And . . . and . . . and . . . indeed . . . and . . . .”70 
Ong’s individual psychodynamics, like the concept itself, is an intriguing one, which 
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68 Ibid., 77. 
69 Ibid., 37–38. 
70 Ibid. See also Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, trans. 
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takes an important step towards clarifying and systematizing the study of the history of 
concrete semiosis. 
Despite this, Ong and McLuhan remain focused on very broad correspondences 
between linguistic physicality and consciousness/experience: they are concerned with the 
epoch-making literalate technologies of alphabet, printing press, television, and 
computer. As a result, they remain fundamentally unsatisfying to the modern, 
poststructuralist historian. If not necessarily a technological determinism, their proposed 
history nevertheless fits into a rather caricatured course of sudden, accidental 
technological innovations that transformed the human psyche almost on the model of 
revelation originating beyond the world of matter and history. This model does not really 
accord with the Christian metaphysics outlined above and the notion of rupture as a part 
of the continuity it implies, nor is much room left for the particular, incremental, or even 
properly cultural.  
My work rectifies this problem by focusing on much smaller and more subtle 
physical changes in language than those emphasized by McLuhan and Ong. In this, I turn 
to the work of paleographers and codicologists, and especially of the historian Paul 
Saenger. In his Space Between Words (2000), Saenger, without specifically engaging 
either with the oral/literalate split in general or the work of McLuhan and Ong in 
particular, greatly challenges, revises, and advances this line of inquiry. First, Saenger 
identifies the modern style or practice of reading known as “reference reading,” which he 
defines as “intrusive and rapid, silent perusal of text in the quest for specific 
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information.”71 This sober, untechnical definition has important resonances with several 
of Ong’s psychodynamics: silent and exclusively visual rather than oral or aural, 
individual rather than social, “intrusive” and extractatory (even exploitative) rather than 
imbedded and participatory, focused on the abstract in its specific effort to pick out this 
information here while ignoring that there. Reference reading so defined is paradigmatic 
of the post-print consciousness of what McLuhan calls “Gutenberg Man.” Therefore, 
when Saenger convincingly argues that this form of reading emerged at least a century 
before the invention of the metal mobile-type printing press in Europe, his research must 
be taken very seriously by anyone working honestly in the oral/literalate framework.  
Saenger, citing a great deal of neurophysiological and sociological research, 
shows that what is truly necessary for reference reading is not, or not only, the specific 
homogenizing power of machine reproduction, but rather the creation of distinctive 
“Bouma shapes” for written words and the aid to the eye provided by regular, inter-word 
space of sufficient breadth.72 Such shapes allow the brain to recognize a word as a full 
visual unit, rather than parsing it phonetically every time it is encountered, as novice 
readers must do, while the use of reliable spacing between words (and only between, 
rather than sometimes within, words) provides a guide to the eye that allows maximally 
efficient saccades (the muscular movement of the eyes involved in focusing the view on a 
particular point). These are, of course, mutually reinforcing, as distinctive word shapes 
                                                 
71 Saegner, Space Between Words, 4; see also Carr, The Shallows 68–76. 
72 Saenger, Space Between Words, 6–7 (word space as eye-aid), 26–27 (sufficient space), 18–19 (shape). 
The concept of Bouma shapes offers very interesting implications for Peircean semiotics, and indeed for 
Silverstein’s account of words, normally understood as Peircean symbols, as icons or indices. 
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enhance the use of the parafoveal and peripherial vision, even further reducing the 
number of distinct saccades necessary to read a given bit of writing. 
The complex history of the development of this kind of writing, which involves 
the combination of several distinct material traditions and techniques over more than a 
millennium, is beyond the scope of the present work.73 For now it is sufficient to note 
Saenger’s assertion that “scholastic Latin, when written by a professional scribe with 
complete word separation, allowed the medieval scholar familiar with its conventional 
abbreviations, preferred modes of construction, and vocabulary to read swiftly and skim 
easily in a fashion not readily distinguishable from the perusal of a modern printed 
book,”74 and that  
 
when attention is focused on details of central importance to the study of the 
history of reading, such as space, abbreviation, prosodiae (signs that aided 
recognition and pronunciation of syllables and words), punctuation, terminal 
forms, and other related graphic innovations that enhanced word image, this 
period from the ninth to the eleventh century on the Continent emerges as an 
epoch of revolutionary changes. During this period . . . the Bouma shape first 
emerged on the written page, and as a consequence, Continental reading habits 
began to undergo a fundamental restructuring. So dramatic was this change that it 
                                                 
73 See the accounts presented in Saenger, Space Between Words, 6–17; Ong, Orality and Textuality, 83–91; 
Carr, The Shallows, 52–66. 
74 Saenger, Space Between Words, 18. 
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is unsurpassed by any other alteration in the act of reading between the patristic 
age and the sixteenth century.75 
 
In light of Saenger’s far-reaching and exhaustively researched arguments, the 
oral/literalate split, as historically treated by McLuhan and Ong, is in need of some 
serious revision. I maintain, however, that it is certainly revision, and definitely not 
wholesale rejection, that is called for—after all, McLuhan and Ong have conducted and 
cited a great deal of research in developing their psychodynamics, and, more importantly, 
the basic outlines of the contrasts between the two linguistic physical modes they draw 
appear compatible with Saenger’s comparisons between modern reference and ancient 
meditative reading. The issue is therefore one of bringing the broad theoretical 
framework I have been outlining by reference to McLuhan, Ong, Deely, semiotic 
anthropology, and even, at the ultimate remove, David Christian, into better contact with 
the detailed, material “facts on the ground” as apprehended by historical research and 
represented in the current case by Saenger and other historians. All these scholars agree 
that the use of oral and written texts is rooted both in the physical realities of those texts 
and in the socio-cultural nature of that use. They also agree that such uses are plural and 
hybrid. I will therefore, with Saenger’s work as my guide, attempt to refit McLuhan and 
Ong’s theories to better accord with the actual materiality and praxis of high medieval 
monastic documentary culture. 
                                                 
75 Ibid., 21. 
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This consideration of Saenger’s work provides the major justification for the 
chosen spatio-temporal frame of my study. Perched atop a broader account of experience, 
semiotics, and historical change, Saenger’s precise research relates these issues to the 
historical minutiate I follow him in pursuing. In the next chapter, I shift to exploring and 
justifying my use of the concept of ritual, which I have found useful in studying these 
particulars of monastic life, culture, and semiosis. This concept and the history of its use 
within the social sciences, however, are not simple, and indeed “ritual” has been the 
subject of sustained theoretical—some would say, polemical—assault. Some examination 
of these debates, on the way to the elucidation of my own understanding of the concept, 
is therefore both appropriate and necessary. 
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CHAPTER III: RITUAL 
 
 
Ritual, not only in the academic study of history, anthropology, and religion, but also in 
(Western) civilization generally, is a fraught concept. Like similar concepts, whether 
slightly broader (religion, history) or more narrow (feudalism, the West), it is caught 
somewhere between encountered phenomenon and scholarly analytical tool. In the field 
of medieval history, Philippe Buc has argued forcefully that it tends much more towards 
the latter, and moreover that historians would be better off abandoning it entirely.1 Given 
that I will spend some time and effort here explaining, defining, and defending this 
analytic for my own use, then, perhaps it would be wiser to simply use some other term 
(or even coin my own). But that would not be true either to the course of my own reading 
and thinking or to my own experience of the source material. Instead, I will first review 
some of the scholarly reflection and debate on ritual most relevant to my own work, then 
offer up and explain my own ponderous definition, and finally relate this definition to the 
earlier work—that is, to its own antecedents. 
The beginning point for the modern debate over ritual in the context of medieval 
historiography is Philippe Buc’s The Danger of Ritual (2001). Buc outlined three goals 
for this work: (1) to determine and explain what ancient and medieval authors thought 
happened in what we have called ritual; (2) to examine why and how these authors wrote 
about these “rituals”; and (3) to analyze the genealogy of the modern academic concept 
                                                 
1 Philippe Buc, The Dangers of Ritual: Between Early Medieval Texts and Social Scientific Theory 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
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of ritual.2 Thus these first two goals are clearly historical, while the third is much more 
historiographical. Nevertheless, the three endeavors work together quite coherently to 
advance Buc’s overall goal, that is, the substantial demolition of ritual as an acceptable 
scholarly analytic. First, Buc shows that the medieval authors who described (I again 
emphasize Buc’s vital qualifier, “what historians have called”) rituals depicted them as 
productions in which a community characterized by order, consensus, and some notion of 
transcendental knowledge and/or nature, was created, renewed, or displayed.3 From the 
perspective of modern history, anthropology, and religious studies, this is about as 
conventional an account as could be imagined. It quickly emerges, however, that this is 
precisely Buc’s point: this account of ritual, as a social mechanism intended to create and 
maintain order, obedience, and hierarchy, was adopted and developed by Reformation 
thinkers as a criticism of Catholicism. Reprising the older Christian account of Judaism, 
they divided people in ritual-performing societies into gullible masses and cynical 
choreographers. This account was further developed by secular Enlightenment thinkers 
and French revolutionaries, before being adopted by the roots of modern social science in 
the nineteenth century.4  
At least since the fifties, anthropologists have diagnosed a number of major 
problems with this account of ritual. First, it proposes an objective divide between what a 
ritual appears or claims to do or communicate and what it actually does or communicates 
                                                 
2 Ibid., 3–5. 
3 Ibid., Part I, 13–158. 
4 Ibid., Part II, 159–247. 
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that is, in the most fundamental sense, impossible to prove and unjustified to assume.5 
Second, it positions the external observer—apparently but not actually by coincidence a 
Christian, Protestant, secularist, or white university-educated European, depending on the 
century—as the uniquely authoritative arbiter of this distinction.6 And finally, as in some 
other cases of social science terminology, it takes a European Christian practice as the 
baseline manifestation of a universal human phenomenon, dooming other cultures to 
accounts of analogy and deviation.7 Additionally, there is the danger of a “naive 
functionalism,” which also is generally agreed to have grown out of Protestant critiques 
of Catholicism and their maturation under the aegis of social science. This approach, 
likewise much criticized in anthropological circles since at least the middle of the last 
century, understands society according to the metaphor of an organism, with rituals 
playing a key role in maintaining that organism’s homeostasis by providing an outlet for 
antisocial or anarchic urges and reiterating community and hierarchy.  
But even besides these broad criticisms, Buc’s book also shows, in its second 
goal, how even in its own house (medieval Europe), this account of ritual is only a trope; 
throughout the whole first millennium of the Common Era, Buc shows how the authors 
who record rituals are quite careful in their depiction. These authors show rituals working 
when performed by their favored actors, whether kings or churchmen, and failing or even 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 203–247. 
6 Ibid. 
7 For excellent works on different elements and examples of this phenomena, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, 
Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2007) and Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions: or, How European 
Universalism was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (Chicago, IL: Univeristy of Chicago Press, 
2005). 
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counterfeiting when performed by others.8 In Buc’s eyes, at least, this opens a large gap 
between the actual event recounted in whatever document and the representation of it 
therein, even besides the concatenation of that event and other disparate practices into the 
analytic, “ritual.” It is not the ritual but the chronicler’s gloss on the ritual that asserts the 
creation or affirmation of a special kind of transcendent community. In short, an 
ideological account of a range of practices has been mistaken by historians for those 
practices, and then been systematized into a social science term and widely exported.  
Geoffrey Koziol, as a prominent historian whose work often centers on ritual,9 
and moreover as perhaps the flagship target of The Dangers of Ritual, offers a response to 
Buc in Early Medieval Europe,10 to which Buc in turn later replied.11 Besides criticizing 
Buc for going “beyond respectful professional disagreement,” Koziol has two main 
points. First, Buc has failed to appreciate that the genealogy of the concept of ritual he 
advances is already well-known and has been the subject of much critical engagement by 
the very scholars Buc attacks.12 To this point, Buc clarifies that his dispute was 
specifically with historians’ use of the concept, and that recent anthropological work on 
ritual and rituals is acceptable, or at least not so fundamentally flawed as that of 
historians. Along these lines he rejects Koziol’s claims that this work has been 
                                                 
8 Buc, Dangers of Ritual, Part I, 13–158, for example in Gregory of Tours’ treatment, 100–102, 106–107, 
110–118. 
9 Geoffrey Koziol, Begging Pardon, Begging Favor: Ritual and Political Order in Early Medieval France 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992). 
10 Geoffrey Koziol, “Review article: The Dangers of Polemic: Is Ritual Still an Interesting Topic of 
Historical Study?,” Early Medieval Europe 2 (2002): 367–388. 
11 Philippe Buc, “The Monster and the Critics: A Ritual Reply,” Early Medieval Europe 15 (2007): 441–
452. 
12 Koziol, “Dangers of Polemic,” 372–375. 
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sufficiently processed by medievalists: “But the accumulation of footnotes, perhaps to 
look au courant, is not tantamount to the integration of ideas, or exclusive of some 
functionalism. . . . [medievalists’] understanding is often that rituals, while conflictual, 
perpetuate order, and express and renew deep structures.”13 The debate here thus 
becomes a rather subtle and involved one that would need to be conducted in the context 
not only of individual medievalists but even of individual works. And ultimately it is less 
important to establish which historians have successfully integrated recent 
anthropology’s critical approach to ritual than it is merely to integrate, and then proceed 
into the sources themselves. 
Koziol’s second point is that Buc himself does not actually dispense with the 
term—and more importantly, with the concept behind the term—“ritual.” In a basic 
sense, this is obviously true. Buc sometimes uses words like “ceremony” or “solemnity,” 
and sometimes “ritual” itself. Moreover, in pursuing his first two analyses, of what rituals 
did or were comprised and of how they were recorded, Buc just as obviously studies the 
same phenomena as medievalists working on ritual, and groups them the same way.14 
Moreover, Koziol makes the predictable, if fair, point that there are many other, even 
more fundamental, social scientific terms with just as much baggage as “ritual”: society, 
culture, institution15, and so on. As in the case of Koziol’s first line of attack, Buc’s 
response is convincing, or at least defensible, but also, to my eye, gains some of its 
                                                 
13 Buc, “The Monster and the Critics,” 450. 
14 Koziol, “Dangers of Polemic,” 375–377. 
15 Ibid., 375 
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cogency by retreating into a weaker formulation of the claims made in Dangers. Buc 
writes: 
 
Granted, scholars cannot explain much without having recourse to concepts such 
as ‘class,’ ‘culture,’ ‘institutions.’ . . . But in reconstructions of the past some 
concepts yield more than others. And even the more fruitful among these 
instruments have to be used with caution and with full understanding of their 
ontological status, epistemological claims, and heuristic potential. . . . ‘Ritual’—if 
medievalists still want to use it—necessitates the same caution.16 
 
In the final estimation of this exchange, then, it seems that its substance lies in an 
assertion that historians, and medievalists in general, ought to be more diligent, and more 
up-to-date, in studying their anthropology and more aware of their analytics as 
intellectual constructs of their own making. In the specific case of ritual, this means 
developing an account of ritual that addresses the genealogy of the term and its frequent, 
even constant, ideological uses, particularly in confessional or colonialist contexts. 
Related to this is an appreciation that, for medievalists, what we call ritual is always 
related in writing.17 While noting this point may sometimes, erroneously, suggest that 
being physically present at a ritual is a substantially more immediate and less fallible 
                                                 
16 Buc, “The Monster and the Critics,” 442–443. 
17 Buc, Koziol, and others constantly use the word “text.” Without writing a book-length polemic of my 
own, I will remark that this usage elides the distinction between writing and set, established discourse that 
is not the autonomous speaking of the speaker. Despite the improvisation in oral epic poetry, for example, a 
work such as The Odyssey or The Illiad certainly is a text, and was long before it was ever recorded in 
writing. 
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experience of it as a socio-cultural phenomenon, this fact of transmission is certainly 
significant and requires serious engagement. Finally, Buc reiterates quite elegantly what 
could be a warning for all social science, which can never be too frequently repeated: 
“The risk lies in too fast an appropriation of the other, in a shortened, truncated 
hermeneutic spiral. . . .”18 
With all this in hand, then, let us dig a bit more into the nature of the analytic 
“ritual,” before stating out and out the definition to be used here and investigating it in 
terms of the foregoing discussion. Christina Pössel has also contributed to the debate over 
ritual conducted in Early Medieval Europe,19 and her article provides a useful segueway 
from debates over whether or not historians have considered “ritual” with appropriate 
care and insight into actually considering it. Pössel situates the modern (since the 1990s) 
historiographical turn towards ritual in an interesting way:  
 
[Ritual] was . . . an attractive subject because it offered an approach to think about 
powerful actors’ interactions, instead of institutions and structures; about social 
practices and actual encounters rather than legalistic and normative descriptions 
of power. In particular (but not just) for Germanophone scholars, ritual was a 
liberation, freeing us from the more traditional forms of analysis of constitutional 
history, enabling us to move from the ideas of what imperial, royal, ducal, 
                                                 
18 Buc, Dangers of Ritual, 3. 
19 Christina Pössel, “The Magic of Early Medieval Ritual,” Early Medieval Europe 17 (2009): 111–125. 
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aristocratic power ought to have been, to how it was demonstrated and negotiated 
in meetings between emperors, popes, rulers and their aristocrats.20 
 
In this conception, the ritual turn is one towards what seemed irrelevant, or at least 
secondary, to a previous generation of scholarship.21 On the one hand, there exist the 
“real,” “material” forms of power: weaponry, riches, men, and enumerated legalistic 
prerogatives. On the other, up overhead in the superstructure, reside the effluvia of these 
phenomena: crowns and oaths, and the ceremonies in which crowns are bestowed and 
oaths sworn and witnessed. “No one’s will is actually enforced on anyone else in a 
crowning,” (our strawman of) the old guard says, to which we reply, eppur si muove. 
For Pössel, therefore, ritual is a turn towards power, agency, and culture. In true 
poststructuralist—though neither Pössel nor her footnotes invoke this term—fashion, it 
revolutionizes the structuralist paradigm by asserting that the event, that is, the 
instantiation or manifestation of the structure’s operation, also exerts its own influence 
back upon the structure that generates it. It re-centers our view on the border, the 
mediating field, between, to select one metaphor from the many available to us, langue 
and parole—or, to select another, between base and superstructure. This mediation is 
thus transformed from a direct and unambiguous process, the transmission of electrical 
current, for example, into the whole candle, the battlefield wherein many sides struggle 
and the outcome is, besides never finally settled, always some messy conglomerate of 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 112. 
21 In my limited experience, turns, like revolutions, exaggerate their departure from and censor their debts 
to their predecessors. And yet the distinction between them and those predecessors is often also real. From 
this perspective I engage in a bit of oversimplification for the sake of clarity.  
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force, intentionality, accident, and partial accommodation. Though some historians may 
grimace at such language, this is precisely what Buc and Koziol are debating: Buc 
accuses medievalists as regarding ritual as an objective phenomenon wherein society, as 
a self-reproducing structure, self-reproduces.22 It is an expression of power, that is, power 
projected in one direction, from “society” or “culture” into or onto concrete human 
beings and their particular material relations at a certain time and place. In opposition to 
this, he and Pössel argue that ritual is really a site of contention and fallibility, both in the 
moment of performance and in the larger arena of recording, relating, and reinterpreting 
wherein historians eventually come to participate.23  
Pössel also approaches the question of what ritual, either as an observed 
phenomena or as a scholarly analytic, actually is much more directly than Buc or Koziol. 
She does this first by arguing that one of the greatest problems with how medievalists 
have so far used the term is the assumption, unstated and sometimes denied even in its 
obvious presence, that rituals “worked then but not now.”24 In Pössel’s view, despite 
scholarship delving into ritual in modern life, medievalists persist in identifying medieval 
ritual as part of an essential medieval otherness; this leads to the sense that while modern 
ritual is merely vestigial and ultimately unimportant/ineffectual, “medieval ritual is 
credited with the ability to have created community, consensus, or power.”25 Medievalists 
often finish, rather than beginning, their inquiries by identifying something as a ritual. So 
                                                 
22 Buc, Dangers of Ritual, 10. 
23 Pössel, “The Magic of Ritual,” 118–121; Buc, Dangers of Ritual, 12. 
24 Pössel, “The Magic of Ritual,” 114. 
25 Ibid., 112–113. For ritual in modern life, see Erving Goffman, The Presentation of the Self in Everyday 
Life (Edinburgh, UK: University of Edinburgh Press, 1956) and Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-To-
Face Behavior (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967). 
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the concept becomes explanatory; it posits a certain kind of device or mechanism, the 
ritual, which, like a mousetrap, snaps forward when poked no matter where it might 
placed, operating predictably and perhaps even autonomously.26 While turning 
increasingly towards the issue of power and agency, Pössel here repeats the critique of 
the concept as overly reified, and as proposing a doubled model of society in which the 
overly credulous unknowingly perform to the benefit of canny elites, with sufficiently 
rational onlookers in on the joke. But while the move towards power is quite useful for 
my purposes and these criticisms (again, still) well-launched, in my view Pössel missteps 
here in a way quite characteristic of modern positivist thinking. She writes that “The 
difference between ritualized and non-ritualized therefore has to lie in the framing of the 
event [so far so good]: ritual is not so much a category of action as of intention and 
perception. The real difference between an ‘instrumental’ and a ‘symbolic’ act . . . is in 
the mind.”27 
Pössel thus takes a different tack from Buc; where he has (at least initially) 
rejected the concept of ritual entirely as ideological and unexamined, she tries to 
rehabilitate it as an analytic by proceeding from this positive definition. Along these 
lines, she asks why medieval actors performed rituals. Given their cognizance of the 
“dangers of ritual”—that its meanings were unfixed and therefore open to interpretations 
tangential or contrary to any particular performer’s intent—why did they take the risk?28 
This turns her attention to “the barrage of texts” produced, for example, surrounding the 
                                                 
26 Pössel, “The Magic of Ritual,” 115–116. 
27 Ibid., 117. 
28 Ibid., 118. 
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momentous political events of the 830s, when Louis the Pious’ rebellious sons challenged 
his rule. These various documents all sought to propagate partisan readings of the various 
“rituals” (anointings, public penances, etc.) at the core of these events. Pössel thus widens 
even further than Buc the gap between “rituals-in-texts” and “rituals-in-performance.”29 
From this and other conflicts of Carolingian dynastic politics, Pössel builds on her 
conception of ritual (“. . . a category of perception and intention . . . in the mind”) to 
argue that the “meaning” of ritual acts is, contra many medievalists (who, again, appear 
victims of a generational lag in appropriating anthropological methods and theory), 
extremely underdetermined, weak, or general: actions are not capable of transmitting 
complex meaning, like language can, and so discussions of such meaning must remain 
rooted in the texts (preserved in written documents) that have survived into the present; 
similarly, that meaning is a product of those documents, and thus of events subsequent 
and ancillary to the ritual acts themselves.30 The study of medieval ritual on this basis, 
then, is essentially the study of post factum partisan or ideological interpretations of 
medieval ritual. 
I do not mean to completely reject this line of inquiry; not having plumbed it, I 
would not claim to know it is ultimately barren or misfounded. Moreover, even within the 
Middle Ages there are hugely divergent contexts for ritual; as will be clear, my own sense 
of ritual arises out of a post- or neo-Carolingian monastic milieu very different from the 
turbulent high politics of the ninth century. Yet Pössel’s account seems to me to veer off 
into a problematic direction, beginning from her location of ritual essentially in the mind. 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 118–119. 
30 Ibid., 119–120. 
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This conception reproduces the quintessential modernist binary of mind against body, 
which besides being totally opposed to medieval anthropology and epistemology has also 
been challenged quite profoundly on its own grounds.31 Predictably, from the perspective 
of critiques of this binary, it leads Pössel to drastically over-privilege mental content, and 
thus ultimately to reproduce the “two levels” account of ritual. Here, instead of gullible 
plebs, manipulative clergy, and snickering medievalists, we have kabuki theatre, in which 
no one’s performance is sincere. Everyone is merely playing along in the hopes of later 
convincing some other, apparently more gullible, people somewhere else of their own 
preferred interpretation of the events. In emphasizing choice and intentionality, Pössel 
has multiplied cynicism to an absurd extreme. 
I hope I have not been unfair to Dr. Pössel’s argument. Medieval participants in 
and observers of ritual certainly did seek to advance their own interpretation while 
refuting or discrediting those of others; cynicism was undoubtedly at play sometimes, in 
some quarters. And Pössel certainly allows that there were other reasons for medieval 
actors to engage in rituals.32 I find her account of how a ritual can be used to stage 
consensus by creating a venue in which it is impossible to dissent from a particular figure 
or policy without seeming to repudiate the broader social order itself quite convincing 
and useful.33 But doesn’t this invocation of the power of the “ritualized, ceremonial, 
solemn frame” to imbricate acceptance of particulars with acceptance of community in 
                                                 
31 See works by, among many others, Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault (some discussed below). John 
Deely, as cited above and below, also makes a strong, carefully organized, and well-read version of these 
arguments. 
32 Pössel, “The Magic of Ritual,” 124. 
33 Ibid., 122–123. 
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general point up Pössel’s failure to fully demystify ritual? Why did (does) such a frame 
have this power—or how did the frame hold or exercise it? In effect, by downplaying the 
agency of the ritual itself, which she unequivocally and universally denies,34 Pössel 
misses the fact that the ritual itself did make some demand on its performers; that is, there 
was certainly some effort to get the ritual right. Without accepting the basic power of 
such an effort, which might be conceived of on an individual basis as some kind of 
ethical imperative, the category of ritual, as the performance of some at least partially 
established schedule of specific actions and words, is completely incomprehensible: ritual 
is something you do, not anything you do. In my view, this is tantamount to accepting 
that rituals do indeed have some kind of agency, they do, in some sense, do things. As 
Buc writes, “One has to allow for a more complex configuration of agency and 
conviction. The medieval configuration allowed room for propaganda because authors 
and actors thought they served some bonum commune. Sincerity and partisanship often 
went hand in hand.”35  
To my mind this misstep follows from a distorted or miscarried poststructural 
turn: structuralism exaggerated the power of structures, certainly, but the primordial 
event or instance, which it mistakenly regarded as determined by structure in a one-way 
causal relationship, is not the thinking individual, the Cartesian soul-in-a-jar. Rather, the 
primordial event is much closer to raw praxis—what I have called in the previous chapter 
“experience”—as it exists prior to abstraction/socialization into (an) individual(s). The 
                                                 
34 “. . . a ritual never does anything—such a phrase is always shorthand for the agency of a ritual’s 
participants. . . ,” ibid., 116. 
35 Buc, “The Monster and the Critics,” 444. 
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proper theoretical correction to structuralism’s misallocation of agency is thus not to 
imagine shrewd and calculating individuals playing a bottomless game of chess through 
the medium of social mores and traditions, but to appreciate the power of habit, custom, 
and ritual in their own right, and to recognize the dynamic tension in which they exist 
both with broad structures and the coiling, irreducible rebellion of each immediately real 
moment. In considering and developing ritual as an analytic, the issues raised and 
insights offered by the medievalists considered so far are extremely important; but they 
concern predominantly the difficulty of building and deploying social scientific concepts. 
Located as we all always already are within culture, such concepts necessarily carry a 
range of assumptions along with themselves that are impossible to fully root out and 
disempower. But we can—and must—pursue at least the most overtly colonial of these 
stowaways, as Buc in particular has spurred us to do in the case of ritual. But for a 
positive conception of ritual, Koziol, Buc, and Pössel are more useful for their mistakes 
or oversights, for they have called attention to the problematic modernist dualism that 
still lurks within the notion of “ritual”—at least among many historians. My conception 
of this concept is aimed at a more detailed account of just how ritual mediates between 
raw, unindividuated praxis and the larger structures of civilization and reality generally.  
The anthropologist Talal Asad provides a key step towards this account, 
particularly in his essays “On Ritual and Discipline in Medieval Christian Monasticism,” 
and “Toward a Genealogy of the Concept of Ritual.”36 In both of these works, Asad 
                                                 
36 Talal Asad, “On Ritual and Discipline in Medieval Christian Monasticism,” Economy and Society 16 
(1987): 159–203 and Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam 
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 55–82 (Chapter 2, “Toward a Genealogy of 
the Concept of Ritual”). 
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suggests (without quite rejecting the term or criticizing other scholars’ use of it) that 
ritual might be better understood, at least in various particular contexts, as something like 
“discipline,” that is, training.37 Significantly, both of these studies focus on the examples 
provided by eleventh and twelfth century Latin monasticism: in “Ritual and Discipline,” 
Asad focuses on (ritual) techniques for training in virtues, such as are found in the Rule 
of Saint Benedict, the writings of the twelfth-century Victorines, and especially the 
writings of Saint Bernard of Clairvaux, while in “Toward a Genealogy,” he discusses the 
Rule of Benedict again and the liturgy as part of “the Benedictine program.”38 Especially 
in “Toward a Genealogy,” Asad distinguishes this idea of ritual-as-discipline not only 
from modern (as in nineteenth- and twentieth-century professional anthropology) notions 
of ritual but also from early modern (Renaissance, Elizabethan) training in manners. This 
latter distinction is notable for my purposes here because Asad associates it with just the 
kind of division between mind and body, or internal and external selves, that I have just 
called a modern distortion or misunderstanding—or at least quintessentially modern.39 
And he goes on to suggest that the change from medieval to modern ideas of ritual and 
training may well be connected to the development of a textual metaphor for human 
behavior (or even human being more broadly):  
 
Symbols, as I said, call for interpretation, and even as interpretative criteria are 
extended, so interpretations can be multiplied. Disciplinary practices, on the other 
                                                 
37 Asad, “On Ritual and Discipline,” 159–160; “Toward a Genealogy,” 62–64.  
38 Asad, “Ritual and Discipline,” 168–192; “Toward a Genealogy,” 62–65. 
39 Asad, “Toward a Genealogy,” 65–72. 
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hand, cannot be varied so easily, because learning to develop moral capabilities is 
not the same thing as learning to invent representations. This leads me to venture 
a final question: is it possible that the transformation of rites from discipline to 
symbol, from practicing distinctive virtues (passions) to representing by means of 
practices, has been one of the preconditions for the larger conceptual 
transformation of heterogeneous life (acting and being acted upon) into readable 
text?40 
 
At the same time as he relates his new notion of ritual to specific elements of Western 
history, however, Asad clearly intends the idea of ritual-as-discipline or training to be 
applicable outside of Western contexts. Or, more accurately, he intends his examples of 
ritual-as-training to dissolve the conventional reduction of “the various domains of social 
life everywhere to two fundamental categories, ritual and non-ritual,” and to dislodge the 
conventional definition of ritual as “symbolic activity as opposed to the instrumental 
behavior of everyday life.”41 
This notion of ritual as training is central to my definition for two reason, the first 
straightforwardly historical or historiographical and the second theoretical or, more aptly, 
philosophical. The first reason, of course, is that it accords so closely—indeed, is derived 
precisely from—my own particular object of historical study: Latin monasticism in the 
High Middle Ages. Here, Asad’s reading of various important primary sources for 
monastic history is supported, in its main points, by a range of historians. He himself 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 79. 
41 Asad, “Ritual and Discipline,” 194; “Toward a Genealogy,” 55, respectively. 
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cites a number, some more famous or more venerable than others.42 And there has also 
been a great deal of recent work done on the transmission of the customs and liturgy, 
particularly at Cluny as well as more broadly in “Benedictine” settings, during the tenth, 
eleventh, and twelfth centuries. Though these works often focus on questions of 
“literacy”43 and the use of documents, in terms of the methods and aims of monastic 
education they support Asad’s use—or refiguring—of the concept of ritual. A current 
leading historian of monasticism, Susan Boynton, writes that “the liturgy was in many 
ways a school within the monastery, and its incessant rhythm made liturgical training a 
constant preoccupation—the central focus of monastic education and formation.”44 In 
another article, Boynton shows how important training and competence in the liturgy was 
to the monastic self-conception, while again emphasizing the monks’ continued efforts to 
establish the correct forms of the liturgy specifically as ritual.45 And Isabelle Cochelin’s 
essay, “Besides the Book: Using the Body to Mould the Mind—Cluny in the Tenth and 
                                                 
42 For example (not exhaustive): Christopher Brooke, “Monk and Canon: Some Patterns in the Religious 
Life of the Twelfth Century,” in Monks, Hermits and the Ascetic Tradition, ed. W. J. Shields (Oxford, UK: 
Blackwell, 1985); C. van Dijk, “L’instruction et la culture des frères convers dans les premiers siècles de 
l’Ordre de Cîteaux,” Collectanea Ordinis Cisterciensium Reformatorum 24 (1964): 243–258; Georges 
Duby, The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1980); G. R. Evans, The Mind of St. Bernard (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1983); 
Timothy Fry, “The Disciplinary Measures in the Rule of Benedict,” in The Rule of St. Benedict, ed. 
Timothy Fry (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1981); Jacques Leclercq, The Love of Learning and 
the Desire for God: A Study of Monastic Culture (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 1977); 
Barbara Rosenwein, “Feudal War and Monastic Peace: Cluniac Liturgy as Ritual Aggression,” Viator 2 
(1971): 127–157; Brian Stock, “Experience, Praxis, Work, and Planning in Bernard of Clairvaux: 
Observations on the Sermones in Cantica,” in The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning, ed. J. E. 
Murdoch and E. D. Sylla (Boston, MA: Springer, 1975). 
43 My sense of terminology calls for “literality” here, but as these scholars all use “literacy” I felt compelled 
to follow their lead, at least in discussing their own work. 
44 Susan Boynton, “Training for the Liturgy as a Form of Monastic Education,” in Medieval Monastic 
Education, ed. George Gerzoco and Carolyn Muessig, 7–20 (New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2001), 16. 
45 Susan Boynton, “Oral Transmission of Liturgical Practice in the Eleventh-Century Customaries of 
Cluny,” in Understanding Monastic Practices of Oral Communication, ed. Steven Vanderputten (Belgium: 
Brepols, 2011), 67–83. 
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Eleventh Centuries” focuses on the Cluniac emphasis on the body as the medium through 
which oblates (children) could be educated by the monks in behavior, discipline, and 
ritual.46 
Besides this basic congruence with modern historical research, this understanding 
of ritual also accords well with, to be frank, what I need the concept to do; that is, 
develop a resolutely poststructuralist account of just what “it” is that mediates between 
raw, unindividuated praxis and the larger structures of civilization and reality generally, 
and how whatever it turns out to be does so. The intellectual and bibliographical context 
of this account is truly immense, but a brief consideration of three important thinkers on 
this question will suffice for my purposes. These scholars—Heidegger, Bourdieu, and 
Foucault—have suggested that practice is, in some sense, the protean substance of reality, 
preceding such observable phenomena as individuals, ideas, communication, professions, 
tasks, skills, and so on. Heidegger’s concept of Dasein described human being as a 
complex of means-and-ends that, by its essential activity as such, revealed a whole and 
continually transforming world, which of course played a reciprocal, that is, constitutive, 
role in suggesting various means and ends to Dasein. Time, as the perception and 
performance of the distance between all these various means and ends, was rendered 
possible by Dasein’s essential lack of essence, and thus paradoxically unifies Dasein 
throughout its world by virtue of Dasein’s very absence or emptiness.47 Bourdieu 
                                                 
46 Isabelle Cochelin, “Besides the Book: Using the Body to Mould the Mind—Cluny in the Tenth and 
Eleventh Centuries,” in Medieval Monastic Education, 21–35, esp. 26–30. Other important works on this 
topic include Cochelin, “Peut-on parler de noviciat à Cluny pour les Xe-XIe siècles?” Revue Mabillon n.s. 
9 (1998): 17–52 and Boynton, Shaping A Monastic Identity: Liturgy and History at the Imperial Abbey of 
Farfa, 1000–1125 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006). 
47 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1962). 
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developed this concept into his own of the habitus, a set of structuring structures 
embodied in or through the individual.48 Foucault, too, proposed a worldview in which 
practice was organized into individuals of a certain type by non-individual institutions, be 
they prisons, hospitals, schools, or something more abstract and less overt, like a 
particular worldview, habit, or tradition.  
Furthermore, each of these thinkers posits a mediating arrangement that, in effect, 
produces finished products (individuals) from raw materials (pure practice) in a highly-
systematized fashion. In the course, and to some extent by the means, of doing so, these 
arrangements or structures also reproduced themselves. For Heidegger, it is das Man (the 
They or the One), something like (a) Dasein but far larger and far emptier. The They 
exists only when, where, and to whatever extent Dasein acts in the modes offered it by 
the They, as a kind of baseline, unthinking assumption about what Dasein should be/do. 
It is an arrangement of means-and-ends, like Dasein, that can reveal a world, but it is so 
empty of self-awareness, of real engagement with the world, that this “revealing” is in 
fact a hiding. The They anesthetizes Dasein, solving the troubling question of one’s role 
in the world by showing that world only as obvious, uninteresting, and simple: in other 
words, as something that makes no demands or claim on Dasein.49 Bourdieu, too, 
suggests the habitus is strongly determined by a wide range of institutions that come to 
fruition in it, while Foucault, for his part, considers modern disciplinarity as a new 
attempt to make people—bodies—into particular kinds of useful tools or conduits for a 
                                                 
48 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Standford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 52–66. 
49 Heidegger, Being and Time, 163–168.  
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depersonalized power.50 Indeed, he offers the ultimate metaphor for what all three of 
these thinkers suggest is the ultimate driver of their mediating, individual-producing 
arrangements: the panopticon, in which prisoners behave as though they are being 
watched but never actually are.51 In a fundamental sense, no individual or group of 
individuals acts: there are only patterns which precede every individual and thus always 
act from behind, act through, people, in order to reproduce themselves.52  
Bourdieu, and especially Foucault, in the course of elaborating their though, 
brought Heidegger into conversation with another unlikely tradition: that of Marxism. 
Marx suggested that the capitalist ultimately served not himself, but the abstract principle 
or phenomenon of capital. At the basis of Marx’s thought were not capitalists as actors in 
control of history, exploiting the proletariat, pursuing their own ends, but the inhuman 
force of capital which used the bourgeoisie to increase itself no less than it used the 
proletariat for that same purpose. This idea would be developed more fully by such 
thinkers as Althusser, who served as a mentor to the young Foucault, and who attempted 
to thematize and describe ideology through his concept of Ideological State Apparatuses: 
cultural forms, habits of thought, and institutions of social training integral to reproducing 
the relations (means, conditions) of production. Althusser defined ideology as “a 
representation of the imaginary relations of individuals to their real conditions of 
                                                 
50 Bourdieu, Logic of Practice, ibid; Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 2nd ed., 
trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1995; Fr. original published in 1975), 135–141. 
51 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 195–230. 
52 Frits Staal, “The Meaninglessness of Ritual,” Numen 26 (1979), 2–22. 
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existence.”53 He further argues that ideology is in all senses material, in that it inhabits 
material institutions, individuals, practices, and objects, and that through its institutions it 
creates the possibility of agency in individual subjects. Literally, ideology is a set of 
embodied relations that, through their embodiment in individuals, recreate themselves 
continuously in new individuals—an individual being that which exists only to the extent 
that it serves as a conduit for (the) ideology in this way. 
In summarizing these three thinkers on this topic, we have come across terms 
such as “professions,” “tasks,” “skills,” “institutions,” “disciplinarity/discipline,” 
“cultural forms,” and “social training.” This nebulous terminological field refers 
primarily to prescribed behaviors, involving movements of the body, speech and 
discourse, the manipulation of non-linguistic signs, and mental or emotional states or 
postures. By “prescribed,” I mean that their forms, the specific way-they-are-
done/said/felt, is established and stipulated outside and independent of the individual. We 
are not to do this or that in whatever way we prefer or decide, but in a way that is given to 
us.54 To include ritual, at least when understood as a form of training, rather than 
abstractly denotative or symbolic behavior, as a member of this category (this category 
carrying along with it all the broader theoretical context just discussed) is no particularly 
strange intellectual move. In doing so, we avoid the two-level, colonialist problem. We 
                                                 
53 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes towards an Investigation,” accessed 
at http://marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1970/ideology.htm on April, 27th 2012. Translated by Ben 
Brewster, first published in 1970. Emphasis my own. 
54 Obviously a veritable abyss of questions about free will and constructivism opens beneath us here; let us 
bridge it by saying these actions are generally accepted, quite consciously by many social actors, as 
prescribed. We recognize them as such. Thus even if we are truly and entirely determined puppets or 
whatever sort, we may distinguish between what we do and do not recognize as prescribed. 
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side-step the mind/body split. We begin to clarify what ritual is and how it works. And 
perhaps we approach Buc’s “more complex configuration of agency and conviction.”  
There is one more body of work to discuss in the course of developing my 
definition of ritual as an analytic. Heidegger, Bourdieu, and Foucault all rejected the 
clean modernist splits between mind and body, spirit and matter, and subject and object. 
But though all seemed to grasp the major implications these rejections bore for the 
operation and use of signs, and for the philosophy of such, none devoted much work 
explicitly to developing and establishing these implications. For this, we should turn to 
the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, John Deely, and semiotic anthropology. 
This development presents no great intellectual challenge, for R. J. Parmentier 
and Webb Keane, two major semiotic anthropologists, treat the concept of ritual quite 
openly. Parmentier, discussing the work of founding semiotic anthropologist Michael 
Silverstein in order to outline the approaches and assumptions of the subfield, first argues 
that, as actually encountered in daily life, language is much more, and much more often, 
indexical than it is symbolic.55 This is to say that, while words considered abstractly are 
the main metaphor for Peirce’s third type of signifying, that of the symbol, in that they 
refer by convention to some other concept, it is far more common for words to be used 
with a heavy or dominant indexical element. He quotes Silverstein as follows: 
 
But it is precisely at the level of pragmatics that the coding of seemingly arbitrary 
chunks of referential ‘reality’ becomes clear. For lexical items are abbreviations 
                                                 
55 Parmentier, “Theoretical Foundations of Semiotic Anthropology,” 16–19. 
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for semantic complexes made up of semantico-referential primes in grammatical 
constructions . . . together with all of the indexical modalities of meaning that 
make the functional result unexpected.”56 
 
There is a wealth of specialized terminology at work here, but the essential point is that 
words and the longer discursive units they comprise, when instantiated in specific 
speech-acts (“pragmatics” refers to the circumstances and nature of such instantiations) 
rather than merely contemplated as examples in the linguist, semiotician, or philosopher’s 
study, depend so much upon the nested layers of context in which they necessarily appear 
(of the individual speaker and listener, of immediate time and place, of social position 
including race, class, gender, etc., of linguistic register as well as of language, of 
historical period, and so on) that their signifying operation is always crucially indexical. 
The saying imputed to Louis XIV, “l’état, c’est moi,” presents a simple example: just as 
“moi,” a personal pronoun and thus obviously an index, could theoretically refer to 
anyone but in fact (in context) refers quite specifically to Louis and Louis alone, so too 
does “l’état,” which, again theoretically, could mean “state” as referred to in, say, twenty-
first-century French political theory, in fact refers to “state” as conceived in the 
seventeenth century, more specifically as conceived in seventeenth-century France, and 
yet more specifically as conceived in the mind of Louis XIV himself. The point of all this 
is not to deny, of course, a more general, abstract, symbolic meaning to words; rather, it 
is that, while words do indeed possess the capacity for such meaning (and could not 
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function if they did not), in the vast majority of cases in which any given word is actually 
encountered (in the street, in a book, at the movies), it is not intended in the full flowering 
of its potential for context-denying abstraction, but refers principally to some object 
correlated to it by the actual circumstances of its pragmatic use. In fact, this indexical 
aspect is vitally necessary as a winnowing of all the possible symbolic signification of 
words; it is my successful parsing of the indexical aspect of the word “cat” in the 
sentence “don’t let the cat jump onto the counter” that communicates to me to not allow 
this particular, actually present cat to literally jump onto this very counter. 
This point, so concerned with the pragmatics of speech and of semiosis more 
generally, leads naturally into Silverstein’s distinction between pragmatics and semantics, 
on the one hand, and metapragmatics and metasemantics, on the other.57 Metapragmatics, 
the most relevant term for the current discussion, refers to “talk about the pragmatics of 
speech.”58 Thus if I write something about where Louis XIV was when he said 
something, especially if that physical context relates to the semiotic act of saying, discuss 
the volume or tone of his voice, etc., I am discussing metapragmatics (conversely, if I 
gloss his speech content itself, that is metasemantics). Crucially, while metasemantics 
maintains a basic congruence with semantics (speaking about speaking is still speaking), 
the same is not true of metapragmatics, wherein I talk about an action (even though that 
action is itself using signs, I am discussing it as an action, rather than what the signs 
produced and manipulated in the action refer to or how they refer to it). It is from this 
conception of metapragmatics that Silverstein’s conception of ritual arises: 
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Metapragmatic discourse can take advantage of built-in metapragmatic forms 
available in the linguistic code . . . or generate complex patterns of linguistic 
expression, often following specific genre rules, that have implicit metapragmatic 
force—ritual being the best-known example. Silverstein argues that these ‘poetic’ 
(in the Jakobsonian sense) constructions (chants, prayers, oratory, charms, 
proverbs, liturgies, etc.) often take the form of indexical icons, that is, of 
diagrammatic signs whose organizational arrangement either resembles the extra-
linguistic realities of the situation (the hierarchical order of a ritual procession, for 
example) or reflexively mirrors the linguistic event, and signal some aspect of the 
performance context.”59 
 
Parmentier then quotes Silverstein at length to describe the “poetic function” at work in 
ritual: 
 
‘Poetic function’ consists of a set of indexical relationships of utterance-segment 
to utterance-segment that emerge from a superimposition of cardinal (not ordinal) 
metricality onto denotational text: the denotationally entextualized event being 
measured out in countable units of specific linguistic characteristics—number of 
syllables, number of syntactic phrase- or expression-tokens of a particular type, 
                                                 
59 Ibid., 20. Here Parmentier draws on Silverstein, “Cultural Prerequisites to Grammatical Analysis,” in 
Linguistics and Anthropology, ed. M. Saville-Troike (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 
1977), 139–151; Silverstein, “The Limits of Awareness,” Sociolinguistic Working Papers 84 (1981); 
Silverstein, “Metaforces of Power in Traditional Oratory,” Lecture, Department of Anthropology, Yale 
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etc.—every such unit is locatable with respect to every other in the totality, and 
the superimposition of many such principles of metricality determines an overall 
architectonic structure of the text. . . . From the point of view of regimenting the 
event-nature of language-in-use, nonlinguistic context tends toward zero 
importance, and linguistic context—co-text—tends toward saturating the relevant 
contextual presuppositions on how form-tokens occur in event-segments at this 
lowest stratum of metapragmatic-pragmatic relationship. Denotational-text-
internal metrical cohesion of form-tokens thus becomes the determining 
regimentation of their discursive event-status, serving in other words as an 
implicit metapragmatic function through a special metapragmatic indexicality.60  
 
Again, the full dizzying array of semitoic anthropology’s Peircean terminology reveals 
itself. But the essential point is not too hard to grasp. First, all the various concrete 
sayings (“utterance-segments”) that make up a given complex of prescribed behavior (a 
ritual) as it is actually performed at any particular time bear indexical relations to one 
another because of their explicit co-existence in the ritual as such.61 The ritual thus 
operates as a kind of map, charting the various (again, primarily indexical) interrelations 
of the utterances. This particular observation builds on the basic structuralist or linguistic 
point that statements take some of their meaning from the conversation or other extended 
                                                 
60 Parmentier, “Theoretical Foundations of Semiotic Anthropology,” 20–21, quoting Silverstein 
“Metapragmatic Discourse and Metapragmatic Function,” in Reflexive Language: Reported Speech and 
Metapragmatics, ed. J. A. Lucy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 50–51. 
61 Remember that indices signify through correspondence or correlation; in the example of a ritual, the 
various “utterance-segments” that make up the ritual are obviously indexical to one another in that they 
occur together as part of the ritual 
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unit of discourse in which they are encountered: in effect, though the individual texts 
performed in the various utterance-segments of a ritual may have originally been 
composed quite independently, merely by speaking these texts in close proximity, and 
especially within the special realm of the ritual, they are posited as commentary on or 
response to one another.62 Through the carefully established distinctions between these 
different segments (in the Latin monastic context, for example, between a psalm and an 
antiphon or respond, or between a homily and a passage of scripture), as well as through 
other particular aspects of their delivery (meter, melody, different speakers), the precision 
of the ritual-as-map is increased many times over; the resolution is increased as 
individual segments and subsegments and sub-subsegments become clearly 
distinguished. Ultimately, then, the ritual not only functions as a map or guide to the 
abstract arrangement of the texts that comprise it, but, as a complex of these texts, even 
governs specifically the concrete saying (and doing) of the actual performers involved in 
any (and every) particular instantiation of the ritual. That is, the ritual provides an 
“implicit metapragmatic function”: at least in the (theoretically authoritative, ethically 
imperative) case of the ritual, it suggests or demands that each speaker and actor should 
speak or act at a certain way and a certain time, perhaps with a certain mental state or 
posture, and with a cognizance also of where their utterance/performance-segment should 
emerge within a field of others.  
Understood in this sense, ritual is not merely training, but training in the use of 
signs, in metapragmatics. It can thus be taken also as instruction in what the 
                                                 
62 For an example/discussion of this process in monastic liturgical practice, see Boynton, Shaping A 
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contemporary semiotic anthropologist Webb Keane has called “semiotic ideology.” Over 
the course of many works, but most systematically and straightforwardly in his 
“Semiotics and the Social Analysis of Material Things,” Keane deploys Peircean 
semiotics to develop both the historicity and plurality of semiosis.63 In his view Peirce’s 
semiotics is particularly vital for this point because it brings semiosis or sign-functioning 
into direct contact with the physical, material, historical world. It does this both by 
concentrating much attention on the actual concrete situations in which signs operate, and 
also developing a detailed account of how signs signify, one which, unlike the Saussurean 
semiology that has been so influential in the twentieth century, does not bracket off the 
particular function of individual signs in favor of an abstract account of langue.64  
Keane begins by considering the qualisign. The qualisign is a “quality” as it 
functions as a sign.65 It requires embodiment, but the terms of this embodiment are not 
essentially related to the signifying of the qualisign. The most common example is a 
color. Red is obviously a quality objects might possess, and as a quality may signify (thus 
becoming a qualisign) wide ranges of other objects or ideas; yet, of course, red is never 
encountered entirely on its own, but must appear as paint on a house, the skin of an apple, 
and so on. This means that the qualisign in itself is “unrealized potential,” for because it 
cannot even exist on its own it certainly cannot function as an actual sign on its own. It 
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64 Ibid., 412–413. 
65 The qualisign is part of Peirce’s trio of trichotomies of signs. The first concerns the relationship of the 
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thus always requires some instantiation in—or “bundling” with—other qualities. This 
means that there is always some semiotic bleed-through occurring, wherein the signifying 
of the redness of the apple becomes bound up and even confused with the signifying of 
the apple’s edibility, its growing on trees, and/or its cultural association with the story of 
Snow White. Moreover, the qualisign as a qualisign can only ever be an icon, never an 
index or a symbol: the color red signifies, when it signifies, by appearing red. It thus 
signifies by resemblance, itself an “underdetermined” mode that virtually always requires 
“some degree of conventionality” (in Keane’s words) to actually signify (that is, to refer 
to something beyond just the color red).66 The key point here is that  
 
Resemblance can only be with respect to certain features, and therefore usually 
depends on some degree of conventionality. . . . To determine what features count 
towards resemblance require some criteria. These involve the articulation of the 
iconic with other semiotic dimensions—and thus, I would argue, become 
thoroughly enmeshed with the dynamics of social value and authority.67 
 
This is the essence of Keane’s point: Peirce’s semiotics, both through its highly-
developed account of how signs work in and through discrete events in the material 
world, and of how they always refer not only to other signs but in fact consistently leave 
an opening or potentiality that demands additional signs without stipulating exactly what 
these signs should be, suggests a powerful role for historical cultural conventions, not 
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only in the operation of symbols, that is, in abstract contexts of intellectual reflection, but 
also in the operation of icons and indices, and thus in the myriad of unconscious, 
reflexive, momentary sign-uses that comprise day-to-day experience. Keane next uses an 
interesting comparison of Marx’s concept of labor and Bourdieu’s of connoisseurship, in 
Peircean terms, to develop this point in relation to indices: in both cases, objects (either 
of labor or of the connoisseur’s appraisal/enjoyment) are shown to be most powerful in 
the phenomenon of naturalization. That is, rather than being commonly understood as 
products of habituated experience mediated through the individual as, for example, 
habitus, these objects are taken to be expressions of some innate quality of the worker or 
connoisseur. This is a certain stance on these objects as indices, then, which quite 
obviously supports specific notions of class and ideology.68 
The meaning of “semiotic ideology” thus becomes apparent: Keane defines it as 
“basic assumptions about what signs are and how they function in the world.”69 If this 
sounds like an issue only for intellectual elites, Keane is quick to point out the 
implications such a ideology possesses: “It determines, for instance, what people will 
consider the role that intentions play in signification to be, what kinds of possible agent . . 
. exist to which acts of signification might be imputed, whether signs are arbitrarily or 
necessarily linked to their objects, and so forth.”70 I would even go further; besides 
questions of intentionality, agency, and subjectivity and objectivity, which have immense 
impacts on all aspects of individual and social life, the way that we understand, especially 
                                                 
68 Ibid., 415–417. 
69 Ibid., 419. 
70 Ibid. 
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pre- or unconsciously, signs to operate will determine at the very most basic level how 
we collect and integrate information about the world. Such an ideology is the most 
immediate and intimate structure thrown over experience, and will echo upwards from 
the individual moment or event, through the individual itself, and into all manner of 
groups, traditions, and explicit ideologies. Therefore, the notion of semiotic ideology 
offers us a blueprint for studying material and cultural phenomena, through a fully 
historicist lens, in their fundamental and irreducible integration. If it is possible to move 
beyond the modernist epistemological paradigm of radically divided matter and spirit, 
without sacrificing all we have learned, and into a truly informed historical materialism, 
this is the way. 
With all this said, it may seem presumptuous to call the following definition of 
ritual “mine”—I do so not to claim the insights that have informed it or whatever value it 
might have as my property, but only to take responsibility for my own readings and the 
analytic that has resulted. If my definition does truly offer anything of its own, it is likely 
a particular grouping and configuration of the various ideas and approaches I have just 
discussed. Without further ado, I present the following formal definition of ritual: 
 
a complex unit of signifying behavior (or “sign-uses”), often involving multiple 
participants, set aside from the day-to-day business of living, which has the side-
effect of distinguishing and (re)creating a community and, depending on the often 
adversarial interactions of various institutions and individuals, sometimes of 
communicating some message. 
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This definition obviously involves some hedges and, in some ways, suggests certain 
problematic notions I have challenged in the foregoing discussion. I will address these 
briefly. 
My discussions of Peircean semiotics and semiotic anthropology, hopefully, have 
made clear just how large the distinction is between, on the one hand, “signifying 
behavior” and signification in general, and, on the other, a symbolic message rendered in 
linguistic terms. The latter is but one small subset of the former. So it bears repeating that 
while my definition of ritual can accommodate the decoder ring approach to ritual, 
translating observed pageantry into axiomatic statements about reality, society, power, 
transcendence, etc., it does not assume that the event/behavior studied as ritual will be 
amendable to such an analysis—in fact it assumes that vanishingly few will be. At the 
same time, however, analysis of rituals in accord with my definition may often involve a 
great deal of what could be mistaken for such translation. Peircean semiotics are neither 
intuitive nor widely integrated into the perception and thinking of either laymen or 
scholars, and so discussing a certain element of ritual signifying behavior, for example, in 
its iconicity or as a dicent indexical legisign, may resemble translating the element into a 
new, “truer” formulation. But the essence of this analysis is not to say what a ritual 
means, but to expand and deepen our understanding of what it does, and of precisely how 
it signifies. And “complex” here means only that the ritual is divisible into many 
individually coherent and theoretically independent texts and acts; it does not establish 
any minimum bar of complexity, conventionally understood, for the identification of 
social phenomena as ritual. 
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This definition may also appear to contravene Talal Asad in its reference to 
behavior “set aside from the day-to-day business of living.” I have not gone so far as to 
say that ritual behavior is not useful or pragmatic, that it does not accomplish anything or 
is not concerned with whether or not it accomplishes everything. Yet I am not 
comfortable completely rejecting the “opposition” of ritual behavior to “the instrumental 
behavior of everyday life.” In most examples of ritual that spring to mind, from early 
medieval crownings to US presidents swearing their oath of office, there are some 
important behavioral elements that are not directly related to accomplishing pragmatic or 
instrumental tasks. Moreover, in various ways, participants in and observers of rituals 
often allow that what they are doing is not a common or everyday task. It is special, set 
aside as its own task, even if the precise nature of this setting aside is not really 
thematized by participants. It would be very interesting to observe and interview an 
elderly Russian woman, for example, as she goes out to the street market, does her 
shopping, and, on the way home, ducks into a small church to pray before a sequence of 
lavishly decorated icons, perhaps kneeling before them, kissing them, lighting candles, 
and making a monetary donation. How does her behavior reinforce or undermine the idea 
that one stop on this itinerary is not like the others? What would she say if the question 
were put to her? I do not claim to know, but I am willing to venture some trace of a 
distinction, at least, would suggest itself in her unreflective behavior, or in asking her to 
discuss that behavior, or both. Obviously this particular issue remains murky; it is 
probably the one about which I am the most undecided; so I have left this part of the 
definition, to an extent, underdetermined. I hope that my research and that of others can 
help to clarify the matter. 
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The question of the relationship between ritual and community, too, is interesting 
and not decisively answered. As in the case of pragmatic versus special or useless 
behavior, I am left with my general sense that most rituals gather people together within a 
specific, solemn event, and that most rituals involve special officiants, sometimes of 
several different types or ranks. I would not say that the purpose of the ritual is to 
establish or maintain (the) community, for this supposes too cynical and instrumental an 
intention for the actual people conducting the affair. It seems more likely that rituals 
require communities, and perhaps play some role in perpetuating and maintaining them. 
In this sense it would not be that the ritual does exists for the sake of the community, but 
that the community exists for the sake of the ritual.71 Like the rest of my definition, these 
remain preliminary hypotheses. Finally, the last element of the definition, concerning 
conflicting efforts to propagate particular interpretations of rituals, whether roughly 
contemporaneously the their performance or not, should not require further comment. In 
including it, I agree essentially with Buc and Pössel about the contested, post hoc 
propagation of accounts of ritual and its conduct, success, and failure.  
My definition of ritual, therefore, is based on a postructuralist conception both of 
society and reality generally. This account has been leavened with Peircean semiotics, 
especially as developed by semiotic anthropology and John Deely. This second tradition 
of thought, in my view, accords fundamentally with the metaphysics of postructuralism 
but has yet to be fully integrated with it; even today poststructuralism maintains at least a 
ghost or unconscious habit of the cultural/material distinction, as suggested by Webb 
                                                 
71 Though not precisely Staal’s formulation, his article “The Meaninglessness of Ritual” was crucial to my 
own insight in this matter.  
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Keane and my own brief discussions above.72 Peircean semiotics addresses this lingering 
modernist metaphysics by bringing the functioning of signs into contact with the material 
and the particular. Within this blend, ritual serves as a key example of the various types 
of processes by which raw praxis or semiosis is structured into what we more commonly 
recognize as individuals, communities, institutions, ideologies, and so on: into self-
sustaining, structuring structures. To study ritual in this sense, then, is to study the 
elemental self-fashioning of everything human. 
A final note: while this definition of ritual is intended to be broadly applicable, by 
which I mean I hope that other scholars will feel inclined to test or at least consider its 
value outside European, Christian, medieval, and monastic contexts, it is not strictly 
static. Human self-fashioning in its social totality is a highly complex process, and ritual 
is only one part of this fashioning; there is thus a range of variances within the different 
components of my definition that will have important effects on how rituals actually 
function in various contexts. The tension between these variances and the notion of a 
single analytic broadly applicable across historical contexts is an elemental one for 
human inquiry generally, and is to be sought and heightened rather than avoided. In the 
case of my project, a key part of this definition is its flexibility in particular as regards the 
medium of ritual. There are many ways of conceptualizing what the medium of ritual may 
be. I focus particularly on the dialectical and semiotic process whereby raw praxis or 
experience is synthesized into individuals, and specifically as mapped onto the spectrum 
that runs from orality to literality. As discussed previously, preliminary research from 
                                                 
72 Keane, “Semiotics and the Social Analysis,” 409–411. 
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several different fields has suggested—and to some extent substantiated—the idea that 
consciousness in a neurological sense may be restructured by movement along this 
spectrum; in short, that individuals and groups living in highly literalate societies may 
think and even behave, preconsciously as well as in reflective awareness, in a 
fundamentally different way from those living in primarily oral ones. What this means for 
my definition is that the media whereby ritual is transmitted, and moreover the role 
within ritual played by different media, may exercise a decisive effect in how ritual does 
what it does, that is, form communities and train both individuals and groups in the use of 
signs. My project is thus to relate the broader theoretical conception of ritual I have 
presented here to both the specific media technologies and institutional setting of Latin 
monasticism and to Christian theology and the understanding of text and of writing it 
included. I will demonstrate that many key elements of Christian theology, as developed 
in the Latin realm, were quite extensively bound up with written texts as such, and 
moreover that the Latin monastic tradition, at least by the tenth and eleventh century, 
explicitly understood itself as a discipline and training in the use of signs. This interplay 
between theology and ritual, sharing a basic conception of and approach to text and 
writing and, crucially, located within a specific institutional setting, produced a 
distinctive semiotic ideology. My suspicion, which for openness’s sake I will share but 
cannot at this time even begin to substantiate, is that this particular semiotic ideology has 
been absolutely decisive for European, Christian civilization—that is, for the West—
especially in the development of the complex of technologies, behaviors, and ideologies 
that we call modernity. Such grandiose claims obviously lie well beyond the scope of my 
project; my work here in describing this semiotic ideology and the specific history of its 
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appearance and spread, wherein high medieval monasticism played a decisive role, is 
merely a first step. 
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CHAPTER IV: HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
 
Because my project takes Cluny as a case study for the development of literate culture 
and power, in a certain sense Cluny itself is not really the subject. Nevertheless, a short 
consideration of the historiography of the great Burgundian monastery is certainly in 
order.1 I first present what Dominique Iogna-Prat calls the “received history” of Cluny 
(this nomenclature evincing his caution or even skepticism towards the narrative), before 
surveying briefly some of the key debates into which that history has been drawn. 
Cluny was founded in 909 or 910 by William III (the Pious), a great magnate of 
Auvergne, Mâcon, and Aquitaine, referred to in contemporary documents variously as 
count, duke, and prince. William gave the monastery a villa near Mâcon, renounced all 
rights over it, and gave it over to the protection of the pope. In addition to this, the 
community was to have the privilege of electing its own abbot upon the death of Berno, 
the holy man (already abbot of several communities) established as its first leader by 
William himself. The monastery was blessed with a series of prestigious and active 
abbots, who, benefitting from a succession of key papal privileges, became patrons of 
monastic reform throughout Francia, Italy, and Spain. These abbots also presided over a 
great run of donations in land that made the monastery, by the end of the tenth century, 
                                                 
1 For this consideration, I have found long essays by Barbara Rosenwein and Dominique Iogna-Prat 
surveying the vast body of Cluniac scholarship especially useful. See Rosenwein, “The Lineage of Cluniac 
Studies,” in Rhinoceros Bound: Cluny in the Tenth Century (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1982), 3–29 and Iogna-Prat, “A Monastic Church within the Church,” in Order and Exclusion: 
Cluny and Christendom Face Heresy, Judaism, and Islam (1000–1150), trans. Graham Edward Roberts 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002; Fr. original published 1998), 23–95. 
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the possessor of a truly immense estate as well as of numerous parish churches. In the 
early eleventh century, the monastery began to produce an increasingly coherent body of 
abbatial hagiography, which provided an ideological core for the nascent community 
while also embellishing and advancing the prestige of the office of its abbot. Additional 
papal bulls slowly expanded the sense of a juridically distinct Ecclesia cluniacensis, 
building on the foundation provided by decades of reform leadership exercised in and 
through other monasteries. Especially under the abbacy of Hugh I (the Great, of Semur), 
who served from 1049 to 1109, the property rights and observances of the community 
were codified in cartularies (collections of charters) and customaries (written elaborations 
on the Rule as observed at a particular house).  
The expansion of Cluny’s privileges, under the aegis of the popes, as well as of its 
territorial sway, driven by the prestige and charisma of its abbots, played a major role in 
the extension of reform ideas about the independence of church offices and property from 
lay elites, not to mention the independence of monasteries from bishops. Especially in the 
latter half of the eleventh century, the monastery’s community grew vastly in size and its 
geographical reach—its role in the foundation and reform of other houses—extended 
beyond West Francia and Italy, into reconquista Spain, England, and the emerging Holy 
Roman Empire. The monastery also participated in reform in high politics (Hugh of 
Semur operated as an intermediary between Henry IV and Gregory VIII at Canossa), and 
provided many candidates for reform episcopacies, the new Gregorian curia, and even 
the papacy itself in the person of Urban II. During the abbacy of Pontius of Melgueil 
(1109–1122), Cluny underwent some kind of still poorly understood “schism,” likely 
rooted both in the local politics of castellan families and the monastery’s own 
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surrounding burg as well as in the grand intrigues of the papacy and continental reform. 
The monastery was also challenged in the early twelfth century by the lively counter-
example—and criticism—of new reformed monastic orders, chiefly the Cistercians. 
These communities took exception to several aspects of the Cluniac life, including the 
richness and grandiosity of the monastery and its various churches and subordinates, its 
emphasis on the liturgy to the diminishment or omission of physical labor, and its strict 
use of silence and sign language. The Cistercians also presented a new model of 
organization for their many houses, based on councils (general chapters) of 
representatives from all their constituent communities meeting regularly, which 
contrasted sharply with the still rather ad hoc, personal, or even abbatial absolutist 
Cluniac model of leadership. Ultimately, however, especially under the abbacy of Peter 
the Venerable (1122–1156), Cluny returned to internal harmony, reorganized its finances 
and material base, and laid the foundations for a successful imitation of these new 
organizational innovations, to be itself realized only in the first years of the thirteenth 
century. 
This account, the work of many hands over many decades, has more recently been 
called into question (as is the fashion of our times) as too pat, too self-assured, too 
teleological, accepting scattered polemical or ideological declarations from the period in 
question as unambiguous statements of fact and exaggerating innovations and 
uniqueness. A complete, systematic, “reformed” account of the history of Cluny during 
its first three centuries has not yet appeared,2 and one might reasonably wonder if such an 
                                                 
2 Dietrich W. Poeck’s Cluniacensis Ecclesia: Der cluniacensische Klosterverband (10.–12 Jahrhundert) 
(Munich, Germany: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1998), which combines a nuanced discussion of the nature of 
Cluniac association with close analysis of the relevant papal bulls and a detailed catalogue of houses 
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account could possibly find acceptance among those who call for it, or at least whose 
work has problematized the older, retrograde narrative. For now, for my purposes—
which are certainly not to produce such a reformed account, but rather to study the play 
and development of certain modes of thought, training, perception, and power observable 
within the nebulous context of “Cluny”—it is no great challenge to operate in this 
broken, fluid, fertile field.  
This “received history” emerged through more than a century of professional 
historians grappling with the concept and source record of Cluny. These scholars often 
struggled over the validity and preeminence of various key distinctions, the stratigraphy 
of which remains illuminating. Sometimes, these distinctions center on the regional or 
even national identity of Cluny; along these lines historians have argued that the 
monastery, as part of the Catholic Church, brought light to the darkness and barbarism of 
the Middle Ages,3 or that it hindered the consolidation of the Holy Roman Empire and, 
by extension, the German national state,4 or that it and the Lotharingian monastery of 
Gorze represented alternate models of reform competing for influence and allegiance 
across the former Carolingian patrimony in the tenth and eleventh centuries.5 Other 
debates have concerned Cluny’s relationship to the predominant historiographical 
                                                 
attached to Cluny, probably comes closest. Along these lines see also Joachim Wollasch, Cluny—Licht der 
Welt: Aufstieg und Niedergang der klösterlichen Gemeinschaft (Dusseldorf, Germany: Artemis & Winkler, 
1996). 
3 Prosper Lorain, Histoire de l’abbaye de Cluny depuis sa fondation jusqu’à sa destruction à l’époque de la 
Révolution française (Paris, France: 1839); François Cucherat, Cluny au onzième siècle, son influence 
religieuse, intellectuell et politique (Mâcon, France: 1850); J. Henri Pignot, Histoire de l’Ordre de Cluny 
depuis la fondation d l’abbaye jusqu’à la mort de Pierre-le-Vénérable (909–1157) (Autun, France: 1868). 
4 Albert Brackmann “Die politische Wirkung der Kluniazensischen Bewegung,” Historische Zeitschrift 139 
(1929): 34–47. 
5 Kassius Hallinger, Gorze–Kluny. Studien zu den Monastischen Lebensformen und Gegensätzen im 
Hochmittelalter, 2 vols. (Rome, Italy: Herder, 1950) 
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constructs of its age, primarily reform and the rise of the (Gregorian) papacy,6 as well as 
the vexed question of feudalism, feudal culture, feudal society, and so on.7 And still 
others have wrestled with the assumed tension between worldly engagement—primarily 
in politics, power, and property—and religious doctrine, culture, and spirituality at play 
in the history of the monastery.8  
If many, or even all, of these distinctions seem crudely drawn to the postmodern 
historian, it bears remembering that they are the work of scholars who possessed real 
expertise and who worked closely with the source material, often over the courses of 
entire lifetimes. The key, therefore, sometimes lost in the essentially youthful blush of 
revisionism and deconstruction, is not to throw out the baby with the bathwater. In the 
spirit of the idiom, therefore, I will now review the most important of these distinctions 
(that is, those with the greatest enduring purchase on the existing scholarship), showing 
both their missteps and what they still contribute today to a study of Cluny—specifically, 
to my study of Cluny. 
Because my project studies Cluny’s institutional and cultural role in the history of 
media technologies and their application to the exercise of power, I focus here on Cluny’s 
relationship to other monasteries and to the individuals it, as an institution, encountered 
                                                 
6 H. E. J. Cowdrey, Cluniacs and the Gregorian Reform (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1970). 
7 Ernst Wener, Die gesellschaftlichen Grundlagen der Kolsterreform im 11. Jahrhundert (Berlin, Germany: 
Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1953); Georges Duby, La société aux XIe et XIIe siècles dans la 
région mâconaise (Paris, France: Armand Colin, 1953). 
8 Carl Erdmann, The Origin of the Idea of the Crusade, trans. M. W. Baldwin and W. Goffart (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977; Gr. original published 1935), esp. 68–72; Erdmann, “Das ottonische 
Reich als Imperium Romanum,” Deutsches Archiv für Geschichte des Mittelalters 6 (1943): 412–441; 
Gerhart Ladner, Theologie und Politik vor dem Investiturstreit. Abendmahlstreit, Kirchenreform, Cluni und 
Heinrich III (Baden, Austria: R. M. Roher, 1936); Gerd Tellenbach, Church, State, and Christian Society at 
the Time of the Investiture Contest, trans. R. F. Bennett (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1966; Gr. original 
published 1936). 
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both within and beyond itself (that is, both monks and laymen). From this perspective, 
the greatest historiographical issue is obviously “reform,” an immense term and concept 
that, particularly in terms of historiography, exists in an interesting parallel to the 
ultimate bugbear of medievalists, feudalism.9 Both are ways of grappling with and 
categorizing social (as well as political, economic, and cultural) change or rupture. Both 
have provided key demarcations for the periodizing of the high Middle Ages.10 
Moreover, the two have often been related in various ways, sometimes as complimentary 
but more often as opposing trends at work across medieval civilization as a whole.11 And 
both have been challenged, in recent decades, as overly systematic and as too credulous 
in the face of the polemic, ideology, and topoi purportedly at work in the primary source 
record.12  
                                                 
9 This concept was employed fruitfully and with relatively little controversy by an earlier generation of 
medievalists, most famously Marc Bloch in his La société féodale, 2 vols. (Paris, France: Albin Michel, 
1939). Georges Duby inagurated a new understanding or use of the term, particularly as a revolution or 
major social rupture in south-central France during the later tenth century. See his La société, cited above. 
After a wave of regional studies supporting, qualifying, and expanding this account, the concept began to 
receive significant pushback. The two great counter-works in this regard are Elizabeth A. R. Brown, “The 
Tyranny of a Construct: Feudalism and Historians of Medieval Europe,” The American Historical Review 
79 (1974): 1063–1088 and Susan Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
10 See Dominique Barthélemy’s insightful historiographical essay with which he opens his The Serf, the 
Knight, and the Historian, trans. Graham Robert Edwards (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univeristy Press, 2009; Fr. 
original published 1997), 1–11. 
11 For a more nuanced account, and one focused on Cluny’s role, see Rosenwein, Rhinocerous Bound. 
12 See chiefly Barthelemy’s The Serf, The Knight, and The Historian. See also Elisabeth Mangou-Nortier, 
“The Enemies of the Peace: Reflections on a Vocabulary, 500–1100,” in The Peace of God: Social 
Violence and Religious Response in France Around the Year 1000, ed. Thomas F. Head and Richard 
Landes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 58–79. For the debate itself over feudalism, see the 
exchange in Past & Present: Dominique Barthélemy and Stephen D. White, “The ‘Feudal Revolution,’” 
Past & Present 152 (1996): 196–223; Thomas Bisson, “The ‘Feudal Revolution’: Reply,” Past & Present 
155 (1997): 208–225; Timothy Reuter and Chris Wickham, “The ‘Feudal Revolution,’” Past & Present 
155 (1997): 177–208. Thomas Bisson’s The Crisis of the Twelfth Century: Power, Lordship, and the 
Origins of European Government (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), a sometimes 
perplexing work that nevertheless demands (and greatly rewards) prolonged engagement, both defends and, 
to some extent, revises the notion of a feudal revolution or mutation.  
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The very entrance of Cluny into the realm of serious, modern historical study 
came through the question of monastic and especially Gregorian Reform. In the 1890s, 
the German historian Ernst Sackur became the first professional historian to write a 
history of Cluny making extensive use of the primary source material that had been first 
gathered in the seventeenth century by the Maurists.13 For Sackur, Cluny had been the 
central force in the formation of a new culture, and even a “general renaissance,” 
predominantly through its role in the reform of monasteries. This reform was primarily 
concerned with renewed or increased adherence to the Rule of Saint Benedict, and the 
general imitation of a “Cluniac model.” In the later eleventh century, Cluny’s role shifted 
from one of leadership to ideological (or “spiritual”) support of the Gregorian papacy and 
its, in Sackur’s view, essentially political reform of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Sackur 
also, driven by his commitment to the actual sources, argued that Cluny’s influence in 
East Francia, the emerging Holy Roman Empire, had been greatly exaggerated. In 
making this point, he proposed the Lotharingian abbey of Gorze as an alternative or rival 
to Cluny, suggesting that it had led reform within the Empire and thereby created its own 
great network of affiliated monastic communities. 
Though Sackur was immediately challenged by a number of more localized 
studies, his framework persisted into the middle of the twentieth century, when it was 
taken up and elaborated famously by Kassius Hallinger in his huge and controversial 
                                                 
13 Ernst Sackur, Die Cluniacenser in ihrer kirchlichen und allgemeingeschichtlichen Wirksamkeit bis zur 
Mitte des elften Jahrhunderts, 2 vols. (Halle, Germany: 1892–1894). For the Maurist project, see Marc 
Saurette, “Excavating and Renovating Ancient Texts: Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century editions of 
Bernard of Cluny’s Consuetudines and Early-Modern Monasti Scholarship,” From Dead of Night to End of 
Day: The Medieval Customs of Cluny, ed. Susan Boynton and Isabelle Cochelin, Disciplina Monastica 3 
(Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2005), 85–108. 
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Gorze–Kluny.14 Hallinger greatly expanded Sackur’s sense of the two monasteries as 
alternate centers of reform and reform networks into a fundamental dichotomy 
determining a wide variety of social phenomena, including economic and material 
relations as well as liturgical, intellectual, and spiritual positions. He even suggested 
these two rival networks as evidence of or foundation for the divide between French West 
and German East. In his view, from the start the two centers had elaborated at least 
somewhat institutionalized reform programs, which were quickly adapted to the demands 
and assumptions of lay nobles and the reform parties ensconced within the territorial or 
secular church structure. Gorze and Cluny thus became potent ideological foundries, 
arsenals for the two great combatants in the Investiture Controversy, the Holy Roman 
Empire and the Gregorian Papacy respectively.  
As in the case of Sackur, this thesis was quickly criticized as overly systematic 
and predicated on a far too rigidly drawn distinction. But it is only since the 1980s, that 
“reform,” and especially large, well-defined monastic “orders” before the mid- or late 
twelfth century, have been brought under explicit and sustained assault as historiographic 
constructs out of touch with the evidentiary base.15 Even today, new, important, and 
acclaimed works citing Gorze-Kluny uncritically in order to discuss high medieval 
monastic may be found.16 Ironically, it was another monumental contribution to the 
                                                 
14 Hallinger, Gorze–Kluny. 
15 For good modern overviews of reform in medieval monastic historiography, see Monastische Reformen 
im 9. und 10. Jahrhundert, ed. Raymund Kottje and Helmut Maurer (Sigmaringen, Germany: Jan 
Thorbecke, 1989); Ecclesia in medio nationis. Reflections on the Study of Monasticism in the Central 
Middle Ages, ed. Steven Vanderputten and Brigitte Meijns (Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press, 
2011); Mittelalterliche Orden und Klöster im Vergleich: Methodische Ansätze und Perspektiven, ed. Gert 
Melville and Anne Muller (Berlin, Germany: LIT, 2007).  
16 Jehangir Yezdi Malegam, The Sleep of Behemoth: Disputing Peace and Violence in Medieval Europe, 
1000–1200 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), 33. 
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history of medieval monasticism by Hallinger that broke the ground for this volte-face. In 
1963, Hallinger inaugurated a series of critical editions of monastic customaries, the 
Corpus consuetudinem monasticarum, with a collection of the earliest Cluniac texts.17 
His and subsequent editions of the customaries revealed a bewildering array of variations 
in monastic practice that did much to undermine the sense of two coherent, dueling 
traditions, while also revealing many of those variations to be relatively minor and hardly 
the ammunition for some ideological clash of the titans over the constitution and future of 
medieval civilization. 
The essence of this challenge to reform has naturally precluded the rise of large, 
overall accounts of Cluny and the network of houses and communities in which it 
intervened and with which it had important relationships. Nevertheless, a great many 
scholars have engaged productively with the idea of reform in a high medieval or 
specifically Cluniac context; these studies, whether seeking to problematize or even 
overthrow the notion of reform have more, in my view, enriched it even while making it 
harder to fix. Some studies have challenged and reworked the accepted Cluniac 
relationship to the Rule of Saint Benedict and the Carolingian monastic reforms of the 
early ninth century, carried out under the aegis of Benedict of Aniane and Louis the 
Pious.18 Others have taken aim in particular at the notion of Cluny and Gorze as coherent, 
opposed, politically motivated or inspired models of reform.19 There has also been a 
                                                 
17 Corpus consuetudinem monasticarum, ed. Kassius Hallinger (Siegburg, Germany: Schitt, 1963– ). 
18 Barbara Rosenwein “Rules and the ‘Rule’ at Tenth-Century Cluny,” Studia Monastica 19 (1977): 307–
320. 
19 Joachim Wollasch, “Neue Methoden der Erforschung des Mönchtums im Mittelalter,” Historische 
Zeitschrift 225 (1977): 529–571; Barbara Rosenwein, “Reformmönchtum und der Aufstieg Clunys. Webers 
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recent rash of new work on the customaries, often of Cluny in particular, with important 
implications for the question of reform and its nature. These studies have challenged the 
notion of customaries as straightforwardly normative or legislative documents, and, even 
more importantly, done much to develop our understanding of this crucial monastic genre 
in its various stages of historical development.20 Also quite important to our 
understanding of the pragmatic realities of actual instances of reform have been a number 
of studies emphasizing local contexts and lay aristocratic involvement.21 In my view, it is 
particularly this last tendency in recent scholarship that has been developed to a very fine 
point in the voluminous output of Steven Vanderputten.22 Though not without alone in 
making these points,23 Vanderputten has developed an especially exhaustive and 
                                                 
Bedeutung für die Forschung heute,” in Max Webers Sicht des okzidentalen Christentums: Interpretation 
und Kritik, ed. Wolfgang Schluchter (Frankfurt, Germany: Suhrkamp, 1988), 276–311. 
20 Cochelin, “Peut-on parler de noviciat,” Cochelin, “Community and Customs: Obedience or Agency?,” in 
Obedientia: zu Formen und Grenzen von Macht und Unterordnung im mittelalterlichen Religiosentum, ed. 
Sébastien Barret and Gert Melville (Münster, 2005), 229–253; Gert Melville, “Action, Text, and Validity,” 
From Dead of Night to End of Day, 67–83. 
21 Constance Brittain Bouchard, Sword, Miter, and Cloister: Nobility and the Church in Burgundy, 980–
1198 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Bouchard, “Merovingian, Carolingian, and Cluniac 
Monasticism: Reform and Renewal in Burgundy,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 41 (1990): 365–388; 
Barbara Rosenwein, To Be the Neighbor of Saint Peter: The Social Meaning of Cluny’s Property, 909–
1049 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); John Nightingale, Monasteries and Patrons in the 
Gorze Reform: Lotharingia c.850–1000 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001).  
22 Steven Vanderputten, Monastic Reform as Process: Realities and Representations in Medieval Flanders, 
900–1100 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013); Vanderputten, “Monastic Reform, Abbatial 
Leadership, and the Instrumentation of Cluniac Discipline in the Early Twelfth-Century Low Countries,” 
Revue Mabillon 23 (2012): 41–65; Vanderputten, “Abbatial Obedience, Liturgical Reform, and the Threat 
of Monastic Autonomy at the Turn of the Twelfth Century,” The Catholic Historical Review 98 (2012): 
241–270; Vanderputten, “How Reform Began: ‘Traditional’ Monastic Leadership and the Inception of 
Reform in Late Eleventh-Century Flanders,” Studia Monastica 53 (2012): 261–281; Vanderputten, 
“Realities of Reformist Leadership in Early Eleventh-Century Flanders: The Case of Leduin, Arrot of 
Saint-Vaast,” Traditio 65 (2010): 47–74, among other articles. 
23 Besides Bouchard and Nightingale, see Anna Trumbore Jones’ “Pitying the Desolation of Such a Place: 
Rebuilding Religious Houses and Constructing Memory in Aquitaine in the Wake of the Viking 
Incursions,” Viator 37 (2006): 85–102; Patrick Geary, “Monastic Memory and the Mutation of the Year 
1000,” in Monks and Nuns, Saints and Outcasts: Religion in Medieval Society, ed. Sharon Farmer and 
Barbara Rosenwein (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 19–36. 
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systematic criticism of the received narratives of reform. Particularly in his Monastic 
Reform as Process, he has shown how careful reconstructions of monastic institutional 
history are possible. These reconstructions often draw heavily on charters and creative 
readings of various other sources, both roughly contemporaneous and far subsequent to 
instances of reform. And they reveal that narrative accounts of rupture, crisis, and 
intervention by charismatic individuals produced by reformed monasteries are often 
highly intentional and motivated justifications and defenses of reform.24 
What understanding of reform have we arrived at, then? The first point should 
likely be that this term, while not unknown in the vocabulary of the time (reformare), 
was hardly the only or even dominant one used by medievals for the instances and events 
we moderns mean by it.25 Thus (second), if we continued to accept this term—and I, 
while urging due caution and revision, think we should—this means also accepting that 
its referent is a truly immense phenomenon or series of phenomena, not only touching on 
a great many highly various aspects of medieval life but also extending throughout Latin 
Christendom and, temporally, at least from the seventh century onwards.26 This attention 
to terminology and to the vast temporal and geographical scope both help to reorient 
reform not as a single ideological platform and institutional effort, or even as a range of 
                                                 
24 Building on these ideas, Vanderputten has also recently offered a detailed analysis of one key personality 
in early eleventh-century reform, Richard of Saint Vanne. See his Imagining Religious Leadership in the 
Middle Ages: Richard of Saint-Vanne and the Politics of Reform (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2015). 
25 Julia Barrow, “Ideas and Applications of Reform,” in Early Medieval Christianities, c. 600–c. 1100, ed. 
Thomas F. X. Noble and Julia M. H. Smith, The Cambridge History of Christianity, vol. 3 (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 345–362. 
26 Giles Brown, “Introduction: the Carolingian Renaissance,” in Carolingian Culture: Emulation and 
Innovation, ed. Rosamond McKitterick (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1–52, esp. 6–
11. 
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competing platforms and efforts, but as large and complex set of issues, or even more 
vaguely, of concerns and assumptions, that remained both vital and contentious in Latin 
society for centuries. Within the almost anachronistically broad category of “reform,” 
emphases, positions, and alliances shifted and transformed; what endured was the 
widespread currency of the idea that the culture and institutional arrangement of the 
church might, and often did, require conscious programs of change. These changes were 
usually, though not always, conceived of as returns to some superior, if not ideal, past 
state. And a key addendum here is the breadth and complexity of “the church.” As the 
target of reform or reforms, primarily through its landed interests, the church often 
involved issues of central import to regional lay elites (the aristocracy), as well as kings, 
urban communes, and the peasantry.27 Reform, too, often set bishops, monks, and popes 
against one another, creating shifting, partial networks of collaboration and competition 
across all these social and ecclesiastical lines.  
Despite the obvious difficulties in doing so, in order to organize the various points 
and insights I have been reviewing into a rough chronological framework, and thereby 
contextualize my own project, I will venture a very tentative overall account of the course 
of reform in Western/Latin medieval history up to the thirteenth century. The key to this 
account, in my view, is its Carolingian foundations. Like any gesture towards origins, this 
key is in some ways a simplification, a way of bracketing off certain issues and questions 
                                                 
27 Geary “Monastic Memory”; John Howe, “The Nobility’s Reform of the Medieval Church,” The 
American Historical Review 93 (1988): 317–339; R. I. Moore, “Property, Marriage, and the Eleventh-
Century Revolution: A Context for Early Medieval Communism,” in Medieval Purity and Piety: Essays on 
Medieval Clerical Celibacy and Religious Reform, ed. Michael Frassetto (London, UK: Routledge, 1998), 
179–208; Malegam, The Sleep of Behemoth; see also several of the essays in Head and Landes, ed., The 
Peace of God. 
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and of privileging some over others. Obviously Carolingian society had numerous, 
messily integrated influences. And just as assuredly, some subsequent developments 
important to high and late medieval history had deep roots not particularly attested by 
Carolingian sources. These caveats aside, I believe that the “widespread currency” of the 
idea of reform, as invoked above, took its main impetus from the quite explicit, central 
devotion of Carolingian elites to the idea that the church must be repaired, corrected, and 
renovated.28 Moreover, this was not merely an explicit, that is, “intellectual” or “cultural” 
impetus; in my reading, several important scholars have shown that the composition of 
Carolingian society—and especially of Carolingian government power—set the stage for 
the definitive conflicts of the eleventh century. These were, especially in West Francia, 
those associated with the concept of feudalism (an analytic which, unlike reform, I do not 
favor) and, especially in East Francia, those associated with the so-called Investiture 
Controversy.29  
Both of these great conflicts were the result of aspects of a Carolingian system 
that, over the course of that system’s disintegration or devolution, had collapsed into 
schism and contradiction. Put simply, the poorly defined, or even perhaps largely 
nonexistent, distinction between laity and clergy in Carolingian times allowed the 
Karlings to direct and even reform “the church” from within. Lacking this strict 
distinction, it was perfectly acceptable for a king or emperor to appoint a bishop or abbot 
and for a bishop or abbot to lack holy orders and operate personally and professionally 
                                                 
28 Brown, “Introduction,”; Mayke de Jong, The Penitential State: Authority and Atonement in the Age of 
Louis the Pious, 814–840 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
29 Maureen C. Miller, “The Crisis in the Investiture Crisis Narrative,” History Compass 7 (2009): 1570–
1580. 
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more as a warrior or landowner than as a monk or priest.30 Use of church property for the 
maintenance and defense of the realm, similarly, was no great transgression.31 Similarly, 
the Carolingian rulers themselves operated through a complex and subtle collaboration 
with and manipulation of local elites and local politics.32 This was neither a subjugation 
of nor a delegation to local authorities, but a sophisticated network of consultation, often 
making key use of written documents and specially-appointed representatives known as 
missi, that mobilized pre-existing and at least theoretically independent local patronage 
networks to accomplish imperial policy. 
In the broadest sense, the break-up of the Carolingian Empire was hardly 
accidental, let alone surprising. Charlemagne intended to divide his massive patrimony 
among his descendants, and he did so.33 This gave many local powers a choice between 
multiple distant patrons, a freedom their own forebears had not known under 
Charlemagne, which enabled them to play these patrons off against one another.34 By the 
tenth century, the dynasty itself was reduced to intermittent kingship in West Francia, 
while in the east, in the emerging Holy Roman Empire, it had been entirely supplanted by 
                                                 
30 Mayke de Jong, “Carolingian Monasticism: The Power of Prayer,” in The New Cambridge Medieval 
History, 7 vols. (Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge Press, 1995), 2:622–653. 
31 Mangou-Nortier, “The Enemies of the Peace,” Barthélemy, The Serf, the Knight, and the Historian; 
Matthew Innes, State and Society in the Early Middle Ages: The Middle Rhine Valley, 400–1000 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 13–50. 
32 Innes, State and Society; Innes, “Charlemagne’s Government,” in Charlemagne: Empire and Society, ed. 
Joanna Story (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2005), 71–89; Rosamond McKitterick, 
“Charlemagne’s Missi and Their Books,” in Early Medieval Studies in Memory of Patrick Wormald, ed. 
Stephen Baxter et al. (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009), 253–267; McKitterick, “Court and Communication in 
the Early Middle Ages: the Frankish Kingdom under Chalremagne,” in Der frühmittelalterliche Staat: 
europäische Perspektiven, ed. Walter Pohl and Veronika Wieser (Vienna, Austria: Austrian Academy of 
Sciences Press, 2009). See also McKitterick, Charlemagne: The Formation of a European Identity 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
33 McKitterick, Charlemagne: The Formation, 96–105. 
34 Innes, State and Society, 202–251. 
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a series of capable local dynasties. Central power remained strong, or at least stronger, 
there (not coincidentally through a closer integration of royal/imperial and 
clerical/ecclesiastical power, which in turn set the state for the Investiture Controvery),35 
while in the west it appears to have slowly atrophied and devolved rather naturally to 
various powerful regional magnates forging ad hoc networks of patronage and aping what 
they understood to be the Carolingian ideal. These magnates may well have seen 
themselves as fulfilling their duty—again, understood in a basic if vague sense as public 
and Carolingian—rather than as taking the opportunity for “independence.”36 This ideal 
included both the patronage of the church and the use of monasteries as organs of power; 
accordingly, one of these magnates, William the Pious of Aquitaine, founded the 
monastery of Cluny. Like many of the post-Carolingian lords, he achieved a great power 
and prominence in life that he proved unable (if he had ever even nurtured the ambition at 
all) to pass on to any successor. This left Cluny, in the power vacuum of the mid-tenth-
century Mâconnaise,37 more or less to its own devices.  
The monastery, likely because of its independence, forged many important legal 
and proprietary relationships with the landholders of the region.38 It also, especially 
around the turn of the millennium, increasingly enunciated its own particular self-
                                                 
35 Uta-Renate Blumenthal, The Investiture Controversy: Church and Monarchy from the Ninth to the 
Twelfth Century (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988). 
36 Jean Dunbabin, France in the Making, 843–1180 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1985) 89–92; 
Bisson, The Crisis of the Twelfth Century, 22–39. 
37 Dunbabin, France in the Making, 58–60 and 98–100; Rosenwein, To Be the Neighbor, Amy 
Remensnyder, Remembering Kings Past: Monastic Foundation Legends in Medieval Southern France 
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conception and ideology, including powerful emphases on virginity,39 silence, imitation 
of or similarity to angels,40 veneration of Mary,41 institutional independence, and a joint 
Benedictine and Carolingian heritage—and, of course, on itself as a “reforming” 
institution. Into the middle of the eleventh century, the locus of this special role in reform 
resided primarily in the personages of Cluny’s abbots, specifically as individuals; because 
these men were regarded as holy, they were often invited by consortia of lay and 
episcopal elites to reform this or that monastic house.42 These reforms usually served the 
more “material” (if also the spiritual, ideological) interests of these local coalitions. But 
the extent to which they truly reorganized the internal life—represented for historians, at 
least, primarily in the liturgy and customs—of the communities being reformed is at best 
uncertain, and often appears fairly minimal or superficial.43 Finally, these reforms rarely, 
if ever, were understood to represent the formal institutional subjection or subordination 
of one house to another; just because a Cluniac abbot played some role in reforming a 
monastery, even being referred to in at least some documents as the (or an) abbot of that 
monastery, did not mean that his successor at Cluny would also serve as such in the other 
                                                 
39 Isabelle Cochelin, “Le dur apprentissage de al virginitie: Cluny, XIe siècle,” in Au cloître et dans le 
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community.44 This dynamic slowly changed over the course of the second half of the 
eleventh century and Cluniac reform gradually came to possess a somewhat more 
institutional definition. In these years the great system of nested, branching priories 
appears to have formed, in which communities reformed by Cluny elected only priors, 
with the abbot Hugh of Semur remaining their head, at least nominally.45 Even so, 
however, historians remain divided over whether this development perfected an older 
Carolingian model of association between monastic communities or presaged the well 
organized, hierarchical reform orders of the early twelfth century.46  
Thus, balancing my own scholarly purposes with the great weight of Cluniac and 
reform historiography, I conceive of medieval monastic reform as a certain category of 
event of power-use. Such an event is an attempt to intervene within a pre-existing, 
somewhat institutionalized community from some position outside of it. There are both 
continuities and changes or even ruptures in the ideological or programmatic aspects of 
monastic reform in the Middle Ages. One of the main shifts was that which produced the 
more assertive and combative elements of the Gregorian Reform: the development of the 
idea of the independence or libertas of the church, specifically against lay—that is, 
aristocratic, royal, and imperial—power. But for my project the great continuity in 
medieval conceptions of reform, understood primarily as a Carolingian innovation, was 
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the central role of written documents. Obviously the Christian concern for and emphasis 
on literacy and documents is far older, and far more intrinsic to the religion, than the 
Carolingian dynasty. But the Carolingians were the primary patrons and establishers, in 
the West at least, of a notion that has since become central to the Western confessions: 
namely, that right Christian practice and belief must be rooted in written text.47 
Moreover, they also foregrounded the quintessentially literalate issue of the proper 
reception of these texts, in the sense of acquiring “original” versions and correcting 
corrupted ones as well as establishing schools to teach sophisticated understanding of the 
key language of such texts, Latin. 
The enduring presence of this central reform posture or concern can be easy to 
miss in examining post-Carolingian monastic reform. It is not often the subject of 
prolonged or detailed reflection and discussion. Nevertheless, I would suggest that the 
numerous, even ad nauseam references to “true religion,” “monastic life,” “regular life,” 
and so on in accounts of famous reformers and their efforts at various houses are 
essentially reflections of this concern with texts, for they imply (and often state outright) 
a central emphasis on establishing or restoring observance of the Rule of Benedict. As I 
discuss elsewhere, this text was one of the key establishments (and likely innovations) of 
the Carolingian reforms.48 In this view such reforms and accounts of reforms are better 
termed “Carolingian” or “neo-Carolingian” than “Benedictine.” While invocations of 
monastic decline in behavior or discipline as governed by the Rule were often rooted 
more in the need for rhetorical or ideological justification for the specific intervention of 
                                                 
47 McKitterick, Charlemagne, 306–320; Brown, “Introduction,” 17–23. 
48 See my discussion in Chapter 6. 
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a reform than in the concrete realities of these communities, the fact remains that this 
concern for the careful rooting of Christian orthopraxy in canonical text was sufficiently 
widespread and sufficiently unimpeachable to play just this ideological, justificatory role. 
That is to say, despite all the vagaries of time, place, and politics, the conceptual world 
within which notions of reform functioned remained oriented along the Carolingian 
ideological axis. 
But there is much more evidence that written documents played central, or at least 
important, roles in monastic reforms of the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries. Without 
adopting overly systematic conceptions of such reforms, as earlier historians such as 
Kassius Hallinger did, and, on a related note, without adopting an anachronistically 
legalistic or legislative conception of how documents functioned in early and high 
medieval monastic contexts,49 we may still readily observe that numerous documents and 
documentary innovations were produced as part of various reforms. For example, Diane 
Reilly has shown how the monastic production of Giant Bibles, especially in the eleventh 
century, was often an important part of reform. Such Bibles were both optimized for a 
certain kind of liturgical reading, the lectio continua specifically at night, during the 
office of Matins, and also frequently enunciated political or ideological programs relevant 
to reform contexts.50 Isabelle Cochelin, in her extremely important article “Community 
and Customs: Obedience or Agency?” has shown that in some cases, particularly towards 
the end of the eleventh century, certain abbots sought to import the customs or way of life 
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of prestigious houses (often, Cluny) into their own communities in order to reform them. 
This project generally found physical form in the production of written customaries 
describing the life (often selectively) of the house these abbots desired to emulate.51 
There is also a substantial body of very impressive and important secondary 
historical work concerning the organization and reorganization both of individual 
manuscripts and of monastic archives towards the accomplishment of specific ideological 
aims. These aims commonly include rationalizing an abbey’s record of its property (and 
justifying/reaffirming its possession of that property), creating or reinforcing a 
hagiographic tradition for the community’s founder or patron, and organizing its 
repertoire of liturgical manuals. Perhaps the founder of this line of study on the creative 
(re)organization of monastic archives is Patrick Geary in his Phantoms of Remembrance, 
where he discusses chronicles, cartularies, and a wide variety of other monastic sources.52 
Geary figures this study as one of the two-sided process of social/institutional 
remembering and forgetting, a formulation that emphasizes the alternating strategies of 
forgery, destruction, commemoration, reproduction, and new (though often disguised) 
innovation.53 Susan Boynton has also done a great deal of work along similar lines 
focusing on the imperial abbey of Farfa and especially on liturgical manuscripts.54 These 
scholars do not really frame their research or their arguments in terms of, or even in 
relation to, questions of monastic reform. Yet I think that in light of some of Steven 
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Vanderputten’s work, much of what Geary and Boynton have uncovered in the making 
and remaking of medieval monastic manuscripts and libraries can be productively related 
to such questions. In Monastic Reform as Process, Vanderputten devotes a chapter to the 
“reform” of the community at Marchiennes, specifically under the abbot Leduin in the 
second quarter of the eleventh century.55 Vanderputten first reiterates the “model of 
abbatial leadership” provided by the famous reforming abbot Richard of Saint-Vanne, 
particularly important and influential in the early eleventh-century Flemish reform 
context in which we find Leduin and Marchiennes, and specifically that this model 
includes “the management of monastic book collections.”56 Vanderputten is choosing his 
words very carefully for it is quite explicitly not his point that reformist abbots were 
interested in “producing programmatic texts relating to internal discipline” or “a fully 
formed program of disciplinary and institutional intervention, or . . . a top-down policy to 
create a textual community of reformed institutions.”57 Rather, according to 
Vanderputten, reforming abbots, at least those in the tradition of Richard of Saint-Vanne, 
adopted flexible approaches to monastic communities and their scriptoria, libraries, and 
traditions (or, in his terms, “accumulated investments”).58 Vanderputten considers (MS) 
Arras Médiathèque 734, produced at Marchiennes under Leduin and including a vita of 
Saint Vaast, in these terms.59 He writes: 
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57 Ibid., 134. 
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Whatever the circumstances of its creation, the conclusion is clear: it is not the 
contents, the decoration, or even the very existence of the volume that is reformist 
about ms. 734. Rather, it is reformist because it was commissioned by an abbot 
with sufficient resources to replenish a poorly stocked library, a policy to 
strengthen the monks’ sense of solidarity around the figure of their patron saint, 
and a willingness to intervene in hagiographic tradition to justify his institution’s 
popularity with patrons and pilgrims.60 
 
Vanderputten’s goal is thus to define reform, at least in the early eleventh century, at least 
in Flanders (though I am confident his suspicion and critique of accepted reformist 
narratives is applicable far more widely), away from the implementation of a well defined 
and textual program and towards a highly tactical energy that blended a certain flexible 
model of leadership and activism with local realities and traditions.61 The reformist 
approach to existing and newly commissioned manuscripts follows this paradigm. And in 
its careful balancing of existing traditions, which might, in some aspects, be shrewdly 
distorted, reworked, or covered over even in the same breath (or quill stroke) as other 
aspects were mobilized, emphasized, and reproduced, this approach sounds quite similar 
to that studied by Geary and Boynton. 
We are obviously in some danger of broadening the notion of reform so far as to 
render it useless. Is any development or modification of monastic literary tradition and 
written record at all to be understood as reform? To a certain extent, yes; like any 
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tradition, that of high medieval Latin monasteries was continually re-formed, playing on 
concepts and outlines already imbued with social currency and disguising innovation as a 
return to venerable tradition.62 And, as I have been at pains to emphasize, within the 
church (and often straddling its shadowy, uncertain borders), from the late eighth or early 
ninth century onwards, the explicit notion of reform was almost everywhere. In this 
sense, reform becomes only the most explicit, and most politically and socially fraught 
valence of the natural maintenance of traditions and institutions. Certainly stricter 
definitions will be more appropriate for some, likely many, other studies. The analytic 
and the scholarly community can easily bear the weight of these multiple, neither quite 
contradictory nor strictly compatible, senses. For my purpose, which is to study the slow 
development of the culture of power operative at Cluny and the crucial role within that 
development played by literate modes as such, this is definition is preferable.  
A final word on the question of literacy and orality during and before the twelfth 
century, specifically as it has been asked and answered by medievalists, is in order. I will 
state outright what is likely easy to discern: in my view, the paradigm outlined by 
Michael Clanchy and Brian Stock remains the starting, as well as the dominant, one—and 
rightly so. The former, in his foundational work devoted to England from the Norman 
Conquest (1066) to the end of the reign of Edward I (1307) emphasized far more the 
pragmatic and institutional growth of the use of written record, and in particular from a 
royal, administrative perspective. This growth was thus rooted in the exertion of secular 
power and, moreover, distrust between conquerors and conquered. This is certainly not to 
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say that he ignored cultural perceptions of writing and memory as tools and practices; 
these he emphasized in examining the long-enduring resistance to and distrust of writing 
as a tool of record of knowledge. Clanchy’s focus too on the distinction between 
producing a written record and establishing the institutional framework for its useful 
recall decades or centuries later was also illuminating.  
In many ways, Stock’s focuses were quite different. In the first place, where 
Clanchy devoted himself to “government” documents, mostly in the vernacular, Stock 
read Latin documents produced by various members of the church almost exclusively. 
Where Clanchy had given his account of practical literacy nuance by reference to culture 
and mentalité, the latter was Stock’s overwhelming focus. In five massive divisions, 
Stock analyzed what he saw as the rise of a new orientation (or, to use McLuhan’s term, 
“ratio”) among literate and oral modes; while Stock, like Clanchy, saw both as plural and 
both as persisting strongly throughout their period of study, Stock in particular 
emphasized that something fundamental in their interrelationship(s) changed in the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries. Literalate and oral were now far more closely intertwined, 
and the forms of the former came, slowly but irrevocably, to rewrite the terms of the 
latter.63 The new reason or rationality that arose in these centers was both caused by the 
new literalate modes and fundamentally of them.64 These two authors, by virtue of the 
ambition, exhaustive research, and forceful argumentation of their flagship works, thus 
established both literacy and orality as historical in the practical sense: that is, not only 
conceptually historical (plural, acculturated, varying with time and space) but also 
                                                 
63 Stock, The Implications of Literacy, 3–11. 
64 Ibid., 241–325, 326–454, 472–521. 
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studied widely by historians—for down to the present, virtually no study of medieval 
literacy or orality passes without a reference to these two.  
This is not to say that their work was unprecedented, even in the field of medieval 
history. Malcom Parkes produced, in the early 1970s, an article discussing medieval 
literacy as multiple, with historically significant differences between pragmatic, 
recreational, and professional reading.65 Nether were the insights of From Memory to 
Written Record and The Implications of Literacy sui generis, for both drew heavily—and 
quite openly—on the thought of Walter Ong and Marshall McLuhan, as well as on that of 
anthropologists such as Jack Goody, who had pursued related questions.66 One could 
certainly also draw out differences of emphasis and, likely, at least a few contradictions 
between the two, as Charles Briggs has done in his excellent essay on the historiography 
of medieval literacy.67 Least of all would I say that nothing substantial has been added by 
their colleagues, including of course their critics. As causative of the rise of a new 
rationality in the latter part of the Middle Ages, Alexander Murray’s focus on the clerks 
(whom he terms “knowledge workers”) staffing Europe’s nascent bureaucracies and, to a 
slightly lesser extent, Franz Bäuml’s on the development of vernacular literacy, have both 
found broader acceptance among scholars than Stock’s preference for almost 
disembodied literalate modes.68  
                                                 
65 Malcolm Parkes, “The Literacy of the Laity,” in Literature and Western Civilization: The Medieval 
World, ed. David Daiches and Anthony Thorlby (London, UK: Aldus, 1973), 555–577.  
66 Among others, Jack Goody, Literacy in Traditional Societies (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1968) and Goody, The Logic of Writing and the Organisation of Society (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
67 Charles F. Briggs, “Literacy, Reading, and Writing in the Medieval West,” Journal of Medieval History 
26, no. 4 (200): 397–420, at 403–406. 
68 Alexander Murray, Reason and Society in the Middle Ages (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1978); 
Franz Bäuml “Varieties and Consequences of Medieval Literacy and Illiteracy,” Speculum 55 (1980): 239–
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Two other important medievalists, Patrick Geary and Mary Carruthers, come at 
the topic of orality and literacy a bit more obliquely. Rather than directly challenge the 
binary as proposed by Ong, Clanchy, and Stock, these scholars explain why, for their 
major studies, they have not found the binary particularly useful. But there is also a whiff 
of a broader criticism in their (brief) treatments of it as such. Geary writes that “both of 
these authors [Clanchy and Stock] are much more successful in describing the 
developments of the later eleventh and twelfth centuries than the point of departure for 
these developments.”69 In his view, these authors significantly underestimate the amount 
and, more importantly to Geary, the extent of literacy in early medieval western Europe. 
As part of this misappraisal, they also miss the extent to which the survival—and, 
especially important for Geary, the failure to survive—of early medieval documents was 
intentional, rather than accidental.70 This leads into Geary’s study of (social, often 
literate) memory and forgetting, as two sides of the same coin, in the late tenth and early 
eleventh centuries. Carruthers, also studying memory but this time primarily as an 
explicit classical and medieval virtue, faculty, and discipline, memoria, finds the 
oral/literate binary neither useful nor particularly convincing. This stems mainly from the 
fact that literature, despite its etymological similarity to literacy, neither implies nor 
requires the latter.71 The obvious example (noted and discussed by Ong) of oral literature 
                                                 
265. For direct criticism of literacy itself as a cause of cultural and social change, see Joyce Coleman, 
Public Reading and the Reading Public in Late Medieval England and France (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
69 Geary, Phantoms of Remembrance, 13. 
70 Ibid., 14–16. 
71 Carruthers, The Book of Memory, 11–12. 
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would be epic poetry, such as that of Homer, West Africa griots, and so on.72 Carruthers 
also notes that her study challenges (really, demolishes) the notion that memory is 
directly supplanted by an increase in literate modes.73  
To my mind, while these criticisms and certainly the studies in which they appear 
have a great deal of merit, both Geary and Carruthers seem to understand the 
oral/literalate split much more simplistically than the voluminous and nuanced works of 
Ong, Clanchy, and Stock posited it. Many of their points could be accommodated within 
more sensitive treatments of the binary, which, again, for all three authors is more a 
spectrum along which shifting assemblages of plural literalate and oral modes may be 
ranged. Had Geary wanted to, for example, he could have sought to analyze the tactical 
destruction, re-working, and new composition of texts and physical documents in his 
period as manifestations of distinct-yet-interrelated assumptions about what text and 
writing were and how they operated. To take one brief example, Geary concludes his 
discussion of charters and cartularies by arguing that  
 
Arnold of St. Emmeram compared the process of sorting through the past to the 
process of clearing the arable, cutting down groves once sacred to the gods so that 
the land could be made useful for the present. The same pruning was going on in 
archives across the continent. Both he and Paul of St. Père de Chartres 
emphasized that not everything was to be preserved, only that which was useful. . 
                                                 
72 Ong, Orality and Literacy, 10–15; see also on oral literary traditions Albert Lord, The Singer of Tales 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960) and Milman Parry, ed. Adam Parry, The Making of 
Homeric Verse: the Collected Papers of Milman Parry (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1971). 
73 Carruthers, The Book of Memory, 11–12. 
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. . Regional needs and traditions had determined in what form the records of the 
past would be transmitted. . . . When, around the millennium, western churchmen 
became interested in organizing their past, they were faced with these collections 
that they then used as the raw material for the creation of a new past. In the East, 
more coherent records of the past often existed, but they had already been passed 
through a different kind of grid, that of geographically organized collections. This 
organization gave way to a chronological one as the same preoccupations with 
bridging the chasm of past and present became more important than the 
administration and defense of properties based on the written word.74 
 
These are deep and important insights, and this particular process of “destroying, 
revising, recopying, and especially reorganizing” is not one to which either Clanchy or 
Stock devote much time or effort.75 But there is nothing in particular about them that 
prevents analysis through the interpretive lens of shifting cultures of orality and literality. 
Ong (and Clanchy drawing on him) made special note of the fact that different such 
cultures might have different aims, some more directly pragmatic, others more “cultural” 
or symbolic, that is, social actions intended to communicate or accomplish something 
other or beyond mere (re)transmission of discrete units of information.76 One could 
                                                 
74 Geary, Phantoms of Remembrance, 114. 
75 Though see Clanchy on the formation of archives and other dedicated, searchable repositories: Clanchy, 
From Memory to Written Record, 154–172. 
76 Ibid., 26–43. See also the work of Brigitte Miriam Bedos-Rezak, especially When Ego Was Imago: Signs 
of Identity in the Middle Ages (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2010), esp. 9–37. For the basic linguistics of 
beyond mere conveyance of information, see John Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975). 
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examine this process as a certain reassertion of the oral in the face of the passage of time 
and political decline, or at least quiescence, which had rendered the legalistic and 
dispositive role of documents nonfunctional even at the same time the associative value 
of the very same documents was increased, as the figures who had issued or guaranteed 
them passed into the authority of increasingly distant history and tradition. The 
destruction of Merovingian charters so that forgeries could be made using the now-scarce 
papyrus associated with (and materially transmitted by) that lost dynasty by the monks of 
Saint-Denis in particular offers a striking example of this.77 Documents had gained new 
status even as their importance specifically as receptacles of information ebbed from a 
previous high, while that new status itself was the result of their association with 
charismatic and increasingly legendary figures. In my view, this process suggests highly 
intricate interplays among several of Ong’s oral and literalate psychodynamics, with 
these interplays, in the long view, in turn having important implications for the eventual 
development of an extremely literalate Western civilization.  
The possibility for an oral/literalate reframing of Carruthers’ material, approach, 
and conclusions also exists. To summarize her hefty and intricate work in The Book of 
Memory rather more briefly than it deserves, we may say that Carruthers roots the 
discipline and faculty of memoria deep in the Socratic philosophical tradition’s account 
of memory and signification. This account placed great emphasis on the use and recall of 
functional, associational images made in the mind of things encountered in experience. 
The use, recall, and formation of such images had both individual, perhaps “private,” and 
                                                 
77 Geary, Phantoms of Remembrance, 107–113. 
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public, that is, educational, valences, and was eventually elaborated into the distinctive 
and striking practice of self-designed mental maps used in the recall of, for example, the 
entirety of the Aeneid or even of a classical author’s entire oeuvre. In this process, the 
individual seeking to memorize such corpora mentally constructed a great building 
(perhaps a cathedral) with many rooms. This mental construction involved a fixed and 
detailed floorplan, which the memorizer should be able to imagine himself moving 
through with as much confidence and reliability as he would in an actual, physical 
building. Into each of the many rooms, then, the memorizer placed a certain visually-
accessed image that, to him, through close formal or objective—but much more often, 
associative—functioning, would call to mind one segment (perhaps a line, or stanza) of 
the text being memorized.78 Medievals, in particular, might replace the building in this 
context with the actual memorized image of a particular document containing the text to 
be memorized. They could then use the mental image of that document, along with its 
various features (some designed, perhaps, for significant and mnemonic subdivision of 
the text contained therein) and the natural array of subtexts (stages in an argument, 
biblical subdivisions, etc.) to mentally search the text, just as someone using the mental 
floorplan model might.79 Among the particularly adept or well-trained, this method thus 
allowed an astonishing level not merely of rote reproduction, but fluid movement within 
and even on-the-fly sophisticated sorting and recombination of memorized material, such 
as reciting every other verse of the Bible backwards, beginning in the middle of an epic 
poem and proceeding naturally, and so on. This functional capability thus aligned neatly 
                                                 
78 Carruthers, The Book of Memory, 89–93 and 171–186. 
79 Ibid., 199–200. 
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with the pre-modern conception of memory or memoria as creative and insightful, in 
contrast to its modern characterization as dull and inert. 
Carruthers’ further point, that the undeniable increase in both quantity and 
complexity of written texts from the eleventh century onwards did not at all undermine 
the value imputed to and emphasis placed upon memoria in the latter half the Middle 
Ages, is well-taken.80 In particular, she cites the work of the Rouses to the effect that the 
tradition of biblical gloss found in writing from the twelfth century onward must certainly 
have existed as a well-established oral tradition before—almost certainly well before—
that time.81 This tradition was not transcribed because it suddenly became possible, but 
because there suddenly arose a socially- and culturally-constructed demand for its 
transcription, that is, the university and its new, large public.82 Carruthers points out that 
even then, the university classroom remained heavily oral, with students likely 
memorizing texts from individual written exemplars open before them while masters 
lectured before them.83 But while all these points are cogent and convincing, they seem to 
me to demand, not obviate, consideration from within the perspective of the oral/literalate 
spectrum, for they clearly present not only the imbrication but indeed the increasing 
imbrication and mutual co-development of oral and literalate modes discussed by both 
Clanchy and Stock, in precisely the same centuries and contexts. Indeed, they seem to 
quite obviously mark the advance of literalate modes; glosses were written down, and 
                                                 
80 Ibid., 195. 
81 Ibid., 198. 
82 Clanchy makes the point that Gutenberg’s press was within the technological reach of Europe for 
centuries before it was built; what was lacking was not the means but the (conception of the) need. See 
From Memory to Written Record, 309. 
83 Carruthers, The Book of Memory, 199. 
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students memorized from individual exemplars—contrast this with Stephen Jaeger’s 
account of schooling in the late tenth and early eleventh centuries, a practice which is 
widely referred to in period sources but has left astonishingly few actually used within it 
behind.84 Jaeger’s discussion of a charismatic instruction in litterae et mores seems 
radically different from orchestrated mass mental reproduction of written texts that have 
themselves, in comparison to earlier times, also become the subject of mass reproduction.  
More broadly, while Carruthers is right to point out that the expanding use of 
writing did not supplant memoria as a discipline in the Middle Ages, in the longer view, 
that is quite obviously exactly what it did. Not only do we no longer practice this 
discipline, but Carruthers is obliged to spend multiple chapters reconstructing and 
explaining an entirely different semiotic, psychological, and physiological conception of 
the mental faculty known as memory; isn’t this quite convincing and sophisticated proof 
that an immense gap does indeed exist between memory, both as understood and as 
practiced, in the pre-modern and modern eras? The expansion of writing did not 
immediately supplant memoria, indeed it did not do so for several centuries. But 
ultimately, supplanting memory as discussed and analyzed by Carruthers is exactly what 
writing did. In this sense, her book is both a fascinating collection of ways in which 
oralities and literalities combined and recombined over time and a powerful reminder 
(appropriately) that the direct material realities of technological change do not, on their 
own, determine the course of social and cultural development, but rather that such 
influence is always powerful mediated through institutions, contexts, practices, and 
                                                 
84 C. Stephen Jaeger, The Envy of Angels: Cathedral Schools and Social Ideals in Medieval Europe, 950–
1200 (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994). 
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cultures. But it is a challenge only to a very vulgar account of the oral/literalate binary 
that, while real, is a very far cry from the one set forth by the main scholars of such an 
approach. 
In short, while I would never fault Geary or Carruthers for writing their studies 
using their preferred analytics, rather than writing mine with my own, I think both imply, 
or state outright, a greater rejection of the oral/literalate binary than is necessary for their 
work, or even than their own research and argumentation actually support. This being 
said, Patrick Geary’s point about the prevalence and sophistication of literacy and 
literalate modes in the early Middle Ages is a useful entree into the work on Carolingian 
literacy spearheaded by Rosamond McKitterick.85 As discussed earlier, the Carolingians 
are foundational not only for important high medieval conceptions and strategies of 
power, authority, and monasticism, but also for the explicit and central role of documents 
and literacy in reform in general. Besides this, their government or administration 
represented a particular and highly sophisticated combination of oral and literalate 
modes.86 This combination, its rise and decline, and its place in the longer development 
of literacy in/and Western civilization generally, is not the subject of this study. But I do 
wish to note that, as Carruthers’ treatment of memory also attests, the roots of the rise of 
literalate modes are very deep, and if the eleventh and twelfth centuries do constitute a 
                                                 
85 See, in particular, Rosamond McKitterick, The Carolingians and the Written Word (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989) and McKitterick, ed., The Uses of Literacy in Early Mediaeval Europe 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990).  
86 Innes, State and Society; Innes, “Charlemagne’s Government”; McKitterick, “Charlemagne’s Missi and 
Their Books”; McKitterick, “Court and Communication.” 
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decisive inflection point in this rise (as I agree with Clanchy, Stock, and Paul Saenger 
that they do), they still spring from these roots.87  
These three introductory essays weave together my project and its methods, while 
also offering some basis and orientation in the existing scholarship of various fields and 
indeed in philosophical speculation, hypothesis, and assumption. Ultimately, I am 
pursuing the complex dialectical process by which institutions (monasteries) and 
individuals (monks) shaped one another; in particular, I observe this process as it 
occurred through—by means of—texts, which, in turn, existed in a startlingly parallel 
dialectics with written iteration of themselves. This is a, and perhaps the, decisive realm 
for such formation, in my view, because it was, in medieval monasteries as in many other 
historical contexts, one of the most explicit, intentional, and normative sites for the 
learning of interpretation and thus of the integration of raw lived experience. Monks 
learned to read the cultural signs found in texts as various as chronicles, vitae, and 
liturgy, and they learned to read the world—likely in that order. Because of the nature of 
medieval monastic life, I have also found ritual, despite some reservations about the term 
as an analytic, not only useful but unavoidable. Almost all the encounters of monks, 
individually and communally, with texts took place within the context of ritual as I have 
defined it above: achieving or offering transcendence through its “set aside” nature, 
performing and recreating a differentiated and hierarchical community, deploying signs 
in ways with normative implications for their subsequent redeployment. Thus, only after 
this voluminous introductory material, is it possible to say precisely why monasteries: 
                                                 
87 See my discussion of change versus continuity in Chapter 1. 
  
111 
 
because they foregrounded the explicit (re)fashioning of human beings; because they 
pursued this project with an intensity and stamina otherwise found only in (if even there) 
modern total institutions such as schools, armies, and prisons; because texts, whether 
oral, written, or lived, were explicitly taken as crucial in this process; and because they 
did all this precisely during and through a crucial period in the development of modern 
literalate modes. My goal is thus to shed light on monastic semiotics, and on how that 
culture combined with a parallel, not-entirely-distinct culture of power, in order to 
uncover the crucial mutual development of literalate modes and the medieval monastery. 
To do this, we now turn to the sources themselves.
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CHAPTER V: THE CLUNY BIBLE AND ITS INTRODUCTORY MATERIAL 
 
 
Who produced the so-called Cluny Bible (BNF lat 15176) and for what purposes? These 
questions immediately place us at the center of several important issues. First, there is the 
question of the nature of the transition from a Carolingian culture and society to however 
we characterize what followed it, with the added difficulty that most such broad 
characterizations, such as “feudal” or “Romanesque” are themselves highly questionable. 
Next, we confront of course the key issue of this whole study, the spectrum (and tension) 
between oral and literate modes of culture and communication, which again pose various 
ancillary questions in the present context, cardinally that of public versus private reading 
and study. And finally, there is the question of monastic reform in the eleventh century. 
As with the previous two issues, due both to the nature of BNF lat 15176 and the wider 
state of the relevant historiography, this last issue quickly draws us to question both the 
very nature of “reform” and its valences in earlier (ninth, tenth) centuries. In what 
follows, I will hew as closely as possible to BNF lat 15176, touching on this issues only 
enough to properly contextualize our study of this manuscript. 
The manuscript has long been an object of serious scholarly study, with most 
historians placing it somewhere in southern France and suggesting that it was produced 
roughly between 950 and 1050.1 But it was only firmly localized to Cluny in 1979 by 
Monique Cécile-Garand, when she found the name “Franco,” with which Alcuin of 
                                                 
1 Charlotte Denoël, “La Bible d’Odilon et les débuts de l’enluminure clunisienne,” Rivista di storia della 
miniatura 15 (2011), 55. 
  
113 
 
York’s name has been replaced in a dedicatory poem, authored by the latter and copied 
into the first leaves of the Bible by the former, on a witness list in a Cluniac charter from 
1004. She also found Franco’s colophon in an act from either 1002 or 1011, though 
copied into Cluny’s Cartulary B, rather than in autograph.2 As was the norm for Giant 
Bibles of the Touraine type (discussed below), a number of scribes and illuminators 
collaborated in copying out this manuscript.3 Both because of the generally high level of 
skill and the conscious effort to keep the script homogenous, distinguishing these is 
difficult. But it is clear that great care and resources were lavished upon the Cluny Bible; 
besides the generally even writing and skillful ruling, the parchment is of a fine quality 
(especially in comparison to a similar Bible produced around the same time, or a little 
earlier, at Saint-Martial of Limoges), and the craftsmen make use of much color and 
complex page layouts that include a number of huge and ornate illuminated initials. 
Many features of the manuscript suggest that it was intended to evoke and even 
designed and executed on the model provided by the Carolingian Giant Bibles, 
specifically those produced at Tours under Alcuin around the turn of the ninth century 
and then on a “mass” (in early medieval terms) scale between 834 and 851.4 Because the 
                                                 
2 Monique-Cécile Garand, “Une collection personelle de saint Odilon de Cluny et ses compléments,” 
Scriptorium 33 (1979), 174. Walter Cahn notes the “general acceptance” of this identification, and agrees 
that “if these assumptions are correct, the manuscript has a good claim to be regarded as a product of the 
Cluny scriptorium,” however, he cautions, “it should be noted that Odilo personally governed other 
monastic communities possessed by the Burgundian house, where he also bore the title abbas, given to him 
in the manuscript.” Cahn, Romanesque Bible Illumination (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982), 
278. The various other scholars I cite regarding this manuscript tend to assume its Cluniac origin/identity. 
3 Denoël, “La Bible d’Odilon,” 52. 
4 On this connection between the Touraine Giant Bibles and the Cluny Bible, see Cahn, Romanesque Bible 
Illumination, 98–101 and Diane Reilly, “The Cluniac Giant Bible and the Ordo librorum ad legendum: a 
Reassessment of Monastic Bible Reading and Cluniac Customary Instructions,” in From Dead of Night, 
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distinctive style of the Carolingian Touraine Bibles and its relationship to their intended 
use has been the subject of much fruitful discussion by historians already, I will first 
outline the Tours format, with special attention to the commonalities between it and that 
of BNF lat 15176. Then, I will reprise the argument over the use of Bibles of this type, 
both as it has appeared in Carolingian scholarship and in work on turn-of-the-
millennium/reform monasticism. This will bring us, finally, to a consideration of the 
Cluny Bible in its own particular historical context, having prepared the ground for an 
appreciation of this how this manuscript reaches back as well as looks forward. 
Alcuin of York was a very important scholar and courtier in Charlemagne’s 
empire, and one of the most prominent of the emperor’s reformers. He was one of several 
men involved in revising Jerome’s Vulgate edition of the Bible, and in retirement served 
as abbot of the prominent regular community in Tours dedicated to Saint Martin. Under 
his guidance several Giant Bibles were produced, but it was only some decades after his 
death in 804 that Saint Martin of Tours’ became a site of mass production for magnificent 
pandects—single-volume Bibles following, at least in theory, Alcuin’s revised Vulgate 
text.5 By its introductory material, the Cluny Bible immediately invokes both Alcuin and 
Jerome. It includes two hymns or poems by the former, as well as a letter from the latter 
to Paulinus of Nola. These compositions of Alcuin’s are two of his most famous, and 
between them combine a typological and historical overview of the Old Testament, 
                                                 
5 David Ganz, “Mass Production of Early Medieval Manuscripts: The Carolingian Bibles from Tours,” in 
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dedications to lay and clerical patrons, admonitions to read the text clearly aloud, and a 
somewhat extended definition of the manuscript specifically as a pandect. The letter, in 
turn, is a kind of treatise or meditation on how the Bible is to be read and studied and 
who is qualified to interpret it, and was an extremely common opening text for Bibles in 
the high Middle Ages. This introductory collection, in addition to presenting a kind of 
treatise on the Bible and Bible reading, an analysis of which is the bulk of this chapter, 
thus also established a specific authoritative (and textual) tradition, linking Jerome to 
Carolingian, even particularly Touraine, reform.  
Beyond this composite introductory treatise and its ideological valence, the 
physical form and page layout of the Cluny Bible betray a skilled, technical, wholly 
intentional imitation of the Carolingian Bibles produced at Tours.6 Besides the distinctive 
status of the pandect itself, a Carolingian innovation, the massive dimensions of the Bible 
are those of the Touraine exemplars: the folia measure 500x380mm. Like the Tours 
Bibles, the text of BNF lat 15176 is written in two columns of between fifty and fifty-two 
lines each, with the manuscript comprising 439 surviving folia. Though the Bible is badly 
damaged, missing the beginning of Genesis, the beginning of Exodus, and roughly seven 
epistles from the New Testament, this nevertheless puts it at the usual length for a Tours 
Bible—around 450 folia. Throughout, the Bible uses the double margin ruling scheme, 
wherein a narrow column is ruled on each side of each main column of text. This is 
useful for the placement of the initials often used to distinguish chapters within books, 
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and represents a development from the earlier Touraine Bibles.7 The particular texts 
included with these Bibles could and did vary: the Cluny Bible places the 
Apocalypse/Revelations before the Pauline Epistles, like the Touraine Bibles preserved at 
Berlin and Saint Gall but differing from most others of this class. More conventionally 
for the Touraine type (as opposed to other Carolingian Giant Bibles), the Cluny Bible’s 
books are arranged in (rough, theoretical) historical, rather than liturgical order: the 
Octateuch, followed by Kings and Chronicles, the prophets, and then the New Testament 
distinguished from and following the Old.8 It also includes at least part of the “series of 
summaries and prefaces for the Gospels” begun at Zürich and widely dispersed 
thereafter.9 Thus, while the homogeneity of Touraine Bibles and the rigidity of their 
outline as a genre can and sometimes has been overemphasized,10 they do present a 
recognizable format—one the Cluny Bible unmistakably reproduces. 
The most important aspect of identity in layout between the Cluny Bible and the 
Touraine model is, however, the “hierarchy of scripts” used not only to identify the 
different parts of the text, but also to make reading it (aloud) easier.11 Though the Cluniac 
Bible does not use the full range of the hierarchy for the beginning of every book, it does 
appear in all its glory at the beginning of many books (usually the longer and more 
important, such as the Gospels, Kings I—IV, and so on), and some simplified version of 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 59; see also Pater Alban Dold, “Neuentdekte Blätter einer unbekannten Bibelhandschrift von Tours,” 
Zentralblatt für Bibliothekswesen 48 (1931), 173.  
8 Reilly, The Art of Reform, 50–51. 
9 Ganz, “Mass Production,” 57. 
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it is always present. Moreover, when it appears in full it follows very closely the 
summary of its appearance in Touraine Bibles given by David Ganz.12 Distinctive square 
capitals, usually two or three lines tall, form the incipits of each book; these are usually 
red and black, either alternating by line or with black letters highlighted in red, or 
sometimes with red and black ink mixed together. Next comes some initial, often 
ornately illuminated with many brilliant colors and usually significantly larger than the 
incipit script, followed by a few letters in large capitals, sometimes more square and 
sometimes more rustic and usually close to the size of the incipit capitals, or at least 
noticeably larger than the main body text. Then, in some cases, comes a single line of 
one-line-tall text, usually in rustic capitals, before the Carolingian minuscule in which the 
main body of the text is written takes over. Explicits are usually also in one-line rustic 
capitals, often black, sometimes with a touch of red highlighting/rubrication.13 
The range of this hierarchy is reduced and simplified in many places throughout 
the Bible. The most common of these is in the incipits for prologues, prefaces, and 
capitulae. These are generally not given illuminated initials (though they usually possess 
a large, simple initial done in red), and their incipits are sometimes done in a somewhat 
smaller script or at least given less space in the ruling scheme.14 There are certainly 
practical reasons for this: the collective nature of such an immense artisanal undertaking 
as producing a giant Bible meant that, sometimes, one scribe, rubricator, or illuminator 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 58. 
13 The beginning of Luke in the Cluny Bible, 368r, is a good example of the full hierarchy. I have not 
discussed the ornate portrait of the evangelist present there because it was added towards the end of the 
twelfth century—almost two centuries after the Bible was copied. Denoël, “La Bible d’Odilon,” 55. 
14 The prophets, running from 123r through 210r in BNF lat 15176, are a good place to observe these 
principles. 
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working in a given section might not leave enough room for one of his comrades working 
in another role. Or, he could fail to leave himself enough room, as even when the same 
craftsman performed more than one of these tasks, the tasks themselves were usually 
broken up and done sequentially, with all the writing in a quire done before rubrication 
and illumination. Moreover, the Touraine exemplars themselves made perceptible efforts 
to begin and end books and other subdivisions at certain points on the page: Ganz writes 
that “this corresponds to the evidence of the script, where compressed passages of text 
show how the scribes collaborating in the copying of the Tours Bibles tried hard to fit the 
blocks of text which were assigned to them into a predetermined format, a fixed number 
of columns.”15 The purpose of this effort was to allow books to be begun on new pages, 
folia, or even quires.  
Historians remain somewhat divided, or at least uncertain, about the role of Giant 
Bibles in the liturgy. Some have argued that the immense size of the Bibles precludes 
their use by individuals, and therefore that they must have been for public reading in the 
choir and refectory.16 But most cautiously accept the idea that at least some of the 
Carolingian Giant Bibles (relevant studies mostly focus on the Touraine variety) were 
intended and used for public reading, in one form or another, at least some of the time. 
Rosamond McKitterick remains agnostic, but seems to lean rather distinctly towards 
some public role for Carolingian and Carolingian-inspired Bibles:  
 
                                                 
15 Ganz, “Mass Production,” 59. 
16 Lawrence Nees, “Problems of Form and Function in Early Medieval Illustrated Bibles from Northwest 
Europe,” in Imagining the Early Medieval Bible, ed. John Williams (University Park, PA: Penn State 
University Press, 1999), 121–177. 
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We simply do not know enough about the process of reading aloud to discard 
such indications as the manuscript itself may afford us of a scribe’s intention as 
far as oral communication of his writing was concerned. Given that the text is 
didactic in its presentation and was easy to follow as far as its general structure 
was concerned, it might be more plausible to suggest that the didactic function 
was a public rather than a private one. . . . It was a Bible for communication, in a 
context we cannot at present reconstruct. Analogy with the two Ceolfrith Bibles 
housed in the chapels of Wearmouth and Jarrow may be helpful here. They acted 
as definitive reference copies, so that anyone could find the passage he wanted, 
but they were surely also used for public reading.17 
 
On the other hand, Diane Reilly has argued forcefully that “most [Carolingian Giant 
Bibles], including those manufactured at Tours following the instructions of Alcuin, were 
designed to be used on a daily basis for the recitation of the Divine Office.”18 She cites a 
wide variety of evidence to support this proposition. First, there is Charlemagne and 
Alcuin’s specific intent to correct the corrupted recensions of Jerome’s Vulgate in 
circulation, in order to improve the general understanding and observance of Christian 
principles by both the church and the laity.19 There is the ordering of some Giant Bibles 
                                                 
17 Rosamond McKitterik, “Carolingian Bible production.” 
18 Reilly, The Art of Reform, 47–48. See also Reilly, “Lectern Bibles and Liturgical Reform in the Central 
Middle Ages,” in The Practice of the Bible in the Middle Ages: Production, Reception, and Performance in 
Western Christianity, ed. Susan Boynton and Diane Reilly (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
2011), 105–125. 
19 Reilly, The Art of Reform, 48–49. 
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according to liturgical, rather than historical or traditional, demands.20 Reilly also 
discusses at length the increased Carolingian emphasis on the lectio continua, the practice 
of reading the Bible aloud in the church through much of the night, and the particular 
suitability of the Giant Bible in general and the Touraine format in particular for this 
purpose.21 Finally, there is the fact that, while many Giant Bibles were indeed 
commissioned by and given to prominent clerics and laypeople, many of these quickly 
ended up being donated to ecclesiastical communities where they would presumably be 
put to work.22 David Ganz, too, has argued that the Touraine format is particularly suited 
to public reading, by virtue of its distinctive, clear, regular script, the hierarchy of scripts 
that allow a reader to quickly orient himself on the page, and Alcuin’s admonition that 
“Whosoever as reader in church reads in the sacred body of this book the high words of 
God distinguishing the meanings, titles, cola, and commata with his voice, and let him 
say with his mouth as he knows the accent sounds.”23 
For the Cluny Bible itself, consensus seems even stronger. Reilly begins more 
cautiously, citing an eleventh- or twelfth-century Cluny booklist, which refers to several 
manuscripts containing collections of biblical texts that have not survived. She notes that  
 
such manuscripts would have suited better than any of Cluny’s surviving Giant 
Bibles the complicated program of reading for Matins. None of these manuscripts 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 50–51. 
21 Ibid., 52–63. 
22 Ibid., 65. 
23 Ganz, “Mass Production,” 56–59. 
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can be dated using the paltry information provided by the library list, however. It 
is therefore very difficult to extrapolate from this list what Bibles might have been 
used for reading during the night office at Cluny during the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries.24 
 
Yet she also notes that the great Cluniac customary written by Bernard in the later 
eleventh century, and that prepared by Abbot William of Hirsau on the basis of Cluny’s 
customs (chiefly as related to him by Ulrich of Zell), both make provision for rendering 
assistance to the lector in physically moving his book between the choir and refectory; 
the Giant Bible was “the only book used for public reading that was routinely this 
large.”25 So, perhaps not for the central night readings, but likely for some part of the 
liturgy. In a short article, Neil Stratford asserts that, despite “fewer indicators” (than for 
its use as “cultic object,” such as in processions), the Cluny Bible was indeed used for 
refectory readings.26 
We may also note that the Cluny Bible does not use an especially small minuscule 
for the Gospels or Psalms, as Ganz has noted in many of the surviving Carolingian Giant 
Bibles (including the most likely candidates for models for the Cluny manuscript).27 
Ganz suggests that this script was used to help insure an orderly layout of the text (so that 
                                                 
24 Reilly, “The Cluniac Giant Bible,” 180. 
25 Ibid., 174–176. Reilly discusses Romanesque Giant Bibles and their relationship to/role in monastic 
reform specifically in Norman England in her article, “French Romanesque Giant Bibles and Their English 
Relatives: Blood Relatives or Adopted Children?,” Scriptorium 56 (2002): 294–311. 
26 Neil Stratford, “La Bible dite ‘d’Odilon,’” in Cluny, 910–2010; onze siècles de rayonnement (France: 
Editions du Patrimoine Centre des monuments nationaux, 2010), 95.  
27 Ganz, “Mass Production,” 59. Similarly, there exist also a number of eleventh- and twelfth-century 
northern French Giant Bibles that leave these books out entirely. See Reilly, “Lectern Bibles,” 113. 
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books could end and begin on new columns, folia, or quires), and allowed by the fact that 
other copies of these scriptural texts would have been used for liturgical reading—if his 
supposition is correct, it may follow that the lack of such “compression” in BNF lat 
15176 implies that liturgical readings of the Psalms and Gospels used this very, and no 
other, text. Finally, the Cluny Bible appears to contain some tonic accents of the kind 
discussed by Leonard Boyle—several examples can be found in Genesis, though they 
disappear for long stretches of the text otherwise.28 Moreover, the Cluny Bible is 
significantly older than Boyle suggests this practice to be. Perhaps, these marks were 
added much later.29 
Thus, the evidence seems rather more to support than to contravene the 
supposition that at least some Giant Bibles, including that of Cluny at least for some 
period in the Middle Ages, were used for public reading. From many of its layout 
features, and from the inclusion of Alcuin’s injunction to read aloud correctly, we may 
suspect that it was intended for this purpose, if not only for it. From the references in the 
customaries and the tonic accents, we may see that that use itself left some material 
echoes available to the historian. 
Yet as much as the Cluny Bible appears to look back towards the Carolingian 
tradition, in form, function, and explicit efforts at self-association through its introductory 
material, it is also separated from that tradition by a major caesura and, in other important 
                                                 
28 One customary dealing with Cluniac Bible reading, the Liber Tramitis, prioritizes the reading of Genesis 
in particular: Liber tramitis aevi Odilonis abbatis, ed. Peter Dinter, CCM 10 (Siegburg, Germany: Franz 
Schmitt, 1980), 48. 
29 Leonard Boyle, “Tonic Accent, Codicology, and Literacy,” The Centre and its Compass: Studies in 
Medieval Literature in Honor of Professor John Leyerle, ed. Robert Taylor et al. (Kalamazoo, MI: Western 
Michigan University Press, 1993), 4–6. For more discussion of these marks, and of their presence in the 
Cluny Bible in particular, see Saenger, Space Between Words, 55–57 and 287. 
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ways, ahead of or at least very much of its own time, the early/mid eleventh century. 
Indeed it was not alone in this Janus-faced orientation; such was typical of a whole class 
of early Romanesque Giant Bibles (though most of these did not imitate the Touraine 
Bibles, in particular, quite so closely).30 Many of these Bibles were produced, as Reilly 
has discussed in her book The Art of Reform, quite specifically as part of monastic reform 
around the turn of the millennium.31 Often, some cycle of illustrations and historiated 
initials played an important role in enunciating some particular understanding of reform 
and related issues,32 and this trend itself was part of a larger and longer one by which the 
relatively limited figurative principles of Carolingian art were expanded upon and 
developed. This latter process, in particular, led to an explosion of such art within and 
beyond biblical contexts by the end of the eleventh century.33 It is particularly interesting, 
therefore, that the Cluny Bible included virtually no figurative decoration when it was 
first produced.34 All the ornamentation it does possess is strictly aniconic, mostly 
deploying foliate motifs. Perhaps some of its missing leaves, such as the beginning of 
                                                 
30 Cahn, Romanesque Bible Illumination, 95–100; Reilly, The Art of Reform, 66–71 and 88–93. There is 
some reason to believe in a particularly close, almost institutional link between the scriptorium at Saint 
Martin’s and that at Cluny, however. Odo, second abbot of Cluny (926–942), recieved both tonsure and 
“literary education” at Saint Martin, as reported in his vita by John of Salerno. The same source reports that 
Odo brought a hundred manuscripts from Saint Martin to Baume, the monastery where he served under 
Abbot Berno before both were transplanted to Cluny upon its foundation. Being the Life of St. Odo of Cluny 
by John of Salerno and the Life of St. Gerald of Aurillac by St. Odo, ed. and trans. Dom Gerard Sitwell 
(New York, NY: Sheen and Ward, 1958), 26–27. Jean-Pierre Aniel has suggested that this body of 
manuscripts includes a number of decorative features that “could be considered the antecedents of the 
ornamentation of Cluniac manuscripts.” Jean-Pierre Aniel, “Le scriptorium de Cluny aux Xe et XIe 
siècles,” in Le gouvernement d’Hugues de Semur à Cluny, 273.  
31 Reilly, The Art of Reform, 88–93. 
32 This is the central thrust of The Art of Reform; Reilly also summarizes some studies of later medieval 
illustration cycles in her introduction, 1–12. 
33 Cahn, Romanesque Bible Illumination, 121–123 and 165–166. 
34 On impressive illuminations added later, see note 13 earlier in this chapter. 
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Genesis, once contained illustrations or historiated illumination, but this would be a 
marked departure from the hundreds of leaves that do survive.  
In light of this, it makes all the more sense to figure the collection of introductory 
material as a statement on or interpretive guide to both the Bible as a whole and the 
ideological claims of Cluny as an institution: if we may read pictures in such a way, why 
not words? Thus it is my contention that the three introductory texts can be considered 
together, without too much violence to the mentality we are attempting here to reawaken 
and interrogate, as a kind of manifesto. That is, this specific combination of these texts 
presents, and would have presented to a medieval monastic reader or auditor of BNF lat 
15176, a number of assertions about the nature of the Bible’s content and of the act of 
reading (hearing) it.35 Though the specific thought process that produced precisely this 
combination is almost certainly lost to us, and though it may well have involved ways of 
thinking so different from our own (perhaps in the play of authority and custom, or in the 
locus of institutional agency and initiative at work in the Cluny scriptorium) as to be 
almost untranslatable, nevertheless this combination is, on some basic level, intentional: 
though none of these texts are surprising to find in this context, the precise combination 
of them does not appear to have been itself copied from any individual source 
manuscript. At least, a brief survey of other surviving Carolingian and post-Carolingian 
Giant Bibles does not duplicate it.36 Besides this specificity, the legibility of the 
                                                 
35 Here my point is similar to Reilly’s argument in The Art of Reform, 1–10, that the illustrations in the 
Saint-Vaast Bible would be seen by the monastery’s patrons and thus could ennunciate an ideological 
message. 
36 My impressionistic survey includes Gallen Stiftsbibliothek Cod. Sang. 75, Gallen Stiftsbibliothek Cod. 
Sang. 64, BNF lat. 9380, BNF lat. 1, Bern Burgerbibliothek Cod. 3, and British Museum Add. 10546, as 
well as some manuscripts that, because of damage, cannot really be considered evidence for traditions in 
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combination as a manifesto on Bible reading is further suggested by its authorship and 
content. Alcuin and Jerome were both regarded as learned figures well worth reading, 
even besides their special, even preeminent association with the Bible. Most obviously, 
from the wide-ranging works of these two authors have been selected texts that do indeed 
tell the reader or auditor specifically about the Bible. Here, relatively straightforward 
summaries and glosses are accompanied by commemoration of patrons and pleas for the 
memory of (and propitiatory prayers for) the authors. Finally, of great importance for my 
project despite their comparative brevity and subtlety, there are also found in these works 
some suggestive reflections on how to read the Bible—not only technically, as a 
pragmatic skill, but also as a ritual and even as a transcendental, redemptive act—and on 
how to understand it: that is, on how it signifies, its particular semiosis and the human 
role therein. It is thus for an understanding of the biblical semiotics woven by the 
copyists at Cluny from the diffuse Latin Christian tradition (and its increasingly dominant 
Carolingian sub-branch) available to them that I now read these texts. 
The first text is substantially that given as Carmen 69 in the Monumenta 
Germaniae Historica: approximately 90% of its two hundred lines come from that work 
(though not in precisely the same order), with the first nineteen corresponding to the 
beginning of Carmen 68 (which in the MGH goes on for several more lines).37 This is an 
interesting wrinkle, and probably reflects the important role of orality in the transmission 
of the carmini (which were, after all, poems, hymns, and songs, and thus essentially to be 
                                                 
introductory/prefatory material. Many of these Bibles include letters from Jerome and dedicatory poems, 
but none reproduce the precise collection found in BNF lat. 15176.  
37 Together these poems appear in the Antiquitates: Poetae Latini aevi Carolini, vol. 1, Monumenta 
Germaniae Historica, 287–292. 
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performed aloud). But given the underdeveloped literature on the carmini of Alcuin, their 
dizzying number and variety, and the fact that it lies outside the scope of the current 
project, I will not substantially pursue this question.38  
Despite its divergence from the modern edited edition, the poem as it appears in 
the Cluny Bible is quite thematically coherent. The first eighteen or twenty lines, which 
the MGH gives as the beginning of Carmen 68, are an extremely rapid survey-summary 
of the books of the Bible, generally with a reference to their reputed author and/or their 
semi-official grouping among the prophets, or wisdom books, or Gospels, and so on. 
Next come four lines, taken from the very end of Carmen 69 as given in the MGH, 
describing how Ezra, the fifth-century (BCE) Torah-reformer of contested historicity, 
restored “these holy books burnt up in destruction by the enemy.”39 Following this 
reference to Ezra, we encounter the first of several figurae, found throughout these 
introductory texts, that offer salvation to the reader (often specifically to a lector reading 
aloud to others) specifically through the act of reading scripture or, even more 
specifically, the Cluny Bible in particular.40 In this case, Alcuin alleges that, if one reads 
                                                 
38 D. A. Bullough, “Alcuin’s Cultural Influence: the Evidence of the Manuscripts,” in Alcuin of York 
Scholar at the Carolingian Court, ed. L. A. J. R. Houwen and A. A. MacDonald (Groningen, Netherlands: 
Egbert Forsten, 1998), 3. 
39 BNF lat 15176, 1r (the poem itself runs from 1r onto 2r), referencing the destruction of the First Temple 
and the dispersal of the Hebrews by the Neo-Babylonian Empire in the late-mid sixth century. 
40 The classic treatment of figura is found in Erich Auerbach’s essay of the same name, included in the 
collection of his writings entitled Scenes from the Drama of European Literature (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 11–76. Here, Auerbach defines it as a combination of pre-Christian 
Roman rhetoric and Pauline thought brought to fruition among the Church Fathers. Essentially, the figura is 
the “fulfillment” of a prior historical event or episode by a subsequent one, such that the latter reveals the 
former as a sign or portent of the latter: “The relation between the two events is revealed by an accord or 
similarity . . . often vague similarities in the structure of events or in their attendant circumstances sufice to 
make the figura recognizable; to find it, one had to be determined to interpret it in a certain way,” ibid., 29. 
Distinguishing figura from “most of the allegorical forms known to us,” Auerbach emphasizes the 
“historicity both of the sign and what it signifies,” ibid., 54. This method of interpretation played a key role 
in making the Old Testament component of the emerging Christian Bible, in particular, of interest to 
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in the proper spirit, they will be “drawn from the flames and blacknesses,” just as was 
done to/with the “holy books” by Ezra after the Babylonian Captivity.41 Besides the 
striking theological—more accurately, soteriological—implications of this figura, we 
may also note that it analogizes the reader of Alcuin’s address as writing, or scripture, 
itself. The soul of the reader is plucked from the blackness and fire of damnation in just 
the same way that Ezra rescued the scriptures from temporal, historical destruction by the 
fires of the Babylonian conquest.  
Next, the Cluny version follows the MGH Carmen 69 straight through to its end, 
with the sole curious excerption of the three lines describing the letters of Paul in the 
New Testament. The first thirty or so lines of this section place the divine revelation of 
holy scripture in the historical and soteriological context of Adam and Eve’s expulsion 
from the Garden of Eden. Here, scripture is figured as a kind of saving grace, a way back 
offered to man by God even at the moment (or shortly thereafter) of banishment from the 
primordial earthly paradise. Alcuin does not directly reference the incarnation and 
sacrifice of the Christ here, and neither does he specifically refer to any historically 
concrete act of scripture reading; to my mind, this means that this account of scripture as 
a divine dispensation of grace cannot be rightly called a true figura. Nevertheless, its 
equation or parallel with the incarnation of Christ, of God-in-man, seems not only 
obvious but inescapable. And it clearly builds on the earlier figura, in which Ezra’s 
                                                 
Western Romans and their Germanic successors, ibid., 52. But it was also crucial in elaborating a mode of 
historical thought that understood all earthly events as both concrete and real but also as emanations of a 
more ultimate, and more ultimately “true,” divine reality, ibid., 58. 
41 From here on I cite the MGH: 292. 
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textual reconstruction is actualized by the modern reader’s salvation-through-reading. 
Already, therefore, a striking, and even possibly heretical, equivalence is suggested. 
Most of the remaining lines (around 170) are rather in the spirit of the first 
twenty: brief summaries of each book, relating the most famous stories and placing them 
in the broader context of the Bible as an assemblage. The last twenty to thirty lines 
proclaim the importance and beauty of scripture and assert an indispensable role for them 
in understanding God and Heaven, and (yet again) in achieving salvation. They also 
instruct a reader to make proper use of the classical/medieval system of punctuation for 
reading aloud, cola et commata and the various headings of the manuscript, and offer a 
blessing for Charlemagne. 
The role of this text, therefore, is best thought of as a summary of and perhaps 
introduction to the Bible—not an introduction to studying and interpreting the Bible, a 
role fulfilled by the text that follows it, Jerome’s letter to Paulinus, nor a devotional or 
ritual introduction to the Bible, reflecting on the spiritual and transcendental nature of 
Bible reading as an act (though, as we saw, this first hymn does express this idea in 
passing), as in the Alcuin poem that comes after Jerome’s letter and closes out this 
introductory composite manifesto. Instead this poem tells, in brief, what writings are in 
the Bible and why, in the context of a Christian cosmology and historical narrative, this 
assemblage arose. As scholars of the Bible and Christians in general both today and a 
thousand years ago are well aware, the Bible is a complex and challenging collection of 
texts, whose origins (sometimes located, more likely than not, in primarily oral traditions) 
span centuries: whether one adopts a hard-nosed, academic, secular approach or one 
located fully and firmly within the religious tradition of the Abrahamic triad, all agree 
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that the earliest texts of the Bible date from long before the sixth century BCE, while the 
most recent come from the mid or even late first century CE. On top of this, most 
individual books themselves spring from a complex, fragmentary, and contested textual 
tradition, and the decision of which to include in the Bible, like efforts at biblical 
translation, remained contested throughout the medieval period. On top of this temporal 
complexity, moreover, are wide divergences in genre—some books are law, some are 
poetry, some history, others letters, and so on.  
These challenges were also appreciated in the early and high Middle Ages; in this 
light, I suggest that this poem, at least in the specific context of the Cluny Bible, was 
likely intended as a kind of basic orientation for one first approaching the Bible as a 
unitary, not to mention written, assemblage. Here we should note that this was most 
likely not how the average monk (let alone magnate or peasant) would have approached 
it; in general, monks would have experienced “the Bible” as but one source (albeit a very 
important one) from which some of the dizzying array of readings, constantly combined 
and recombined in complex and seasonally-varying patterns, that made up the liturgy 
were drawn. Inattentive, disinterested, dim, or new (whether oblati or conversi) monks 
probably had only a vague sense of “the Bible.” To such a one, it likely seemed a 
diaphanous category under which those of their brothers more involved in the staging of 
the liturgy grouped some of the readings, experienced aurally by the hypothetical monk 
whose perspective we are currently imagining, that they continually ranged and 
rearranged before him. How well would our dunce, dullard, or novice grasp the 
difference between, say, a homily of Gregory the Great and a reading from Jeremiah, or 
between a reading from the vita of a medieval saint and a reading from Acts or Job? 
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Certainly a more, or even only somewhat attentive member of the community could 
quickly build upon the distinctions between different parts of the liturgy—different hours 
in the daily office, the different sequences of readings and responses and of psalmody, the 
yearly cycle of the liturgical calendar and the commemoration of various feasts with 
special pomp and extended services—to aid a clear apprehension of Bible texts as such. 
He also would probably have been able to detect differing dictions, syntaxes, and even 
vocabularies, at least between the extremes of biblical texts and vitae written only a 
generation or two before his own.  
Therefore, I suggest that this poem might have been intended (by Alcuin as well 
as the Cluniac copyists working around the turn of the millennium?), though perhaps not 
exclusively, as an introduction to a more active use and apprehension of the Bible by 
such an attentive monk. This introduction could have served as the first course for a 
brother being groomed at least as a lector, if not for some higher liturgical role such as 
hebdomarius, cantor, or armarius. Susan Boynton has discussed the pedagogical use of 
hymns and psalms in particular in a number of works, noting in particular that “monastic 
education combined learning the monastic life with the study of grammar, which was 
taught primarily through the liturgy. Given the degree of attention focused on ‘Ut queant 
laxis’ in the commentary tradition, it comes as no surprise that the hymn provides the 
ideal text for teaching the central themes of monasticism. . .”42 Similarly, Alcuin’s hymn, 
                                                 
42 Susan Boynton, “Orality, Literacy, and the Early Notation of Office Hymns,” Journal of the American 
Musicological Society 56, no. 1 (2003), 112. For more on the pedagogical uses of hymn glosses, see also 
Boynton, “Glosses on the Office Hymns in Eleventh-Century Continental Hymnaries,” The Journal of 
Medieval Latin 11 (2001): 1–26 and Boynton, “The Didactic Function and Context of Eleventh-Century 
Glossed Hymnaries,” in Der lateinische Hymnus im Mittelalter: Überlieferung-Ästhetik-Ausstrahlung, ed. 
Andreas Haug, Christoph März, and Lorenz Welker, Monumenta Monodica Medii Aevi, Subsidia 4 
(Kassel, Germany: Bärnreiter, 2004), 301–329.. 
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here and in general, might have functioned as an introduction to the Bible as a collection 
of (sacred) history and literature. Besides its content, the verse form of the text would 
have functioned as a learning aid, making it easier to remember and, crucially, to 
remember in the order presented.43 An oral tradition of this and other poems (of Alcuin 
and other monastic or clerical writers) is certainly plausible enough, and might explain 
the variance between the Cluny Bible text of the poem and that of the MGH—even if this 
poem were stitched together by Cluniac copyists directly from other carmini of Alcuin 
available to them in written form, this willingness and ability to combine and recombine 
texts in modular fashion is characteristic of an oral poetic tradition.44  
The content of the poem is certainly introductory and expository. In the main 
body of the poem, the treatment of most individual books is quick and often includes 
reference to their ordinal number: “This fifth book [Deuteronomy] consists in a sermon 
[sermo; conversation, discourse] / Recalling to the mind God’s gifts to the people [the 
wandering Hebrews/Israelites] . . . And in turn the sixth [book], Thomas, holds his deeds 
/ Indeed thus is it named for him . . .” Many of the summaries are striking and 
memorable: “Indeed here are written the deeds of the Prophet Samuel / And Saul who 
destroyed the Philistine with the iron sword.” They frequently put the book into a broader 
historical context, as when Alcuin writes that “Jeroboam took up the lineages of Samaria 
/ A kingdom that cultivated vice above all,” or group the books together by topic or 
genre: “Then there are the famous volumes of the prophets / Which sing of the coming 
                                                 
43 Certainly the author of the present study is not alone in having learned, as a child, the books of the Old 
Testament as a catchy little song in Sunday school. This is essentially the same principle, though of course 
in a very different context and at a much diminished level of complexity/detail. 
44 See Chapter 3, note 72, above. 
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days of Christ / First are these twice eight booklets [chapters] of Jeremiah / Here the 
forerunner of Josiah and the people.” These are the kind of quick, straightforward, and 
significant tidbits upon which one could begin to develop a finer appreciation for the 
range, variety, and typological subdivisions of the Bible; one who learned this poem 
would grasp, for example, the distinction between Leviticus as a book “describ[ing] the 
rite of the priests / And of the Levites . . .” and Kings as a history—specifically one 
describing a time after Joshua’s wars and the rule of the judges. These distinctions, once 
made, would reinforce and be reinforced by each new reading from scripture; whatever 
impression an attentive listener (or lector) took from a given reading would become 
associated in his mind with the memorable account of the book in question given in 
Alcuin’s poem. 
Thus the key that the summaries in Alcuin’s poem provide is context. Even the 
dullards must have sensed that some rational or semi-rational order governed the shifting 
array of innumerable and idiosyncratic texts they sang and listened to through the 
liturgical year; this poem is not an effort to apprehend that order in its entirety, but it did 
offer a window on one of the most important sub-systems of those ritual texts, that of 
“the Bible”—like the novel physical form of the pandect, this poem suggested that a large 
number of those texts were of a type, and that they might be not only gathered but also 
grasped, approached, viewed, and studied together. It is difficult for a modern reader, at 
least one coming from a Christian or Abrahamic tradition, to loosen the powerful 
conceptual unity of “the Bible” in their own mind, but doing so is necessary to grasp the 
role that this poem and the pandect in general played in monastic experience: for that 
modern conceptual unity springs from an ongoing, lifetime experience of the Bible, 
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always (in English) with a singular, definite article, and always in a single, portable, 
ubiquitous volume. The experience of the Bible among the rank-and-file at Cluny in the 
tenth and eleventh century could hardly have been more different: today a chapter of 
Isaiah and a run of Psalms, a few months later, Jeremiah, all ensconced in reverberating 
layers of homily and hymn—and all completely oral and aural. Their counterpart to our 
mental effort at dissolution is embodied in the production and physical reality of BNF lat 
15176, and in the didactic approach of this (composite!) poem of Alcuin’s; theirs was an 
effort at agglutination, concatenation, and perhaps especially at internal ordering and 
rationalization. 
A full accounting of all the pyschodynamical and semiotic-ideological 
implications of this process, by which one of the key signs of the Western tradition was 
totally transformed, is far beyond the scope of the present project. Nevertheless, this 
contrast between the rank-and-file monk’s apprehension or experience of “the Bible” and 
that of the modern Christian offers a powerful example of the progression from orality to 
literacy/literality suggested by Walter Ong and Marshall McLuhan, which bears a passing 
comment. In this progression, a key set of texts is transcribed from an extremely complex 
communal performance and mapped onto a quite specifically spatial, visual field. Besides 
altering the “ratio” of the senses, with all the momentous and subtle results McLuhan 
emphasized, this move also transforms the social relationships that exist to and through 
the texts. Precisely the most sacred pinnacle of speech is pulled out of the transitory 
moment or event and set into a physical form. This physical form, quite obviously, has 
gone on to completely supplant the former embodied, aural, ritual, communal vessel as 
the primary experience of that speech-which-is-no-longer-speech. The psychological, 
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cultural, or, most accurately, semiotic-ideological consequences of this transformation are 
immense. The social, that is, hierarchical effects, too, have been discussed, most 
famously by Brian Stock, who coined the evocative phrase, “textual communities.”45 It is 
often overlooked that Stock coined this term specifically in an effort to conceptualize 
eleventh- and twelfth-century heretical and reform movements; this recollection has 
many important implications for how we understand precisely what Stock meant, as well 
as for our understanding of heresy and the effects on social hierarchy and community of 
changing media technologies and their attendant practices.46 Stock’s point in examining 
high medieval heresies as “textual communities” was to substantiate his thesis that 
“literacy influenced group organization.”47 In Stock’s chosen examples (list them), it did 
so in that  
 
eleventh-century dissenters may not have shared profound doctrinal similarities or 
profound social origins, but they demonstrated a parallel use of texts, both to 
structure the internal behaviour of the group’s members and to provide solidarity 
against the outside world. . . . What was essential to a textual community was not 
a written version of a text, although that was sometimes present, but an individual 
who, having mastered it, then utilized it for reforming a group’s thought and 
action.48 
                                                 
45 Stock, Implications of Literacy, 88–90. 
46 Ibid., 88. 
47 Ibid., 89. 
48 Ibid., 90, emphasis my own. 
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Though Stock does not quite go (explicitly) this far, I would say that the clear implication 
of this account of the textual community and the impact of literacy on group organization 
is the lengthening and strengthening of the hierarchical bonds within society or 
community. Those within the “inner core” of a textual community followed the 
interpretation of the text itself, generally presented by or mediated through the individual 
master.49 This master thus ruled not through ethnic or kinship or social solidarity, and 
even less through the invocation of customary bonds and authority.50 In joining the 
community in the first place, its members had rejected those modes of action, 
justification, and self-understanding, instead opting for “the acting out of specific roles,” 
new “rituals of everyday life . . . a complex set of interactions between members of 
groups which were in large part structured by texts.”51 Structured, that is, by the 
interpretation of texts by the master, agreement upon which is constitutive of the new (or 
reformed) community. Whatever other effects resulted from this new “parallel use of 
text,” then, and there were and are a great many, one of the most immediately apparent 
and momentous is the greatly increased power available to individuals who managed to 
establish themselves as authoritative interpreters.52 And what could better illustrate 
precisely this process than the gathering of the very heart of the liturgy into a singular, 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 89–90. 
50 Ibid., 89. 
51 Ibid., 90. See also ibid., 101. 
52 As Stock notes, old-fashioned personal charisma of a kind not erroneously associated with pre-
literate/legalistic forms of authority (desert holy men, conquering kings) often played an important role in 
this establishment. Ibid., 89. 
  
136 
 
material object, which might be possessed and physically controlled by an individual in a 
way communal performance never could?53  
Returning to Alcuin’s poem, it is important to note that it offers not only historical 
and bibliological context for each various book, but also a much broader, indeed 
soteriological and transcendental, context for the Bible as a (singular) whole. Following 
the reference to Ezra’s project of scriptural recovery and reconstruction, Alcuin writes the 
following lines: 
  
When the first man was driven from the beautiful garden 
Into this tragic state, that is, in sorrowful death, 
Lamenting and accursed, with worthy propitiatory deeds of the flesh 
Equally useless for his benefit as for all his offspring: 
And yet, omnipotent, he [God] dispensed good to all, 
Already in pity a work of great piety 
But with overflowing tears, our mild solace, 
He brought from heaven in his goodness. 
For this he is to be praised always, loved  
Equally by the breast, mind, and hand of all. 
 
The mind conscious of right shall be able to have any good thing, 
                                                 
53 In the monastic context specifically, Steven Vanderputten and Isabelle Cochelin have pointed to the ways 
new written textual forms corresponded to, and possibly drove, the significant increase in abbatial authority 
observable from the late eleventh century onward. See Cochelin, “Community and Customs,” 242–243 and 
250–252 and Vanderputten, “Monastic Reform, Abbatial Leadership, and the Instrumentation of Cluniac 
Discipline.” 
  
137 
 
Of this, the highest grace of all [that he] gave. 
Accordingly, among these are the greatest gifts of the books 
Which sing of things in turn through all time 
And retain, with the saying from God, the origins of the world 
And set forth as music holy Christ 
In which the reason of man is given, fixed, and cultivated 
As of God Himself, the truth of whom is the way, life, and salvation. 
May he, pure in heart, read and hold these,  
to live with Christ forever in the arc of the sky.54 
                                                 
54 “Dum primus pulchro fuerat homo pulsus ab horto 
In hanc, pro, miseram morte dolore diem,  
Infandi et gemuit condigna piacula facti 
Cum tota pariter prole salutis inops: 
Non tamen omnipotens bonitas dimiserat omne 
In miseros magnae iam pietatis opus,  
Plurima sed mitis lacrimis solacia nostris 
Attulit e caelis in bonitate sua. 
Illius ut semper pietas laudetur, ametur, 
Cunctorum pariter pectore, mente, manu. 
Quicquid habere boni poterit mens conscia recti, 
Illius hoc totum gratia summa dedit. 
Inter quae siquidem sunt maxima dona librorum, 
Qui series rerum et tempora cuncta canunt, 
Et dictante deo retinent primordia mundi, 
Et christum saeclis praececinere pium, 
In quibus et homini ratio est data certa colendi 
Ipsa deum, vera est quae via, vita, salus. 
Hos legat et teneat, placeat cui pectore puro 
Vivere cum Christo perpes in arce poli,” MGH, 288. 
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Here the scriptures are clearly presented as a dispensation of divine grace. They were 
given, “from Heaven,” in response to humankind’s expulsion from the Garden. They are 
contrasted with the “worthy propitiatory deeds of the flesh” that were “useless” both to 
Adam and his offspring. These lines also suggest that Bible reading (listening, study) can 
itself redeem humans, or at least play an important role in their redemption. Though, 
again, a proper historically-conscious theological investigation into the question of 
orthodox Christian soteriology is beyond the scope of my work here, to my mind this 
suggestion likely skirted heresy (or at least significant unorthodoxy) in the eleventh 
century as it does even today—the most straightforward reading of it would give rather 
too much efficacy in salvation to individual, mortal intellection and to ink on treated 
calfskin. It also fails to maintain the indispensable mediatory and interpretive role the 
Gregorian papacy would claim for itself. In the fullest account of the Orléans heresy of 
1022, that provided by Paul of Saint-Père of Chartres, it is precisely the ability of 
individuals and groups to interpret scripture “for themselves,” outside the confines of the 
territorial church’s established institutions, which rears its head.55 Though the account 
relating the heresy as such was only written down several decades later, and though 
heresy in the West oddly subsided until the mid-twelfth century, exactly this presumptive 
interpretation would be one of the central bones of contention in most of the major and 
minor heretical outbreaks of the high and late Middle Ages—not to mention of the 
Reformation.56 How similar, and how much worse, to equate or even supplant Jesus 
Christ as incarnate dispensation of salvific grace with the scriptures? 
                                                 
55 Stock, Implications of Literacy, 109–115. 
56 Euan Cameron, “The Waldenses,” in The Medieval Theologians: An Introduction to Theology in the 
Medieval Period, ed. G. R. Evans (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell), 269–286; Stephen Lahey, “Wyclif and 
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Along these lines, we may also note that Alcuin’s poem goes into slightly more 
detail about the nature of the Bible’s role in individual and collective salvation: “The 
mind conscious of right [mens conscia recti] shall be able to have any good thing / Of 
this, the highest grace of all [that he] gave.” Here, “right” or “a mind aware of the straight 
[right, good]” is given as the key to unlocking the immense benefits and even divine 
power of scripture. This is certainly a very terse account of the requisite mental training 
for successful Bible study, but that is no excuse to pretend it does not exist. Again, it 
echoes the Orléansist heresy. As Stock summarizes, “The sect rejected the written 
traditions and dependent institutions of the official church. In their place it put a 
rationality based on simplified textual criticism and on one’s capacity for reflection.”57 
The Orléansians also believed that proper instruction in and interpretation of the 
scriptures’ true meaning would bring unity with God, miraculous understanding of the 
scriptures, angelic visions, and a variety of other supernatural powers and benefits.58 Not 
exactly salvation, but certainly divine or transcendental transformation. It seems likely 
that, if any monks of Cluny had, on the basis of Alcuin’s poem, begun to claim 
unimpeachable or superhuman scriptural understanding, and especially a state of 
salvation, the response would have been similar to that the Orléansians faced. Of course, 
so far as we known, none did. And Stock even suggests that the lack of a strict 
“institutional framework” likely contributed to the Orléansians’ subjectivization of the 
                                                 
Lollardy,” in The Medieval Theologians, 334–356; Malcolm Lambert, Medieval Heresy: Popular 
Movements from Gregorian Reform to the Reformation, 3rd ed. (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002); 
Carter Lindberg, The European Reformations (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1996). 
57 Stock, Implications of Literacy, 112. 
58 Ibid., 111–112. 
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experience of textual interpretation in a way that led to their rejection of various forms of 
traditional authority.59 Certainly the monks encountering Alcuin’s poem at Cluny did not 
lack for such a framework. In any case, the point is not that the monks of Cluny were 
secret heretics; it is rather to locate their developing literalate modes, and thus even those 
represented by the poetry of Alcuin (himself a highly literate reformer), among those that 
also drove the transformations in community Stock examined through reform and heresy. 
Setting aside this issue—for ultimately what makes heresy is the explicit effort to 
change defined religious orthodoxy or suppress variation from it, neither of which is even 
remotely present in early eleventh-century Cluny—the poem also figures the Bible as the 
ultimate grounding of fundamental knowledge. It “retain[s]60 . . . the origins of the 
world,” and within it “is fixed, given, and cultivated the explanation [ratio; reason, 
account] of man.” This too is an introductory encapsulation of the essence of the Bible; 
key to the medieval, or at least medieval monastic, conception of the Bible was its role as 
the ultimate source of knowledge. This phrasing carries a trace of debates already so 
ancient at the turn of the eleventh century as to be forgotten, perhaps, even by members 
of the regular clergy, debates between the Church Fathers and the representatives of the 
classical pagan philosophical tradition about the ability of the Bible to answer the same 
kinds of ultimate questions as thinkers such as Aristotle had tackled.61 But even to a 
                                                 
59 Ibid., 112. 
60 This grammatical editorial tweak neatly encapsulates the recent consideration of the differing modern 
and medieval conceptualizations of the Bible as unitary versus diffuse. 
61 Early Christian apologetics is an immense field, into which I have not really ventured. See Apologetics in 
the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews, and Christians, ed. Mark J. Edwards et al. (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 
1999); Continuity and Discontinuity in Early Christian Apologetics, ed. Jörg Ulrich et al. (Bern, 
Switzerland: Peter Lang, 2009). 
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monastic reader (or hearer) totally unaware of such debates, this assertion would imply a 
certain approach to scripture: one that reinforced and expanded the figural drive to 
discover every line of the scriptures as a virtually infinite chain of signs, revealing 
answers about every aspect of life on earth. And, more importantly, it also implied an 
approach that mapped the world, humankind in general, and the individual onto the world 
of the page. To an attentive reader, at least, the central issues and mysteries of existence 
became increasingly rooted in the spatial field and discrete materiality of the heavy 
pandect spread before him. 
This poem thus presents to its reader/auditor an image of the Bible as a single 
cohesive agglomeration, yet with various concrete subdivisions and with all its internal 
historical and typological variation intact. It is in large part a mnemonic guide to this 
unity-in-diversity. It also sets forth the Bible as itself a mechanism of salvation, with all 
the heretical implications a strict reading of this notion would discover, including the 
elevation of human reading—human semiosis, anthroposemiosis—to an active 
participant in transcendence. In a frustratingly terse movement with deep ties to ancient 
philosophy,62 the poem suggests “a mind conscious of the straight/right” as the key to 
accessing the Bible in this fashion. And, finally, Alcuin declares the Bible the ultimate 
source of knowledge about the reason or purpose of man and the origin of the world.63 
These assertions, too, would be clearly recognized as positions on the central intellectual 
                                                 
62 I am thinking in particular of Plato’s dialogue Protagoras, in which Socrates argues that virtue is 
essentially the art of “measurement,” in that it allows one to evaluate perspective and avoid its inherent 
pitfalls. For a good introductory gloss and discussion of these issues, see Blackson, Ancient Greek 
Philosophy, 61. 
63 Ibid., 39–58 and 140–148. 
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questions of the day in pagan antiquity. Moreover, they encourage and even universalize 
the medieval figural tendency, wherein the Bible is taken to symbolically or analogically 
explain all things, on earth as well as in Heaven.  
The second text is Jerome’s letter to Paulinus of Nola, here introduced (via a 
massive incipit) as “concerning all the divine books of history.” It is thus significantly 
older than the poems which precede and follow it: written in 394, the historical span 
between it and them is twice that which separated the copyists who made the Cluny Bible 
from Alcuin (to say nothing of the great cultural distance at play). But like Alcuin’s 
poems, it owes its place in this turn-of-the-eleventh-century manuscript to the ideological 
and institutional project of Carolingian Bible reform—this letter obviously identifies the 
Bible with Jerome’s Vulgate, with Charlemagne’s reformatio claiming a place as 
mediator between the letter’s composition in the waning years of the Western Empire and 
early church and its continued (or renewed) staying-power in the high Middle Ages.  
Besides acting as a marker of this alignment, what is this letter doing here? Most 
immediately, it functions as an apologia for the Bible and for study of the Bible. It is also 
elaborates a certain conception of the Bible and, indeed, a certain practice of Bible 
reading and interpretation. In pursuing this elaboration, though he is not hostile to the 
great pagan philosophers here, Jerome clearly takes aim at those students of their 
tradition, opposed to or even disdainful towards the Bible and Christianity in his own 
day; in this regard he stands in an already-long tradition of Judeo-Christian self-
justification and assertion before Greek philosophy. Moreover, he advances quite 
explicitly the figural practice of Bible reading, praises the pursuit of knowledge, and, 
incidentally or not, suggests a particular notion of Christian soteriological semiotics. 
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Thus, though there are major differences in period, genre, and content between this letter 
and the poem of Alcuin’s just discussed, they share not merely Christian belief, but also a 
subtle effort to establish and maintain a biblical semiotics at once distinct from (most 
crucially in its figural mode), superior to, and intelligible within the greater Greek 
philosophical tradition. 
Jerome does not much explain the figural method or dynamic in his letter—he 
rather simply asserts it, primarily in the tumultuous outpouring, sometimes called a 
summary of the Old and New Testaments, that appears towards the end of the letter. Here 
we find only one or two clear examples of fully developed figura, as when Jerome writes 
of “Jonah, fairest of doves, whose shipwreck shews in a figure the passion of the Lord, 
recalls the world to penitence, and while he preaches to Nineveh, announces salvation to 
all the heathen.”64 The passage is much more a breathless list of the many Old Testament 
people, episodes, precepts, prophecies, words, and even “conjunctions of words” that are 
“mysteries,” which “throw light . . . upon questions suggested by the Gospel,” “illustrate 
all the laws of logic,” and “convey one meaning upon the surface but another below it.”65 
The treatment of the New Testament in this regard is shorter, though it does include a 
fascinating interpretation of the four evangelists as the cherubim from Ezekiel’s vision of 
God:  
 
                                                 
64 I have made use of the translation found in Philip Schaff and Rev. Henry Wallace, eds., Nicene and Post-
Nicene Fathers: Second Series, vol. 6 (New York, NY: Cosimo, 2007), 96–102, comparing it with both the 
Latin “original” in BNF lat. 15176 6r–4r and the Patrologia Latina, vol. 22 (1845), 540–549. 
65 Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 100. 
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Matthew, Mark, Luke and John are the Lord’s team of four, the true cherubim or 
store of knowledge. With them the whole body is full of eyes, they glitter as 
sparks, they run and return like lightning, their feet are straight feet, and lifted up; 
their backs also are winged, ready to fly in all directions. They hold together each 
by each and are interwoven one with another: like wheels within wheels they roll 
along and go whithersoever the breath of the Holy Spirit wafts them.66 
 
Thus while Jerome’s letter cannot really be taken as an explanation of the figural 
approach to Biblical interpretation, it certainly assumes and presents that approach, both 
in fully-formed figurae and in a general assertion that the Bible is filled with semiotic 
units (words, characters, stories) that signify many different things on many different 
levels, binding not only the New and Old Testaments but also the high intellectual culture 
and complex social world of pagan (or at least not-specifically-Christian) antiquity 
together in a web that reveals the truth of Christianity at all points simultaneously.  
Perhaps more interesting is another, overlapping semiosis suggested by Jerome in 
the letter. The core of this semiosis is, fittingly, Jesus Christ himself—specifically 
understood as Logos. Jerome writes that this term “in Greek has many meanings. It 
signifies reason [ratio] and reckoning [or “computation,” subputatio] and the care of each 
individual thing, through which every [one], which halts/maintains itself, is [cura unius 
cuiusque rei per que[m] sunt singula quae subsistunt]. All of which things we rightly 
                                                 
66 Ibid., 101. “Matthaeus, Marcus, Lucas, et Joannes, quadriga Domini, et verum Cherubim, quod 
interpretatur scientiae multitudo, per totum corpus oculati sunt, scintillae emicant, discurrunt fulgura, pedes 
liabnet rectos et i nsublime tendentes, terga pennata et ubique volitantia. Tenent se mutuo, sibique perplexi 
sunt, et quasi rota in rota volvuntur, et pergunt quocumque eos flatus Sancti Spiritus perduxerit.” PL 
22:548.  
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predicate of Christ.”67 Christ as Logos is both the human faculty of reason that grasps and 
understands things, and the essence or attracting force by which those things persist, in 
the face of their fundamental finitude and mutability, on their own as things.68 This dual 
function suggests that the basis on which things are and the basis on which they are 
known are both Christ Himself. 
Jerome proceeds from here to emphasize that Christ is inaccessible to merely 
human understanding; he is a “truth Plato with all his learning did not know,” of which 
“Demosthenes with all his eloquence was ignorant,” a “true wisdom” that “must destroy 
the false,” and ultimately “the wisdom [of God] which is hidden [absconditam] in a 
mystery.”69 In this characterization, Jerome subtly recalls the opening of his letter, in 
which he described the virtuous seeking by postulants for wise men. This part of the letter 
ended, perhaps somewhat mysteriously in a written communication about reading books, 
with Jerome saying that, “the living voice possesses something of a latent/hidden 
                                                 
67 Here I depart somewhat from the English translation I have been using. First, this translation begins the 
list of meanings of Logos, “It signifies word. . . .” The Cluny Bible recension does not include “word” here. 
Much more significant is my clumsy attempt at a philosophical literalism for the latter part of the sentence 
(I have kept/concurred with “reason and reckoning”): the translation gives “the cause of individual things 
by which those which are subsist.” Obviously cura here could by translated many different ways, and this 
particular semantic field is of immense significance for the Western philosophical tradition. Rendering the 
word as care, concern, anxiety, attention, management, or administration would immediately associate 
Jerome’s phrase quite particularly and intimately with a philosophical genealogy for which no single term 
exists, encompassing Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and even Foucault. For his part, Jerome is likely 
drawing on an Aristotelian or Neoplatonic framework here that would be quite obvious to any educated 
reader. The last sentence of the quote (“All of which things. . . .”) is again the translation’s. For more on the 
large and complex topic of Neoplatonism and early Christianity, see Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, “Origen, Patristic 
Philosophy, and Christian Platonism: Re-Thinking the Christianisation of Hellenism,” Vigiliae Christianae 
63, no. 3 (2009), 217–263. For a relatively complex introduction to Neoplatonism itself, with an eye on 
historical development and its encounter with Christianity, see John Deely, Medieval Philosophy 
Redefined: The Development of Cenoscopic Science, AD 354 to 1644 (From the Birth of Augustine to the 
Death of Poinsot) (Scranton, NJ: University of Scranton Press, 2010), 54–81 
68 The question of essential mutability, persistence, and identity is one of the most central to the Greek 
philosophical tradition, from which Socrates and to some extent Plato represent partial diversions and 
Aristotle a marked return. Blackson, Ancient Greek Philosophy. 
69 Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 98, with this last phrase quoted from 1 Corinthians 2:6–7. 
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[latentis] energy I do not understand. . . .”70 There is thus an implicit parallel between the 
hidden power of the spoken word and Christ as the hidden wisdom of God, and the 
suggestion that both, in some mysterious way, simultaneously undergird and supersede 
the written play of knowledge or wisdom. This parallel is further substantiated by 
Jerome’s meditation on disciples and masters.  
After a few brief remarks about friendship in Christ, Jerome quickly proceeds to 
describe at some length various philosophers who either traveled in search of wisdom or 
were themselves sought out as purveyors of the same. Passing over a number of pagan 
figures, such as Plato, he comes at last to Paul, “doctor of the Gentiles,” who claimed to 
have Christ speaking through him. Then follows his curious remark about the power of 
the living voice, before Jerome explains why he has recounted all this:  
 
I do not adduce these instances because I have anything in me from which you 
either can or will learn a lesson, but to show you that your zeal and eagerness to 
learn—even though you cannot rely on help from me—are in themselves worthy 
of praise. . . . What is of importance to me is not what you find but what you seek 
to find. Wax is soft and easy to mold even where the hands of craftsman and 
modeler are wanting to work it.71 
 
                                                 
70 Here again I have departed slightly from the translation I have been using. It gives “Spoken words 
possess an indefinable hidden power. . . .” (ibid., 97) for “Habet nescio quid latentis energiae viva vox. . . .” 
(BNF lat. 15176 2v). 
71 Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 97. “Haec non dico, quod sit in me aliquid tale, quod vel possis, vel 
velis discere: sed quod ardor tuus ac discendi studium, etiam absque nobis per se probari debeat. . . . Non 
quid invenias, sed quid quaeras, consideramus. Mollis cera et at formandum facilis, etiam si artificis et 
plastae cessent manus.” PL 22:542. 
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Here, Jerome suggests that the pursuit of knowledge is more important even than the 
actual attainment of it; in other words, that the journey is the destination. At first, the rest 
of the long passage seems to contradict this notion: Jerome describes the learning of, or 
esteem for, the law and the scriptures by various New and Old Testament figures, such as 
Paul, Timothy, Haggai, and David. He also decries “want of education in a clergyman.” 
In seeming contrast Jerome interprets a verse from Daniel (12:3) to the effect that the 
righteous ignorant rank above those instructed in righteousness, but immediately 
demonstrates, by recourse to the original Hebrew, that the verse can also be understood to 
praise the learned exclusively. And Jerome ends this meditation on the value of the 
scriptures by reference to the learning of Paul, Peter, John, and the twelve-year-old Jesus 
that so astounded the Pharisees. But while the point of these various digressions is to 
show how much various seminal figures in the Judeo-Christian tradition valued the law 
and the scriptures—and thereby to praise Paulinus for his decision to pursue that same 
learning—the outcome is not really in doubt for Jerome’s addressee; like wax, he will 
intrinsically pick up the scriptures by pressing himself against them: “It [wax] is already 
potentially all that it can be made.”72 The implication of this somewhat hazy distinction 
seems to be that understanding the scriptures is not necessary to receive the ultimate 
benefit (salvation) that they offer. 
Jerome’s letter thus exhibits a basic congruency with several parts of Alcuin’s 
poem. Most obvious is their shared figural approach, by which the Bible is transformed 
into both the secret blueprint and, paradoxically, cipher of all things. But Jerome also 
                                                 
72 Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 97. 
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seems to agree with Alcuin in the salvific power of scripture, and furthermore, by dint of 
discussing the matter at greater length, suggests how it can be reconciled with the 
Augustinian doctrine of man’s helplessness in his own salvation,73 the exclusivity of 
Christ as savior expressed in John 14:6, and, further on, the church’s claim of a unique 
and indispensable intermediary role. First of all, as expressed through his wax metaphor, 
Jerome removes the agency of the individual approaching the Bible in his own salvation: 
“What is important to me is not what you find but what you seek to find”—the emphasis 
here is quite specifically on the endeavor and not its result, outcome, or achievement. 
Secondly, as I will now show, Christ himself is shown to animate or inhabit the scriptures 
in some way. The foundation of this idea has already been provided in the implicit 
parallel between the hidden power of the spoken word and Christ as the wisdom of God, 
the ground of both being and knowing, hidden in a mystery. I will draw out the second 
component of Christ-in/as-scripture, before addressing the mediatory role of the church 
(which, appropriately, shares much of its basis with that of Christ-in/as-scripture).  
Immediately after introducing the idea that effort, rather than attainment, is the 
important thing when approaching scripture, Jerome complicates this idea. While 
pursuing the scriptures regardless of understanding may be sufficiently virtuous, Jerome 
does offer advice on actually achieving that understanding; he tells Paulinus that “a 
revelation is needed to enable us to comprehend it and, when God uncovers His face, to 
behold His glory.” In essence, and this is a complex religious epistemology that one 
encounters constantly in medieval devotional writing,74 God must grant the individual 
                                                 
73 John Rist, “Augustine of Hippo,” in The Medieval Theologians, 3–21, at 9–11. 
74 Ibid., 9–11. 
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access to the scriptures through a specific act of grace; the Christian postulant alone is not 
even capable of accessing the already divinely-inspired scriptures as a stepping-stone 
towards God: God Himself must not only provide the path (the scriptures), but also set 
the human on that path. Indeed, this is the passage where Jerome provides his definition 
of Christ as Logos; just like the living voice of the philosopher, Christ is a mystery which 
contains a miraculous power to stir revelatory understanding in those who roam the 
world, or the expanse of scripture, to find him. And this mystery is, to some extent, in 
some way, contained in the text itself. In effect, God provides to the Christian reader 
access to the scriptures, wherein Jesus as savior lies concealed, ready not only to redeem 
but to active the correct semiosis, in reading or hearing, of the human.  
Jerome also makes room for a layer of human revelatory intercession, in 
recounting the story in Acts of the Ethiopian eunuch75 who read and loved scripture 
without it:  
 
Yet although he had the book in his hand and took into his mind the words of the 
Lord, nay even had them on his tongue and uttered them with his lips, he still 
knew not Him, whom—not knowing—he worshipped in the book. Then Philip 
came and shewed him Jesus, who was concealed beneath the letter. Wondrous 
excellence of the teacher! In the same hour the eunuch believed and was baptized; 
he became one of the faithful and a saint. He was no longer a pupil but a master. . 
. .76  
                                                 
75 Acts 8:26–40. 
76 Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 98, emphasis my own. “Et tamen cum librum teneret, et verba Domini 
cogitatione conciperet, lingua volveret, labiis personaret, ignorabat eum, quem in libro nesciens 
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Thus, despite the nature of true scriptural understanding as essentially revelation, and 
despite Jerome’s long warnings against all those who wrongly claim to understand and 
butcher with their misinterpretations the scriptures, and also despite the protestations of 
his own amateur status as biblical scholar, Jerome does allow for human teachers to 
(somehow) participate in the miraculous process of true biblical learning. 
Here we have encountered, as we will many times in reading texts copied, 
preserved, and used at Cluny during its heyday, a semiosis involving not one but several 
mediatory layers between the individual Christian and the ultimate apprehension of the 
divine. The reader of the letter—Paulinus, or a monastic lector—is left with a nested 
hierarchy of transcendental exegesis. If we were to reduce this to a strict sequence, it 
might proceed from the instruction of human teachers to an appreciation of figura to an 
encounter with Christ as Logos to a profound (even revelatory) personal understanding of 
scripture (on the model of a Church Father or, as we will see, saint-abbot), and thence 
ultimately to God. Due to the nature of this semiosis (which might be identified with but 
not reduced to figura), I would not insist upon such a progression to the exclusion of 
various alternatives. There are vital similarities between each link in this chain such that, 
in a certain sense, each is all the others: the teacher functions as, is animated by, Christ in 
his human guise,77 as the scriptures are by Christ as Logos or incarnate God, and so on. 
                                                 
venerabatur. Venit Philippus, ostendit ei Jesum, qui clausus latebat in littera. O mira doctoris virtus! Eadem 
hora credit eunuchus, baptizatur, fiedlis et sanctus est; ac de discipulo magister . . .” PL 22:544. This again 
recalls quite closely Stock’s analysis of Paul of Saint-Père of Chartres’ account of the Orléans heresy: 
“Wisdom, so to speak, merely descended when the time was right; but this time coincided with the moment 
when the recruit, having absorbed scriptures through others’ interpretations, suddenly began to understand 
them for himself. He was thereby led upwards in the fashion of all mystics towards a selfless identification 
with God,” Stock, Implications of Literacy, 112.  
77 An excellent example is Bernard’s account of Hugh in the prologue to his customary (itself implicitly 
equated to the scriptures in revelatory/salvific power), see Chapter 8, below. 
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The nature of figura is to contain the greater within the lesser, and retroactively to reveal 
this identity upon apprehension of the greater in such a way that the lesser is utterly 
transported and transformed. The hierarchy or chain is thus essentially fluid, the links 
transposing themselves as they are traversed.78 
That being said, there are good reasons for this particular order. First of all, 
human teachers, whether grammarians, exegetes, lectors, or those setting a good example 
for Christian living (conversatio), provide the most basic and immediate access to 
scripture. Next, figurae can come in many forms, some obvious and straightforward, 
others deeply esoteric. They thus progressively draw the reader into scripture and train 
him in digging ever deeper for signs of Christ’s divinity and the ordered universe as 
evidence of a benevolent and omnipotent creator.79 Ultimately, however, profound access 
to scripture, at least according to Jerome in this text selected as a preface to his Vulgate 
by the Carolingian and Cluniac traditions, requires the intervention of Christ as Logos, 
sometimes accompanied or preceded (indeed, prefigured) by a similar intervention on the 
part of some saintly human. This act of epistemological or hermeneutic grace neatly 
parallels that which is Christ’s central function, which grants humans ultimate salvation. 
In his role as the redeemer, Christ rescues humankind from the ramifications of their 
disobedience in the garden by an act of selfless sacrifice. In so doing, he cures human 
being of sin and restores it from a fallen, bestial state to a truly human—that is, in some 
                                                 
78 I would suggest that this fluidity is itself the result, or at least nature, of a significantly more oral culture 
than that of modernity: increasingly literalate modes clarify and fix syntactic relations, erasing plural 
paratactic variability. This principle operates here, in Jerome’s account of this transcendental exegesis, at a 
higher level (that of semiotic ideology), but remains rooted in the slow, material from orality to literality.  
79 On Christ as the ultimate signified of the scriptures and the ordered universe as evidence of God, see my 
discussion of Glaber, in Chapter 5. 
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sense, a divine—one. Similarly, in granting understanding of the scriptures to humans, 
Christ is restoring or fulfilling their faculty of intellect or ratio. In the Cluniac monk 
Ralph Glaber’s chronicle, Historiarum libri quinque, written around the time of the 
Cluny Bible and which we will shortly consider in its own right, Glaber identifies ratio as 
the essential distinction between humans and animals, and suggests, as the primary 
operation of this faculty—the ability to correctly interpret signs. Essentially, to be saved 
is to be human is to be a user of signs, with Christ paradoxically, miraculously incarnated 
both in flesh and in scripture (with the Latin corpus used for both) as the ground of all 
three.80 
So, Jerome’s letter communicates a deeply Christian semiosis comprised of thick, 
continually inter-penetrating layers of figural interpretation and intercessory, revelatory 
exegesis. It also establishes a number of basic principles for what might adventurously be 
called the religious sociology of Bible study: such study is virtuous merely as 
unconsummated praxis—it does not require or depend upon any particular attainment or 
achievement, it is best pursued in the company of others and severed from all worldly 
wealth and involvement, and, recalling Jerome’s equation of the hidden power of speech 
with Christ as hidden divine wisdom, it requires a teacher or “guide” to progress. These 
principles would clearly have been understood by the monks of Cluny to justify and 
sanction their particular way of life. 
It also demonstrates striking thematic cohesion with the Alcuin poem that 
precedes it in the Cluny Bible but post-dates it by roughly four hundred years. In this 
                                                 
80 See Chapter 5. 
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arrangement, it appears to elaborate upon and clarify Alcuin’s terse characterization of 
scripture as a miraculous intercessory dispensation of grace. Already as formulated in 
Alcuin’s poem, this characterization would suggest a parallel with Christ to virtually any 
Christian; and while Jerome has still not quite openly asserted it, the parallel is yet more 
strongly implied by his discussion of the mysterious power of the physically-present 
teacher, Christ as Logos, and his passing reference to Christ as incarnated in the Bible. 
The other notable similarity between Alcuin’s poem and Jerome’s letter is that the claims 
of both concerning the Bible fit precisely into the classical philosophical tradition. In 
Alcuin’s case, this may well have been the result of learning such claims—about the 
Bible as containing the truth of the origin of the world and the ratio of man—without 
being aware of their roots in pagan-Christian debates from the patristic age. But in 
Jerome’s, it is a fully intentional effect, and also includes Jerome’s use of a broadly 
Neoplatonic philosophical terminology.  
The final prefatory text, Alcuin’s Carmen 65, approaches the issue of Bible 
reading in a different way.81 Rather than discussing different levels of meaning and 
stressing the importance of proper interpretation, Carmen 65 outlines the reading of the 
pandect as a devotional and commemorative act—the issue is not what is understood 
(and how) in reading, but the acts that the reading and writing of the text itself are. In this 
way, figural hermeneutics are not employed to bridge the historical or soteriological gap 
between the Old and New Testaments, nor that between the time of Christ and the fourth-
, ninth-, or eleventh-century present. Rather, Alcuin’s second poem emphasizes the 
                                                 
81 Antiquitates: Poetae Latini aevi Carolini, vol. 1, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, 283–285. 
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figural identity between the specific acts of reading and writing the pandect and several 
different events in Christian history, events taking place both before and after the earthly 
time of the text’s composition, in both heaven and earth.  
In the first place, Alcuin writes: “As many letters as are in this book / . . . may 
King Charles, who commanded him to write [them] / have so many rewards given by 
Christ through the ages.”82 In the Cluny Bible, “King Charles” has been replaced with 
“Abbot Odilo” (just as later on “Alcuin” has been replaced with “Franco”). Here a key 
figural comparison, that of works on earth and rewards in heaven, is mobilized to make 
the writing of the biblical pandect a devotional and salvific exercise. Though the 
emphasis is on the rewards of he who commanded, rather than of he who composed or 
wrote, the work, and though the historian should not ignore the vital clue towards the 
sociological Weltanschauung of the Carolingian and post-Carolingian intellectual elite 
here revealed, it is nevertheless impossible to imagine that Alcuin and his Cluniac readers 
did not believe that some measure of divine reward could be expected by the lowly 
copyist as well as the mighty patron.  
Alcuin also includes a more explicitly figural passage within his poem. After 
recounting briefly the story of the old widow and her two little coins among the 
ostentatious display of wealthy donors at the temple,83 he writes “I do not bring a poor 
little gift to your treasuries, master [unless] my poor self shall be permitted. But beautiful 
                                                 
82 “Codicis istius quot sunt in corpore sancto . . . 
Mercedes habeat Christo donante per aevum 
Tot Carolus rex, qui scribere iussit eum.” MGH, 283. 
83 Mark 12:41–44. 
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gifts, given of the Lord from the heavens, I bear to you, most excellent king, with full 
hands.”84 This is a classic illustration of figura as a medieval literary device. The action 
of Alcuin is identified with that of a praiseworthy biblical figure, thus allowing the 
perfect and atemporal divine reality to unify and imbue with meaning disparate human 
events, while also allowing a biblical text to inhabit the present, directing lived behavior 
and finding (re)incarnation—and summation—within it. Whereas the previous example 
focused on the heavenly rewards earned by the commissioning of the work, here the act 
of copying the text, or at least of compiling and presenting it to the patron, is emphasized: 
Alcuin is a holy conduit between God and Charlemagne. And, implicitly at least, the 
comparison with the widow of the Gospel also draws the reader’s attention to the specific 
act of preparing the document: the widow’s gift was sanctified not by virtue of its innate 
qualities, but by virtue of being all she had to give; Alcuin, in turn, cannot (even) muster 
a “poor little gift”—he can only transmit the Lord’s gift of scripture. All he has to give is 
this service of transmission, which, whether Alcuin himself copied (or oversaw the 
copying) of the pandect or not, would most obviously be identified with the specific 
technical and learned provision of the text as a physical, signifying object, given Alcuin’s 
status as a learned figure of imperial stature deputized by Charlemagne to restore 
Jerome’s Vulgate. This transmission also fits neatly into the chain of mediation and 
intercession extrapolated from Jerome’s letter. Thus the artisanal production of the 
                                                 
84 “Non ego parva tuis, rector, munuscula gazis 
Infero, persona sit mea parva licet. 
Munera sed domini caelestibus inclyta dictis 
Porto tibi plenis, optime rex, manibus.” MGH, 284. 
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document, as well as its commission by a patron, is rendered a devotional and sanctifying 
act—so too, as we will now see, is reading it.  
The final figural episode of this brief poem is a direct address from its author to 
the anonymous reader. Alcuin writes “Remember to pray for me each verse you read, 
Alcuin I am called; be well, O You, forever.”85 As with the dedicatory verse invoking 
Charlemagne above, in the Cluny Bible the historical figure has been replaced with a 
contemporary one, so that it reads “Franco I am called.” If the first of our three episodes 
drawn from this poem associated the commissioning and patronizing of this bible with 
the storing up of treasures in heaven, and the second equated the presentation (and, 
implicitly, copying) of the text with the humble donation of the poor widow of the 
Gospels, this third episode equates the reading of the text with an intercessory act 
executed by whomever might be reading the text for the original copyist. On the basis of 
this triad, one might venture a basic account of the socio-economics of the medieval text: 
a device that assumes patron, copyist, and lector and, at least in the archetypal case of the 
biblical text, unites the three in the execution of the core ritual upon which society is 
built, the transmission of scripture. 
But this episode differs from the others in at least one important respect: whereas 
the former two concern individualized and temporally-specific acts associated with the 
text’s creation (its commissioning by Charlemagne/Odilo and its production and 
presentation by Alcuin/Franco), this one is multiple, anonymous, and open to continual 
re-performance. A lector using the Bible at Cluny, a century or two after its production, 
                                                 
85 “Pro me, quisque legas versus, orare memento: 
Alchuine dicor ego, tu sine fine vale!” MGH, 285. 
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certainly could not inhabit the space of Alcuin/Franco, though reading and remembering 
this poem was likely intended to be edifying for such a one. Even less can he inhabit the 
role of Charlemagne. But Alcuin’s poem, coopted by Franco, does offer that individual, 
as it does to all individuals (even a historian reading the work a millennium after its 
copying), participation in the transcendental relationship spanning God and man, heaven 
and earth. For it invites that reader to figure each verse as a prayer (specifically, not to 
accompany each verse with a separate prayer) for the memory of Alcuin. Alcuin’s send-
off to the reader maintains this aperture into an open-ended merging of present and 
future: “Be well, O You, without end.” In this way, these humble two lines do something 
quite remarkable: they figure the text itself, in the state of being-read, as the ritual space, 
wherein transcendence is found, community formed, and the use of signs policed and 
diagrammed. Unlike in the classical Christian figura discussed and dissected by 
Auerbach, these lines make the Cluny Bible itself, as a specific, physical, readable 
object, the unifying field across which scattered and random human doings of the secular 
world find intelligibility and redemption. What makes the widow’s donation and Alcuin’s 
(or Franco’s) preparation of the text figurae of one another is not anything involved in the 
physicality of either, but their status as actions that bear relationships to God and the 
human soul’s state or pursuit of salvation. They are revealed as alike because in both 
cases a fallen human humbly gives all that they have to give to (a proxy of) God. The 
biblical text is certainly crucial here, for it both relates the story of the widow and gives 
the language in which the comparison is realized. But there it merely allows the figurae 
to be recognized; it is quite irrelevant to their actual nature as donative actions.  
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Conversely, in the case of Alcuin’s call for remembrance not just in the mouth of 
the lector but in the exact moment—in every exact moment—that the verses he has 
copied are read and read again, the text itself as written and read is drawn into the locus 
of the figural relationship. Here, the thing done is reading and writing, the making and 
use of signs, semiosis. There is thus the semiosis of recognizing the figura (as with all 
figurae), but also the semiosis that the figura in this case is. As a figura, the two sides of 
this (semiotic) act (writing and reading/hearing/understanding) are fused across time into 
an explicitly transcendental and even salvific whole, and the play of the sign as such 
draws the human towards God. Implicitly, this miracle, which parallels the philosophical 
account wherein reading and writing are two subdivisions of the single semiotic process 
as well as the incarnation of Christ as the vehicle for grace, operates not (or not only) by 
identity in an ultimate and divine Christianized Neoplatonic reality, but by the 
mechanical perdurance of words carved into parchment and the human practices and 
faculties that actualize them as communicative signs, by the transmission-and-reception 
of the biblical verses, renewed and reincarnated with every reading, accomplished 
through the document itself. 
The whiff of heresy has returned, and strengthened besides. This is the subtle and 
explosive alchemy bubbling in the heart of millennial Latin monasticism, a more 
fundamental and more radical change than the reading of new texts or the practicing of 
new argumentation. It is a change in the posture adopted, largely unconsciously but 
nevertheless institutionally and normatively inculcated, toward the written word (and 
perhaps toward language itself), in the intimate economy of thought, behavior, and 
semiosis as inevitably social and trans-historical. Taken together, these three texts link 
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the Bible physically and figura-ly to a particular (Carolingian) heritage, develop a sense 
of it as a single and cohesive document, hold it up as the ground of all knowledge, and 
position it as a second form of Christ’s incarnation and thus as a second holy mystery and 
a second dispensation of salvific grace. They spin an increasingly coherent thousand-year 
Christian tradition, rooted firmly in the concerns and vocabulary of a yet-older pagan 
philosophical one. But they also make of the Bible a kind of filter, a machine through 
which living human experience of and action within the world is to be fed, that it may be 
transformed into something meaningful and enduring in a truly transcendental sense. As 
we continue our investigation of Cluny and its documents, we will see that, while this 
posture, this process, this goal, was nowhere laid out nearly so explicitly as I have just 
done, it is nevertheless attested time and again by the efforts to elaborate from scriptural 
foundations and fix in writing a ritualized code of behavior capable of encompassing 
every moment and every contour of human life. And we will also see that the brute form 
of this machine—written text—left an indelible mark upon its output.  
  
160 
 
CHAPTER VI: THE SEMIOTICS OF RALPH GLABER’S HISTORIARUM LIBRI 
QUINQUE 
 
 
Ralph Glaber was a monk, given at the age of twelve (around 997) to the monastic life by 
his uncle, a monk at Saint-Léger of Champeaux. Though expelled as a youth for 
disruptive and insubordinate behavior, he later rejoined the regular life, becoming a 
companion and hagiographer of William of Volpiano, a towering figure in turn-of-the-
millennium monastic reform, and moving through various houses associated to varying 
degrees with Cluny. He likely spent much or all of the 1030s at Cluny itself, where he 
began his great chronicle, and retired to Saint-Germain of Auxerre.1 His chronicle, in 
particular, remains one of the key documentary sources of the period, and has been the 
subject of extensive research, analysis, and debate for generations of historians.2  
                                                 
1 See the introduction to Ralph Glaber, The Five Books of the Histories and the Life of Saint William, ed. 
Neithard Bulst, trans. John Frace and Paul Reynolds (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1989). I have used this 
facing-page translation, with close reference to the provided Latin, for the following discussion. 
Subsequently cited as “Glaber, Historiarum,” etc. 
2 Because both of its timing (written early in the eleventh century) and its explicit devotion to omens and 
portents, Glaber’s chronicle has been perhaps the central locus of debates about the existence, extent, and 
intensity of apocalypticism concerning the end of the (first, Christian) millennium for almost two hundred 
years. For important recent publications on such questions, see Richard Landes, David Van Meter, and 
Andrew Sydenham Farrar, ed., The Apocalyptic Year 1000: Religious Expectation and Social Change, 
950–1050 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003) and Michael Frassetto, ed., The Year 1000: 
Religious and Social Response to the Turning of the First Millennium (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2002). 
Richard Landes has written extensively on the question of apocalypticism around 1000, and exploring his 
CV will quickly introduce one to a great deal of the literature (in particular that in favor of the notion and 
existence of apocalypticism in this period). He has also published online a good review of the longer 
historiography of the question, “Giants with Feet of Clay: On the Historiography of the Year 1000,” 
http://www.mille.org/scholarship/1000/AHR9.html (accessed 28 August 2015). Brian Stock devoted an 
entire section of his massive The Implications of Literacy to Glaber, “Rituals, Symbols, and 
Interpretations,” 455–521, and Georges Duby also discussed Glaber’s chronicle at length in his key work, 
L’An Mil (France: Julliard, 1974). For an important example of how debate about this apocalypticism is 
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My examination of Ralph Glaber’s Historiarum libri quinque is a bit more 
curtailed than in the case of other works considered; I have not delved into how the 
document itself may have been used specifically or the precise physical nature of the 
text’s production and dissemination.3 Chronicles would seem to have no role at all in the 
liturgy of Cluny or even monasticism generally, thus likely remaining the preserve of 
relatively few of the more literate brothers and probably perused at their individual 
leisure and on an individual, ad hoc basis.4 In this vein, the best attested use of chronicles 
is in the production of later chronicles.5 This chapter, instead, therefore pursues a 
somewhat more convention intellectual historical view of Glaber, analyzing his 
Historiarum for what they reveal about his concerns, assumptions, and beliefs. 
In particular, Glaber’s history offers a wealth of information about medieval, 
Christian, and monastic notions of semiosis in the early eleventh century—unlike in the 
case of most of the other works considered here, therefore, we are not limited to 
interpreting the text for its implicit semiotics, but are offered many quite explicit accounts 
of just how signs work and what they are. As many commentators have noted, Glaber 
reports on a wide variety of omens and portents, frequently offering interpretations as to 
what these might mean; in this most basic emphasis, my study is not novel. On the other 
                                                 
bound up in debate about feudalism and the feudal revolution or mutation, see Dominique Barthélemy, The 
Serf, the Knight, and the Historian, 245–301. 
3 Again, see the voluminous introductory material to France’s edition of the Historiarum. 
4 Witness the idiosyncratic nature of several famous high medieval monastic chroniclers, such as Adémar 
of Chabannes and Bernard Itier. 
5 As merely one example, consider the numerous stages and branching adaptations of the Historia 
Normannorum, begun (or first gathered from oral traditions) by Dudo of Saint-Quentin and subsequently 
embracing generations of mostly monastic authors, including William of Jumièges, Wace, Robert of 
Torigni, Hugh of Fleury, and Orderic Vitalis.  
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hand, so far as I know, I am the first to mine or read Glaber’s discussion of such signs in 
pursuit of a semiotics of his time and place as such. Thus, to an extent, my reading is an 
effort at synthesis and systematization, a derivation of Glaber’s “doctrine of the sign.”6  
Such efforts at synthesis and systematization are often suspected of reading their 
conclusions into their sources, rather than discovering them there. But Glaber is hardly 
coy about his interest in and even focus on signs and their operation. In his vita of 
William of Volpiano, Glaber writes that his chronicle was intended to read the signs of 
Christ and his justice as they occurred around the year of the millennium.7 In the 
Historiarum itself, he writes that “with truthful words [of the scriptures] and prodigies he 
[God] shows . . .” (ueracibus uerbis et prodigiis ostendit).8 This direct statement that 
omens and written words, at least those of the Bible, signify in some basically similar 
way undergirds much of Gaber’s chronicle, and also testifies to his own explicit 
awareness that he pursues a discussion of signs in various forms. The brevity, simplicity, 
and directness of this characterization should not occlude the fact that it does, indeed, 
represent an analytical and interpretive approach to the notion or category of the sign. 
                                                 
6 This is an expression used by John Deely, particularly in regards to Augustine, in his Medieval 
Philosophy Redefined. By deploying it here I mean to communicate an acceptance and adoption of Deely’s 
conception of medieval (Latin) philosophy as centrally concerned with this issue (in fact Deely argues that 
the enunciation and consideration of this problem is the Latin period’s chief contribution to Western 
philosophy), and, moreover, to place Glaber as a thinker, albeit of a type rather alien to the organized 
discipline and history of philosophy, within the tradition of semiotics. 
7 See France’s translation of this vita in the volume cited above, and also the Vita Sancti Guillelmi in PL 
142 (718). 
8 Glaber, Historiarum, 146. Unlike in some other sections, I have generally provided the Latin in my body 
text here. This is because I am frequently emphasizing Glaber’s particular terminology to suggest the 
semiotic focus of his writing, so it is necessary to call attention to his references to nouns and verbs of 
interpretation and signification. 
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In fact is abundantly clear that the definition of a sign for Glaber is quite broad, 
and moreover that he is not at all disinterested in the role semiosis plays both in day-to-
day temporal affairs and in the matter of humanity’s relationship to God and the ultimate 
question of its salvation. When he asks “what indeed in this thing is signified to us, to 
whom nearly everything comes out in figure” (quid igitur in hoc facto nobis innuit, 
quibus pene omnia in figura contingunt), Glaber is not only admitting openly what his 
chronicle reveals (a mind eager and able to see signs everywhere, in everything, 
concerning everything); he is also offering a characterization of the Christian 
community—his “we” is those who believe in the age of the New Law or Covenant of 
Jesus Christ, and who wonder why God does not reveal himself directly as He did in Old 
Testament times.9 According to Glaber, another important characteristic of this 
community is that it sees signs everywhere. 
On what basis does Glaber assign semiosis such an important role for Christians 
and, by extension, humans, God, and the world in general? The best beginning place for 
answering this question is the discussion of (the) quaternity(s)10 early in Book One11 and 
the refutation of the Orléansian heresy Glaber offers in Book Three.12 Both give 
essentially triadic accounts of God, the human, and the corporeal world, and both figure 
semiosis as the central mechanism by which the only truly significant movement in this 
cosmology—that of the human between God and the world—occurs. In addition to 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 228–229. 
10 Glaber varies in referring to these as singular and plural.  
11 Ibid., 4–8. 
12 Ibid., 142–148. 
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providing a certain basis for Glaber’s conception of and focus on signs as such, they also 
establish a speculative, systematic, and even philosophical bent for Glaber as a thinker 
and writer. Let us see what we can draw out by a close reading of these passages.  
Glaber provides his discussion of the “divine and abstract quaternity” (divine et 
abstracte quaternitatis) because he wishes to describe events occurring throughout the 
four parts of the globe—in other words, because of a correspondence which, when noted, 
illuminates both its constituents. According to Glaber, God made the world and 
everything in it “by many figures and forms . . . that through those things which the eyes 
see and the spirit understands he might raise the erudite man to a simple [unadorned, 
direct] perception of God” (multiplicibus figuris formisque . . . ut per ea que uident oculi 
uel intelligit animus subleuaret hominem eruditum ad simplicem Deitatis intuitum).13 By 
parsing these quaternities and “(what) of these in themselves is returned/reflected” 
(earumque in sese reflexus), humans achieve a better understanding of God, themselves, 
and of the created world.14 Among the quaternities considered by Glaber are the four 
Gospels, the four elements, the four senses (with touch discounted as ancillary), the four 
virtues, the four great rivers mentioned in Genesis, and the four ages of history.15 
Throughout, Glaber elucidates correspondences (convenientia) such as that between the 
element air and the virtue fortitude, wherein the former “in the corporeal world 
invigorates all living things and strengthens the act in whomever moves to it [i.e., moves 
to act]” (qui cuncta uiuentia uegetans et in quemcumque actum promouens roborat) just 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 4. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 4–8. 
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as the former does in the “intellectual world” (Illud quoque quod aer in mundo corporali, 
id ipsum fortitudo in intellectuali).16 These correspondences, especially those between the 
elements and the virtues, are thus generally based on paired actions or functions—air and 
fortitude play analogous roles in different spheres of a fundamentally ordered cosmos, 
suggesting in the case of fortitude-air that Glaber understands some notion of an 
intellectual or mental act that is of a type with one that is physical or material. Glaber also 
makes use of etymological interpretations in some cases, as when he associates the river 
Tigris with fortitude because the Assyrians live near it: “who are understood/translated 
‘steersmen.’ Through this indeed is signified fortitude, which certainly, having rejected 
prevaricating deficiencies [vices], directs men through the help of God to the joy of 
eternal reign” (qui interpretantur ‘dirigentes’. Per hunc nihilominus signatur fortitudeo, 
que uidelicet reiectis peruaricatoriis uitiis dirigens homines per Dei auxilium ad eterni 
regni augia).17 Thus, though the structure of Glaber’s miniature treatise on the 
quaternities is rather disorganized, he not only groups individual members of each 
foursome into referential chains, but also draws out what may be called “metaphysical” 
accounts of each term: in the example of air-fortitude-Tigris, we learn that fortitude and 
air both provide some kind of general enabling power to the physical and intellectual 
worlds respectively, and also that fortitude provides not only force but direction and 
discernment as well. 
Not only do these correspondences serve to expand and deepen one’s knowledge 
of any particular term, but their totality itself speaks to God. Glaber writes that “therefore 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 6. 
17 Ibid., 8. 
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by these most apparent complexes of things is God patently, silently, and beautifully 
proclaimed, since, while stable in motion, each thing in its place portends another, having 
proclaimed their principle origin from which they proceed and to which they seek in 
order to rest again” (ab his igitur euidentissimis complexibus rerum patenter et 
pulcherrime silenterque predicatur Deus, quoniam dum stabili motu in sese uicissim una 
portendit alteram, suum principale primordium predicando a quo processerunt, expetutn 
ut in illo iterum quiescant).18 Glaber elaborates slightly on just how this semiotic 
cosmology evidences God later in the Historiarum, when he repeats the assertion in the 
course of his refutation of the heresy at Orléans. There, Glaber argues against the 
heretics, who hold that God is not the sole creator or “author” (auctor) of everything, by 
saying that everything must have come from somewhere, and that all change presupposes 
a more fundamental unchanging substrate.19  
The concept of “divine quaternity” is thus a relatively strange, involved, and 
distinctive one. For some years, historians searched for the “Greek fathers” and “Greek 
philosophers” to whom Glaber attributes his ideas in this introductory section. It was not 
until P. E. Dutton, however, that these efforts encountered any success.20 Dutton first 
shows that Glaber’s source for his discussion of the four rivers comes from Ambrose of 
Milan’s De paradisio.21 More strikingly, he is also able to establish that the source for 
Glaber’s larger conception and discussion of the quaternities almost certainly comes from 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 6. 
19 Ibid., 142. 
20 P. E. Dutton, “Raoul Glaber’s De Divina Quaternitate: An Unnoticed Reading of Eriugena’s Translation 
of the Ambigua of Maximus the Confessor,” Mediaeval Studies 42 (1980): 431–453. 
21 Ibid., 437–438. 
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a translation of Maximus the Confessor’s Ambigua made by John Scottus Eriugena.22 
This is a very obscure source, but Dutton cites a twelfth-century Cluny booklist to 
confirm the presence there of an extant manuscript of the translation, Arsenal 237, itself 
likely from the ninth century.23  
To my mind, there are two particularly important aspects of this point. First, 
Maximus and his Ambigua were conduits for one of the most powerful Neoplatonizing 
forces in the history of Christianity, the ideas of Pseudo-Dionysus the Areopagite.24 
Secondly, Dutton also demonstrated that Glaber’s use of the Ambigua was far from 
simple repetition. Glaber altered word order when he preferred, and often left out and 
simplified parts of Maximus’ comparisons between the different members of the various 
quaternities.25 Maximus’ work is difficult, and, as a result, Glaber’s engagement appears 
to have been limited. Yet I would argue that even such a limited engagement should be 
conceived as essentially a work of philosophy, which so often consists in critical 
summaries, re-workings, and selective appropriations of one’s forbears in the tradition. 
Certainly in making this use of the Ambigua, he had sought out an obscure work and 
freely adapted it for his own ends.26 Dutton has made a similar point: he notes that, while 
Maximus’ works are quite poorly attested in the surviving medieval source record, 
nevertheless “a wide range of influence has been ascribed to Maximus by scholars. . . . 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 438–439 and 445–446. A translation from Greek to Latin, that is, by Eriugena, one of very few 
truly literate in Greek in the ninth century Latin West. On Eriugena, see Deely, Medieval Philosophy 
Redefined, 111–116. 
23 Dutton, “Glaber’s De Divina Quaternitate,” 440. 
24 Deely, Medieval Philosophy Redefined, 106–111. 
25 Dutton, “Glaber’s De Divina Quaternitate,” 448. 
26 Dutton also notes Glaber’s use of another concept likely taken from the Ambigua: God’s nature and 
goodness as paradoxically immobiliter mobilis et mobiliter immobilis. Ibid., 451–452. 
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here in Glaber’s Historiae we have hard evidence of a clear and relatively early reading 
of Maximus in the West.”27  
The point here is that, as Dutton notes, the somewhat traditional claim that Cluny 
and some nebulous ideology or principle or culture that it represented was averse to either 
philosophy or the orientale lumen, the light of the more “intellectual” Greek Fathers, is 
misfounded.28 Besides the case of overlooked direct engagement with philosophy and 
orientale lumen, there is also the possibility that liturgical performance and ritual in 
general could draw individuals into engagement with questions and postures not 
dissimilar to philosophical and theological questions: the relationship of the individual to 
himself and to the community, the nature of transcendence or agency, and of course the 
use of signs.29 Or, as I have shown in the case of the Cluny Bible’s introductory materials 
and now in a reading of Ralph Glaber’s semiotic preoccupations, there is the possibility 
that works that, by their titles, genres, and subject matter do not appear as works of 
speculative or systematic theology or philosophy, when dug into at great length reveal 
prolonged engagement with questions quite familiar from such pursuits. 
In this spirit, perhaps, Glaber posits a world that both is a sign in the full totality 
of everything it contains and at the same time that most or all of those things it contains 
are themselves individual signs. This allows the human intellect to climb, as it were, hand 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 450. 
28 Ibid., 450–451. For pushback against this idea particularly in the context of the Hirsau reforms and the 
Cluniac attitude towards pagan Roman literature, see also Felix Heinzer, “Hirsauer Buchkultur und ihre 
Ausstrahlung,” in 700 Jahre Erfurter Peterskloster: Geschichte und Kunst auf dem Erfurter Petersberg, 
1103–1803, ed. Helmut-Eberhard Paulus (Regensburg, Germany: Schnell + Steiner, 2004), 99–100. 
Dominique Iogna-Prat has also traced Neoplatonic influences at Cluny. See his Agni immaculati. 
29 I have tried to suggest this perspective in my chapters on ritual (2) and on Bernard’s customary (8). 
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over hand up these ladders of correspondence to a vision, knowledge, or experience of 
the divine. Of particular importance here are three points: first, these signs are intentional 
creations of God; second, the semiosis whereby humans approach God takes place in 
their own intellectual world; third, the ambiguous relation between these created things or 
signs in the absence of the perceiving human intellect—what does Glaber mean when he 
says these chains of correspondences “proclaim silently . . . while stable in motion”? 
How much of their nature as signs inheres in them independent of human observation? 
Also important is the possibility that the human mind may fail to operate correctly upon 
these signifying chains. Certainly those of the Orléansian heretics have so failed, in that 
they do not read the obvious existence of God in the correspondences between created 
things. This fallibility and the specific intentionality of God provide an obvious 
metaphysical basis for orthodoxy, as an authoritative interpretation from which there can 
be no licit deviation. Moreover, through the parallels Glaber draws between mental and 
physical action and his general formulation of reading the correspondences as a concrete 
act, this could alternately (or additionally) provide a basis for orthopraxy. Learning to 
interpret properly, to think and to read, is, at least for monks, very much learning to 
behave a certain way in order to approach through discrete acts a certain goal.  
Glaber also offers a significant account of human being—and of scripture—in 
these passages. He calls human being “the middle of creatures/created things” (in 
quodam creaturarum medio, uidelicet in homine),30 and “clearly better than all animals 
and inferior to heavenly spirits . . . [so that] if to one part it [human being] adheres the 
                                                 
30 Glaber, Historiarum, 148. 
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more, to that it is caused to conform” (potius scilicet cunctis animantibus atque inferius 
celestibus spiritibus . . . si cui parti plus adheserit, illiefficitur conformis).31 The human 
thus mediates between the divine and the created as well as among the created—Glaber 
says that “all this is conceded [to humanity] in deference” (cuius haec uniuersa concessa 
sunt obsequio), and that “to these speculative connections, specifically of elements and 
virtues and gospels, man is united harmoniously” (quibus etiam speculatiuis 
conexionibus, elementorum scilicet ac uirtutum Euangeliorumque, ille conuenienter 
sociatur uidelicet homo).32 Pivotally, it is the virtue of reason that sets human being apart 
from animals, and it is the exercise of this virtue that constitutes human being’s 
fulfillment of its nature. Failing to practice it, that is, giving in to “concupiscence and 
madness” (concupiscentia et furor) nullifies its benefits.33 Glaber suggests that the main 
way one can concretely practice ratio is by reading the signs of God that fill the world 
and that the world itself as a totality is.34 God provides “prodigies” (prodigia) to raise 
humans up—these include, pivotally, the actual writings of the Bible, “which he certainly 
created by the office of his own omnipotence” (que scilicet littere ipsius omnipotentis 
reperte magisterio).35 The course of this reading should move from first pursuing self-
understanding to pursuing understanding of God (is cuius hominis animus sui Conditoris 
agnitionem desiderat, expedit ut primum studeat qualiter sese).36 Given that the human is 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 144. 
32 Ibid., 6. 
33 Ibid., 146. 
34 Ibid., 144–146. 
35 Ibid., 144. 
36 Ibid., 144–146. 
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made in the image of God,37 it is no surprise that correctly advancing along the chain of 
correspondences through knowledge of the self, one uncovers that image there and thus 
the contemplation of the self slowly becomes both the contemplation and imitation of 
God.38  
It truly is, then, signs all the way down. Implicitly, as a sign, human being 
mediates between the created and eternal worlds, pointing from one to the other just as all 
things do and, more uniquely, revealing the image of God, temporarily covered over in 
created fallibility, in the human. This only heightens the intensity with which the 
passages we have already considered raise the question of just where the correspondences 
between things that human beings are supposed to climb to the Godhead are located—in 
the things themselves, in the human intellect, or somewhere else? Perhaps more 
importantly, it also blurs the distinction between 
reading/perceiving/interpreting/understanding, on the one hand, and acting on the other. 
The point of correctly parsing the signs that fill and comprise the world is not ultimately 
to know anything, in the sense of holding disembodied information in the mind, but to 
move, spiritually and intellectually, between concrete acts of perception. In this light 
Christian praxis becomes significantly or even wholly intellectual while yet remaining 
praxis. Despite the focus on ratio, the point is still to behave in a certain way. 
Let us keep these questions in mind as we consider some characteristics of 
Glaber’s semiosis as they emerge from his text. Immediately apparent is the emphasis 
upon sight (and to a much lesser extent, hearing) and signs that are apprehended through 
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that sense. Almost every sign perceived in the Historiarum, whether a miraculous omen 
such as a comet or spectral army on the march, Jesus’ arms outstretched in crucifixion, a 
menacing demon or mendacious apparition, or a new piece of imperial regalia made by 
humans, is one obviously grasped specifically through vision. This is not surprising after 
Glaber’s clear statement during the discussion of quaternities that sight and hearing 
“which minister to the intellect and reason correspond to the superior aether, that stands 
more subtly among the elements, that is so much more sublime, noble, and brilliant than 
the others” (qui intellectum et rationem ministrant, superiori conueniunt aetheri, quod 
constat subtilius in elementis, quodque quantum ceteris sublimius, eo honestius ac 
lucidius).39 In the few cases where hearing is given center stage—in the case of either 
angelic or demonic apparitions that communicate verbally with humans—sight is still of 
great importance, as the appearance of the visions plays an important part in 
understanding them. There are also Glaber’s frequent justifications for including an 
account of this or that portent, namely, so that people may be instructed by them. This of 
course figures his text itself as a sign or at least the vector of signs, thereby making 
relevant for these purposes the question of which senses an audience would make use in 
order to perceive it—of course the answer is sight, if they are reading it themselves, or 
hearing, if they are listening to it being read. All in all, one suspects that the main 
importance of hearing and its inclusion with sight as senses that operate on and through 
reason and intellect stems from its important role in consuming linguistic and written 
texts.  
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The result is that Glaber’s text advances an exclusionary association of semiosis 
with those senses used in the consumption of language and most especially of written 
language. By extension, it also associates this limited semiotic range with rationality and 
with its entire cosmological and soteriological schema. These moves, in conjunction with 
the notion of everything as a sign, narrow the human window onto the world to the 
apertures of the eyes even as they emphasize the universal applicability of sight. Almost 
without the reader’s notice, Glaber’s text edits the world down to the seen while also 
setting the reader to the endless task of seeing the divine throughout that world—in 
effect, an intensification of semiosis is accomplished through the simultaneous reduction 
and enrichment of the potential semiotic field.  
Also important is the recurring role of the personal or of persona in Glaber’s 
semiosis. Individuals serve as signs in and of themselves, as reference points, and as 
authoritative interpreters of signs who thereby guide others. In the first case, Glaber 
spends some time telling the story of the treasurer (archiclauo) Hervé of Saint-Martin of 
Tours, of whom he says “concerning indeed the life and behavior of [this man], such 
from childhood up to exit from the end of this present life, if anyone had been able to 
record this, it would fully offer an incomparable example to the men of this age” (de 
cuius etiam uita et conuersatione qualis a puericia usque at presentis uite terminum 
extiterit, si quis referre quiuisset, pleniter incomparabilem huius temporis ostenderet 
uirum hominibus).40 Similarly, Glaber relates the life and times of Odo II, count of Blois, 
as well as of his predecessors and descendants, in order to demonstrate God’s punishment 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 116. 
  
174 
 
throughout the generations of a bad patrilineal line.41 In both of these cases the lives, 
behaviors, and fates of individual men are taken as highly useful examples or signs of 
right behavior (in the latter case, negatively by egregious failure and punishment); the 
reader of Glaber’s text is invited to “read” these lives in particular. Glaber also makes a 
space in both accounts for the importance of textual transmission, lamenting the lack of a 
more detailed account of Hervé’s conversatio (behavior, habit, conduct), and offering the 
example of Odo II as an illustration of God’s fulfillment of yet another text, the biblical 
threat to visit the sins of the father upon his sons.42 
As for individuals as reference points, in the beginning of Book Two, Glaber 
compares the role of great men in his history to that of mountain peaks in setting a course 
while on a journey: both offer reference points that allow the reader or traveler to orient 
themselves.43 This figures the great man as a sign, of course, like so many other things, 
but also sets him higher in an implicit hierarchy of signs—the persons (personis) of great 
men serve as organizing principles, as unusually stable points in a world in flux around 
which other, less stable signs may be arranged.  
Individuals may also assume a special social role in the Christian play of 
semiosis. In his relation of an episode from the life of Saint Brendan, Glaber describes 
how the holy man, passing the night with his community on what they thought was an 
island, “cautiously investigated the force of the wind and the course of the stars . . . 
[when] suddenly he realized that the promontory to which they had come specifically to 
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rest, was carrying them to the east” (explorabat cautius uim uentorum et siderum cursus . 
. . repente intellexit quoniam illud promuntorium, at quod scilicet hospitaturi diuerterant, 
ad orientalem illos eueheret plagam).44 This realization (based in part upon a reading of 
the stars) is quite specifically and uniquely Brandon’s—his companions had gone to 
sleep, and when he explained his realization to them upon their waking, they were 
“hurled into a mental stupor” (mentis stupore adacti).45 Thus, Brenden, the “ever-
watchful guardian of the flock of the Lord,” (peruigil custos dominici ouilis) led his 
followers not only in authority and virtue, but in interpretive ability. Glaber develops this 
into a more general role for the clergy when, in decrying simony and clerical avarice, he 
writes that “since the fog of most evil blindness crept over the eye of the catholic faith, 
that is, the ecclesiastic prelates, the people of this [faith], ignorant of the proper path of 
salvation, fell into the ruin of perdition” (et quoniam catolice fidei oculum, uidelicet 
ecclesie prelatos, pessime cecitatis caligo obrepsit, idcirco plebs illius, proprie salutis 
uiam ignorans, in sue perditionis ruinam decidit).46 Thus he clearly assigns to the 
episcopate the function of sight and, by virtue of this, leadership over the community of 
Christian faithful in the process of salvation (which, as demonstrated, is one based upon 
the act of right interpretation).  
Of course the ultimate individual-as-sign in the Historiarum is Jesus. In refuting 
the Orléansians, Glaber writes that Jesus “showed openly to those believing in him (a) 
sign/example/evidence to-be-fulfilled, hidden by the centuries, enveloped by hidden 
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enigmas, a testimony concerning himself of expressing scripture” (exhibuit plane sibi 
credentibus quibusque a seculis incognitum, occultis enigmatibus inuolutum, de se etiam 
testimonium perhibentium scripturarum, adimplebile documentum).47 Of course the 
notion that Jesus fulfilled the prophecies of the Old Testament is a core Christian belief, 
but Glaber’s phrasing is interesting—Jesus retroactively offers the “sign” of fulfilled 
biblical prophecy; the suggestion is that scripture was not a sign before Jesus fulfilled it, 
but that it has become such a sign because it has been fulfilled (the classic definition of a 
figura). In a sense, Jesus restores the proper functioning to the scriptures of their 
(ultimate, divine) author’s intent: “in this [the scriptures] indeed by true words and 
prodigies he shows that he and his father and their spirit to be one and the same in three 
discrete parts and most-clearly-defined persons . . .” (in quo etiam ueracibus uerbis et 
prodigiis ostendit seipsum et suum patrem atque eorum spiritum in tribus discrete 
certissimis personis unum idem esse).48 And his role vis-a-vis humanity is quite similar: 
the “median creature . . . having neglected the governance of its proper constitution, and 
more something other than what the will of the author [God] had decreed it should be, 
continued to deteriorate in proportion to its increasing presumption. Indeed to undertake 
the reformation of this one [humanity] the creator himself sent the person of the son of 
his divinity to take upon himself [Jesus] the image of himself [God] in this world he had 
previously made” (neglecto proprie constitutionis moderamine, ac plus quippiam uel 
aliud quam Auctoris uoluntas illum decreuerat sese existimans fore, continuo tanto 
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deterior est effectus quanto presumptior. Ad cuius potiorem etiam reformationem isdem 
Conditor personam filii sue deitatis misit in mundum sui preformatam sumere imaginem).  
Jesus as Christ thus regenerates both scripture and humanity specifically in their 
capacities as the signifying creations of God. Humans, made in the image of God, fell 
away from their nature, just as scripture remained cloaked in impenetrable allegory. 
Jesus, both man and god, bears the image, the representation, of God-in-man back into 
the fallen world. In this schema, Glaber figures even the process of salvation itself as a 
semiotic one, in which the repair, uncovering, or right interpretation of a sign or image is 
the heart of the incarnation and ministry of Jesus and the specific, central mechanism by 
which humanity is concretely saved, restored to its nature, and brought closer to God. 
And in so doing, not only the biblical scriptures but the very life and person of Jesus 
becomes a text the worshiper both reads and seeks to imitate, thereby restoring the 
worshiper’s own ability to semiotically indicate God.  
Glaber offers an example of how a medieval Christian might imitate the text of 
the living, physical Jesus in the story of the pilgrim Lethbaud, who travelled to 
Jerusalem. Going to the Mount of Olives, the place of Jesus’ final ascension, this man 
first mimicked the position of being crucified, “extending himself in the fashion of the 
cross” (proiciens se in crucis modum), and subsequently implored Jesus to let him die in 
the Holy Land, saying “just as I have followed you in body, in that I come to this place, 
so my soul, unharmed and rejoicing after you may enter into Paradise” (sicut te secutus 
sum corporse, qualiter ad hunc deuenirem locum, sic anima mea inlesa et gaudens post 
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te sit ingressura ad Paradisum).49 Here the physical performance of the bodily reality of 
the early life of Jesus is explicitly shown to be part of pursuing him in worship and 
achieving salvation—as was suggested above in the discussion of Glaber’s quaternities, 
the semiotic processes and acts that play such an important role both in cosmological 
accounts and in the institutional and personal project of Christian salvation are often 
embodied in the most direct possible way, and so the human body, living and in motion, 
participates fully in Christian semioisis. 
Along similar lines, Glaber offers a reading of the body of Jesus, once again as it 
appears in the shape of crucifixion. Glaber claims that the more extensive spread of 
Christianity to the west and north of the Holy Land, in contrast to southern and eastern 
regions, “was most truthfully presaged by that cross of the lord upon which the savior 
hung in the place Calvary” (ueracissimus presagii index fuit constitutio illa crucis 
dominice dum in ea Saluator penderet in loco Caluariae).50 Glaber goes on to explain 
that the west and north were favorably positioned under the eyes of Christ and in the 
direction of his right arm, outstretched upon the cross, while the fact that his back and left 
arm were pointing towards the east and south indicated that Christianity would spread 
less there. These episodes suggest that Glaber’s conception of Christ-as-sign was no 
empty theological precept, but rather that that conception had very concrete and 
immediate applications in the project of being a Christian—the very shape of Jesus’ body 
at significant points in his life could be imitated to approach him soteriologically, or read 
interpretively for understanding of the human world and its history. 
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Two other important considerations remain concerning Glaber’s semiotics. The 
first flows quite clearly from the passages already considered in which Glaber discusses 
the nature of humanity in relation to God and the created world and the role of Jesus in 
human salvation, and appears at several points in the text of the Historiarum. Since the 
role of intellection, reason, and semiosis are so central to humankind in this cosmology—
not only central to salvation, but also unique to human nature—it is no surprise that those 
who lose or forgo their reason are frequently described as insane or even inhuman. To 
begin with, Glaber constitutes both the Orléansians and heretics in general as those who 
have failed to understand or perceive Christ-as-sign: “though ultimately they ought have 
been able to grasp sufficient meaning of benefit in it [Christ’s incarnation and ministry]” 
(ut sic tandem in illa sue salutis sufficientiam putuissent intellectam repperire).51 Recall 
also his claim that the heretics do not accurately read or interpret reality, because they fail 
to discern the necessity of a single original creator of all. Later in the Historiarum, 
discussing other heretics, Glaber writes that “indeed they worshipped idols in the way of 
the pagans and with the Jews they relied upon making senseless sacrifices” (colebant 
enim idola more paganorum ac cum Iudeis inepta sacrificia litare nitebantur).52 These 
characterizations continue to figure non-Christians as hapless users of signs: the pagans 
address their worship to a meaningless signifier, while the Jews fail to accomplish 
anything through their symbolic actions—actions that do not represent or refer properly. 
Glaber also calls the Breton peasant-heresiarch Leutard “mad” (insanum), and his 
sermons “empty of truth and utility” (utilitate et ueritate uacuis). And there is the case of 
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the heretic from the Lombard city of Monteforte, a woman who Glaber claims came 
under the pretense of examining an ailing night to spread her cult. This woman, like other 
non-Christians, is unable to “read” the world accurately. She examines the forehead and 
pulse of the knight, and pronounces him on the mend, only for him to die later that same 
day, after having successfully resisted the temptations of the devils that had secretly 
accompanied his human physician.53 
It is only a short step from these ideas for Glaber to openly dehumanize non-
Christians. He tells that one who gives free reign to the vices set against reason—
madness and concupiscence—is “like a beast” (bestiis similis).54 And he also calls the 
Orléansian heretics “lunatics” (insanientes) who “[bark] in the way of dogs] (canum more 
latrantes).55 And, just as humans who reject Christ lose their ability to use and decode 
signs, the spirits (demons and devils) associated with evil who manifest themselves as 
dreams or visions in Glaber’s Historiarum often appear as vile non-human creatures – 
corrupted signs for corrupted users of signs. In some cases these figures are vague in the 
extreme: “someone loathsome” (quendam teterrimum)56 or “an innumerable army in 
black clothes and with loathsome faces” (innumerabilem exercitum in nigerrimis uestibus 
faciebusque teterrimis).57 But in one case, Glaber describes such a vision that appeared to 
him personally in much more detail. The creature “was in stature middling, with a thin 
neck, a skinny face, with black eyes, a rugged and contorted forehead, pinched nostrils, a 
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wide mouth, bulbous lips, a recessed and pointed chin, a goatish beard, shaggy and 
pointed ears, disorderly and stuck-up hair, dog-like teeth, a pointed head, a swollen 
breast, a hunchback, agitated haunches, [and] filthy clothes . . .”58 It is clear that such a 
hideous apparition, rather than draw the human intellect upwards towards the divine by 
association with various noble qualities and substances,59 would exert the very opposite 
effect on anyone not sufficiently guarded against dangerous and evil semiotic processes. 
Ultimately this sign itself is too malicious even to be clear—Glaber prefaces his 
description with the qualification “so much as I could judge” (quantum a me dignosci 
potuit).60 Thus Glaber develops the negative or evil end of his cosmological semiosis: just 
as the nature of heresy and all non-Christian religion is ultimately an inability or 
unwillingness to “read” the correct signs in the correct fashion, failure to exercise one’s 
nature as a rational consumer of signs leads to madness and bestiality. And, in turn, a 
world of signs at once terrible, inhuman, and fundamentally uncertain ministers to these 
barking man-beasts. 
Last but not least, what does Glaber have to say about monastic observance and 
the Rule that guides it? Perhaps surprisingly, relatively little. His most prolonged 
consideration of custom and its transmission appears in the course of explaining and 
describing the reforming work of his patron and abbot at Saint-Bénigne of Dijon, Saint 
William of Volpiano. In a period in which many were seized with the desire to found and 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 218. 
59 Compare to Glaber’s account of a more angelic apparition, “to him appeared a certain [one, person] 
standing beside the altar wrapped all about in a white cloth/garment” (apparuit ei stans iuxta altare quidam 
candidis indumentis circumdatus), 224. 
60 Ibid., 218. 
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refound, with all the donations and political/ecclesiastical maneuvering this entailed, 
churches and monasteries, Glaber praises William in particular for his association with 
the Cluniac abbot Mayeul, who appointed William to one of his greatest abbacies (that of 
Saint-Bénigne), the material success of his reforms and refoundations, evidenced in his 
splendid rebuilding of the church at Saint-Bénigne, his prudence, intelligence, and 
learning, and especially for the fact that “he was indeed no less famous in [for] the 
strictness of his rule and in his time he was an incomparable propagator of this order” 
(regulari etiam districtione non minus effloruit atque incomparabilis huius ordinis suo 
tempore extitit).61 Then, by way of explanation, Glaber offers an account of why and how 
“the institution and use of this custom” came to Burgundy (institutio ususque huius 
consuetudinis).62 According to the chronicler, these came “from the monasteries and rule 
of the holy father Benedict” (ex sancti patris Benedicti monasteriis uel regula exordium 
habuisse), and were transmitted through a series of exception individuals (Saint Maurus) 
and monasteries (Glanfeuil, Saint-Sabinus, Saint-Martin of Autun, Baume) to find a 
home at Cluny.63 Despite being “almost exhausted” (iam pene defessa), this rule and 
custom was well-implemented, both at Cluny and elsewhere, by a succession of virtuous 
and wise abbots, running down to Saint William in his own day, whom Glaber holds 
above all the rest in reforming zeal and virtue.64 
                                                 
61 Ibid., 120. 
62 Ibid., 122. 
63 Ibid., 122–124. 
64 Ibid., 124–126. 
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Though the modern historian is left wanting much more detail, particularly as to 
the triadic relationship between written record, lived tradition, and authoritative 
institution in the transmission of the Rule, this short passage does provide some useful 
information. First of all, Glaber makes some kind of distinction between several different 
components and aspects of the whole monastic life. As cited above, he refers to the 
“institution and usage of this custom,” clearly suggesting at least a rudimentary sense of a 
body of custom or practice on the one hand and the concrete implementation—perhaps 
“institution” can be read to imply the role of some authoritative individual or group (the 
abbot or monastic institution in general)—of that body on the other. Similarly, Glaber 
attributes this institution and usage to two seemingly-coequal sources: both the Rule of 
Saint Benedict and the monasteries founded by him. If we understand regula in this case 
to refer to a written document, or at least an established text, then Glaber has again laid 
an abstract statement of precepts alongside a living and basically indeterminate reality. 
And, by suggesting that the Rule and/or its institution (for we cannot impose a greater 
conceptual clarity upon Glaber than he actually provides) could be more or less strictly 
observed and implemented, and particularly that its implementation might vary with the 
passage of time and historical setting, Glaber again suggests that the Rule and monastic 
life fit into a complex, fundamentally iterative relationship: the Rule must always be 
applied, an action of reading and embodying which in turn generates a second text, 
written or simply practiced, which is authoritative in a way similar to the Rule and which, 
at least ideally, also guides the lived behavior of a particular community. Though Cluny 
will not, as of Glaber’s time, produce a written customary for several decades, the 
principle behind it as an elaboration—one might even say commentary—upon the text of 
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the Rule clearly exists. Indeed in a sense the customary exists already in the form of the 
monks’ awareness that they have added a body of authoritative practice to the Rule, 
distinct from the Rule, that they teach within their communities and which can set those 
communities off from others, even others that follow the Rule in their own fashion. 
Further evidence of these views is provided in one or two other brief passages. 
Recording a series of episcopal synods taking place in Italy and France around the turn of 
the millennium, Glaber notes that these councils ruled on the acceptability of a certain 
monastic deviation from the Roman custom (morem Romane ecclesie). When called to 
justify the singing of the Te Deum during Advent and Lent, the monks did so, winning 
the bishops’ ultimate acceptance of the practice, on the basis of a precept (preceptione) of 
Saint Benedict, “the deeds and sayings of whom were indeed laudibly recorded and 
affirmed by the most excellent pontiff of the Romans, Gregory” (cuius etiam actus simul 
et dicta a summo Romanorum pontifice, uidelicet Gregorio, haberentur descripta ac 
laudabiliter roborata).65 This brief account of conciliar debate and reform attests not only 
to the authority of Benedict as a historical and saintly figure, but also shows the use of the 
Benedict’s dicta as texts, written down in general if not cited through a particular 
concrete document in this specific episode—after all, the monks not only invoke 
Benedict, but also speak specifically to the recording (haberentur descripta) of 
Benedict’s actus et dicta by another authoritative (in both senses) figure, Gregory the 
Great. Again, the doubled sense of monastic custom as both decreed by Benedict and 
attested by/surmised from his personal life appears as presented both in the phrase actus 
                                                 
65 Ibid., 114. 
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et dicta and in the reference to Gregory’s vita of Benedict. As with Jesus, the 
sayings/writings and the living, fully-embodied practice of the authoritative figure both 
provide texts to be read and imitated. The monks’ usage is also confirmed through more 
supernatural semiotic processes—Glaber relates another controversy discussed by these 
synods, as to whether the feast of the Annunciation should be celebrated on March 25, as 
the monks of West Francia did, or on December 18, “in the way of the Spanish” 
(Hispanorum more).66 Glaber does not record the ruling of the synods of this question, 
but tells of how, when some Spanish monks living at Cluny under the Abbot Odilo were 
permitted to celebrate the feast on their preferred date (though segregated, segregati, 
from the rest of the community), two of the oldest monks of Cluny dreamt that one of the 
Spanish monks had taken a young boy from upon the altar and fried him in a pan.67 For 
Glaber, the meaning of this dream is quite clear: “What more is there? Among us the 
ancient custom, as was proper, prevailed” (Quid plura? Apud nos antiqua consuetudo, uti 
decebat, preualuit).68  
Proper observance of the Rule and the difficult question of interpreting and 
implementing it could also be complicated by demonic influences. Glaber records an 
episode in which a fearsome apparition appeared to a monk, openly identified himself as 
associated with the forces of Hell, and tried to convince the monk that all the rigor and 
observances of monastic life were unnecessary to achieve salvation, supposedly because 
                                                 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
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every Easter Christ returns to harrow Hell and bear out all the faithful.69 Glaber, however, 
quotes scripture to reveal this creature’s deception, writing  
 
the words of the Holy Gospel contradict what he had seductively invented 
concerning the resurrection of the Lord. They say: ‘Many bodies of saints who 
had slept arose.’ They do not say all, but many . . . although sometimes the 
Almighty in his prescience allows that demons may speak less than total and most 
simplistic nonsense, nevertheless, whatever of their own be included is lies and 
seduction70  
 
These passages thus introduce new dangers into Glaber’s Christian world. While 
the Orléansian heretics had failed to accurately read/interpret the world as a whole, and 
while the general root of heresy might be the misinterpretation of Jesus as Christ, and 
while other heretics might mistakenly place other signs and texts (such as the pagan 
classics) above the scriptures,71 there also existed the possibility that those striving after 
true Christianity could mistakenly combine counterfeit orthopraxy with the true 
disciplines of worship and salvation. Though Glaber does not dwell as much on this 
danger as later authors, he nevertheless demonstrates a real historical and cultural sense 
                                                 
69 Ibid., 216. 
70 “Illud sane quod de dominica ressurrectione seductorie confinxit uerba sacri redarguunt Euangelii, quae 
dicunt: “Multa corpora sanctorum quae domierant surrexerunt.” Non inquiunt omnia, sed multa . . . Licet 
enim aliquoties, uera Omnipotentis prescientia disponente, fallacissimi omnino demones minus irrita 
prenuntient, tamen, quantum ex illorum deliberatione sit, perfunctoria ac seductoria constant,” ibid., 216–
218. 
71 Ibid., 92. 
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of the variations in Christian tradition and also a concern that these variations be 
navigated correctly.  
What sense of Glaber’s Christian semiotics are we left with? In general, we see 
that signs are everywhere, and that they are of fundamental importance for Christians. 
Exercising the rational faculty in recognizing and correctly interpreting these signs 
fulfills human nature, thereby uncovering the image of God that each person is while also 
drawing them towards Heaven; the alternative is a bestial and insane earthly existence, 
presumably followed by Hell. Though there are signs made by and for humans, such as 
the imperial regalia gifted to Henry II by Benedict VIII,72 the large majority of specific, 
individual signs Glaber considers are naturally or supernaturally occurring: whales, 
comets, spectral armies, angels, demons, Jesus, and the ultimate totality of what exists as 
created. This, combined with the disinterest in or confusion concerning the capacity in 
which something is a sign—with where and how its signifying operates in relation to its 
total existence—suggests that Glaber has little sense of human agency in semiosis: it is 
not clear how humans consume signs, other than rationally or intellectually, and they 
rarely make signs for their own earthly purposes. Signs are therefore naturally occurring 
(for a value of “natural” that includes divine and demonic origins) and either point 
upwards, to heaven, or, by confusing or deceiving (that is, by failing to correctly or 
properly signify), paradoxically point downwards, into a fallen fleshy world and the Hell 
beneath it.  
                                                 
72 Ibid., 40. 
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Nevertheless, the germ of a fully human semiosis does suggest itself in Glaber’s 
Historiarum. The scriptures, after all, are one of the most important signs in this Christian 
cosmology, and they were created—to say nothing of disseminated—through humans, or 
with human participation. Similarly, the life of Jesus offers a behavioral text that can be 
imitated, inhabited, and even adapted. In both cases, the divine has entered the earthy 
mundane (writing and flesh, respectively), and this hybridity offers to the Christians of 
Glaber’s time something both authoritative and eternal in the ultimate sense and 
something fundamentally accessible to the limited capacity of living humans. One might 
even suggest, from within Glaber’s account, that the divine irruption of right semiosis 
into the fallen world was a precondition for the human taking-up and employing of signs: 
not merely the particular dispensed signs of Jesus and scripture, but signs in general, 
elaborated from these primordial, transcendental models. In a religious tradition with 
deep paradoxes at its core—the triune godhead and the incarnation together standing first 
among them—semiosis operates for the majority of worshippers not as they contemplate 
or attempt to parse these mysteries, but by a far more instrumental imitation of and 
subjection to the most visible and earthly iterations of the divine: that is, the actual 
words-on-parchment of the scriptures and the human life and behavior of Jesus. At the 
risk of functionalism, one might that it was indeed the purpose of the central mystery of 
Christianity, the incarnation, to make God accessible in just this mundane way to the 
human creature. Glaber shows us the early (but not earliest) stages of a great medieval 
project, whereby every inch of scripture and every moment of Jesus’ life became raw 
material for the edifice of an active and lived Christianity. It is not possible to know 
whether the emphasis on and concern for semiosis was a sine qua non for this historical 
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process, but it is possible to trace the actual role in that process semiosis played: in the 
Historiarum, the scripture and the life remain divinely dispensed signs, merciful aids. But 
it would not be long before an additional layer of intermediary and human-designed signs 
would be created to make scripture-and-life ever more accessible, both to laity and 
clergy—indeed the first kernel of this new intermediary set of signs is already suggested 
by Glaber: the Rule of Saint Benedict and the tradition of its institution and usage in the 
West that was Latin monasticism.  
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CHAPTER VII: THE VITAE ODONIS 
 
 
How and why were vitae produced at and around Cluny? Given the importance of the 
genre in the Middle Ages, in monasteries, and at Cluny especially, this is an immense 
question. To reduce it to manageability and root its answer among the numerous other 
lines of inquiry this project pursues, I focus here upon the vitae of the second abbot of 
Cluny, Odo (927–942). Odo was the first of the four major early abbots of Cluny, whose 
hagiographical commemoration, primarily in vitae, played an important role in the 
elaboration and institutionalization of a Cluniac ethos and in the development and 
expansion of its geographical reach and prestige.1  
Indeed, in considering the social production and consumption of these vitae, this 
is exactly the process we are considering and will unveil in all its complexity, richness, 
and importance: how these individuals fashion—were fashioned into—an immensely 
powerful and distinctive ethic. The efforts by the authors of these texts to capture and 
retransmit this highly personal charisma lies at the heart of my research’s central 
questions: how did writing become authoritative, and how did it make its own material, 
                                                 
1 Besides Iogna-Prat, Agni immaculati, see also Isabelle Rosé, Construire une société seigneuriale. 
Itinéraire et ecclésiologie de l’abbé Odon de Cluny (fin du IXe-milieu du Xe siècle) (Turnhout, Belgium: 
Brepols, 2008); Franz Neiske, “Charismatischer Abt oder charismatische Gemeinschaft? Die frühen Äbte 
Clunys,” in Charisma und religiöse Gemeinschaften im Mittelalter, ed. Giancarlo Andenna, Mirko 
Breitenstein, and Gert Melville (Münster, Germany: LIT, 2005); Gert Melville, “Geltungsgeschichten am 
Tor zur Ewigkeit. Zu Konstruktionen von Vergangenheit und Zukunft im mittelalterlichen Religiosentum,” 
in Geltungsgeschichten. Über die Stabilisierung und Legitimierung institutioneller Ordnungen, ed. Gert 
Melville and Hans Vorländer (Cologne, Germany: Böhlau, 2002); Melville, “Brückenschlag zur zweiten 
Generation. Die kritische Phase der Institutionalisierung mittelalterlicher Orden,” in Religiöse 
Ordnungsvorstellungen und Frömmigkeitspraxis im Hoch- und Spätmittelalter, ed. Jörg Rogge (Korb, 
Germany: Didymos, 2008), 77–98. 
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technological nature felt even as it also served as a medium for the experience of living 
persons and their behavior? For, as we will see, the goal of these authors was not only to 
set the whole, complete picture of this man in all the mobile complexity of life before 
their readers, but to help those readers process that complexity into discrete and 
manageable steps in the project of personal improvement that Latin monasticism was. 
Ultimately, though it would likely be anachronistic to impute the conscious design of a 
program of living—an orthopraxy—to these authors, that was very much what the result 
of their accrued efforts. Though Odo, Mayeul, Odilo, and Hugh remained important as 
saints to be honored and imitated, by the late eleventh century, their behavior, as that of 
the (Cluniac) ideal, was more and more intellectually available as a body of practice fully 
discrete from their persons, a “field,” perhaps, full of discursive meaning explicitly 
understood as legible and therefore, we may say, as a text.2 Accordingly, at Cluny we 
witness over the course of the eleventh century, and especially in its latter half, the 
development of customaries beyond their origins as liturgical manuals and ethical 
treatises to contain a dizzyingly complex and detailed account of the proper daily life and 
conduct of Cluniac monks in the dormitory, in the refectory, and even beyond the cloister 
entirely.3 
One of the clearest witnesses to this gradual, uncertain process is John of 
Salerno’s Vita prima et maior sancti Odonis and the textual tradition it inaugurated. 
Appropriately, this is also, so far as we know, the first vita composed for an abbot of 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Bernard’s preface to his customary and his discussion there of Hugh of Semur’s 
conversatio, Chapter 8. 
3 Cochelin, “Community and Customs.”  
  
192 
 
Cluny. Like his predecessor, Berno, and as John’s text attests, in his own day Odo was 
not exclusively or, perhaps even primarily associated with Cluny over the several other 
houses of which he was abbot. That since long before modern times he may be referred to 
without further ado or qualification as “a Cluniac abbot” is evidence of the substantial 
success of the very process of post factum, essentially literalate editing and revision we 
are here studying.4 My reading here is based on the main, full text of the vita, as mediated 
through the early modern Cluniac tradition of Dom Marrier and André Duchesne, the 
Bollandists, and Migne.5 I have also made use of Dom Gerard Sitwell’s 1958 English 
translation, with introduction and notes.6 But before presenting this reading, a brief 
discussion of the manuscript tradition, drawing on the main modern philological studies 
of Maria Luisa Fini and their analysis/summary by Dominique Iogna-Prat, will be used to 
ground my arguments and hypotheses in the physical sources, as they themselves 
survive.7  
John, a personal companion and co-abbot/prior of Odo, wrote the Vita prima 
shortly after Odo’s death in 942. It has been excoriated at least since the early twelfth 
century as overly long and diffuse, with a murky chronology and many irrelevant 
digressions. The bulk of my analysis here centers on what specifically about the text 
                                                 
4 In this sense, the vitae tradition of Odo both manifests one of Ong’s psychodynamics—the ability to edit 
and revise offered by writing—while complicating his claim that primarily oral cultures have a special 
ability to edit their collective memory to accommodate changes in social and political power, authority, and 
tradition. See Ong, Orality and Literacy, 40–41. 
5 As found in the Patrologia Latina 133:43–86. 
6 Sitwell, Being the Life. 
7 Maria Luisa Fini, “L’editio minor della Vita di Oddone di Cluny e gli apporti dell’Humillimus. Testo 
critico e nuovi orientamenti,” L’Archiginnasio 63–65 (1968–1970): 132–159; Dominique Iogna-Prat, 
“Panorama de l’hagiographie abbatiale clunisienne (v. 940–v. 1140),” Beihefte der Francia 24 (1992): 77–
118. 
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creates these impressions, and on how a contrast between John’s work and its substantial 
revision by the Cluniac monk Nalgod in the 1120s reveals both the changing conception 
and use of documents in the world of high medieval monasticism and the slow 
accumulation and clarification of a distinctively Cluniac tradition. It is really impossible 
to overstate the value of precisely this kind of rewriting for a project such as mine: these 
texts are excellent examples of the effort to capture lived experience in writing at (and 
around) Cluny, but Nalgod’s revision also reveals the striving of individuals within that 
tradition to manage it, to mobilize it, or to contest and redirect its inertia. 
But long before Nalgod, even in John’s own day, there is some indirect evidence 
that his work was perceived as worthy of summary and simplification by an editor’s 
hand. Fini’s examinations of the manuscript tradition reveal a text very much in flux. She 
bases her analysis on a collation of nine manuscripts, all from the twelfth century, 
ultimately dividing John’s text into two main recensions. The first, O0, is the base, with 
T1 and T2 representing variations primarily in the ordering of the narrative and its various 
episodes. To this, Iogna-Prat adds a summary of work on a five other witnesses, three of 
which he suggests grouping as yet another variant of the second recension under the sign 
T3.8Given the nature of my work here, I must repeat Iogna-Prat’s summation of the 
implications of the manuscript tradition of the Vita prima for the main edited versions, 
such as that of the Patrologia Latina, which I have made much use of: “It is therefore 
appropriate to use the old edition that is currently available with the greatest 
circumspection since, as we have seen, the organization of the text provides variants.”9 
                                                 
8 Iogna-Prat, “Panorama,” 83–84. 
9 Ibid., 84. 
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Iogna-Prat’s warning stems primarily from the varying order of the material presented in 
the Vita prima.10 While I have made some reference in the discussion that follows to this 
ordering (whether the particular divergences in order found in Nalgod’s revision that I 
discuss are truly the result of his modification of John’s text or merely result from his use 
of a different ordering of that material, no one would dispute that changing the order of 
John’s episodes was a common editorial practice), I am predominantly concerned with 
the content of the Vita prima; accordingly, I have forged ahead and rely on the attention 
and expertise of others to bring to light any major problems.11  
Besides the manuscript variations in the Vita prima, there are two other alternate 
versions of John’s vita, distinguished in the BHL and designated by Iogna-Prat as Vita 
minor (BHL 6297) and Vita minor extensa (BHL 6298). The first is represented chiefly 
by one manuscript (BNF lat 5386) from the twelfth or thirteenth century, discovered by 
Sackur. Sackur believed that this text, the Vita minor, was the work of John himself,12 but 
Iogna-Prat, citing Fini, disqualifies this attribution due to variance in the “general spirit” 
of the text.13 Nevertheless, he also calls the style close to that of John, and suggests that 
the this version of the vita might have been the result of an associate working with John 
or editing the Vita prima in accordance with John’s intent after John’s death—“perhaps a 
Frank working in a Cluniac atmosphere.”14 The other text, the Vita minor extensa, 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 83. 
11 I also note that Fini, Iogna-Prat, and others locate most of the fluidity in the ordering of the sections of 
the Vita prima in the second half of Book II and in Book III; the vast bulk of my examination concerns 
Book I and the first part of Book II. Ibid. 
12 Sitwell, Being the Life, xxiv; Ernst Sackur, “Handschriftliches aus Frankreich,” Neues Archiv der 
Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichte 15 (1890): 103–116. 
13 Iogna-Prat, “Panorama,” 84–85. 
14 Ibid., 85. 
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similarly survives in one manuscript (BNF lat 5566), also discovered by Sackur, this one 
from the end of the eleventh century.15 This text is addressed to Hugh the Great. Sackur 
suggests that this second Vita minor is a revision of the first. 
Summarizing Fini and Iogna-Prat, these texts share substantially their editorial 
approach to the Vita prima et maior. Many passages are reworked and simplified, making 
the text easier to follow. The ordering of the material is also changed, increasing thematic 
and chronological clarity. In what is a significant contrast with the later major revision of 
Nalgod, these texts do not make much effort towards focusing the narrative more clearly 
upon the person and biography of Odo, the aspect of John’s vita that likely most strikes 
the modern reader as odd and confusing. Instead, they predominantly reduce or remove 
references to Saint Martin and the monastery dedicated to him at Tours (both of which 
play a prominent role in John’s original)16 and to Odo’s reform work (the entire third 
book of John’s text is devoted to his reforms, especially of Fleury).17 Moreover, the Vita 
minor extensa also adds a few episodes to John’s base text: the conversion of Berno, the 
foundation of Cluny, and the testament of Berno.18 These variances are important; I will 
discuss their implications for my research, briefly here, before reviewing Fini’s work on 
the manuscript tradition of Nalgod’s vita, the text of which, in comparison to John’s 
original, is the central concern of this chapter. 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 82. 
16 Indeed, Saint Martin was established as co-patron, with Benedict of Nursia, of Benedict of Aniane’s 
monastic church in Ardo’s vita. Albrecht Diem, “Inventing the Holy Rule: Some Observations on the 
History of Monastic Normative Observance in the Early Medieval West,” in Western Monasticism Ante 
Litteram, ed. Hendrik Dey and Elizabeth Fentress, Disciplina Monastica 7 (Turnhout, 2011), 76. 
17 Iogna-Prat, “Panorama,” 84. 
18 Ibid., 85. 
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These revisions and rewritings are extremely useful because they provide a 
window onto the actual, concrete process by which the Cluniac tradition was built. By 
“tradition” here I mean a heterogeneous assemblage of ideology (much of which is 
essentially theological and/or ecclesiological) and religious praxis or ritual. The borders 
of this assemblage are not fixed, but rather produced and reproduced continuously 
through history by the various operations of numerous individuals and groups and not, in 
general, according to any single plan or vision. Thus, what we study when approaching 
these revisions from this perspective is the concrete application of semiotic and material 
power to something essentially living and naturally occurring, in hopes of bending it, 
channeling it, appropriating it, and so on. With this in mind, what do these textual 
fluctuations of John’s texts, lesser precursors to Nalgod’s immense project of rewriting, 
reveal about their authors’ designs upon the great seam of meaning and authority 
represented by John’s essentially contemporaneous account of Odo’s life and 
conversatio?  
In the first place, of course, they reveal that the uses and roles of John’s text, as 
well as of Odo’s life, were themselves highly fluid, variable, and multiple. While one aim 
of these texts was certainly to instruct a monastic community about Odo as an individual 
and specifically as an exemplar of Christian and monastic conversatio, John’s text also 
indulges in a number of long digressions that have very little to do with Odo. Moreover, 
these first revisions make substantial edits to the Vita prima, without significantly re-
centering the narrative on Odo’s biography. Clearly, much more was at work in this 
textual tradition than mere concern with the person, role, and history of Odo himself. The 
early revisions especially are far more concerned with the place of Saint Martin and his 
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foundation at Tours, both of which they diminish as general patrons of monasticism in 
Mediterranean Francia in favor of adding material about Berno and the foundation of 
Cluny. Far from strengthening and clarifying the role of Odo, these vitae are thus 
obviously concerned with that of Cluny. This is certainly understandable; John’s vita is 
not particularly concerned with Cluny, mentioning it only quite rarely. Baume is given a 
bit more attention, but much of its importance comes from the supposed survival there of 
the tradition established by Benedict of Aniane under Louis the Pious.19 
The intent, or at least the effect, of these revisions is to prune John’s vita, and to a 
certain extent the career and legacy of Odo himself, in such a way that Cluny becomes 
the primary inheritor of the Carolingian monastic heritage (itself identified, as in Glaber’s 
chronicle, with Benedict of Aniane). This calls for a certain finesse; Odo reformed and 
served as abbot at a number of monasteries, and there is scant indication in the Vita prima 
et maior that Cluny was particularly special among them. Moreover, Odo himself is 
closely connected with Saint Martin (being promised to the saint as an infant by his 
father) and the regular community devoted to Martin at Tours (where Odo first becomes a 
canon and where he discovers and adopts the Rule of Saint Benedict), while it is Baume 
and Berno that are figured as the essential conduits of right, (second) Benedictine 
monastic observance. Indeed John’s vita does not explain how Cluny came to be 
founded, and even gives the impression, contradicted by the testament of Berno that is 
presented in the Vita minor extensa (the one addressed to Hugh of Semur and thus dating 
from the second half of the eleventh century), that Odo’s abbacy there had nothing to do 
                                                 
19 Sitwell, Being the Life, 26. 
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with Berno—there is not even any explicit connection made between Berno and Cluny! 
John writes that 
 
[following Berno’s death] as soon as he [Odo] was elected and blessed as abbot 
his old persecutors, whom I mentioned above, rose up against him. But he, 
preferring to give way and to be happily at peace than to live in contention, left 
the monastery and the things which Berno had collected and bequeathed to him in 
the manner of a father, and going to Cluny finished the monastery which had been 
begun there.20 
 
This makes it seem as though Odo has fled to some half-finished monastery that, so far, 
has only been referred to as a place to which Adhegrinus, a hermit and companion of 
Odo, would later be attached.21 Conversely, the testament of Berno related in the Vita 
minor extensa claims that Berno bequeathed Cluny to Odo, along with two other houses, 
and moreover that Berno transferred some of the property from another house (one not 
left to Odo) to Cluny.22 This revision also adds the foundation of Cluny, making the 
monastery seem far more important both by including this episode at all and also by 
praising William the Pious as a powerful and charitable magnate.  
                                                 
20 Sitwell, Being the Life, 41. “Igitur pater Odo electus et abba ordinatur, mox contra eum pradicti veterani 
persecutores insurgunt. Ille autem malens locum dare et beate quiescere, quam contentiose vivere, derelicto 
eodem monasterio, et quaeque ibi fuerant a domno Bernone parata, alque ei paterno more tradita, abiit 
Cluniacum, et copetum pridem monasterium,” PL 133:61. 
21 Sitwell, Being the Life, 30. 
22 Ibid., 41. 
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The Vita minor and Vita minor extensa thus both modify John’s text, not in 
focusing it on the actual life of Odo, but by building up and clarifying (if not 
exaggerating or even inventing) the place of Cluny in an essentially Carolingian, reform 
monastic tradition. By deemphasizing Saint Martin, Tours, and the other monasteries Odo 
reformed (such as Fleury, a prestigious foundation that might have been a prime 
competitor for this legacy), and by clarifying the relation of Baume and Berno to Odo and 
Cluny, a clear line of translatio regulae Benedicti—and of saintly, reforming, 
authoritative abbots—is established. 
Having briefly surveyed these early revisions of John’s work, I turn now to a 
detailed reading of that work itself, in preparation for a fuller consideration of the nature 
of Nalgod’s far more radical revision. Establishing a precedent that would be followed by 
several of his successors, Odo spent much of his abbacy travelling, often widely.23 He 
made several trips to Italy in his life, reforming (whatever we understand that to mean) a 
number of monasteries there. John claims to have met Odo in Rome in 938 or 939.24 He 
tells us that he was a canon “involved in worldly interests,” but that Odo took pity on him 
and led him to Saint Peter’s in Pavia, where John was trained for a while by a certain 
Hildebrand, prior of Cluny at one time, in “monastic discipline.”25 We also learn later on 
that John served as a prior, probably of the monastery at Salerno; though the exact nature 
                                                 
23 Besides accounts of his many trips in the Vita prima, see broader discussions of itinerant reform abbots 
in Rosé, Construire une société seigneuriale; Isabelle Rosé, “Circulation abbatiale et pouvoir monastique 
de l’époque carolingienne au premier âge féodal (IXe–XIe siècle),” in Des sociétés en mouvement. 
Migrations et mobilité au Moyen Âge (Paris, France: Sorbonne, 2010): 251–266; Phyllis Jestice, Wayward 
Monks and the Religious Revolution of the Eleventh Century (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1997).  
24 Sitwell, Being the Life, 7 (see Sitwell’s note 1). 
25 Ibid. 
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of the office of prior and its relationship to that of abbot in this context is both murky 
and, probably rather poorly defined for modern tastes, we may speculate that Odo himself 
served as (an) abbot for Salerno, as he did for many houses he reformed during his life, 
and that John, as prior, was as his foremost lieutenant in regards to Salerno and indeed 
functioned as abbot in Odo’s (frequent) absence.26  
As is often the case, John’s prologue gives a more immediate personal (and 
social, even institutional) context for his project. In the first line of his text, John 
specifically addresses the Vita to “the fathers and brothers at Salerno.”27 He tells how, 
upon completing the copying out of another work, he fell ill. While sick he was visited by 
two men, one “our confrere” Adelrad, and another, John, treasurer of the Salerno 
monastery. These men, knowing that John loved to narrate the life and behavior of Odo, 
asked him to do so, and subsequently to record this “goodly inheritance for the benefit of 
posterity.” A little further along, John references the “exhortation” of his “dear brothers,” 
in response to which he writes the Vita.28 Whether he means by this these two named 
visitors or the monks at Salerno more generally, then, we understand that the work is 
addressed to and for the benefit of a monastic community, specifically the one at Salerno, 
recently reformed by and operating under some kind of abbacy of Odo. The implication 
is clearly that this text may serve as a kind of example for the monks, with John quoting 
Ecclesiasticus 44, “The people show forth the wisdom of the saints. . . .”29 Along these 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 44–45; for more on leadership positions in monasteries reformed by Odo, see Nightingale, 
“Oswald, Fleury.” 
27 Sitwell, Being the Life, 3. 
28 Ibid., 4. 
29 Ibid., 3. 
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lines we also note that John’s previous writing project, a transcription of the Lausiac 
History, also carried out at the behest of the community at Salerno, is also a text setting 
forth biographical examples of the monastic ideal (in this case, accounts of the Desert 
Fathers). One should wonder if John’s reference to this project here is entirely 
coincidental, or if it rather functions to contextualize and even imply a particular role and 
use for the Vita. For like the History, this is a text quite obviously intended to capture and 
transmit the lived example of a holy man, that is, to capture the very thing most difficult 
to put into words: the charisma of a striking individual. Let us bear this in mind as our 
eyes gloss over John’s inclusion of the well-worn humility topos—“I feared that my 
literary talent would not sufficiently grace the style; nor did I seem worthy to narrate the 
life of this great man, even if I had the ability”—because this formula demonstrates 
John’s cognizance of one of this study’s central concerns, the historical effort to grasp 
and retransmit lived complexity through the use of both language and technology.30 
One of the aspects of John’s work, vital to understanding its place in a broader 
lived context, is thus that it is pitched to and for a very specific and special kind of 
community. Like his copy of the Lausiac History, it is intended not for the Christian 
faithful in general nor even for the clergy as a whole, but for the monastery at Salerno. 
This fact is important in making sense of the numerous strange digressions and bizarre 
chronology that characterize John’s text. Crucially, these frustrating oddities have drawn 
comment not only from John’s twentieth-century readers and editors, but also from 
Nalgod himself, who heaped striking abuse upon the Vita prima et maior in the prologue 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 4; see also sources cited in note 414. 
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to his twelfth-century revision. Perhaps John’s approach to the text made sense to his 
contemporaries, or perhaps not. But it made sense, at least, to him, someone selected as a 
personal disciple and later co-abbot by Odo himself, confidant of kings and popes, and 
later begged by his brother monks to produce at least two substantial literary works. Why 
did he choose this strange structure that has so perplexed and even vexed subsequent 
readers? How should it be understood? Put differently: we well know that it fails to make 
sense to us, to make our sense, but what kind, whose, does it make? 
I submit that John of Salerno’s Vita is intended, centrally or primarily if not 
exclusively, to serve as what we now call a customary, a text recording the distinctive 
style or form of life—the best medieval Latin term is probably conversatio, though ordo 
and even, perhaps, ritus are also sometimes used for the concept at roughly this time—of 
a particular monastery, loose group of monasteries, or reform party. Exactly what this 
style or form (my favorite translation for conversatio in this context is “behavior”) 
includes is one of the questions asked (or at least implied) by all the waves of reform that 
gripped Latin Christendom from the mid-eighth century at least through the twelfth, and 
grasping the mobility of the distinction between its purview and what lies beyond is 
crucial for any effort to understand how writing worked within monastic communities. 
The genre thus exists from the outset in complement to (and to some extent, in tension 
with) that of the monastic rule, which might be thought of as a kind of constitution for 
monasteries. Taking the most famous rule, that of Saint Benedict, as an example, we may 
say that a rule includes information about the offices and division of labor that the 
monastery as a normative and property-holding (or at least property-consuming) 
institution employs, about the proper behavior (ethics and praxis, conversatio) of monks 
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within and beyond the monastery, and about the performance of the cycle of prayers, 
readings, and rituals known as the liturgy. Customaries elaborated on rules in various 
ways, adding, explaining, and qualifying.  
To understand how both rules and the various customaries actually worked in 
relation to real individuals and communities, and how and why they were defined, 
amended, propagated, and disputed, it is crucial to note that the earliest monasteries were 
probably older than rules as specific, written documents and had been founded without 
them. Albrecht Diem shows that Merovingian narrative sources (unlike Carolingian ones) 
almost never refer to regulae as normative documents or to their use in the settlement of 
disputes.31 Moreover, Merovingian church councils (generally episcopal) never propagate 
regulae, while Gregory of Tours (d. 594) depicts the monasticism of his day as highly 
diverse and generally marginal.32 A few bishops did produce regulae, and while these 
were important in the development of the genre and its conception/role, they were 
obviously intended as “individual attempt[s] to sustain a private project and to perpetuate 
its existence and discipline.”33 The most important of these for the long-term 
development of Latin monasticism was Caesarius of Arles’ Regula ad virgines, written in 
the first third of the sixth century for a community of nuns.34 Diem shows how this 
regula, though intended for one particular community, appears to have inaugurated three 
pivotal concepts: first, the duty of the community to intercessory prayer for the founder; 
                                                 
31 Albrecht Diem, “Inventing the Holy Rule,” 55. 
32 Ibid., 58–59. See also Diem, “Gregory’s Chess Board: Monastic Conflict and Competition in Early 
Medieval Gaul,” in Compétition et sacré au haut Moyen Âge: entre méditation et exclusion, ed. P. Depreux, 
F. Bougard, and R. Le Jan (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2015), 165–191. 
33 Diem, “Inventing the Holy Rule,” 60. 
34 Ibid., 60–61. 
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second, compete enclosure; third, the regula as holy (sancta) and thus completely 
inviolate for all time.35 Diem emphasizes this third innovation in particular, stressing its 
departure from the more common conception of regulae at the time as diffuse and 
flexible “floating” collections of institutions—essentially, as florilegia.36 Unlike the idea 
of strict enclosure, which was adopted about a century later by Jonas of Bobbio,37 the 
idea of the inviolate sancta regula did not find much purchase in the soil of Merovingian 
monasticism. Significantly, it was only taken up by Benedict of Aniane himself, as part 
of his effort to establish one particular regula—that of Saint Benedict—as the sole, 
inalterable guiding norm of monasticism.38 
Given that, by the time of Cluny’s foundation and Odo’s abbacy, the Rule of Saint 
Benedict had indeed become, at least theoretically, the exclusive and unchangeable 
constitution of Latin monasticism, we must also ask where this document itself came 
from. It is traditionally attributed to Benedict of Nursia, (fl. early sixth century), a 
founder of monasteries in Italy. However, as Diem points out, this attribution is so 
weakly supported by the source record that it cannot really be regarded as a serious 
theory, let alone established fact. The main source most proximate to Benedict of 
Nursia’s life is the Dialogi of Gregory the Great, written at the turn of the seventh 
century—if it was indeed written by Gregory, for this too is a hotly disputed attribution.39 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 61–62. 
36 Ibid., 62. 
37 Ibid., 63; a supposition based on not seeing such an idea anywhere else before the RC began to appear. 
38 Ibid., 64. See also Rosenwein, “Rules and the ‘Rule,’” 309–310. 
39 The authorship of the Dialogi is disputed in Francis Clark, The Pseudo-Greogrian Dialogues (Leiden, 
Netherlands: Brill, 1987) and Clark, The “Gregorian” Dialogues and the Origins of Benedictine 
Monasticism (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2003). For more on the broader issue of the work’s historicity see 
Johannes Fried, Der Schleier der Erinnerung, Grundzüge einer historischen Memorik (Munich, Germany: 
  
205 
 
This source describes Benedict in his deeds and character as a holy man, but makes only 
a passing reference to a regula written by him at the end of his life. Throughout the rest 
of his work, Gregory gives no indication of familiarity with the Rule of Saint Benedict or 
indeed that he regarded life under a rule as an integral part of monastic life.40 Paul the 
Deacon’s Historia Langobardorum, written in the 790s, is the only source for most of the 
history of Montecassino between the time of Benedict and that of Charlemagne, and Paul 
himself was both a monk of Montecassino and a courtier of Charlemagne, with every 
motivation to link the newly prominent regula with the ancient pedigree of the Dialogi’s 
Benedict and with his own monastery.41 Moreover, there is no explicit connection made 
between Benedict of Nursia and the Rule of Saint Benedict in any Merovingian charter or 
hagiography, or in any seventh-century Columbanian text (where references to a regula 
Benedicti first appear), or in the acts of any Carolingian council, or in any capitularia.42 
To the best of our knowledge, the first such connection between the Benedict of the 
Dialogi and that of the regula is made by Bede.43  
Looking at practical references in contemporary sources to the Regula Benedicti 
leads therefore not to Montecassino but to what might be clumsily and unsatisfyingly 
referred to as the “Iro-Frankish” monastic tradition.44 In episcopal charters produced for 
                                                 
Auflage, 2004), esp. 344–356 and Joachim Wollasch, “Benedikt von Nursia. Person der Geschichte oder 
fiktive Idealgestalt,” Studien und Mitteilungen zur Geschichte des Benediktinerorderns und seiner Zweige 
118 (2007): 7–30. 
40 Diem, “Inventing the Holy Rule,” 72. 
41 Ibid., 73. 
42 Ibid., 72. 
43 Ibid., 75–76. 
44 Ibid., 64. 
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monasteries from the 630s through the 740s, references to the Regula Benedicti et 
Columbani first appear.45 This is a strange term, duplicated neither in royal charters nor 
in the foundational texts of Columbanian monasticism. These latter do refer to a regula 
Columbani, though Diem argues convincingly that this should not be taken to refer to the 
texts that appear under this name in Benedict of Aniane’s Codex regularum. Instead, 
these mid-seventh-century texts (predominantly Jonas of Bobbio’s Vita Columbani)46 
most likely used Regula Columbani to refer not to a specific normative or constitutional 
document but to the fact of a monastery’s foundation by and under the guidance and 
leadership of the Columbanians’ main foundation at Luxeuil.47 Diem ultimately suggests 
that the addition of the et Benedicti to Regula Columbani is meant to communicate, in 
true “floating” style (i.e., where the invocation of regulae refer not to full texts but to 
certain signature provisions, often relating to the foundation of a monastery), that, while a 
given house bears some foundational relationship to Luxeuil (Diem does not say what 
this might be but the most obvious idea would be that the house has taken one or more 
monks from the prestigious Columbanian foundation for the core of its new community), 
it retains the right to elect its own abbot. This right of election is not exclusive to the 
Regula Benedicti, but is specified with exceptional clarity therein, and moreover 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 67. 
46 In suggesting this identification of the original Regula Columbani with the Vita Columbani, Diem 
foreshadows my own argument here, that is, of the Vita prima itself as an effort at some of the key 
functions of the customary. For another example of this concept in Diem’s work, developed at far greater 
length, see his “Vita, Regula, Sermo: Eine unbekannte lateinische Vita Pacomii als Lehrtext für ungebildete 
Mönche und als Traktat über das Sprechen (mit einer Edition der Vita Pacomii im Anhang)” in Zwischen 
Niederschrift und Wiederschrift: Hagiographie und Historiographie im Spannungsfeld von 
Kompendienüberlieferung und Editionstechnik, ed. Richard Corradini, Max Diesenberger, and Meta 
Niederkorn-Bruck (Vienna, Austria: Austrian Academy of Sciences, 2010), 224–272. 
47 Diem, “Inventing the Holy Rule,” 65. 
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contravenes precisely a central implication of contemporary Columbanian references to 
the Regula Columbani, namely that Luxeuil appoints the abbots of its daughter houses.48 
The suggestion is thus that the Rule of Saint Benedict was of a type with many of 
the rules of Merovingian monasticism; here the expression “of a type” almost erases 
itself, since these rules were highly various and fluid, open to the free addition, 
subtraction, and combination of material. In many cases, Diem argues that references in 
the contemporary sources to regulae should not be read primarily as indicating an 
established and fixed written constitution, but rather a particular foundation process (by 
the community at Luxeuil, for example) or individual distinctive institution (such as the 
Regula ad virgines’ strict delineation of monastic versus non-monastic space, or the 
Regula Benedicti’s establishment of an individual community’s right to elect its own 
abbot). To these two suggested interpretive glosses I would add that the term may 
sometimes have been used to mean the general behavior (conversatio), conceived as 
distinct but often left relatively vague, of a particular community. Ultimately, the point of 
Diem’s article is that Benedict of Aniane, building on the general Carolingian movement 
towards the establishment of particular texts as authoritative, fixed, and complete, 
gathered together the Merovingian and Carolingian regulae in his Codex in such a way as 
to present a particular history of monasticism, “to show that the history of monasticism is 
a chain of textual observances,” and to figure the Regula Benedicti itself as the “natural 
culmination” of this history.49 But a close consideration of the Codex regularum, 
especially when laid alongside the contemporary Merovingian evidence, reveals that, at 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 67–70. 
49 Ibid., 54. 
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the same time Benedict of Aniane sought to establish the Regula Benedicti as the sole 
authoritative text of Latin monasticism, he was also seeking to establish Latin 
monasticism as based on authoritative texts: this is the sense of Diem’s title, “Inventing 
the Holy Rule.”50  
At this point, the specific origin of the Regula Benedict may be almost secondary; 
Diem goes so far as to allow that the Rule of Benedict may have been first brought to 
Montecassino, after it was refounded in the early eighth century, by the Anglo-Saxon 
monk Willibald!51 Under its second founder, Petronax, Montecassino achieved status as 
“a place of monastic pilgrimage and training,” attracting especially Anglo-Saxon monks 
who, following the Dialogi, understood it as the original font of Latin monasticism. Diem 
then quotes from Hugeburc’s Vita Willibaldi, which describes Willibald, as such a 
pilgrim, arriving and finding nothing there  
 
except for a handful of monks and an abbot with the name of Petronax. He at once 
began to teach the happy group of brethren with a well-governed mind and with a 
keen sense for doctrine, using frequent admonitions and arguments. . . . In the 
course of the ten years, this venerable man Willibald tried to observe entirely—as 
far as this is possible—the holy institution of the regular life of Saint Benedict, 
                                                 
50 See in particular Diem’s (ibid.) introduction, 53–55, and his conclusion, 76–77. 
51 Ibid., 74. 
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which he had striven for, for the salvation of his soul and for the work within his 
life. . . .52 
 
Whether we believe that Willibald introduced the Rule of Benedict at Montecassino or 
not, it certainly seems much more likely that this regula operated there in the early eighth 
century (and, in the sixth century, if it operated there then at all) as a floating rule similar 
to those at work in Gaul before the Carolingian reforms, than as a normative, inviolate, 
and insoluble monastic constitution. Other than Caesarius’ Regula ad virgines, which in 
this specific conception (but, significantly, not in others) was ignored by its 
contemporaries, it is not until the second half of the eighth century and especially the 
reforms of Benedict of Aniane decades later that we have any evidence of Latin regulae 
being used in this way.  
This digression from tenth- and eleventh-century monasticism is necessary to 
accurately approach the question of what a customary is, for the genre of customary is 
only intelligible in comparison to a sancta regula—and not in comparison to the 
“floating” or “mixed” regulae of pre-Carolingian times, as Diem and others have 
revealed them. It was really the Carolingian efforts at reformation, as the rooting of 
behavior in canonical and inviolate texts, that make the genre of customary as distinct 
from that of rule comprehensible. In grasping the distinction in this sense, Dom 
Hallinger’s efforts to define and analyze the customary as a genre appearing in his 
Introductio Editoris Generalis to the first volume of the Corpus Consuetudinum 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 74. I quote here Diem’s translation; Diem editorializes that “the text is itself rather ambiguous (also 
due to its poor Latin), but it does not exclude the option that it was Willibald who brought the RB to the 
monks of Montecassino.” 
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Monasticarum remain useful. He defines the customary as “a way of life of many people, 
having a binding character,”53 further elaborating that “in a monastery, whatever is done 
by night or day and is performed with a certain order makes a custom.”54 But, while true, 
these points do not function to distinguish a customary from a definition of regula that 
includes the pre-Carolingian tradition of the concept. The distinction comes into light 
only when the regula comes to mean something fixed and unchanging, and moreover 
when Latin monasticism as such comes to be defined by the unique normative status of 
the Regula Benedicti—“a customary is normally thus not complete in itself but is 
complementary to a monastic rule.”55 Essentially, a customary is a kind of commentary 
or licit institutional (regional, local) variation on that which itself may not be modified, 
the Regula Benedicti. Thus, the genre itself has no distinct meaning before the 
specifically Carolingian innovation (or adoption of Caesarius’ otherwise-ignored 
concept) of the regula sancta.56 
The customaries that began to be produced or compiled in the Carolingian period, 
as part of the effort to standardize and correct—to reform—the church and Christendom 
as a whole were thus not codes to condition the establishment of new communities, 
arriving, as it were, alongside prospective monks and guiding them as they began to be 
                                                 
53 Corpus Consuetudinum Monasticarum, vol. 1, xxxii. For more on the definition of the monastic custom, 
see Kassius Hallinger, “Consuetudo. Begriff, Formen, Forschungsgeschichte, Inhalt,” in Untersuchungen 
zu Kloster und Stift, ed. Max-Planck-Institute für Geschichte (Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck and 
Ruprecht, 1980), 140–166. 
54 Ibid., xxii. 
55 Giles Constable, review of Hallinger in Speculum 39 (1964): 531–534, at 531. 
56 On these grounds I would dispute calling several texts in the early volumes of the CCM customaries, just 
as many of the regulae in Benedict of Aniane’s Codex operated in their own day neither as Benedict nor as 
modern historians usually understand the term “rule.” 
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monks, but were intended to delineate correct and incorrect conversatio, affirming the 
former and relegating the latter to discontinuation and replacement. Because the liturgy 
was, according at least to Carolingian theology and ecclesiology, one of the most time-
consuming and significant activities performed by monks, many early customaries deal 
primarily or even exclusively with it.57 In twelfth century terms, these texts are 
sometimes closer to straightforward liturgical manuals such as ordinals, missals, and 
breviaries, or to such texts combined somewhat jarringly with vitae or treatises on 
virtues, than to what that age knew as a customary, which had come to include, if not 
exclusively refer to, an ever-increasing collection of strictures for eating, sleeping, 
working, dressing, and moving throughout the monastery as well as the wider world on a 
day-to-day, rising-to-lying-down basis. This shift in genre, at least Cluny, is best 
localized to the eleventh century, especially its last two or three decades.58 Cluny neither 
inaugurated nor perfected this change-over, but by virtue of its size, reach, and prestige, 
nevertheless played a crucial role and attests particularly to it.59 
John’s vita should be understood as one in a long series of experiments and 
expedients, of local or even personal horizon, in fixing and communicating monastic 
conversatio. It this regard it developed the function of documents in general (and of 
regulae/customaries in particular) within Latin monasticism in two specific ways: first, it 
advanced the slow blooming trend of conceiving conversatio broadly, beyond and outside 
specific liturgical rite as something that might be fixed and transmitted, and also 
                                                 
57 Constable, review, 532; Mayke de Jong, “Carolingian Monasticism,” 647–653. 
58 Cochelin, “Peut-on parler de noviciat”; Cochelin, “Community and Customs”; Diane Reilly, “The 
Cluniac Giant Bible.” 
59 Cochelin, “Community and Customs,” 232–246. 
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specifically, as more than mere imitation of the exemplary individual; second, it pursued 
a conversatio specifically identified with . . . with what, exactly? From the perspective of 
historians today, or even of its subsequent Cluniac editors, one might say “the 
conversatio of Cluny,” as indeed we are considering John’s text as part of the foundation 
of the Cluniac nebula and, even later, order. But part of understanding how this edifice 
was built is appreciating that, in John’s day, the Cluniac Order was but one potentiality 
his text laid open and advanced. History had not yet narrowed to Cluny’s advantage, and 
the conversatio John transmitted might less anachronistically be identified with Baume, 
or Odo himself as the exemplar of a usage observable to varying, never perfect, extents in 
a whole network of (Carolingian, Benedictine, Martinian) houses, of which Cluny was 
only a single prominent member.  
The essential chronology of the Vita is that of Odo’s life. Following the prologue 
and a brief summary of Odo’s childhood, education, and monastic career (essentially, an 
argument), John begins by describing how he came to become a monk and accompany 
Odo as a personal disciple and companion. This quickly leads into John describing the 
occasion upon which he “boldly broke out and did not hesitate to inquire diligently from 
him his origins and way of life. . . .”60 The vast bulk of the text then follows, proceeding 
through Odo’s life chronologically, though with several major (and several lesser) 
digressions, up to about the point where John meets him (towards the very end of his life, 
in Rome). Here, John writes, “Now having come as it were in a circle, let us return to 
former times, and let us look a little at some more important examples.”61 The work then 
                                                 
60 Sitwell, Being the Life, 7. 
61 Ibid., 65. 
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includes some highly various episodes of difficult chronology, comprising in effect a 
loose treatise on the topic of reform, before abruptly recounting Odo’s death and ending. 
The basic form through which John presents Odo’s biography will be familiar to 
anyone with much experience regarding vitae. The text is divided into numerous short 
episodes. Some of these possess a familiar dramatic logic characterized by establishment 
of setting, followed by rising action, climax, and resolution, appearing to the modern 
reader as quite compact and intelligible little anecdotes, fables, or parables. Take for 
example, the brief account of “a certain very excellent brother in the monastery who was 
beloved by all.” On his death bed, he relates to his brethren, with much horror and alarm, 
a vision of the devil menacing him with a sack of breadcrumbs: all those left over from 
his meals in the refectory that, in breach of custom, he had failed to eat before the end of 
the reading. As they watch, he dies, his ultimate fate unknown. Rather unnecessarily 
highlighting the point of the episode, John concludes “From that day the breadcrumbs 
were collected with diligence.”62 Others are more puzzling to a modern reader, such as a 
very short account of how Odo refused “gifts and presents.” After beginning the episode 
by asserting this in general terms, John offers the following: “But on one occasion the 
above-mentioned lord [Fulk] got the better of him, and whether he would or no he had to 
receive a hundred shillings which he sent. But the solider of Christ did not suffer them to 
remain with him for a moment, but immediately gave them to the needy.”63 To me, this 
seems a curious half-story, or even less. Either a single line asserting that Odo did not 
accept such gifts, with no reference to any specific instance of this virtue, or a longer 
                                                 
62 Ibid., 32–33. 
63 Ibid., 21. 
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treatment that relates precisely how Fulk tricked or otherwise maneuvered (as seems to 
be the implication) Odo into accepting the money and perhaps goes into more detail on 
its distribution among the indigent would make more narrative sense. But as it stands the 
episode neither clarifies or expands upon its excruciatingly simple main idea, nor is it 
particularly memorable or interesting. But many of these odd quasi-narrative moments 
make more sense when approaching John’s work as a customary as well as a biography. 
John’s efforts to bound what later ages would come to call a customary within his 
vita are most explicit towards the end of Book I, where he writes: “For the moment it will 
be well to put the story of Odo’s life aside for a while that I may explain the customs of 
the place a little and thus make the succeeding narrative clearer.”64 This line introduces 
around five subdivisions in the text, comprising a few pages, concerned with the customs 
of Baume. It is the essence of my point here that even this discussion of customs is both 
fit into and, ostensibly, presented in order to better reveal the personal behavior and 
virtue of Odo, such that it would be impossible to say exactly where vita ends and 
customary takes over. 
The first subsection of the proto-customary, beginning with the line quoted above, 
briefly summarizes two customs observed at Baume in Odo’s day. Their only apparent 
connection is their relevance to episodes from Odo’s life that John includes in his text. 
The first of these is that  
                                                 
64 Ibid., 32. The PL titles this subsection “Cluniacenses ritus praestringuuntur,” while Sitwell in his glosses 
and footnotes suggests that John means to refer to Baume. The actual text names neither Cluny nor Baume 
explicitly, though the ordering of the material (uncertain as it may be) and place of this episode within 
Odo’s unfolding biography makes Baume seem much more likely. There are also the questions of how 
different the customs of Baume and Cluny would have been in the middle of the tenth century, and of 
whether John would have preferred to emphasize or downplay their similarity, neither of which is strictly 
relevant here. 
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the master of the school should never go with only one boy alone to any place 
whatsoever, not even for the purposes of nature, also that no boy should presume 
to talk with the master alone, but for the sake of good report he should always 
take another of the boys or one of the brethren to accompany him or talk with 
him. But if it was night and one of the boys wished to withdraw, he might not put 
a foot out of the dormitory without the light of a lantern and another to 
accompany him.65  
 
And the second that 
 
At meal times there was always reading at both tables; each one carefully 
collected his breadcrumbs before the reading was finished, and consumed them, 
giving thanks, for when the reading was finished no one might consume them or 
any other food.66 
 
These are obviously distinctive customs, as John refers to them as “of the place” and 
specifically offers them to help his intended audience, the Salerno community, 
understand the significance of ensuing events in the life of Odo. They are thus also, at the 
                                                 
65 Ibid. “Mors enim ejusdem loci fuerat, ut magister scholae solus cum solo puero nec quoquam iret saltem, 
nec ad naturae digestionem, sed nec solus puer secretius illi loqui praesumeret: sed et propter bonum 
testimonium alium e pueris, aut unum ex fratribus in comitatu, vel locutione semper assumeret. Si autem 
nox foret, et casu accidente secessum puer peteret, sine lucernae lumine et alio fratre extra dormitorium 
pedem non auderet protendere,” PL 133:56. 
66 Sitwell, Being the Life, 32. “Tempore vero refectionis nunquam deerat lectio utrisque mensis: micas vero 
quae ex sectione panum fiebant, unusquisque ante se diligenter recolligens, priusquam lectio finiretur, cum 
gratiarum actione sumebant. Finita itaque lectione, nec eas, nec cibum alium sumere ultra aliquis audebat,” 
PL 133:56. 
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same time, very likely the kind of thing that monks interested in imitating the specific 
conversatio associated with Odo, his reforms, and Cluny (or Baume, or Francia) would 
hope to learn. In the mid-tenth century, they might hope to learn them from a man such as 
Odo himself, or from veteran monks transplanted from one house (Cluny, Baume) to 
another (Salerno) specifically for the sake of the habitual, praxical knowledge they 
embodied,67 or from a personal companion of such people, like John himself. Or, of 
course, from a text produced by John, at their behest, specifically to communicate the 
conversatio of Odo as an example similar to those of the Desert Fathers, as he had also 
transmitted by copying out the Lausiac History. Here quite directly we observe how Odo 
himself, as a charismatic figure, in the context of a work like John’s vita, serves as a 
vehicle for a broader, communal code of behavior. Whether John or his audience would 
have conceptualized it this way or not, an account of Odo’s life, written by and for 
monks, necessarily draws an emerging Cluniac conversatio along with it. 
The next subsection relates the deathbed vision of the monk who did not finish his 
crumbs in accordance with the second of the two customs. Its inclusion is interesting, 
because it has nothing to do with Odo but is wholly an elaboration on the custom itself 
and its origin. In explaining the custom concerning the crumbs, John writes that “It was 
said that these crumbs had more of a sacramental character than other food, because they 
had been the subject of a miracle about this time.”68 The story of this monk follows 
immediately, leading us to understand that this vision is the miracle. John is thus 
                                                 
67 Isabelle Cochelin, “Besides the Book”; Cochelin, “When Monks Were the Book: The Bible and 
Monasticism, 6th–11th Centuries,” in The Practice of the Bible, 61–83. 
68 Sitwell, Being the Life, 32. 
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buttressing the legitimacy of the custom (while also providing a striking story to serve as 
an aide-mémoire),69 rather than relating anything strictly relevant to Odo himself.  
The next subsection is the heart of this proto-customary; it has nothing to do with 
Odo, nor even with either of the customs John has digressed to explain, ostensibly in 
pursuit of describing Odo’s life and deeds. It begins by describing “the custom of 
silence” as practiced at Baume.70 In describing this silence, John adopts the curious 
mixture of detail and vagueness concerning the liturgical order of medieval monastic life 
so familiar in customaries: 
 
At unsuitable times no one might speak or consort with another of the brethren in 
the cloister of the monastery, and on days when a twelve-lesson Office was 
celebrated no one might speak in the cloister before chapter on the following day. 
Within the octaves of Christmas and Easter there was strict silence day and 
night.71 
 
This description is clearly for a monastic audience that knows through long training and 
habituation the basic course of both the daily office and the mass; it can thus use various 
                                                 
69 A glimmer of Ong’s psychodynamic regarding the strange and bizarre; this common feature of miracles 
as related in hagiographic literature attests, perhaps, to their almost folkloric status. In their Writing Faith: 
Text, Sign, and History in the Miracles of Sainte Foy (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 
1999), Kathleen Ashley and Pamela Sheingorn have even suggests the folkloric elements of the miracula of 
Saint Foy may have been consciously emphasized by their author, Bernard of Angers (19). 
70 Sitwell, Being the Life, 33. Scott Bruce in particular has analyzed this custom, its significance, and its 
broader place in the high medieval reforms associated with Cluny. See his Silence and Sign Language. 
71 Sitwell, Being the Life, 33. “Incompetentibus namque horis nemo intra claustrum ejusdem monasterii 
audet loqui, nec se cum alio fratre jungere. Quando vero duodecim celebrantur lectiones, nullus intra 
praedictum claustram, praeter ad capitulum, sequenti die loqui audet. Octava enim Natalis Domini et ejus 
Resurrectionis summum silentium die noctuque diebat in illis,” PL 133:57. 
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parts of the liturgy as reference points, describing new practices within a field oriented by 
abbreviated gestures to a shared body of praxis. After commenting briefly on the 
existence of a system of sign language—“which grammarians I suppose would call the 
language of the fingers and eyes”—John adds more description of the liturgy: 
 
But on ferial days and in the other octaves of the saints there was this 
arrangement. On ferial days in the day and night Office together they sang one 
hundred and thirty-eight psalms, from which we subtract fourteen for the sake of 
the weaker brethren. But against this must be put the special prayers which our 
brethren say which are seen to exceed the psalter and also the two Masses and the 
litanies. At each of the canonical hours they knelt twice. During the other octaves 
which were mentioned, they sang seventy-five psalms only in the day and night 
Offices together, and they knelt once and rested twice.72 
 
This discussion of the distinctive liturgy of Baume bears no strict relevance to the 
discipline of silence practiced there, and neither is directly linked to the events of Odo’s 
life. They are, however, part of Odo’s specifically monastic conversatio, since as a good 
monk he conducted himself according to the customs of his house. They thus become of 
interest for the community at Salerno through the personal medium of Odo, just as this 
                                                 
72 Sitwell, Being the Life, 33. “At vero in quotidianis diebus diebus et reliquis octavis sanctorum talis 
discretio tenebatur. Etenim in quotidianis diebus, inter diei noctisque cursus, cxxxviii canebant psalmos: ex 
quibus xiv nos dempsimus propter pusillanimorum animos, exceptis peculiaribus orationibus quas nostri 
frequentant fratres, quae cidelicet modum psalterii videntur excedere. Similiter duabus missis identidemque 
litaniis. Per singulas vero horas canonicas bis flectebant genua. In octavis quas diximus, lxxv tantum 
canebant inter praedictos cursus, et semel flectebant genua, et bis reficiebant,” PL 133:57. 
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community was joined to a larger monastic network primarily through Odo’s personal 
multi-abbacy. As a result, John’s vita of Odo becomes an appropriate vehicle for both 
liturgical and increasingly detailed extra-liturgical customs, presaging the trajectory of 
the emerging genre of the customary. 
From here, the proto-customary buried within the Vita prima et maior by John 
returns to narrating specific episodes in Odo’s life. In the following passages, the 
synthesis of vita and customary achieves its greatest refinement. First, John relates an 
occasion during Odo’s tenure as master of the school when, helping a boy to the 
bathroom in the middle of the night, Odo did not take a candle. John explains that Odo 
reasoned doing so would have been unnecessary, as the bathroom was so close by the 
dormitory that the dormitory lantern fully illuminated it. But a group of bad or false 
monks who regularly bedeviled Odo seized upon this violation of the letter of the Rule 
and indicted Odo before the abbot and the whole community in the following day’s 
chapter gathering. Odo was, accordingly, reprimanded most harshly, by the community 
as well as the abbot (who, according to John, only went along with this pedantry in order 
to provide Odo an occasion to demonstrate his virtuous patience before the brothers).73  
But at the same time that this story represents a compact and narratively satisfying 
episode from Odo’s life, it also illustrates and clarifies a striking number of important 
details about regular, licit monastic life in general, as well as the rituals of public 
confession, reprimand, prostration, and forgiveness, all commonly treated in the great 
                                                 
73 Sitwell, Being the Life, 34–35. 
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Cluniac customaries of the following century.74 Moreover, John subtly emphasizes the 
text here as closely articulating the Rule and the customs of Baume. He notes in his 
narrative that the lantern in the dormitory was there “by rule,” just as he notes that “the 
brethren came together in chapter according to custom,” that “no one might set out his 
case before asking pardon, or defend his action afterwards,” and that the abbot (Berno) 
“according to the custom of the rule healed his trouble by a blessing. . . .”75 Four times in 
this short biographical episode, John takes special care to anchor key points in the 
proceedings in the institutional context created by the Rule and Baume’s distinctive 
elaborations upon it. 
This contextualization invites the reader to consider John’s narration here not only 
as a personal account of Odo’s conversatio, but also as a blueprint for both the proper 
behavior of any master of the school and for the important ritual of reprimand, 
confession, prostration, and forgiveness, itself taking place within the larger cultural 
space of the monks’ regular chapter assembly. Along these lines, John relates that Odo 
woke one of the other boys before he took the first one to use the bathroom. He notes that 
Odo’s accusers made their recriminations at the following day’s chapter, thus waiting for 
the appropriate time and place, and adds that this was done “after the reading of the 
martyrology and the Rule,” giving some indication of what other activities took place at 
the meeting and where this practice fit into their schedule. And, of course, Odo’s 
response is to be taken as a model for any monk put in a similar situation: John allows 
                                                 
74 Ulrich of Zell, Antiquiores Consuetudines, ed. Jacques-Paul Migne (Oxford, 1853) 149:706; Bernard of 
Cluny, Ordo Cluniacensis per Bernardum, ed. M. Herrgott (Paris, 1726), 176–177. 
75 Sitwell, Being the Life, 34–35. 
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that Odo did offer a justification of his actions, “stating that the dormitory light was 
sufficient,” but emphasizes much more his patience and humility in seeking pardon and 
prostrating himself. Here, prostration should be understood as a specific kind of bowing, 
as the term is carefully deployed in later customaries, appropriate for accepting 
reprimand at chapter. It is also significant that John notes that Odo accepted his 
reprimand without “murmuring,” as this is a significant term for inappropriate monastic 
behavior in the Latin tradition.76 John’s account also relates Berno’s punishment of Odo, 
excommunication, “saying that he should no more ask pardon that day.” In response to 
this, Odo goes “out” (i.e., out of chapter) and prostrates himself again, this time before 
his brother monks, requesting that they seek pardon of the abbot in his place.77 Again, 
here John’s precision in description, the intended audience and use of his work, and 
especially the eminence of the personalities involved, all work together to suggest the 
episode as a model for the conduct and organization of the monastic community itself. 
Salernitan monks, reading or listening to the vita for examples of appropriate personal 
conversatio, would learn not only about Odo’s patience and humility and Berno’s strict 
impartiality, but also details about the placement of lamps in the dormitory, the conduct 
of chapter and its sub-ritual of reprimand and prostration, and even appropriate 
punishments and responses to punishments. 
The next subsection describes in general terms how the bad monks continued to 
harass Odo, often by “bringing false accusations against him.”78 Odo always met these 
                                                 
76 Bruce, Silence and Sign Language, 32. 
77 Sitwell, Being the Life, 34–35. 
78 Ibid., 35. 
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partisan recriminations with humility and, as John particularly emphasizes, patience: he 
does not contest them, “although innocent,” but throws himself at his accusers’ feet and 
begs forgiveness. Odo remains a model of the ideal monk in this passage; the Salerno 
community is still intended to read and imitate his conversatio as related here. And John 
even notes that Odo’s seeking the pardon of his enemies was conducted “not through 
human fear, but through fraternal charity, that his patience might correct those who he 
saw were incurring divine vengeance,”79 thus figuring his behavior as instructive within 
as well as beyond the text and offering an ethical (internal, emotional) as well as 
legislative (external, pragmatic) standard.  
Finally, John returns to the custom of the breadcrumbs. Here he tells a story that 
Odo himself was accustomed to relate, the experience of a “certain brother” who was so 
absorbed in the refectory reading that, though he had collected his crumbs, forgot to eat 
them before the abbot formally ended the reading, after which point no more food could 
be licitly consumed. The monk instead held the crumbs in one hand while the community 
went into the church to pray, and upon leaving again “immediately prostrated himself at 
the abbot’s feet,” offering up the “little heap.”80 This prostration is immediately 
recognized as doing penance (supporting the idea that prostravit here is a technical term), 
and when asked the reason for it, the monk opens his hand, revealing that the crumbs 
have been transformed into pearls. Like the story of Odo’s false accusers, this episode fits 
perfectly into the vita as a genre. But, also like that story, this episode also goes one step 
further, and serves to relate an important issue about generally appropriate monastic 
                                                 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., 36. 
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behavior, at least in the particular customs of Baume and Cluny: specifically, it clarifies 
the proper response to a complex and uncertain situation, wherein the demands of 
monastic life appear contradictory. The customaries are full of traces of conflict,81 
whether between individuals or, as here, between the strictures of custom itself and all the 
little variations and difficulties of actually living them. In this vein, this episode answers 
the hypothetical and entirely reasonable question—“What is a good monk who has 
forgotten to eat his crumbs during the time allowed for eating to do?” This is just the kind 
of naturally-occurring difficulty wherein life itself rubs up against the constraints of rule 
and custom, by which the customs of a house (and thus, later, its customaries) grow and 
expand.82 In relating it, John again uses his vita to accomplish a certain kind of concrete 
task that will, in roughly a century, at least as far as Cluny is concerned, come to be the 
characteristic one of a new expansion of the genre of the customary. We also note, 
finally, that the specific solution is a recourse to abbatial authority; this is an authority 
whose purview and stature, especially in the area of custumal legislation was, very likely, 
at the beginning of a major period of expansion at this time, at least at Cluny and 
certainly aided by the introduction of new kinds of literate tools.83 
Once we recognize this proto-customary for what it is, other parts of John’s vita 
that had previously seemed entirely tangential to the explicit subject of the text begin to 
                                                 
81 Cochelin, “Peut-on parler de noviciat,” 37. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Steven Vanderputten has argued that Cluniac reform, at least in the Low Countries around the turn of the 
twelfth century, frequently functioned less as the imposition of new, substantially-different liturgical and 
ritual observances and more as an opportunity to re-arrange power structures within and around a given 
institution, often to the benefit of abbots as allies and agents of regional lay and episcopal elites. See 
Vanderputten, “Monastic Reform, Abbatial Leadership, and the Instrumenation of Cluniac Discipline,” 
250–253. 
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make more sense. The foremost of these is another few subsections that I group together 
as another proto-customary. These are concerned primarily with one of Odo’s 
companions, Adhegrinus, who had sought Odo out after hearing about him from the 
nobleman Fulk.84 John first treats of Odo and Adhegrinus’ ascetic life together, and their 
search for a monastic community of sufficient rigor. This led them to Baume, primarily 
because of its purported connection to Saint Benedict of Aniane. The Vita prima then 
presents a series of short episodes devoted exclusively to Adhegrinus, leaving behind 
Odo entirely. 
From these episodes, we learn some basic details about Adhegrinus’ way of life 
that confirm him as a hermit or anchorite, a kind of monk specifically sanctioned by 
Benedict in his Rule.85 Crucially, each story reinforces the fact that Adhegrinus’ life was 
a licit part of the monastic institution, pleasing to God and the saints. The first begins by 
telling us that “the venerable Adhegrinus . . . after he had received permission, sought out 
a deserted place and was there enclosed in a little cave.”86 This simple introduction 
establishes that Adhegrinus, even in physically separating himself from the monastic 
community at Cluny (a little earlier on, John notes that Adhegrinus lived in a small cell, 
again with the permission of the abbot, at Baume, but at the end of this group of episodes 
will note that Adhegrinus’ cave was near Cluny) still maintained the crucial monastic 
principle of obedience. Even if he did not physically reside within the monastery, his 
                                                 
84 Sitwell, Being the Life, 24. 
85 RB 1980: The Rule of St Benedict in Latin and English with Notes, ed. and trans. Timothy Fry 
(Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1981), 169. Not having deviated from this edition’s English tradition, 
which is widely available, I have not provided the Latin. 
86 Sitwell, Being the Life, 27. 
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person and way of life were bounded within a broader notion of the monastic community 
or institution. Similarly, in telling us that he was “enclosed” in a “little cave,” John makes 
clear that Adhegrinus conformed to the specific definition of an anchorite given by 
Benedict: that he maintained stability of place.87  
Beyond these important details, the episode is a little story about a day when 
Adhegrinus lay in the grip of despair, desperate to know if his “service” was pleasing to 
the Lord.88 This obviously sets up quite neatly a justification for this particular form of 
life, which is of course provided both to the reader but also to Adhegrinus. Emphasizing 
his solitude, the text relates that “there was no one present who might bring him words of 
consolation or the examples of the Fathers.” As Adhegrinus lies on the ground, “brought 
almost to desperation,” a man “splendid in appearance” suddenly appears.89 He asks 
Adhegrinus what is so troubling him, and subsequently reassures him that “you shall 
never be unworthy of the good things of the Lord.” This figure is never further 
characterized or identified, though the use of implicitly-miraculous or angelic but 
otherwise anonymous figures in this way is not unusual.  
The two following subsections are broadly similar in function; each justifies 
Adhegrinus’ life as an anchorite through a miraculous visitor. However, in these accounts 
the figure is identified as Saint Martin of Tours. Martin is important partly because of his 
close association with Odo in the Vita: Odo’s father secretly promises his infant son to 
the saint (probably this should further be understood as also promising him to the 
                                                 
87 RB 1980, 169. 
88 Sitwell, Being the Life, 27–28. 
89 Ibid. 
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monastic life), and Odo enters Saint Martin at Tours as a canon or cleric at the age of 
eighteen.90 But it is even more significant for the functioning of John’s passage on 
Adhegrinus’ life that Martin was something of a patron of monasteries, especially of 
monasteries in southern Francia, due to his founding of some of the very earliest and 
most famous houses in the region. In the first of these two episodes, Adhegrinus is 
grabbed suddenly while outside his cell by “the tempter” and almost thrown from a cliff. 
Martin intervenes suddenly, and “restored him [Adhegrinus] to his dwelling.”91 Here 
danger strikes precisely when Adhegrinus has left his sanctioned ascetic residence, and 
the very father of Frankish monasticism rescues him and then places him specifically 
back into that very place—the sanction of Adhegrinus’ conversatio is as obvious and 
direct as it is divine. We also note that this story recalls Benedict’s description of the 
anchorite as one who fights against the devil alone in the wilderness.92 
The second of the two stories involves Adhegrinus being visited by Saint Martin, 
and the two engaging in “no small contention of a friendly sort” over which was worthy 
to and would give the other a blessing. The solution, unsurprisingly, is to bless one 
another. This passage, too, emphasizes Adhegrinus’ stability of place, for Martin explains 
to him that “I come from Rome . . . and I am going to France, and as my journey brought 
me near you, I turned aside to visit you.”93 The reference is brief, but relates a journey 
that would obviously have taken him past Cluny and clearly presents the memorable 
                                                 
90 Ibid., 8–9 and 13. 
91 Ibid., 28. 
92 RB 1980, 169. 
93 Sitwell, Being the Life, 29. 
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image of the saint stopping to visit a hermit whose location was reliable and predictable. 
Perhaps more important in outlining the nature of Adhegrinus’ anchoritic life is his 
description of Martin’s arrival: “On a certain day when I had finished the appointed 
psalms, Saint Martin suddenly stood before me. . . .”94 Here, John clearly suggests that 
Adhegrinus maintains some schedule of psalmody, almost certainly based on that of 
Cluny or Baume. The life of an anchorite thus includes this central duty of monks living 
in communities, a key stipulation in debates about the reform and orthopraxy of regular 
life.95 
The final subsection in this passage has no narrative thrust at all, and thus is the 
purest example of the proto-customary function here at work. Therein, John first notes 
that these episodes all occurred after Adhegrinus had been a hermit for more than thirty 
years. He also notes that Adhegrinus lived near Cluny, rather than Baume, making the 
first explicit reference to Cluny in the text. But particularly interesting are the few lines 
he offers by way of describing Adhegrinus’ relationship to Cluny itself:  
 
Only on Sundays and the principal feasts was he accustomed to come down to the 
monastery of St. Peter, which is called Cluny, because it lies about two miles 
from that place [where he lived]. When he had collected a little flour from which 
he used to make bread, and a few beans, he returned immediately to his solitude. 
He never took wine, and he did not season his food with fat or oil. In all seasons 
                                                 
94 Ibid. 
95 See Giles Constable, The Reformation of the Twelfth Century (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 24–26 and 150. For more on monastic debates over ermeticism, see Vanderputten, Imagining 
Religious Leadership, 62–67. 
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he suffered cold and heat; heat between his shoulders, cold in his hands and 
arms.96  
 
As with the passage on silence and the liturgy in the previous proto-customary gathering, 
it is the inclusion of this subsection that reveals the previous few as part of a general 
treatment of communal monastic life, such as would later become associated with the 
customary as a genre. While these communicate that Adhegrinus’ life as a hermit accords 
with Benedict’s definition of anchorites as those who, having been trained in a 
monastery, now fight the devil alone in the wilderness, and also that he maintains the key 
monastic virtues of stability of place and obedience and the key monastic duty of 
psalmody, they give little account of more pragmatic matters, such as what (and how) he 
eats, and no indication of what his ongoing relationship to any monastery might be. This 
last subsection, in its turn, addresses the question of his sustenance. This is important 
both because fasting and simple food are so important to monastic asceticism, but also 
because the issue of getting food at all obviously exposes the monk or hermit to the 
dangers of handling money and interacting with the world in general. As we see, 
Adhegrinus does neither, even limiting his intercourse with other monks to the absolute 
minimum. At least as important, this last passage also establishes that Adhegrinus was, in 
fact, connected to a particular monastery, an important issue in integrating hermits and 
anchorites into reform monasticism. The straightforward address of these issues here 
                                                 
96 Sitwell, Being the Life, 30. “Dominicis tantum diebus aut praecipuis festivitatibus ad monasterium sancti 
Petri, quod Cluniacum dicitur, quia duobus fere millibus propre est, assuevit descendere: sumpta videlicet 
modica farina, ex qua sibi panem conficere solet, et fabae paucis granis, mox ad eremum revertitur. Vino 
nec aliquando utebatur: adipe vero vel oleo ejus cibus non conditur. Patitur omni tempore frigus et calorem: 
calorem inter scapulas, frigus inter manus et brachia,” PL 133:55. 
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encourages and supports my reading of the earlier episodes as illustrations not only of an 
individual holy man’s conversatio, but also as delineations of a general model of living 
that, if not quite legislative-normative, were something more than a mere example. 
In light of all this, we should briefly double back to consider how John introduces 
the gathering of episodes devoted to Adhegrinus. He does so with a typically-meta 
reflection on the course, content, and aims of his narrative: 
 
I confess that I expected to pass easily and swiftly over the life of our most holy 
father . . . along with his life I would describe the men who, I understand, were his 
companions. . . . I beg that, as I do not shrink from laboring under this burden, so 
it may not seem to you onerous to receive it. For it seems right and pleasing to 
God, and an added adornment of this narrative, that along with his life I should 
relate the example of those whom he conducted to their fatherland [presumably, 
heaven]. . . .97 
 
The plural is odd here, since John gives no other figure (besides Odo, of course) the 
sustained narrative attention he devotes to Adhegrinus. More straightforward are his 
efforts to convince his readers that a short section devoted to this man is not too 
extraneous to his main project of relating Odo’s life and conversatio. This relatively 
involved justification is evidence that the response John hopes to anticipate and turn 
                                                 
97 Sitwell, Being the Life, 27. “Fateor, inquam, putavi vitam sanctissimi patris nostri simpliciter, cursimque 
transire . . . una cum ejus vita vult enarrare viros, quos intelligit habuisse socios. . . . obsecro, ut quem 
admodum me non piget sub tanto desudare labore, nec vobis videatur ad recipiendum onserosum vel grave. 
Justum namque et bene placitum coram Deo esse videtur, ut eorum exempla ad ornatum locutionis cum sua 
describantur vita, quos . . . transvexit ad patriam,” PL 133:54. 
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away—annoyance at a prolonged and irrelevant digression—is a wholly conceivable and 
non-anachronistic one. That is, John knows well that he risks violating his audience’s 
general (that is, genre-al) expectations for a vita. This, along with the use of the specific, 
individual person of Adhegrinus as a guiding and organizing principle, is especially 
interesting in combination with the passage’s operation as a proto-customary: essentially, 
John knows that he has innovated, or at least deviated. Perhaps he even recognizes that 
his innovation is two-fold, both in digressing to relate some episodes from the life of a 
man who is not the subject of his vita, and in using these episodes, this small fragment of 
another man’s otherwise-nonexistent vita,98 to relate a body of accepted monastic praxis 
in no way limited or specific to Adhegrinus himself, but actually characteristic of a 
whole, clearly-delineated class of monks.  
These are hardly the only instances in which John’s description of Odo’s 
conversatio seems to step beyond the mere presentation of an exemplary individual and 
gesture towards a relatively discrete code of behavior grounded in the scriptures, the Rule 
of Saint Benedict, and the established orthopraxy of monastic behavior at places like 
Baume and Cluny. There is a long series of episodes shortly after the beginning of Book 
II that John characterizes as descriptions of Odo’s “generosity” and “mercy.”99 These 
they assuredly are, but they have another striking commonality upon which John does not 
comment at all: they are all stories of things Odo did on his numerous journeys 
(predominantly between Francia and Rome). And while they all focus on, or at least 
                                                 
98 Actually, a very rare vita of Adhegrinus (BHL 70) was subsequently produced on the basis of John’s text. 
See Iogna-Prat, “Panorama,” 82. 
99 Sitwell, Being the Life, 46–53. 
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include, instances of Odo’s personal charity, they also address in passing the matter of 
appropriate monkish behavior while travelling outside the cloister: John (citing both the 
Rule of Saint Benedict and the Bible) tells how Odo encouraged the monks to contain 
their laughter,100 references the singing of psalms by the traveling abbot and brothers,101 
and (again citing rule and scripture in tandem) describes Odo’s practice of keeping his 
head bowed and his eyes fixed on the ground “wherever he was, standing, or walking, or 
sitting. . . .”102 This interest in supporting Odo’s conversatio with the authoritative texts 
of Latin monastic life betrays the proto-legislative intent (or at least function) of John’s 
text, and future customaries contain echoes both of some of these specific practices and 
of the concern for extending the monastic code beyond the cloister.103 Moreover, this 
series of episodes itself leads into more discussion of the custom of silence, including a 
very long string of biblical citations justifying the practice, with no narrative frame all.104 
Still more examples could be provided,105 but the basic argument has been 
sufficiently well-established. John’s Vita prima et maior digresses regularly from its 
                                                 
100 Ibid., 46. 
101 Ibid., 47. 
102 Ibid., 52. 
103 In Bernard’s customary in particular there are many references to the delegation of duties when senior 
monastic obedientaries, and especially the abbot himself, are away from the cloister. See the provision for a 
welcoming procession for a returning abbot and the strictures for monks travelling on the road as regards 
the Daily Office and proper diet: Bernard, Ordo Cluniacensis, 138. Bernard’s description of the behavior 
and dress of Cluny’s deans while these travel to and from the monastery is another example: Bernard, Ordo 
Cluniacensis, 139–141. 
104 Sitwell, Being the Life, 56–57. 
105 The largest concentration of such examples not discussed here are to be found in the first few 
subsections of Book III; see Sitwell, Being the Life, 71–77. Book III might be conceptualized as a kind of 
manual on reform, including justifications for it in general and accounts of Odo’s reform of specific 
monasteries, primarily Fleury, and the conflict involved. Accordingly, these opening subsections, framed as 
Odo’s responses to questions put to him by John and other disciples, discuss the importance of proper 
monastic dress, fasting, and obedience, making use of the familiar mixture of miraculous fables/parables, 
and citations of the Rule and of scripture. 
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ostensible subject, the life of Odo himself, and there is some evidence that these 
digressions were understood in their own day as unusual, innovative, and perhaps 
unwelcome. Certain passages of the Vita, considered closely, reveal by their citations of 
the Rule and of scripture and by their detailed depiction of various monastic customs that 
they were likely intended not merely to tell the life of Odo, but in fact to elaborate a 
whole code of behavior that he exemplified but of which he was not, ultimately, the 
source or even primary justification. Rather, it was a lived tradition that had grown up 
over the course of centuries, often in dialectical relationship with the Rule of Saint 
Benedict and other texts and documents of varying normativity, and in the present case 
were specifically mediated through the individual communities of Baume and Cluny. 
And while the most recent scholarship quite convincingly argues that medieval reform, 
especially in the tenth century, was not nearly so schematic and invasive (in terms of 
interfering in the day-to-day liturgy and customs of reformed houses) as has long been 
imagined, we might justifiably hypothesize that this broader institutional or communal 
conversatio itself was something that John wished to transmit to the monks of Salerno (a 
community that, after all, had been reformed by Odo), and that at least some of them 
might well have been eager to receive it. 
Further weight is lent to this reading by the nature of Nalgod’s revision of John’s 
text, called appropriately the Vita reformata by Iogna-Prat and Maria Luisa Fini.106 
Written most likely in the 1120s, this vita was composed almost two hundred years after 
John’s. By the time of Nalgod’s work, Odo had become a saint and Cluny had become, 
                                                 
106 Maria Luisa Fini, “Studio sulla ‘Vita Odonis reformata’ di Nalgodo. Il ‘fragmentum mutilum’ del 
Codice latino NA 1496 della Bibliothèque Nationale di Parigi,” in Rendiconti dell’Accademia di Scienze 
dell’Istituto di Bologna. Classe di scienze morali, Bologna 63 (1975): 33–147. 
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under the reign of several more saintly abbots, the foremost monastic institution of Latin 
Christendom. Not only was its example widely known and admired, but the reform party 
associated with Gregory VII that had so radically remade the papacy included many 
members with connections to the Burgundian abbey,107 and the abbots of Cluny also 
exerted some varying measure of authority or at least exemplary influence over a huge 
and diffuse network of houses spread (and still spreading) across Europe.108 Cluny had 
also, slowly and often not as chief innovator, developed an increasingly sophisticated role 
for written documents within its culture and institution.109 In terms of its customaries, 
they had developed from primarily recording liturgical usage, around the end of the tenth 
century, to include by the end of the eleventh more and more detail about monastic 
behavior beyond the schedule of psalms and readings and outside the church.110 Perhaps 
more importantly, the production of these newly comprehensive customaries occasioned 
a greater role for abbots in the life and constitution of the community itself, and in 
particular more power in the establishment of customs themselves.111 In the 1070s or 
1080s,112 under Hugh of Semur, a monk known only as Bernard had produced an 
                                                 
107 Iogna-Prat, Order and Exclusion, 58 and 78–79. 
108 Poeck, Ecclesia cluniacensis; Cochelin, “Community and Customs,” 233. 
109 For important limits to Cluniac innovation along these lines, see Boynton, “Oral Transmission of 
Liturgical Practice”; Reilly “The Cluniac Giant Bible”; Cochelin, “Community and Customs,” 231–232; 
Iogna-Prat, Order and Exclusion, 30. 
110 Reilly, “The Cluniac Giant Bible.” In general, compare the earlier “Cluniac” customs (on the difficult of 
this term, see Cochelin, “Community and Customs”) such as the Consuetudines antiquiores (CCM 7) with 
the later collections of Ulrich and Bernard, on any particular point, to see this unmistakable trend of 
elaboration. 
111 Cochelin, “Community and Customs,” 239–243. 
112 Several theories for the precise dating of and composition relationship between the customaries of 
Ulrich and Bernard have been proposed. I have not waded into this debate, as it is not precisely relevant for 
the work at hand, but the key citations are as follows: Kassius Hallinger, “Klunys Bräuche zur Zeit Hugos 
des Grossen (1049–1109),” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte: Kanonistische Abteilung 
45 (1959): 99–140; Joachim Wollasch, “Zur Verschriftlichung der klösterlichen Lebensgewohnheiten unter 
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immensely detailed customary that dealt not only with the liturgy, the training of novices, 
and a range of rituals that took place outside the oratory, but also what can only be called 
the administration of the monastery as an immense nexus of property, resources, and 
people. Intended for use at Cluny itself, Isabelle Cochelin has identified this work as a 
crucial turning point in the history and role of the genre.113 Fifty years later, Nalgod was 
writing during the early abbacy of Peter the Venerable, who would go on to hold a series 
of great Cluniac assemblies and promulgate an authoritative, revised body of statutes 
very much like a legislating, constitutional monarch.114  
These great changes in the scope and status of Cluny as an institution, and 
especially of the role written documents played within it, provide key context for the 
striking prologue with which Nalgod introduces his Vita Reformata. Nalgod presents 
himself as forced by insolence as well as by “imperious charity” to produce this work “in 
my homely way of speaking.”115 But if this self-effacing humility is quite predictable, the 
extreme criticism Nalgod heaps on John (whom he mentions by name) surprises with its 
ferocity. He writes that he John “was found offensive,” and that  
 
such was the confusion of words, so scattered the prolixity, indeed so disordered 
and preposterous in order of narration, that the series itself hardly cohered in 
reason or time to itself. It perturbed me greatly: and since the famous deeds of this 
                                                 
Abt Hugo von Cluny,” Frühmittelalterliche Studien 27 (1993): 317–349; Isabelle Cochelin, “Évolution des 
coutumiers monastiques dessinée à partir de l’étude de Bernard,” in From Dead of Night, 29–66, esp. 29–
30. 
113 Cochelin, “Community and Customs,” 240–243. 
114 Iogna-Prat, Order and Exclusion, 30; Melville, “Action, Text, and Validity.” 
115 For the Vita reformata, I use Nalgod of Cluny, Sancti Odonis vita altera, PL 133:85–104. 
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most honorable man were covered over with an unfitting veil of obscurity, I was 
fiercely vexed.116  
 
Indeed, Nalgod was so disturbed that he felt compelled to “dig out the pure and simple 
truth from that multitudinous run of words” and to “draw back the cloud of disordered 
relation,” ultimately describing his work by saying, “I reformed [or repaired] the 
collection for the eyes.”117 We are left to imagine humble Nalgod, reading one day about 
Saint Odo (whom he refers to here as the “founder of Cluny”), and growing progressively 
more horrified at the confusion that threatens to obscure his crucial, even salvific 
example. His anger and dismay is so powerful that it forces him to take the extreme 
liberty of revising this venerable text, a process that he characterizes almost as one might 
the gathering of wood from a forest or of stone from a quarry: he must excavate Odo’s 
life from the quagmire where he has discovered it, making it intelligible and available for 
himself and his contemporaries. The historian may feel a pang of commiseration.  
The key questions of what Nalgod removed, what he added, and how he 
(re)organized the resulting combination of old and new material thus arise, and this effort 
to excavate and clarify Nalgod’s editorial process therefore reveals not only which parts 
of John’s text he valued and which he did not, but also how he understood written 
material to be intelligible, both in general and specifically in contrast to John. At the 
outset we note that the Vita reformata is significantly shorter than the Vita prima et 
                                                 
116 PL 133:85. “Tanta erat verborum confusio, tam dispersa prolixitas, ita inordinatus et praeposterus ordo 
narrandi, ut ipsa series relationis vix sibi aut ratione aut tempore cohaereret. Displicuit mihi valde: et 
praeclara dignissimi viri gesta quia indigne obscuritatis nebula praemerentur vehementer indolui.” 
117 Ibid. 
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maior; in the Patrologia Latina, it occupies only nineteen pages (85–104) to the Vita 
prima’s forty-three (43–86). Evidently, Nalgod considered more than half of John’s text 
to be superfluous. 
In beginning his text, Nalgod reveals nothing about himself; he has no equivalent 
to John’s frame narratives (first, concerning his sickness and the visitation by his friends 
that resulted in the Vita prima et maior; second, relating how John himself met Odo, 
toward the end of Odo’s life, and eventually came to ask to hear the story of his life), and 
neither does he repeat John’s brief argument summarizing Odo’s life beforehand. Rather, 
he begins immediately with Odo’s birth, and from there proceeds through the episodes of 
Odo’s early life, essentially as John himself related them. The first major divergence 
between the two texts comes after Odo has been driven by visions and pains away from 
the worldly life of his late teens to become a cleric or canon at Tours. Both texts follow 
these events by describing a vision Odo had, in which pagan classical literature was 
revealed to him as a beautiful vessel filled with deadly serpents.118 But in John’s text, this 
story is followed by a lengthy discussion of Odo’s virtues.119 These pages are similar to 
the proto-customary gatherings: while personal virtue is certainly a conventional topic for 
a vita, John’s treatment here is rather more systematic than episodic, with the general 
behavior of Odo characterized in such a way that it dominates what little narrative 
content is present; moreover, it is frequently undergirded by citation of scripture. John 
begins the section:  
 
                                                 
118 Sitwell, Being the Life, 14; Nalgod, PL 133:88–89. 
119 Sitwell, Being the Life, 15–21. 
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I shall now go on to describe briefly how much of the virtue of patience began to 
shine forth in him. From this time onwards he left the songs of the poets, and 
taught by the Spirit from on high, he turned his attention wholly to those who 
expounded the Gospels and the prophets. Meanwhile almost all the canons began 
to inveigh against him, croaking like so many crows. “What are you doing?” they 
said, “Why do you wish to undertake this unaccustomed work? You are wasting 
your labor, and the flower of your youth along with it. Spare yourself, and leaving 
these inextricably involved writings, go to the psalms.” But the same spirit which 
had taught him to be silent from good things, now taught him to be silent from 
evil. With bowed head and stopped heart, his eyes fixed on the ground, he 
repeated in his heart that saying of David, “I will take heed to my ways, that I sin 
not with my tongue. I have set a guard to my mouth, when the sinner stood 
against me. I was dumb, and was humbled, and kept silence from good things.” 
Nor was he unmindful of that precept and promise of the Lord, “In patience you 
shall possess your souls.”120 
 
As a customary, there is much that could be discussed here: the code of behavior 
encompassing both the course of Odo’s studies and his physical and social passivity, the 
                                                 
120 Ibid., 15. “Interea quanta in eum coepit postmodum emanare virtus patientiae, succinete describam. 
Deinde relictis carminibus poetarum, alti edoctus spiritu consilii, ad evangeliorum prophetarumque 
expositores se totum convertit. Coeperunt interea rabido latratu omnes pene canonici fuere contra eum. 
Quid agere velis, inquiunt? cur invadere quaeris opus alienum? hoc opus pretii perdidisti cum flore 
juventutis. Parce tibi, et relictis his inextricabiliter connexis litteris, ad psalmos abi. Sed idem spiritus qui 
eum pridem docuerat a bonus silere, tunc docebat eum a malis conticescere. Ille vero curvato capite et 
obturatis auribus, defixisque in terram aspectibus, illud in corde versabat Davidicum: Dixi, Custodiam vias 
meas ut non delinquam in lingua mea. Posui ori meo custodiam (Psal. xxxviii). Nec tamen erat immemor 
Dominici promissi: In patientia vestra possidebitis animas vestras (Luc. xxi),” PL 133:49. 
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implicit distinction between canons (as both worldly and unlearned, with the common 
bestial topos of the morally compromised) and monks, the scriptural support furnished 
for Odo’s conversatio. And there follow several more subsections carrying forward this 
treatment of Odo’s virtues. Another recounts Odo’s discovery of the Rule of Saint 
Benedict, and his decision to live by some of its precepts without yet formally being a 
monk. Though making less reference to the particulars of communal monastic—or 
anchoritic—life than he does elsewhere, John is clearly enunciating an ethic, a habitus, a 
conversatio, which is supported by scripture and the Rule, and which is also contrasted 
with that of canons. 
But what is most important here is that this gathering is one of the main targets of 
Nalgod’s editorial scourge. Despite all his changes, it is ultimately possible to follow 
Nalgod’s progression through John’s text—the sequence of events leading up to this 
section is extremely similar, with the discussion of virtues immediately preceded in both 
texts by Odo’s rejection of pagan literature and followed by the story of the composition 
of his summary of Gregory the Great’s Moralia in Job. Between these passages, Nalgod 
has also reproduced the key narrative events related by John in the course of his treatise 
on Odo’s virtues: first, Odo’s vigils at the tomb of Saint Martin, during which he is 
attacked by demonic foxes and saved by a heaven-sent wolf, next, his ascetic life 
modeled on that of monks, whose ranks he has not yet joined, and finally, his ministry in 
Tours.121 But from these events, Nalgod has entirely removed the discussion of Odo’s 
                                                 
121 I use “ministry” here in an informal sense; John writes: “And many of those who came to Tours visited 
Odo; those who already knew him that they might meet him again, those who did not know him that they 
might make his acquaintance. And he, as an overflowing fountain, offered to all the cup they so much 
desired, and as from an open book gave fitting instruction to all. To one he disclosed the virtue of chastity, 
on another he imposed sobriety; this one he taught to despise the world, that one he admonished not to 
covet the goods of another. To each he gave abundantly whatever was necessary. . . .,” Being the Life, 19. 
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virtues as such. And he has also clarified the troubled chronology, characteristic of John, 
which characterizes this section of the Vita prima et maior. First, he moves the brief 
description of Odo’s time in Paris under the tutelage of Remigius from the end of this 
section to the middle. John has tacked this on to the very end of the discussion of virtues, 
with a rather confusing “About this time he went to Paris, where he studied dialectic. . . . 
When his studies were over, he returned to Tours. . .”122 Nalgod also expands somewhat 
upon John’s exceedingly brief treatment of Odo’s studies. And he removes a jarring 
section in which John suddenly leaps to his own present day, and describes some of 
Odo’s character during their travels together at the very end of Odo’s life. This jump may 
make sense in John’s conception of a treatise on general personal behavior, but is quite 
mysterious if his text is evaluated as a biography.123  
Nalgod’s revision here thus consists of reordering events to better serve the 
specific narrative of Odo’s life, concentrating on discrete actions and episodes. In 
addition to this reordering, he removes much of John’s generalized, almost philosophical 
discussion of Odo’s virtue; the modern reader understands quite easily Nalgod’s 
preference. But making the effort to understand why John put his text together the way he 
did reveals that Nalgod is not merely editing a poorly-composed work, but rather drawing 
the Vita prima et maior back within the confines of the vita as a genre. In John’s hands, 
                                                 
“Contigit interea ut plurimi ex ipsis ad eum introirent visitandi gratia, cogniti ut notum reviserent, ignoti ut 
notum eum sibi facerent. At ille, velut fons redundans, desiderantissima cunctis praebebat pocula, et, quasi 
ex aperta bibliotheca, omnibus congrua ministrabat exempla: huic castitatem indicens, illi sobrietatem 
imponens: hunc contemnere mundum docet, alterum ne alterius res concupiscat admonet. Unicuique enim 
quaeque erant necessaria affluenter ministrabat. . . .,” PL 133:51. This section goes on at some length in 
this vein, maintaining the general feel of narrative submerged in a discussion of virtue more generally. 
122 Sitwell, Being the Life, 21. 
123 Ibid., 18. 
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the vita (his in particular and the genre in general) had overleapt these bounds; it ended 
up, like the character of Odo himself, serving as an awkward and unconventional vehicle 
for a generalized code of behavior that might be studied, learned, institutionalized, and 
policed under a communal paradigm fundamentally different from that of individuals 
imitating an exemplar. Nalgod was not interested in this aspect of John’s work, precisely 
because by his own day the customary had come into its own (and was indeed on the 
verge of being replaced by yet another advance in genre and documentary form): neither 
did he expect to find customs related in a vita, nor did he want for a legible record of 
Clunaic customs in particular. 
The next section where Nalgod’s text diverges most noticeably from John’s, the 
passages concerning Adhegrinus, comes almost immediately after the treatise on virtues. 
Nalgod, like John, relates that Adhegrinus was a fighting man of Fulk’s who, hearing 
from Fulk of Odo’s holiness, went to join Odo. Nalgod also tells how the two travelled 
around looking for a monastery to join, with only Baume meeting their high standards. 
And in reworking somewhat the story of Odo’s introduction to Baume and his struggles 
there with the party of false monks who persecuted him, Nalgod adds Adhegrinus where 
John has not mentioned him.124 But Adhegrinus’ role here is quite minor; he is really only 
an adjunct to Odo. And the several passages that John devoted to the description of 
Adhegrinus’ life as a hermit are completely absent. Here again, a very long digression, 
entirely tangential to the story of Odo, has been removed. Even more clearly than in the 
case of John’s treatise on virtues, this digression served in the Vita prima et maior a 
                                                 
124 Nalgod, PL 133:92–93. 
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highly-refined proto-customary function, describing and justifying through miracles, 
scripture, and both implicit and explicit citation of the Rule of Saint Benedict the life of 
an anchorite, even giving basic logistical and liturgically-oriented instructions for the 
interface of this kind of life with that of an overseeing coenobitic community. 
This is very much the form Nalgod’s revision has followed when it comes to the 
heart of and key to John’s aspirations to customary, the passages devoted explicitly to the 
customs of Baume. Again, Nalgod has stripped out a great deal of material that is not 
strictly necessary from a narrative or biographical perspective. This includes John’s brief 
preamble where he justifies description of the customs of Baume. Nalgod has also 
removed entirely the discussion and justification of silence, and likewise John’s partial 
description of the liturgy at Baume. The “matter of the crumbs,” as he calls it, has been 
heavily reworked. First of all, the account of the monk on his deathbed has been excised; 
Nalgod is content merely to assert that this custom “was lawful [legitimum; meaning 
“licit behavior required that . . .,” not “it was permitted to . . .”] in the church [ecclesia] of 
Baume, and as though for the sake of law [quasi pro jure] it was observed in that place. . 
. .”125 It is significant that he does not regard the story of the vision as a necessary 
substantiation of the custom’s weight; John, by contrast, gives not only an origin story, 
which both explains and justifies the custom, but also even a (very) brief theological 
gloss, in writing that the crumbs had “more of a sacramental character than other 
food.”126 But Nalgod can merely assert the custom as legitimum and move on. 
                                                 
125 PL 133:95. 
126 Sitwell, Being the Life, 32. 
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As for the material concerning Odo’s tenure as school master, Nalgod has moved 
it earlier in the text, away from the matter of the crumbs. Chronologically, these episodes 
are not meant to be distinct, and Nalgod has not truly altered the sequence of events from 
John’s portrayal; both the matter of the crumbs and Odo’s persecution by the pedantic 
false brothers are situated shortly or immediately after Odo and Adhegrinus together 
locate and enter Baume. But Nalgod does not put them together into their own little 
gathering because, for him, they are unified primarily by their relevance to Odo’s life and 
career—so they appear in lived order, with Odo’s persecution followed a bit later, at 
some more general point during his time at Baume, by the matter of the crumbs. For 
John, these two episodes belong together in a special section devoted to the customs of 
Baume, because it is the relatively systematic consideration of monastic custom and 
conversatio that unites them. And the narrative of Odo’s actual transgression (failing to 
take a chaperone with himself and one young boy who had to use the bathroom one 
night) is likewise much streamlined.127 Nalgod does not offer the prefatory summary of 
the custom itself that Odo violates, both because his audience can be expected to be 
familiar with the custom already, and for the related reason that describing the customs of 
Baume is not his aim. The account of the chapter at which Odo is reprimanded by his 
enemies in the community is similarly truncated: gone is the reference to the reading of 
the Rule and martyrology, gone is the reference to prostration, gone is the reference to 
Odo’s punishment and his continued petition. None of this is relevant to Nalgod’s 
purposes, which are those we today understand as typical of the vita as a form, as a 
                                                 
127 Nalgod, PL 133:93. 
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specific technique, artifice, technology—as a genre. So he does not include it. But this 
erasure reveals John’s purposes: to capture not only Odo’s conversatio, but the institution 
of Baume’s. 
This pattern of revision also holds for the gathering with which John opens Book 
II; again, this gathering, comprised of five subsections dealing with essentially the same 
events in both vitae, is, by conservative estimate, two or three times longer in John’s 
text.128 Nalgod has, characteristically, removed much of the material that could serve 
John’s audience as a guide for appropriate monastic behavior on the road, focusing 
instead on the specific deeds of Odo. In the first subsection of this gathering, he gives a 
short, general statement on Odo’s charity to paupers, omitting John’s discussion of 
laughter, of Odo’s humble comportment, of his disciplining of his travelling companions 
(especially that resulting if they “replied sharply” to any pauper), of his habit of seating 
any infirm person encountered on the road on his own horse, and of his guiding of his 
companions in singing psalms while walking or riding.129 Various specific instances of 
Odo’s charity and humility are included, but not these more general illustrations. In the 
next section, Nalgod removes a story included by John of Odo’s charity towards an old 
man crossing the Alps with a reeking sack of onions and garlic. This excision seems 
strange: isn’t such an episode exactly the kind of story Nalgod appears to favor? Perhaps 
the answer lies in the “point” of this story. John relates that Odo carried the foul sack of 
the man a ways, and that the stench forced all Odo’s companions to hang back some 
distance from him. Eventually, John himself, feeling guilty, caught up to Odo, who 
                                                 
128 Sitwell, Being the Life, 41–47; Nalgod, PL 133:98–100. 
129 Sitwell, Being the Life, 46–47; Nalgod, PL 133:98. 
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exhorted him thusly: “Come on, for there are still some psalms we must recite.” John, 
however, is too nauseated (until he is miraculously cured by Odo’s ensuing 
reprimand).130 The story thus serves as a vehicle for communicating the imperative to 
sing psalms while traveling, rather than for relating some particular moment in Odo’s life 
(Nalgod has already treated of his charity, and the miracle of John’s sudden loss of his 
olfactory faculties is rather underwhelming), and this is why Nalgod deigned to include 
it.  
A particularly clear example of this editing process is observable just a little 
further on in the text.131 John describes the following incident, which took place while 
Odo was attempting to mediate a peace between two feuding lords: 
 
During this time, while he [Odo] was one day going past the monastery of St. 
Andrew which is called ad clivum Scauri, a yokel tried to kill him for a small jar 
of water. According to the saying of Scripture: He that walketh sincerely walketh 
confidently [Prov. 10:9], Odo was going along as usual without doing any harm to 
anybody, suspecting nothing, and with his head bowed. For to such an extent had 
the custom of the Rule [chapter 7] grown habitual to him, that wherever he was, 
standing, or walking, or sitting, he always had his head bowed and his eyes fixed 
on the ground. . . . When this yokel aimed a blow at Odo’s head the bystanders 
with a loud cry seized him by the hands. Then our most gentle father borrowed—
                                                 
130 Sitwell, Being the Life, 48. 
131 It is hard to locate a definite end to this gathering dealing with Odo’s travels for, despite some 
digressions concerned with Odo’s deeds in Rome or some other place where he spent significant time while 
away from the several monasteries that he served as abbot, it constitutes the entirety of Book II. 
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lest I should make a mistake, I don’t know how many—pennies and, rendering 
good for evil sent him away as an ally.132 
 
By contrast, Nalgod gives the following, extremely terse description of these same 
events: 
 
. . . blessed Odo, who put himself forth as mediator for holy peace between these 
two tyrants, near the monastery of blessed Andrew, which is called ad clivum 
Scauri, making the crossing, with head bent, went forward. A rustic with a thrown 
rock attacked the man of God, but with the clamor of those surrounding, and 
having been grabbed [by them], was held amidst them and the throwing [weapon] 
removed. However, the man of God, conscious of scripture, accepting money, 
borrowed to pay the undeserving that he might return good for evil.133 
 
Most of what Nalgod has removed for the sake of clarity concerns Odo’s general 
behavior, and that it stems from a particular personal approach to the Rule of Saint 
                                                 
132 Ibid., 52–53. “Interea quadam die dum juxta monasterium beati Andreae apostoli iret, quod ad clivum 
Scauri dicitur ex nomine, quidam rusticus voluit eum propter lagunculam aquae occidere. Etenim, sicut 
Scriptura dicit: Qui ambulat simpliciter, ambulat confidenter (Prov. x, 9), more suo nulli nocens, nihilque 
suspicans curvato incedebat capite. Intantum enim apud cum usus inoleverat. Regulae (Regula S. Bened., 
cap. 7), ut ubicunque esset, sive stans, sive ambulans, aut sedens semper curvato capite, defixisque terram 
luminibus incederet. . . . Factum est autem dum praedictus rusticus ictu caput illius appeteret, omnes qui 
juxta viam aderant, emissis vocibus percutientis attraxerunt manus. Tunc dulcissimus pater: Ne fallar, 
ingnoro quot denarios accepit mutuo, eique bonum pro malo reddidit, et foederatum dimisit,” PL 133:66.  
133 Nalgod, PL 133:99. “. . . beatus Odo qui ad pacem evangelizandum inter duos tyrannos medium se 
praebebat, juxta beati Andreae monasterium, quod dicitur ad Clivum Scauri, transitum faciens, submisso 
capite incedebat. Rusticus jactu lapidis oppetierat virum Dei, sed clamore circumstantium et obtentu, 
libratus in ejus verticem jactus evanuit. Vir autem Domini denariis acceptis, mutuo muneravit immeritum, 
Scripturae conscentiens, ut redderet bonum retribuentibus sibi mala.” 
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Benedict. Sitwell here suggests that John means in particular Chapter 7 of the rule, 
devoted to humility.134 This is quite a long chapter, which, rather than describing some 
particular point of monastic order, outlines a detailed ethic springing from radical 
humility that all monks should seek to perfect in themselves. This is very much what Odo 
has done; his humility is not a simple matter of low self-estimation, or even of obedience 
and the absence of willfulness. Odo walks quietly, head lowered, eyes on the ground. His 
humility, internalized we would say, from the Rule, is manifested not only in conscious 
acts but in the most basic and minute comportment of his body—conversatio beyond 
even praxis, but as bearing. For John, the point of this episode is not merely, and perhaps 
not even primarily, to illustrate an instance of Odo’s charity, but rather to suggest the 
ways the Rule may be lived, strictly and fully, so as to truly create a distinct, 
otherworldly bearing. In this, he went beyond the normal role of the vita to offer a 
specific understanding of the application of the Rule to daily life and comportment. But 
by Nalgod’s time, such had become quite clearly the province of the well-defined and 
commonly encountered genre of the customary, and certainly not of vitae. Accordingly, 
he has neatly excised it, preserving this narrative episode as an appropriate matter for his 
text. 
Another instructive example of Nalgod’s editorial preferences comes immediately 
after this episode. Both authors follow it with one in which, during one of Odo’s visits to 
Rome, a thief stole one of his party’s horses. The minders of the horses (likely lay 
companions or servants, rather than brothers) were all asleep, but one monk who had 
                                                 
134 RB 1980, 190–203. 
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gone out to them saw the theft being committed. This monk, rather than breaking the 
customary silence of Baume/Cluny, shook one of the minders awake and communicated 
to him by signs what had happened. At daybreak, the thief was found sitting nearby on 
the motionless horse, but upon being turned over to Odo was merely given some money 
and sent on his way. Both authors treat the story itself in similar fashion; but John takes 
the passing reference to the custom of silence here as an opportunity to discuss this 
custom itself at far greater length: 
 
Since we have got on the subject of silence, without which the life of a monk is 
led to no purpose, it remains that we should go back and treat of it a little further. 
For the life of a monk is of value as long as he takes pains to keep silence. But 
when that is lost, whatever he thinks to do well will be nothing, according to the 
teaching of the Fathers.135 
 
He follows this statement with a relatively detailed account of two esteemed brothers of 
the community (probably Cluny rather than Baume) who were captured by Norsemen. 
John notes that the brothers maintained their silence, attempting to finish the “appointed 
psalms” so that “they might bring the time of silence to an end.” They were interrupted 
by one of their abductors, however, but maintained their silence even when threatened 
with death. Ultimately, they are spared when their attacker is suddenly flung from his 
horse and killed. The function of this story as part of John’s efforts toward a customary is 
                                                 
135 Sitwell, Being the Life, 54. 
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further indicated, as is often the case, by his reference to the Rule: “But the monks, 
constant in spirit, remained unmoved in body, and this they did, not from any deceit, but 
in observance of the holy Rule, under which they desired to live and die, and from which 
they never wished to turn aside.”136 And following this story, which has nothing at all to 
do with Odo, John gives a relatively extended scriptural florilegium justifying silence—
he begins with Paul, then quotes several Old Testament prophets, and then asserts that 
“these men were imitated by the Fathers of the New Testament; by Paul, Anthony, 
Hilarion, John, and lastly by our holy Father Benedict . . .”137—before continuing to cite 
support for silence as a practice from the gospels, and closing with a rather disparate 
selection of quotations from Psalms, Proverbs, and Isaiah.138 These two or three pages of 
quotations abandon all pretense, not only of narrative, but also of Odo himself, while the 
placement of Benedict in a tradition of silence stretching from the Old Testament 
prophets through the evangelists and the Desert Fathers suggests a conscious effort to 
outline both a legitimate custom and its authoritative textual basis. Nalgod has summarily 
dispensed with all of this, both the story of the two brothers among the Norsemen, and of 
course the florilegium. By now, the reasons for this drastic editing are clear. 
As before, further examples could be adduced—in particular, I have left 
undiscussed the fascinating pamphlet on the nature of and justification for monastic 
reform that John includes at the end of his text (which Nalgod has characteristically 
plundered for straightforwardly hagiographic, narrative elements)—but the point has 
                                                 
136 Ibid., 55. 
137 Ibid., 56. 
138 Ibid., 57. 
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been made. The strangeness of John’s narrative structure (or lack thereof) in the Vita 
prima et maior stems from his innovative efforts to cram a customary into the outline of a 
vita. This is revealed by precise attention to just what appears superfluous to the modern 
reader; close reading reveals that it is usually details about the constitution of monastic 
life at the communities of Baume or Cluny, and the citations of scripture, Benedict’s rule, 
and miracle stories that support them. Focusing on the most egregious deviations, such as 
the discussion of the custom concerning breadcrumbs, or the various justifications for 
silence, opens a fissure in the sense of the work as the story of Odo. This fissure, in turn, 
quickly opens out to present an wide range of references, short and long, subtle and 
obvious, to a program of monastic ethics, praxis, and conversatio quite distinct from Odo 
as a historical, even exemplary, individual. But this reading is also evidenced in a striking 
way by comparison of John’s text with Nalgod’s second, heavily revised edition. What is 
so interesting about Nalgod’s complaints is how similar they are to that of readers today, 
almost nine hundred years later; he finds John’s text meandering, confusing, and so full 
of unnecessary words and passages that “the famous deeds of this most honorable man 
were covered over with an unfitting veil of obscurity.”139 Whether John’s experimental 
effort at producing a customary-vita was successful in his own day, by the early twelfth 
century its fruits had become vexing in the extreme. By that time, the customary was the 
well-established proper receptacle for monastic conversatio as well as specific, technical 
liturgical usage. Nalgod, accordingly, throughout the entire text, edits out everything the 
                                                 
139 Nalgod, PL 133:85. 
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modern reader perceives as extraneous, clarifying John’s vita into a more conventional 
form, unified cleanly around the person of Odo and the narrative of his life. 
As a story in the historical development of genera, the composition of John’s vita 
and its revision by Nalgod reveals much about the role of documents in the Cluniac 
world, both functionally and conceptually. Both authors intended their documents to be 
useful in a very practical sense—that is, in having to do with the practice or praxis of 
concrete groups and individuals. They were to be used, not merely and perhaps not even 
primarily to relay historical information about the life of a person from one mind to 
another, but as guides to self-(re)fashioning. But, paradoxically, it was likely Nalgod’s 
text that more closely approximated, for example, the Lausiac Histories in this function. 
Nalgod’s revision of John’s vita presented Odo’s life as a series of episodes illustrating 
individual virtue, inviting the brothers who heard these stories in the refectory to strive 
for their example. John’s text was very different, for it attempted, at least in part, to 
communicate a program for formalized monastic, that is, regular, life. It would be going 
much to far to attribute to the Vita prima et maior a legislative or truly normative role, 
but neither did it merely hold up Odo as an exemplar of virtue conceived on an 
individual, personal scale: John used his text as a venue for information about the 
placement of lamps in the dormitory, the proper conduct of confession and forgiveness in 
chapter, and the provision of food to hermits living near monasteries precisely because he 
aimed to communicate the institutionalized notion of monastic life that would, 
eventually, become known as an ordo. 
How does this reading relate to what has gone before? Our analyses of the Cluny 
Bible’s introductory material and of Ralph Glaber’s Historiarum quinque libri revealed a 
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monastic conception of semiosis that held up the world, the scriptures, and the life of 
Jesus as signs that, when understood—and, to some extent, even when merely imitated or 
retransmitted—elevated the human in some ultimate, salvific sense. The preface to the 
Cluny Bible combined two poems by Alcuin and one letter from Jerome to outline a 
complex conception and program of Bible reading, figuring this praxis as salvific 
semiosis. In this fashion, Bible reading (including Bible listening) played upon divine 
grace specifically as the dispensation of signs: scripture and Christ. Such a 
praxis/semiosis also implied a certain complex and expansive social or even institutional 
setting. This setting included humans as both teachers and exemplars, poverty, 
community, a range of specialized professions and roles (scribe, lector), and the 
patronage of ruling elites.  
Glaber significantly develops both of these broad themes (the 
theological/soteriological account of semiosis-as-praxis and the nature of the complex, 
far-flung, highly differentiated community that accommodates it). First, he explicitly 
argues that man exists in God’s image precisely in that he is rational, with the central 
example of this faculty being the use of signs. Glaber also argues that the nature of Jesus 
as savior is to bear the image of God back into the fallen world, thereby regenerating 
scripture as a sign and man as a reader of signs. In my view, these theological claims are 
implicit in much of Jerome and Alcuin’s writing as found in the Cluny Bible: consider 
where Jerome discusses Jesus as Logos, ratio and subputatio, and the “hidden wisdom of 
God” who is revealed to the earnestly seeking postulant through grace mediated by 
scripture, or where Alcuin portrays scripture as a dispensation of grace, efficacious for 
salvation as no “worthy propitiatory deeds of the flesh” can be, waiting to be unlocked by 
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the mens conscia recti. But it is Glaber who makes them explicit in this way, who sums 
up and develops and advances what Jerome and Alcuin (and the Cluniacs of the 
generation preceding Glaber, by gathering these texts together) have suggested. So too 
does he refine and further articulate the sociology of Bible reading suggested by the 
Cluny Bible’s preface. Jerome emphasizes the importance of teachers and comradely 
communities devoted to this study by comparison with the great pagan philosophers and 
their students, and of course to scripture and Jesus Christ. Alcuin’s contributions, 
unsurprisingly, go into much more detail about the nature of the particular monastic 
community that had, by his day, grown up around Christian Bible praxis. His first poem 
suggests itself as part of a training program for new monastic lectors, both by 
summarizing the books of the Bible in terms of contents and typology and by 
admonishing its audience with these words: “Whosoever as reader in church reads in the 
sacred body of this book the high words of God, distinguishing the meanings, titles, cola, 
and commata with his voice, and let him say with his mouth as he knows the accent 
sounds.” His second poem invokes the patronage of a great king (reinscribed, literally, as 
abbot in the Cluny Bible), relating the monastic community specifically in its production 
and use of scripture to a broader external world of secular economy and temporal power. 
But it is Glaber who discusses the monastic implementation of the Rule of Saint Benedict 
(and the Codex regularum of Saint Benedict of Aniane) as a distinct, authoritative 
tradition of communal living—and, crucially, one which may be modified beyond the 
explicit text of these documents by monks and bishops together in council, and, 
moreover, which is threatened both by human fallibility and demonic corruption.  
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Together, these two texts (the Cluny Bible’s composite preface and Glaber’s 
chronicle) present a gradual elaboration of Christian semiosis-as-praxis and the theology 
and sociology/ecclesiology that accompany it. This elaboration proceeded alongside the 
development of literate technologies such as page layout, script, annotation, and genre, 
most obviously in the example of the Tours Bible, just as it did with the practical 
constitution of communities centered on that praxis and their relationship to the broader 
world of power, authority, and economy. Thus we witness the adaptation of the page, and 
of educational (that is, disciplinary) apparatuses, to serve clear public reading. We see the 
Bible gain an increasingly coherent conception, unified both physically as an imposing 
pandect, and conceptually, as a second incarnation, a Christ accessible to, even physically 
produced by, human artifice. Moreover, as Christ, the Bible became also Logos—the 
ground according to which all things are known, an infinite sign whose diversity 
manifests the trans-historical unity of all things, and whose use imbues human activity 
with transcendental meaning.  
I have revisited this material because, taken together, the vitae Odonis present a 
very different and illuminating view on this same process. In them, the holy man 
occupies the role of blessed exemplar. Like the Bible, even like Christ, he mediates 
between man and God. He is a vehicle for grace, dispensing advice, counsel, succor, and 
discipline, providing in effect a sign that may, like the Bible, be both read (that is, 
observed, contemplated) and written (imitated) as part of the individual’s pursuit of 
salvation. But by the mid-tenth century, when John of Salerno walked with and then 
recorded the conversatio of Odo, there was already an awareness of this conversatio—
and of the institutional strictures that inculcated it in man and sheltered it from a 
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tumultuous, sinful world—as something distinct from the exemplary individual. John’s 
vita is an effort, experimental to some extent, to communicate the conversatio and the 
consuetudines that bound it alongside, within, and through the example of Odo. By 
writing out the text with this goal, John plunged into the murky area between law and 
grace, between the codified behavior of the total community and the charismatic 
individual nature and personal experience of the holy man. In this effort, the person of 
Odo very much served as a vehicle for the practices of Baume and Cluny, at a time when 
the other possible vehicles—the other genres—for doing so remained comparatively 
underdeveloped. Very likely, his text contributed to that development, as we will 
examine in the following chapter. Certainly the various customaries identified with Cluny 
all postdate the Vita prima et maior, becoming increasingly complex as the years go by. 
So much so that, by Nalgod’s day, in the 1120s John’s vita had become wholly 
unsatisfactory, even vexing—perhaps because so much of what it was meant to convey 
now belonged, quite obviously, in a different kind of receptacle: the customary.  
These vitae, then, do relatively little to expand our understanding of the 
theological and sociological/ecclesiological issues raised by our consideration of the 
Cluny Bible and the Historiarum; rather, they reveal, from the instrumental side, how the 
efforts to capture and fix the authoritative constitutional and behavior forms suggested by 
those texts proceeded, how those efforts influenced the development of literalate 
technologies, and how those efforts themselves elaborated the praxis as such. But if they 
temper and complicate the history of ideas we have wrested from Jerome, Alcuin, and 
Glaber, they also testify to the fact that certain of these key ideas—the relationship 
between charismatic holy individual and (at least potentially) legislative text, the 
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importance of the proper social integration and historical transmission of monastic praxis, 
and the key concern for semiosis and signification supporting the whole edifice—
manifested themselves also in pragmatic, material, flesh-and-blood contexts.  
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CHAPTER VIII: THE VITAE ODONIS MANUSCRIPT TRADITION 
 
 
A consideration of the form in which various manuscripts of the vitae Odonis survive 
adds important confirmation and qualification to my analysis of their content and genre. I 
have not been able to scrutinize all the manuscripts of these texts, so the following 
discussion is necessarily impressionistic; moreover, I rely heavily on the paleographic 
and codicological work of others, which I have endeavored to consider critically and have 
cited fully. Nevertheless, I trust the reader will find my discussion and conclusions 
basically substantive and worthwhile. 
The manuscripts in which we find today the vitae Odonis may be divided into two 
rough categories; the first I call the “customary” type, and the second I term the 
“legendary” type. As their names suggest, these types are primarily matters of genre, 
particularly with an eye to the intended function and use of their members within a 
monastic setting. The customary type is so named because, as I argued in the case of the 
Vita prima et maior, although they are not what most medieval historians imagine when 
using or hearing the word “customary,” there is good reason for imagining that they 
performed roughly the function of those documents historians do understand when 
encountering the term—that is, they give some guide to the praxis that characterizes 
monastic life, and often that of a particular house or network/group of houses rather than 
of, or in addition to, monasteries in general. This guide might appear so vague as to be 
virtually useless, but one must always remember that the bulk of monastic practice and 
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the main vehicle for its instruction/social reproduction remained lived and oral 
throughout my period (and probably well into the age of orders that followed); if the 
monks of a given community did wish to change their behavior to adopt that of another 
house, in many cases this might best be understood as the addition of certain feasts to 
their liturgical calendar and of various “tweaks” to rituals and disciplinary practices both 
within and beyond the liturgy itself. At least as far as this liturgical and para-liturgical 
material (often including the vitae, which were read aloud in the rectory and perhaps also 
the chapel) was concerned, documents transmitting it would probably have been aimed at 
the cantor and/or armarius, who drew on a repository of such texts as well as on their own 
extensive personal experience of the liturgy to oversee its choreography each week.1 
While perhaps useful for citation in chapter or for individual study, these texts thus might 
have been most centrally figured as the personal library of a monastery’s literate ritual 
specialists. A more “comprehensive” customary was thus not often necessary—nor 
frequently conceived—before the later eleventh century.2 
To make these more ad hoc customaries, the monks usually combined texts 
belonging to highly various genres in a way that may appear haphazard to modern 
observers. These often include regulae, vitae, all kinds of liturgical material, canons, 
letters, and sermons—all texts that can be understood as offering some guidance on how 
monks should conduct themselves in general, the observance of particular feasts and 
other significant modifications to the liturgy, and, in some cases, on why “reform” itself 
                                                 
1 Margot E. Fassler, “The Office of Cantor in Early Western Monastic Rules and Customaries: A 
Preliminary Investigation,” Early Music History 5 (1985): 29–51. 
2 Cochelin, “Community and Customs.” 
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might be necessary or justifiable. Such works were thus resolutely composite, at least 
from our perspective. But, crucially, in addition to the distinctive content of these proto-
customaries, I also note a fairly distinct formatting of these manuscripts, at least of the 
several surveyed here. This is, in general, rather spartan: the manuscripts in question use 
simple full-page blocks of minuscule script (lineis plenis), without much illumination or a 
particularly extensive/complex rubrication, and often without additional finding aids such 
as running titles. Finally, there does appear to be a rough periodicity for these type: 
obviously none considered here will be older than the mid-tenth century (when the Vita 
prima et maior was first composed, though this format may well have antecedents with or 
without functional congruence), and, very roughly, they peter out around—or within a 
few decades of—the turn of the twelfth century, giving way to the second type. 
This second type, the “legendary” style, is a bit less unusual in its nomenclature; 
in general, these texts are widely recognized by medievalists as legendaries, that is, 
collections of vitae, miracula, passiones, and sundry other episodic or narrative 
hagiography featuring important holy men and women. Similarly, these texts have a 
much more clearly-defined function within the monastery: in general, they are primarily 
(if not exclusively) intended for use by lectors reading to the brothers while they eat in 
the refectory, and perhaps also sometimes as part of the liturgy itself. Corresponding to 
this different functional role, page layout differs markedly from the customary type. 
These texts are written in even double columns, basically similar to those found in the 
Cluny Bible and its Touraine antecedents, usually in a gothic or proto-gothic hand (this 
due to their usually later dating), and include precocious finding aids such as running 
titles. In terms of dating, these manuscripts appear from the mid- and late-twelfth 
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centuries onwards. I will discuss these manuscripts in more detail before drawing some 
more general conclusions and relating this examination to the previous discussion. 
I begin with the oldest manuscript, a liturgical miscellany of the Aquitaine 
monastery Saint-Martial des Limoges (BNF lat. 1240). A large part of the text is a tenth-
century troper-proser with some other, more various and (likely contemporaneous) 
liturgical texts attached.3 James Grier, over a career of careful work on liturgical 
manuscripts and musical notation, has managed to situate BNF lat. 1240 within a series 
of efforts by the scribes of Saint-Martial to document and transmit the liturgy in written 
form. This series runs from the second quarter of the tenth century, when the production 
of the core of BNF lat. 1240 inaugurated (or at least first attests) the tradition, a hundred 
years into the 1020s and 1030s, culminating, in a sense, with the career of Adémar of 
Chabannes. The series is comprised of roughly four generations of manuscripts. First 
comes BNF lat. 1240, produced either between 923–928 or 931–936.4 Next come a pair 
of fragments, BNF lat. 1834 and a few lines of palimpsest text from BNF lat. 1085. Grier, 
building on work by Alejandro Planchart and Danielle Gaborit-Chopin, locates these 
manuscripts to the first years of the eleventh century.5 He even goes so far as to argue, on 
the basis of their similarities, high style, and incompleteness, that these two manuscripts 
were together intended as a major project of liturgical codification that was abandoned in 
                                                 
3 James Grier, “Roger de Chabannes (d. 1025), Cantor of St Martial, Limoges,” Early Music History 14 
(1995): 59–119, at 68–69.  
4 Ibid., 69. 
5 Alejandro Planchart, “The Transmission of Medieval Chant,” in Music in Medieval and Early Modern 
Europe: Patronage, Sources, and Texts, ed. Iain Fenlon (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1981), 347–364; Danielle Gaborit-Chopin, La Décoration des manuscrits à Saint-Martin de Limoges et en 
Limousin du XIe au XIIe siècle (Paris, France: École Nationale des Chartes, 1969).  
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the midst of their composition.6 Within a few years, however, as part of what I identify as 
the third generation, a new effort was made in this direction. This is evidenced in BNF 
lat. 1120 and the main bulk of 1085, evidently repurposed from its role in the earlier, 
second generation effort.7 Grier proposes that both this second and especially third 
generation of texts were closely associated with Roger of Chabannes, suggesting Roger 
as a scribe participating in copying out of the former and, some years later, in his capacity 
as the monastery’s cantor, overseeing and perhaps initiating the latter.8 Finally, the fourth 
generation, represented in BNF lat. 909 and 1121, appears during the tenure of Roger’s 
nephew and successor as cantor, Adémar of Chabannes in the second half of the 1020s.9 
Immediately following the main liturgical material comes the Vita Prima et 
Maior, which is itself followed by eight more texts. These are a mixture of vitae and 
liturgical materials, such as sermons and individual offices/feasts. Interestingly, almost 
all are centered on particular, usually post-biblical individuals. Included are regional 
figures, such as Saint Foy of Conques and Saint William of Gellone, and those from 
further afield, such as Leodegar of Poitiers and Margaret the Virgin. There are two 
homilies, Bede’s on Palm Sunday and Raban Maur’s on Luke (this latter incomplete), 
and two sermons: Fulbert’s sermon on the birth of Mary and Odo’s sermon on Saint 
                                                 
6 Grier, “Roger de Chabannes,” 81–82. 
7 Ibid., 73–80. 
8 Reliable facts about Roger of Chabannes’ life and career are few but useful: Adémar, famous as an 
audacious forger but presumably lacking any real motivation to fabricate on this point, relates that Roger 
was both his uncle and his teacher at Saint-Martial by 1010, and that he died, as the monastery’s cantor, in 
1025. There is some potentially-independent confirmation of this latter fact in the manuscripts and 
tombstones of Saint-Martial, though these could also stem ultimately from Adémar. Grier builds on this 
chronology with some informed speculation, tentatively attributing a Saint-Martial charter dated 992 to 
Roger on the basis of the signature “Rotgerius scripsit,” ibid., 53–59. 
9 Ibid., 117. 
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Benedict. This diffuse collection presents several suggestive themes. Both William of 
Gellone and Margaret became important figures associated with crusading in the eleventh 
and twelfth century, and Fulbert’s sermon on the immaculate conception calls to mind 
Cluny’s promotion of Mary’s cult, most prominently through the Ildefonsus tradition, and 
its relationship to the burgeoning phenomenon of crusading.10 There is also, of course, 
the creation of socially- and culturally-significant networks attested by the weaving 
together of locally important saints and those from further afield—here the inclusion of 
the Burgundian bishop Leodegar alongside Foy and William of Gellone probably 
demonstrates the important intermediary role between Cluny and Aquitaine adopted by 
Saint-Martial, whether before or after its reform by Hugh of Semur in the 1060s.11 
But more than these individual valences, I focus here on the overall effect of the 
manuscript. We must walk a very fine line in this question, for the libelli supplementing 
the troper-proser were most likely added significantly after its composition, in the 
eleventh or even twelfth centuries. This overall effect, therefore, cannot be imputed to the 
intention or conception of any individual, and especially not to the tenth-century 
community at Saint-Martial. At the same time, I think it would be a mistake to regard the 
collection as accidental or arbitrary—monks working in Saint-Martial’s scriptorium fifty 
or a hundred years after the original compilation of the troper-proser did not simply shrug 
                                                 
10 For Cluny and Mary, see Schapiro, The Parma Ildefonsus, 71–72. Iogna-Prat reviews the arguements for 
Cluny’s “contribution to the ideological prehistory of the crusades,” which he largely rejects, in Order and 
Exclusion, 323–332. See also Erdmann, The Origin of the Idea of the Crusade, 68–72; H. E. J. Cowdrey, 
“Cluny and the First Crusade,” Revue Bénédictine 83 (1973): 285–311; Marcus Bull, Knightly Piety and the 
Lay Response to the First Crusade: The Limousin and Gascony, c. 970–c. 1130 (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 1993). 
11 See Andreas Sohn, Der Abbatiat Ademars von Saint-Martial in Limoges (1063–1114) (Münster, 
Germany: Aschendorff, 1989); Cowdrey, Cluniacs and the Gregorian Reform, 90–94 
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their shoulders and copy/sew these libelli into BNF lat. 1240 because it happened to be 
lying nearby. Keeping in mind the common monastic practice of reading vitae in the 
refectory (as well as my reading of the Vita prima), all these texts have a specific 
liturgical role, just like the tenth-century core of the manuscript. Moreover, this core itself 
remained an estimable repository of tradition at least into the early eleventh century: 
Grier shows how the scribes responsible for the “third generation” of liturgical texts, 
discussed above, in some cases recopied precisely those elements from BNF lat. 1240 
that had been omitted in the production of the interceding second generation, even though 
the scribes doing this work appear not to have understood the precise use/role of these 
elements in the office.12 This interest in historical completeness, even in the absence of 
pragmatic application, suggests a weak glimmer of normativity imported to the troper-
proser; its contents ought to be preserved even if they have left the realm of strict utility 
due to historical drift and the communal, institutional loss of knowledge. And finally, we 
certainly know that these texts were bound together at least by the early thirteenth 
century, for an index written by Bernard Itier (d. 1225) on f. 194v lists them all. This 
overall manuscript is thus no post-medieval, haphazard assemblage of convenience. 
Most important for my purposes along these lines, of course, is the inclusion of 
the Vita prima et maior. As I have suggested above, this text could certainly be used as a 
guide—normative, elective, or even devotional (though keep in mind John’s hard-nosed 
attention to the details of chapter and other more “functional” or legislative concerns)—
for houses (or even, perhaps, individuals) seeking to emulate the conversatio associated 
                                                 
12 Grier, “Roger de Chabannes,” 109–110. 
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with Cluny or Odo. If this argument is accepted, then BNF lat. 1240 becomes quite close 
to what historians generally understand a customary to be: it includes some record, 
possessed of ambiguous normative status, both of the liturgy and of various forms of day-
to-day conduct, community, and dispute resolution characterizing monastic life. The 
former concerns how the monk pray, and the latter how they eat, sleep, learn, and 
generally manage all the material issues naturally arising in the course of institutionalized 
communal life. Some of the other texts play a role in this function, too. Odo’s sermon on 
Saint Benedict is certainly a statement on the proper conduct of regular life (indeed, in 
specifically advancing the importance of the Regula Benedicti itself, it undertakes one of 
the key tasks of Carolingian or post/neo-Carolingian reform). And the passio of Saint Foy 
includes notation for an office for that saint known from the eleventh century.  
Without making broader claims about the specific nature or extent of this process, 
the combination of these texts must be considered within the context of Odo’s “reform” 
of Saint-Martial, and also, for reasons which will become clear, of Fleury. Historians 
today understand monastic reform, especially that associated with Cluny and especially 
that associated with Cluny and preceding the twelfth or later eleventh century, quite 
differently from previous generations of scholars. Reform was not a neat or easy process; 
communities could and did resist it as a hostile takeover. Narrative sources that describe 
specifically the reform of this or that house, such as the Vita prima et maior in the case of 
Odo at Fleury, often operate as apologia or justifications, exaggerating the material 
poverty of a house or the laxity of its community’s life. And, just as in so many other 
institutions throughout history, reform could easily be shrugged off over time, whether 
intentionally or not, as the inertia of communities asserted itself against the brief or 
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symbolic action of lone charismatic individuals. Similarly, reform did not necessarily 
imply a connection between two monasteries outside the lifetime or career of a particular 
individual: just because Odo reformed Fleury and was even (if intermittently and 
ambiguously) recognized as (one of) its abbots, Cluny itself as a community or institution 
did not gain any particular rights or authority over that of Fleury. 
One of the foremost figures in this revision of monastic history and our 
understanding of Carolingian/post-Carolingian reform, John Nightingale, has devoted 
some work in particular to the question of Odo’s reform of Fleury.13 He complicates the 
main sources for this reform—John’s vita and a papal privilege of 938 naming Odo abbot 
at Fleury—through comparison to (later copies of) charters produced at Fleury and its 
principle cell, Perrecy, in the 930s and 940s. These latter frequently (though not always) 
fail to name Odo as the monastery’s abbot. Nightingale also examines the papal 
privilege’s stipulations and the wider political context of Odo’s reform, showing that 
many issues of contention between the Fleury community and Odo remained, that the 
community’s rights and prerogatives received some papal protection and sanction, and 
that Odo’s tenure as abbot was probably limited to the late 930s, rather than spanning the 
entire decade as has been widely assumed.14 At the same time, however, it is not 
Nightingale’s point that Odo was never recognized as the (or more likely, an) abbot of 
Fleury, or that he exerted no leadership or influence there during his service as such; his 
                                                 
13 Nightingale, “Oswald, Fleury.” 
14 Ibid., 34–37. 
  
265 
 
study rather seeks to show that Fleury’s prominence in tenth and eleventh century West 
Francia did not stem from its association with or reform by Odo or Cluny.15  
This consideration of Odo’s experience at Fleury is relevant to BNF lat. 1240 
because, as pointed out by Grier, the system of musical notation used for much of the 
liturgical material in the first part of the manuscript is, in contrast to the subsequent three 
generations of liturgical texts produced at Saint-Martial, made in a style associated with 
northern Francia.16 Further investigating this fact, John A. Emerson has forcefully argued 
that 
 
at least four notators from a northern French monastery were responsible for 
neuming scattered texts throughout Pa 1240; this was done in Limoges, not 
elsewhere. . . . I have attempted to provide evidence that these French scribes 
belonged to the great scriptorium at Fleury-sur-Loire, since it is known that Aimo, 
abbot of the monastery of Saint-Martial, and Géraud, abbot of the nearby abbot of 
Saint-Pierre de Solignac, had contracted an act of association with the monastery 
of Saint-Benoît before February 942. And, in my, view, this act of association is 
further manifested in the unusual ecumenical melding of two distinct notational 
systems—one from northern France, the other from southern Aquitaine—in one 
liturgical book.17 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 33. 
16 Grier, “Roger de Chabannes,” 116; Paul Evans, “Northern French Elements in an Early Aquitainian 
Troper,” in Speculum musicae artis: Festgabe dur Heinrich Husmann zum 60. Gerburtstag am 16. 
Dezember 1968, ed. Heinz Becker and Reinhard Gerlach (Munich, Germany: W. Fink, 1970), 103–110. 
17 John A. Emerson, “Neglected Aspects of the Oldest Full Troper (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, lat. 
1240),” Recherches nouvelles sur les tropes liturgiques 36 (1993), 211. 
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And, to add the final piece, Joachim Wollasch, citing necrological documents from 
Solignac, adds that, as part of his abbacy at Fleury, Odo himself sent four monks 
religionis gratia to Saint-Martial and thence to Solignac for purposes of affirming just 
this confraternity.18 Is it any great leap to suppose that these four elite monks might have 
been the very ones to assist in the creation of this liturgical manual, or to modify it 
shortly after the completion of its first phase with their distinctive system of musical 
notation? We need neither accept John’s characterization of Odo’s work at Fleury, nor 
assert an anachronistically intensive sense of the word reform to advance this hypothesis. 
And if such where the case, the manuscript may have gained a certain association with 
Odo as a reformer, thus inviting the addition to it, sometime in the eleventh century, of 
John’s vita. The normative, or at least exemplary, nature of John’s text could then have 
found reinforcement from that of the earlier contents of the manuscript as a liturgical 
guide, and given the same to them in turn.19  
It is particularly interesting to view the presence of the vita besides this liturgical 
material in the combined light of Stock’s account of textual communities and of what we 
know of the armarius/cantor’s concrete duties in the monastery.20 As discussed in detail 
in the customary of Bernard, it was quite explicitly the job of the armarius or cantor to 
prepare written “tables” for all liturgical performances detailing who performed what 
role: 
                                                 
18 Wollasch, “Monasticism: The First Wave of Refrom,” 176. 
19 It is interesting to view the presence of the vita besides this liturgical material in the combined light of 
Stock’s account of textual communities and of what we know of the armarius/cantor’s concrete duties in 
the monastery. It was quite explicitly the job of the cantor to prepare  
20 On the former, see above (Chapter 4) and Stock, Implications of Literacy, 88–90; on the latter see 
Fassler, “The Office of Cantor.” 
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Whoever reads in the church, or sings, he ought to heed/obey him [the armarius]; 
indeed of him [the armarius] it is to foresee the hour, that negligence concerning 
the work of God shall not arise in any way, and for Mass and for Matins and for 
all the remaining Hours, and for the whole Office that shall be in the house of the 
Lord. . . . Of this one [the armarius] it is to place all the brothers of the church in a 
table for the whole Office, not according to rank, or according to their desires, but 
only according to however it shall seem pleasing to him, for the edification and 
worthiness of those hearing, with exception for reading and Matins. There indeed 
he takes care only that a younger one does not sing, or read at Matins before his 
superior, unless for some reason it is necessary, that another asks him, or he 
wishes several beautiful responsories to be worthily sung; or he is absent, who is 
written in the table.21 
 
This is a perfect illustration of Stock’s concept of the leader whose authority stems from 
communal consensus on his authority in interpretation of a specified text. Under this 
schema, as Fassler has shown, the positions of armarius (librarian) and cantor rapidly 
converged, since the planner of the liturgy would naturally make regular, even constant 
use of liturgical manuals in planning the day’s office.22 The basic principle, that one of 
                                                 
21 “Quicumque legit in ecclesia, sive cantat, ab eo auscultare debet; ejus enim est omni hora providere, ne 
eveniat negligentia de opere Dei in aliquo, et ad Missam, et ad Matutinas, et ad caeteras omnes Horas, et ad 
omne Officium quod sit in domo Dei. . . . Ipsius est ponere omnes Fratres ecclesiae in tabula ad omnia 
Officia, non secundum ordinem, au voluntatem eorum, sed tantum secundum quod videbitur et libitum ei 
fuerit, ad aedificationem et honestatem audientium, excepto ad Lectiones etc. Matutinorum. Illud enim 
tantum providet ibi quod junior non cantet, au legat ad Matutinos super Priorem suum, nisi pro aliqua 
necessitate, ut aliquis roget eum, aut aliquod pulchrum responsorium velit honestius cantari; aut defuerit, 
qui scriptus in tabula fuerat,” Bernard of Cluny, Ordo Cluniacensis, 161. 
22 Fassler, “The Office of Cantor,” 46–47. 
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the most important and powerful positions within the monastic community would employ 
a manuscript such as BNF lat. 1240 in directing the behavior of the monks, is thus 
established. And given that the liturgical office of Prime crucially overlapped with the 
chapter meeting, in reading the martyrology and necrology, to which the conduct of 
which John’s vita gave special attention, the Vita prima found within BNF lat. 1240 was 
clearly positioned to exercise a semi-, proto-, or at least potentially normative function. 
An armarius charged with overseeing the proper conduct of at least some elements of the 
chapter gathering, especially one in a community recently “reformed” by Cluny, may 
well have referred to John’s text. 
The case of another of the manuscripts relating John’s vita, BNF lat. 18306, is 
more complex. BNF lat. 18306 is one quaternion of an otherwise-lost manuscript, and 
accordingly contains the prologue and first part of Book 1 of the Vita Prima et Maior. It 
was produced around the turn of the twelfth century at Saint-Martin-des-Champs, today 
within Paris but in the high Middle Ages in a field (hence its name) outside the city.23 As 
with BNF lat. 1240, the broader context of this manuscript and its production and role at 
Saint-Martin is reform. 
Saint-Martin has not yet been the target of the kind of revisionist historical 
attention that has been widely applied elsewhere, generally transforming our 
understanding of early and high medieval monastic reform. The received early history of 
Saint-Martin, therefore, relying primarily on nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century 
narratives, sounds both familiar and suspicious to those familiar with this more recent 
                                                 
23 Denoël, “La Bible d’Odilon,” 59. 
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work. First referenced in a charter, supposedly from 710 (Merovingian charters 
benefitting Saint-Denis, as this one does, are best treated with caution if not outright 
skepticism), of Childebert III, the monastery was substantially destroyed by Normans in 
the late ninth century. Henry I reconstituted the community as a group of regular canons 
in 1059 or 1060, and it remained important to his son and successor Philip I in the 
following decades. Eventually, in the summer of 1079, Philip gave the community over 
to reform at the hands of Hugh of Semur, whence it became an important node in the 
network of priories built during his abbacy.24 Besides the possibility of forgery by the 
monks of Saint-Denis at work in the Merovingian charter,25 one may also question the 
extent of the devastation inflicted by Norse raiders, which has been found to be 
exaggerated in order to justify reform in many other cases from West Francia during the 
ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries.26 The replacement of a community of canons with 
monks is also a common feature of such accounts, though rather than being invented may 
often merely be snidely invoked to assert the superiority of the latter. Thus, though I do 
not here embark on a true, sustained effort to unravel the actual early institutional history 
of Saint-Martin, there is good reason to be suspicious of some key elements of this pat 
narrative. 
At the same time, however, Saint-Martin-des-Champs may well have maintained 
a closer relationship, or even subordination, to Cluny during the twelfth century than was 
                                                 
24 Charlotte Denoël, “La bibliothèque médiévale des Saint-Martin-des-Champs à Paris,” Scriptorium 65 
(2001): 67–108, at 67–68; Cornelia Heintz, “Anfänge und Entwicklung des Cluniazenser-Priorates St.-
Martin-des-Champs in Paris (1079–1150),” dissertation, Münster, Germany, 1982. 
25 Geary, Phantoms of Remembrance, 107–113. 
26 Jones “Pitying the Desolation”; Nightingale, Monasteries and Patrons; Nightingale, “Oswald, Fleury.” 
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typical of houses reformed by the great Burgundian abbey during the preceding two 
centuries. From the mid-eleventh century, Cluny did begin to develop a more regular 
network of subordinate priories, even if this still did not approach the “fully constituted 
order” pioneered by the Cistercians from the mid-twelfth century onwards.27 BNF lat. 
18306 and some other manuscripts associated with it may well attest to this: whereas 
BNF lat. 1240 appears as a manuscript first created at the initiative of the Saint-Martial 
community for its own use, and subsequently supplemented on its own scribal terms by 
its own monks with the Vita prima et maior and modified in its musical notation by 
monks of a semi-independent Fleury on a mission sanctioned not only by Odo but also by 
Saint-Martial’s own abbot and that of Solignac, BNF lat. 18306 is one of several complex 
and ornate manuscripts produced at Saint-Martin under an overwhelming Cluniac scribal 
and artistic influence.28 This influence is paralleled by the immense role Cluniac abbots 
and liturgy occupy in these manuscripts. All this is to say that BNF lat. 18306 appears as 
part of a much more comprehensive, assertive, and even externally-directed scribal 
endeavor than BNF lat. 1240, in any of its various part or as a whole. Both projects are 
similar in advancing a proto- or semi-normative program testifying to some amount of 
Cluniac influence; but they differ radically in the extent of that influence, the terms on 
which it was received, its breadth, and its apparent clarity or specificity of intention. 
The Cluniac scribal and artistic style of BNF lat. 18306 is readily apparent and 
well-known.29 It is most obvious in the illumination of the manuscript, which, though 
                                                 
27 Bouchard, “Merovingian, Carolingian, and Cluniac Monasticism,” 382. 
28 Denoël, “La bibliothèque médiévale,” 85–86. 
29 Ibid. 
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short, includes two great initials, approximately ten lines tall. These demonstrate Franco-
Saxon interlacing and a restrained foliage motif particularly reminiscent of the Cluny 
Bible (BNF lat. 15176), with some subtle developments in the treatment of branching 
“polylobes,” quite similar to those found in the roughly contemporary Cluny lectionary 
(BNF NAL 2246).30 The script of BNF lat. 18306, a heavily-abbreviated, skillful, 
squarish minuscule, also appears quite similar to that of the Cluniac lectionary. We also 
note a simplified hierarchy of scripts, as observed in the Cluny Bible; both the beginning 
of John’s prologue and of the vita’s main text begin with large (two to three lines tall) 
square/rustic capitals.31 The explicit of the prologue is treated in the same way. Finally, 
again as in the case of the Cluny Bible, many of the initials are highlighted in yellow. 
This script and decorative style also appears in two other manuscripts, Mazarine 2009 
and 2012, produced, according to Charlotte Denoël, in the scriptorium at Saint-Martin 
around the same time.32 
These two manuscripts are also interesting for our purposes. Their close similarity 
to BNF lat. 18306 and their Cluniac features, combined with their production following 
the time of Saint-Martin’s reform—or acquisition—by Hugh of Semur, suggest the 
possibility of a major scribal and artistic project involving all three (and likely more) 
manuscripts occurring as part of that reform. They may also shed some light on the 
conceptualization and intended use of BNF lat. 18306 (and themselves/one another) by 
providing more content than the lone first quire of the Vita prima et maior. Both 
                                                 
30 Denoël, “La bibliothèque médiévale,” 85; Denoël, “La Bible d’Odilon,” 59. 
31 See Chapter 4 for discussion of the hierarchy of scripts and its relationship to the Cluny Bible and Tours 
Bibles. 
32 Denoël, “La bibliothèque médiévale,” 85. 
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manuscripts are, broadly speaking, miscellanies. Each gathers together relatively 
established individual texts, often with known and famous, at least within clerical circles, 
authors. The dates of completion/publication of these texts, whether fictive or 
reconstructed by modern historians, can span a century or more. None of this is to say, 
however, that these collections are arbitrary; indeed, unlike many miscellanies with a 
concrete thematic unity discernable to modern historians only with difficulty and 
insight,33 these texts make very obvious and direct sense together. Mazarine 2009 is a 
collection of texts about Saint Martin, bishop of Tours and patron of (Frankish) 
monasticism, perhaps in some tension or rivalry with the Benedicts of Nursia and Aniane. 
Included is the vita of Martin by his contemporary, Sulpicius Severus, as well as several 
letters by this hagiographer to deacons, priests, and others about Martin. There is also a 
text called De Trinitate and attributed to Martin, a vita of Saint Brice, episcopal successor 
of Martin at Tours, and passion texts for Dionysius the Areopagite and Maurice and his 
companions. 
Even more striking are the contents of Mazarine 2012. This manuscript is 
comprised of a series of texts concerning—and often authored by—Cluniac abbots. First 
comes a substantial fragment of the Vita prima et maior, missing the prologue and most 
of the first book but otherwise complete. Next the Credulitas of Odilo, then his Ad 
crucem adorandam oratio, his vita of Mayeul, and four hymns for the feast of Mayeul, 
again composed by Odilo. Following in turn comes Peter Damien’s vita of Odilo, then a 
hymn for Odilo’s feast, then, breaking the rough chronological order, a vita of Adelaide 
                                                 
33 For examples of modern readings of whole miscellanies for just such unity, see Karen Fresco and Anne 
D. Hedeman, eds., Collections in Context: the Organization of Knowledge and Community in Europe 
(Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2012). 
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by Odilo and a collection of Odilo’s sermons. These contents suggest that the manuscript 
was completed during or very shortly after Hugh’s abbacy (which ended in 1109); 
otherwise why would works by and concerning him, who actually reformed Saint-Martin, 
not be included?  
They also further testify to the intentional association of Cluniac abbatial 
literature and liturgical texts, specifically in the context of reform. Mazarine 2012 would 
have presented a useful modular addition to the lived traditions and customs of the 
community at Saint-Martin, facilitating the grafting of offices and vitae for prominent 
Cluniac saint-abbots onto the house’s existing liturgical cycle. It also would have 
included, according to my reading, the proto-customary of John’s vita. This text appeared 
first in the larger collection and the loss of its first gatherings (very roughly, the missing 
material might comprise ten to fifteen folia) suggests that frequent recourse was made to 
it. 
Though it does not include the Vita prima, the manuscript BNF lat. 17742, the 
core of which is a copy of the ninth-century martyrology produced by the monk Usuard, 
is also relevant here. This manuscript was produced in the Cluniac scriptorium—or at 
least in its artistic and scribal style—most likely between 1087 and 1109 (shortly after 
Hugh’s reform of Saint-Matin-des-Champs).34 In addition to this text, the manuscript 
includes a selection of Gospel excerpts, which, together with the martyrology itself, 
likely constitute the core of the office of prime, as recited in chapter35 and specifically 
                                                 
34 Jean Vezin, “Un martyrologe copié à Cluny à la fin de l’abbatiate de saint Hughes,” in Hommages à 
André Boutemy, ed. Guy Cambier (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 1976), 404–412, at 411–412. 
35 Ibid., 412. 
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referred to in John’s vita. The Usuard copyist has also added a number of festivals to the 
text’s calendar; the greatest number of these concern Cluniac and associated Burgundian 
figures, with the second greatest concentration devoted to Tours and Saint Martin. These 
inclusions lead Jean Vezin to write that the manuscript “leads us yet again to invoke the 
name of the abbot, Saint Odo,” and his “influence” on the “redaction” of this 
martyrology.36 This becomes especially significant when we note the addition to 
Usuard’s text of an extensive necrology for Saint-Martin-des-Champs, including 
additions throughout the Middle Ages. On this basis, Vezin and others have suggested 
that the manuscript, sometime during the twelfth century, was transferred to Saint-Martin 
and used there. This text would thus have facilitated the weaving together of the Cluniac 
commemorative liturgy with that of Saint-Martin, but also, crucially, could have 
functioned as a guide to performing, or reforming, the ritual of chapter at Saint-Martin 
along Cluniac lines. We do not know if the monks of Saint-Martin were so inclined or 
directed, and if they were directed whether or not they complied or how willingly. But 
reading the Vita prima et maior as a customary suggests that John, at least, considered the 
conduct of chapter, including both the ritual of public recrimination, confession, and 
punishment and the reading of just such a document as BNF lat. 17742, something worth 
relating to a community that had been recently reformed by Odo and was, at least 
theoretically, interested in imitating his usage and conversatio to some extent. One also 
notes that this manuscript includes the text of the Rule of Saint Benedict, likely added in 
the early fourteenth century; the manuscript was thus regarded even that late as an 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 408–410. 
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appropriate context for such normative texts concerning the constitution of the monastery 
and the conduct of its members. 
Another manuscript containing a fragment of the Vita prima et maior, currently 
preserved in Oxford’s Bodleian Library (Bodley 817, formerly Madan 02690), sheds 
more light on the role of the Vita prima et maior. Strikingly, this manuscript’s contents—
and their order—are identical to that of Mazarine 2012! In my view, this is a rather 
astounding piece of evidence in support of the particular genealogy of the genre of the 
monastic customary I am attempting to suggest here, for this duplication both reinforces 
the appearance of Mazarine 2012 as intentionally composed by an individual or group of 
individuals working closely together, and also, crucially, indicates that the collection was 
considered appropriate for a range of circumstances or applications. Thus, rather than the 
slow, associational accumulation that produced BNF lat. 1240 as we possess it today (and 
as it confronted Bernard Itier in the early thirteenth century), Bodley 817 is a decisive and 
coherent statement. It stitches together works by and concerning a succession of major 
Cluniac abbots into a manual including liturgical material for feasts and offices whose 
performance would have attested—or even constituted—the most important kind of 
institutional linkages between high medieval monasteries. And to these it also adds 
narrative refectory readings that served as normative exemplars for the self-(re)fashioning 
of a monastic conversatio, which, like the liturgy, would have had a distinctly Cluniac 
character. Finally, it included the Vita prima et maior, itself a synthesis of these two 
former categories into a new kind of document. 
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I have not yet been able to examine Bodley 817, either in person or as an image 
file. But even the brief descriptions of it available in published works are suggestive.37 
These agree that the manuscript was produced in southern France around the turn of the 
twelfth century; according to Jean Vezin, it “possesses a decoration wholly in the Cluniac 
style of the beginning of the twelfth century.”38 The Bodleian catalogue description adds 
that the text possess “some elaborately drawn capitals, in one case illuminated,” and also 
that John’s prologue and much of Book 1, as in Mazarine 2012, are missing.39 And the 
size given there for the manuscript, 11x7 5/8 inches (279.4x193.674mm), is similar to 
that of both Mazarine 2012 (259x184mm) and BNF lat. 18306 (260x190mm). It is thus 
likely that Bodley 817 conforms reasonably closely to the style of BNF lat. 18306 and 
Mazarine 2012, as outlined above.  
I suggest these comparisons in order to contrast these three manuscripts—but not 
too strongly—with the Vita prima as it appears in BNF lat. 1240. The similarly between a 
Cluniac style and that of Saint-Martial is well-established (and certainly not the result of 
one-way influence, imitation, or imposition).40 Particularly in the case of the Cluny and 
Saint-Martial Bibles, this similarity is not merely found in the artistic realm of 
illumination, but also in what might be called the artisanal or techn(olog)ical realm of 
page layout. Here, this is unquestionably attributable primarily to the two monasteries’ 
                                                 
37 Iogna-Prat, “Panorama,” 83; Jean Vezin, “Une importante contribution à l’étude du ‘Scriptorium’ de 
Cluny à la limite des XIe et XIIe siècles,” Scriptorium 21 (1967): 312–320, at 317; Falconer Madan, A 
Summary Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, vol. 2 (Oxford, UK: 1922), 
495–496. 
38 Vezin, “Une importante contribution,” 317. 
39 Madan, Summary Catalogue, 495–496. 
40 Denoël, “La Bible d’Odilon,” 52–54. 
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efforts to ape—or, more fairly, to reproduce—the famous Tours Bibles of the early/mid-
ninth century. But, at least in the “hierarchy of scripts,” we find resonances of this Bible 
style in Mazarine 2012 and BNF lat. 18306. This is essential to the kind of distinction 
that should be made between the style and layout of the Vita prima in BNF lat. 1240, one 
the one hand, and these other manuscripts associated with Saint-Martin-des-Champs, on 
the other. In the former case, we find that John’s text has been produced in a style quite 
similar to and yet markedly different from that of Cluny. This deviant similarity, to my 
eye, corresponds closely to that found between the two monasteries’ Tours Bibles. The 
two were probably produced at similar times, with Saint-Martial’s dating from the last 
decades of the tenth century and Cluny’s from the first decades of the eleventh.41 Their 
matrix of deviations and resemblances are best characterized as the result of two 
scriptoria of differing resources—in artisanal skill as well as in material—attempting a 
shared style. The most obvious illustration of this discrepancy appears in parchment 
quality: that of the Cluny Bible is significantly lighter and finer. But it appears in many 
other areas of the manuscripts as well. In general the Cluny Bible uses more color, 
rubricating the body text freely and deploying characteristic yellow shading or highlights. 
The grandeur of the most ornate illuminations in the Saint-Martial Bible is comparable to 
that of the best piece of such work in its Cluny counterpart, but the latter are more 
common. Similarly, the Cluny Bible usually has much larger and more striking incipits 
and explicits.  
                                                 
41 Cahn, Romanesque Bible Illumination; Gaborit-Chopin, La Décoration; Denoël, “La Bible d’Odilon”; 
Stratford, “La Bible dite d’Odilon.” 
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Keeping in mind the differences between the layouts that are attributable to the 
distinct genres in question—most cardinally, the double columns and large margins of the 
Tours Bibles versus the single block of text and comparatively narrow margins of the 
vitae—this is a similar contrast to that which appears between Mazarine 2012 and BNF 
lat. 18306, on the one hand, and the Vita Prima in BNF lat. 1240, on the other. The 
former two manuscripts present huge, and hugely ornate, illuminated initials (as does 
Bodley 817, probably, given the descriptions cited); the vita in BNF lat. 1240 uses rather 
large red initials to begin both the prologue and book 1, but certainly includes no 
illumination whatsoever. Mazarine 2012 and BNF lat. 18306 use large, square capitals, 
red and black, blue, or yellow-highlighted, for their incipits, and either this same script or 
a slightly smaller rustic capitalis for their explicits. While the Saint-Martial text does 
differentiate its incipits and explicits with a special script (rustic capitals) in a different 
color (red), this script only fills a normal line (as opposed to the two- or even three-line 
size of its Cluniac counterparts) and gives a much less grand impression. It also uses 
virtually no color at all in the body of the text, while the other two manuscripts employ 
both highlighting and colored initials therein. And the parchment of the Saint-Martial text 
is much darker and coarser than that of Mazarine 2012. 
But as with the Bibles, these differences should not be overstated; they appear, 
rather, as the result of variance in resources available for tasks of similar conception and 
intent: thus, while the Saint-Martial text lacks illumination and imposing square capital 
incipits, it nevertheless does employ very large initials and does gesture towards the 
hierarchy of scripts. The page layout is also basically similar, presenting a single large 
block of text written in relatively large, even, roundish minuscule across BNF lat. 18306, 
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lat. 1240, and Mazarine 2012. This results in a similar number of lines on each page, too: 
the Cluniac manuscripts associated with Saint-Martin-des-Champs each present thirty-
one lines per page, while the Saint-Martial text gives twenty-eight. These commonalities 
are significant; after all, nothing dictates such shared features. And as we will soon 
discuss, when the Vita prima appeared in legendaries of the mid- and later twelfth 
century, it did so not only in a modern, gothic or proto-gothic script, but also in neat 
doubled columns and shed of elaborate illuminations and the more elaborate iterations, at 
least, of the hierarchy of scripts.  
Finally, the formal characteristics shared by BNF lat. 18306, Mazarine 2012, and 
the Vita prima as found in BNF lat. 1240 can also be contrasted with the two other vita 
texts appearing in the Saint-Martial manuscript. First there is the Vita Leodegarii 
episcopi, occupying folia 155–168. This text uses no illumination or color, nor even any 
glimmer of the hierarchy of scripts; its incipit and explicit are in the same minuscule, in 
the same ink and the same size, as the body text. It also begins in the middle of folio 155, 
rather than at the beginning of one, as in BNF lat. 18306 and the Saint-Martial Vita prima 
(and, mostly likely in the missing first folia of Mazarine 2012 and Bodley 817). Its 
irregular minuscule, sharp and with a heavy right-ward slant, is quite distinct from that of 
the Vita Prima, and results in only twenty-three lines per page. The other vita in BNF lat. 
1240, that of William of Gellone, approaches the form under consideration somewhat 
more closely. It, at least, sets off incipits and explicits for both the text as a whole and the 
prologue and main body with a different color scheme (red, or alternating red and black). 
But the text of these incipits and explicits are not really distinguished by size or script. 
Space has been left at the beginning of the body text for a large (or sparsely illuminated) 
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initial, but this has not actually been added. And the text itself varies markedly from that 
of the various versions of John’s vita: the minuscule is very small and narrow, rather than 
the more rounded, larger, open script found in the other texts. This gives the Vita 
Guillelmi noticeably larger margins on the top, bottom, and outsides of each page, even 
while allowing fifty lines of writing per page. 
The implication is thus that the Vita prima found in BNF lat. 1240, when 
originally created, was based in some sense on a Cluniac model of what this vita—of an 
abbot of Cluny, after all—should look like in the most straightforward sense. This (more 
than merely artistic/decorative) style, in its use of the hierarchy of scripts, drew, at least 
indirectly, on the model of the Tours Bibles, as received at Cluny (in fact, as received at 
Cluny very likely at the same time and in consultation with this form’s reception at Saint-
Martial itself), yet was here employed in the production of a very different kind of text. 
Together, this text and this particular physical form were apparently considered useful in 
the reform (however else this kind of action or project was conceived at the time) not 
only of Saint-Martin-des-Champs, but almost certainly of at least one other monastery—
hence the identical Bodley 817. The copy of John’s text found in BNF lat. 1240 almost 
certainly began its career as an independent libellus, later to be bound into the old 
liturgical collection that made up the core of the modern codex.42 And it is definitely an 
eleventh-century manuscript, with a deviation, as I have argued, from the Cluniac model 
provided by BNF lat. 18306, Mazarine 2012, and Bodley 817 that corresponds to that 
                                                 
42 Recall that this core itself had already experienced quite directly “Cluniac reform,” in the addition of 
northern French musical notation to some of its material, as discussed above. For the Vita prima as a 
libellus, see Emerson, “Neglected Aspects,” and P. A. Robinson, “The ‘Booklet,’ A Self-Contained Unit in 
Composite Manuscripts,” Codicologica 3 (1980): 46–69. 
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observable between the Cluny Bible (BNF lat. 15176) and the first Saint-Martial Bible 
(BNF lat. 5). Perhaps the Vita prima found in BNF lat. 1240 was produced according to a 
similar conception of form and content and as part of a similar project, namely, the 
second, more substantial Cluniac reform of Saint-Martial, which took place in the 1050s 
and 1060s, again under Hugh of Semur? Along such lines, Felix Heinzer has argued in 
his work on book culture in the Hirsau reforms that  
 
Specifically in the context of reform, where books take on normative functions, 
they transport with their contents also aesthetic aspects: certainly the forms of 
writing to some extent, the typical composition of page layout, and the 
composition of decoration. These formal components constitute a certain weight, 
and so also do the authority and the normative character of the contents exert, for 
their part, the effect of a model.43 
 
The Hirsau reforms did draw to some extent on Cluniac models, particularly in the 
production of a new customary by the abbot of Hirsau, William, based on the customs of 
Cluny as related in Ulrich of Zell’s work.44 They also took place during the abbacy of 
Hugh of Semur, in the last quarter of the eleventh century, and Heinzer is at pains to 
assert that these “aesthetic” aspects in relevant manuscripts—page layout as well as 
decoration and illumination—were in fact understood as a functional part of reform, 
                                                 
43 Heinzer, “Hirsauer Buchkultur und ihre Ausstrahlung,” 101. 
44 Cochelin, “Community and Customs,” 233–235. 
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intended to contribute concretely to the accomplishment of that process.45 Much of my 
argument, therefore, is by analogy and considered supposition. But the rough dating and 
almost certain original independent production of the Vita prima in BNF lat. 1240, its 
basic formal resemblance to texts used in the reforms by Hugh of Semur at Saint-Martin-
des-Champs and, probably, at least one other house (Bodley 817), and its combination 
with liturgical, proto-normative texts as would be included in fully developed 
customaries all suggest that this copy of John’s text, too, can be understood as playing a 
particular and intentional role at Saint-Martial in the mid- or late eleventh century. 
My claim concerning this handful of manuscripts must not be overstated. It is, in 
its essence, a rather weak one: these compilations—for they are essentially compilations 
in the way those manuscripts of the second, legendary type are not—are an important 
parallel development to the emergence and expansion of the clearly-defined and clearly-
apprehended genre of customary. There is a great contrast between them and the 
customaries of Ulrich and Bernard, produced around the same time or slightly earlier, in 
the 1070s and 1080s, which are, as much as they draw on earlier records of various kinds, 
essentially unified and wholly novel compositions, single-author texts composed all at 
once, identified by all contemporaries as such. In contrast, the “customaries” here 
considered are stitched together, sometimes over years or decades, from various texts that 
either have an author clearly defined as someone other than any of the individuals 
specifically involved in the production of the manuscript in question (such as John of 
Salerno), or might reasonably be regarded as more or less authorless, as in the case of 
                                                 
45 Heinzer, “Hirsauer Buchkultur und ihre Ausstrahlung,” 101–102. 
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technical efforts to transcribe important elements of the liturgy itself as an ancient 
communal tradition well beyond the composition or invention of any individual. And yet 
these proto-customaries do seem to evidence, through their uneven, haphazard 
compilation and all their varying constituent texts, some unifying notion, however vague, 
of weaker or stronger normativity. They are guides for behavior, however they might 
have been used, even whether or not they were actually used as such, and their compilers 
and transcribers understood them as such. Moreover, they include, broadly speaking, the 
kinds of information that characterize a full customary: a mixture of theological or 
philosophical ethical instruction specifically intended for monks, drawing on scripture 
and the patristic tradition, of constitutional directives for the management of the 
monastery as a large and property-holding institution, and of technical records for the 
principle activity of Benedictine monasticism, the performance of a staggeringly complex 
cycle of group prayer and worship. 
This survey, therefore, limited though it is, reveals a specific typology for 
manuscripts including the Vita prima et maior; in considering a few more manuscripts 
that also include John’s vita, we will now discover a clear break from this type, 
observable (very) roughly in the early or early mid-twelfth century. Around this time, we 
begin to discover the Vita prima in a different type of manuscript, what I have called the 
legendary type and briefly characterized above. But before considering two clear 
exemplars of this type, BNF lat. 17007 and BNF lat. 3788, I will first examine a 
manuscript that does not fully and unambiguously display this typology; this manuscript, 
BNF lat. 5290, rather presents an intermediate point between the customary type to the 
legendary type, reveling elements that suggest both classifications. 
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BNF lat. 5290 is a collection of passion texts and vitae, also including the story of 
a translation and a fragment of Bede’s tractatus on Proverbs. Though the manuscript may 
include as many as ten different scribes working across five distinct sections and even in 
two separate monasteries,46 the overall effect is relatively harmonious. In the first place, 
page layout is roughly similar across the various sections. The entire manuscript uses the 
straightforward block of minuscule script I have identified above with the customary 
type; thus the vast majority of the folia present between twenty-six and thirty-two lines, 
with the last ten leaves noticeably shrinking the script size in order to accommodate 
thirty-four. Every text in the manuscript save one makes use of a specially-ruled marginal 
column for both larger illuminations and simpler, generally-rubricated initials, and the 
one that does not is copied into a section, with which it shares its ruling scheme, that 
does, so that even here the marginal column is merely ignored rather than absent. The use 
of the hierarchy of script is more ambiguous: all told, texts comprising 68 of the 
manuscript’s 160 folia include this device. In none of these cases do we find anything 
like the hierarchy as it appears in Tours or “Neo-Tours” (such as that made at Cluny 
under Abbot Odilo) Bibles, where a square capital incipit made up of text two or even 
three lines tall may run for almost half a page. In some cases, the hierarchy found in a 
BNF lat. 5290 text is so slight that I term it “token,” meaning that it appears a scribe or 
scribes intended only to nod in the direction of the hierarchy, calling it to the mind of a 
reader without going to the full trouble. To do so in this manuscript, they either employed 
just one line or even only one word at the text’s beginning written in distinctive square 
                                                 
46 Betty Branch, “The Development of the Script,” PhD dissertation, Duke University, 1974, 96–99. 
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capitals, or, more often, used two different capitalis scripts for the incipit,47 but very little 
(again, just one line or a word in each) of them. Similarly, the manuscript includes a 
number of very large and ornate illuminations, but these are somewhat unevenly 
distributed throughout; not every text includes them, and they are even entirely lacking 
from at least one major section of the text—save, again, for what I think of as token 
efforts to call to mind illumination without actually producing any. 
At this point we should delve more precisely into the composition of the 
manuscript. The term “section” I have taken from Betty Branch’s examination and 
description of BNF lat. 5290, from which I have learned much. According to her analysis, 
the manuscript is composed of five such sections, composed and produced as individual 
units and then combined into the form which confronts us today. In all but one of these 
sections Branch identifies more than one scribal hand, and, again, in all but one section, 
more than one text appears. The contents of BNF lat. 5290 are all, with one exception, 
narrative texts centered on saints. Several are passiones, accounts of martyrdom, several 
are vitae, and one is an account of Saint Nicholas’ translation to Bari and a collection of 
miracles associated with him and his relics. The content then, like the layout, is relatively 
homogenous, save for four pages of Bede’s tractatus on Proverbs, attached to the very 
end of the manuscript.  
There is some evidence that the constuent sections of this manuscript were all 
produced within a fairly short window of time, around the turn of the twelfth century. In 
                                                 
47 If pressed to provide a strict and unambiguous definition for the hierarchy of scripts, I would suggest this 
one: the presence of at least two different scripts in the title, incipit, and/or first lines of a given text. The 
script of the main body text does not “count” for these purposes, and the two scripts, at least in my limited, 
post-Carolingian, Western, monastic experience, are virtually always capital scripts (usually square and 
rustic). 
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the first section, encompassing the first thirty-four folia of the manuscript, a scribe has 
copied eight passiones, all roughly the same length (two or three folia) and all concerning 
early Christians martyred in Roman persecutions. In the same section, using the same 
ruling (but without the hierarchy of scripts, marginal capitals, or impressive illuminations 
of the earlier texts), another scribe has copied a Vita sancti Barsanorii abbatis in an 
insular hand. This is a text about the sixth-century Palestinian hermit/ascetic more 
commonly referred to as “Barsanuphius” and know primarily through a suspiciously-
large collection of surviving letters (over 800!) he purportedly exchanged with another 
companion, John the Prophet, in the desert.48 His relics were brought to the Italian town, 
Oria in Apulia, in 850. The Bibliotheca Hagiographica Latina, at least, lists the copy of 
this vita appearing in BNF lat. 5290 as by far the earliest surviving version—the BHL 
dates it to sometime in the twelfth century, while Branch suggests it be located 
“somewhere within the last quarter of the eleventh century.”49 Compared to this, the BHL 
gives one other manuscript for this vita (BHL 0998), Rouen BP U 20, supposedly from 
the fourteenth century, and several variant texts surviving from fifteenth-century 
manuscripts. Following Avril, who asserts that the script and illumination of the first 
scribe’s portion of this section are of the appropriate style, Branch suggests that this 
gathering was copied at Mont-Saint-Michel.50 
The next section includes a single work, the Vita beatissimi Nicholai confessoris 
atque pontificis, copied out by a single scribe. It provides token illumination, in the form 
                                                 
48 Alexis Torrance, “Standing in the Breach: The Significance and Function of the Saints in the Letters of 
Barsanuphius and John of Gaza,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 17 (2009): 459–473. 
49 Branch, “The Development of the Script,” 99. 
50 Ibid., 97. 
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of a single large “B,” which has some detailing or adornment (a kind of banded pattern in 
its bows), but is nothing like the several huge and impressive illuminations in other parts 
of the manuscript. Similarly, the incipit is done in largish (perhaps 1.5 lines tall) square 
capitals. The text itself very much follows the general layout already discussed, and 
includes a fairly developed system of rubricated initials to aid the reader in finding and 
keeping his place. The manuscript also includes marginal Roman numerals, likely 
indicating sections for reading aloud. The text thus parallels the form and function of the 
manuscript as an overall unit: a collection of narrative hagiographic material for reading 
aloud in the refectory. There are two other key facts to note about this section: first, the 
opening folio shows no particular sign of wear, such being a common indicator that a 
given booklet or gathering has enjoyed some period of independent life, with its 
beginning not shielded within a larger binding; second, the section that follows this one 
begins immediately with the story of Saint Nicholas’ translatio to Bari, as originally 
written by the archdeacon of that town, a certain John—this text, too, shows no wear or 
particular soiling on its opening folio. Finally, the origin of this section is uncertain; not 
recognizing its script in any of the known Fécamp manuscripts, Branch again suggests 
that it was produced at Mont-Saint-Michel during the last quarter of the eleventh century. 
The third section is by far the longest, running from folio 55 through 139, and, if 
the first section (the second-longest) appears to have a Roman, early Christian, or 
Mediterranean “theme,” this one is very much Cluniac in nature. Again following 
Branch, this section includes work by three scribes. The first of these, a scribe whose 
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hand Branch has identified in a manuscript known to have been produced at Fécamp,51 
has copied John of Bari’s Translatio and Miracula beatissimi Nicholai confessoris et 
episcopi into the section—the only text without an immediately obvious connection to 
Cluny. This scribe is particularly important for dating and locating this section; his hand 
is also found in BNF lat. 2401, and this manuscript was illuminated by another artist who 
also worked in BNF lat. 2403 and Rouen BM 489 (A 254) (and who also provided the 
large initial on f. 139r of BNF lat. 5290), which have both been, by their contents, dated 
to shortly before the Norman Conquest in 1066.52 On these grounds, Branch dates this 
third section to the third quarter of the eleventh century and Fécamp. This, however, 
cannot be right, since Saint Nicholas’ relics were not translated to Bari until 1087, with 
John’s account likely written within the next two years.53 Moreover, John’s text in BNF 
lat. 5290 ends in the middle of f. 65v, where the next vita picks up immediately, using the 
same ruling and presenting thirty-one lines per page, just as in the Translatio (even if it 
does not continue the illuminations and hierarchy of script used in John’s narrative). 
While it is always possible for a text to be copied onto unused folia in a gathering already 
hosting another self-sufficient work, the suggestion that scribes and binders may have 
appended a significantly-later text (the Translatio) onto the front of this other vita 
(beginning for some reason in the middle of the page) and adopted the latter’s ruling for 
their new text is rather ridiculous. Without having interrogated the paleographical 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 98 (BNF lat. 2401). 
52 Branch, “The Development of the Script,” 99; F. Wormald, “An Eleventh-Century Copy of the Norman 
Laudes Regiae,” Historical Research 37 (1964): 73–76. 
53 Paul Oldfield, Sanctity and Pilgrimage in Medieval Southern Italy, 1000–1200 (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 118–119; Patrick Geary, Furta Sacra: Thefts of Relics in the Central 
Middle Ages (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 94–99. 
  
289 
 
attributions and the dating of BNF lat. 2401, BNF lat. 2403, and Rouen BM 489, 
however, I would only suggest this as a relatively minor adjustment to Branch’s schema; 
of course efforts to estimate the date of a manuscript based on hands and styles shared 
with other manuscripts is always a process of estimation. It is obviously not at all 
impossible that a given scribe or illuminator worked on one manuscript in the early 1060s 
and another in the early 1090s. Thus I suggest that this section of BNF lat. 5290 is more 
likely from the last decade of rather than the third quarter of the eleventh century (or even 
a little later). 
Next, copied by a scribe Branch does not recognize from any other Fécamp 
manuscript, comes the Vita sancti Leonardi confessoris. This is Leonard of Noblat, 
traditionally an early sixth-century Merovingian saint and associate of Clovis. However, 
Steven Sargent has pointed out that the cult of Saint Leonard is only attested from around 
the second or third decades of the eleventh century.54 The earliest reference to it appears 
in Adémar of Chabannes’s Chronicon, in a somewhat ambiguous context that suggests 
this date range.55 Moreover, in the mid-1020s, Jordan of Laron, former provost of the 
church of Saint Leonard in Noblat and current bishop of Limoges, deputized Hildegar of 
Chartres to write to Fulbert of Chartres to request a copy of Leonard’s vita.56 Obviously, 
therefore, Jordan did not possess one, which suggests that one did not exist in either 
Limoges or even the church at Noblat. Though Fulbert’s reply has not survived, Sargent, 
as well as Poncelet and Krusch, all conclude that no vita actually existed at that time, and 
                                                 
54 Steven Sargent, “Religious Responses to Social Violence in Eleventh-Century Aquitaine,” Historical 
Reflections/Réflexions Historiques 12 (1985): 219–240, at 228–229. 
55 Adémar de Chabannes, Chronique, ed. Jules Chavanon (Paris, France: Picard, 1897), 179–180 (3:56). 
56 Hildegar of Chartres, Epistola 134, PL 141:273. 
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that Jordan subsequently had one composed.57 Sargent supplements this interpretation 
with the lack of any manuscript text of the vita from before the early/middle eleventh 
century, the lack of reference to Leonard in church calendars before the eleventh century, 
and the presence of archaeological evidence from Noblat, also no older than the eleventh 
century.58 Sargent also presents internal evidence from the vita itself: first, he notes that 
the text refers to Saint Martial, patron of Limoges, as pontifex rather than apostolus, 
giving a terminus ad quem of 1031, when a council at Limoges promoted Martial from 
third-century founder of the see of Limoges to companion of Christ and deputy of Saint 
Peter in Aquitaine; second, the text speaks of Duke William the Great of Aquitaine as 
though dead,59 providing an a quo of 30 January 1030. In fact, the vita is likely even 
younger than this tight range would suggest. The 1031 council, or at least its recognition 
of Saint Martial as an apostle, is almost certainly one of Adémar’s many fabrications; 
while Martial was eventually accepted in Aquitaine as an apostle, this was only towards 
the end of the eleventh century.60 If we continue to assume that Jordan eventually 
commissioned, or even, as has been suggested, himself composed the Vita Leonardi, our 
new terminus ad quem is his death in 1051. I am not aware of a direct link between Cluny 
and Noblat, such as an episode of reform, but given the close proximity of the monastic 
community there to Saint-Martial, its increasing importance as a stop on the pilgrimage 
                                                 
57 Sargent, “Religious Responses,” 230. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., 231; in BNF lat. 5290 70v: “tempore viviente magno Willelmo duco aquitaine.” 
60 Anna Trumbore Jones, “Discovering the Aquitanian Church in the Corpus of Ademar of Chabannes,” 
The Haskins Society Journal 19 (2007), 88; Daniel Callahan, “Adémar de Chabannes et la paix de Dieu,” 
Revue Bénédictine 101 (1991): 32–49; Richard Landes, Relics, Apocalypse, and the Deceits of History: 
Ademar of Chabannes, 989–1034 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 15–16 and 177–178.  
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route to Compostela, and the growth of its cult in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, 
the presence of this vita here among more clearly Cluniac texts is not strange. 
Less ambiguous is the Vita Tetbaldi, the life of Theobald of Provins. Unlike the 
other texts from BNF lat. 5290 so far discussed, Theobald is both fully historical and 
virtually contemporary with the various gatherings of the manuscript. Theobald was born 
into a comital family in the Île-de-France, but refused marriage and a military career to 
become a pilgrim, ascetic, and hermit. He travelled the Compostela route, and eventually 
became a hermit and leader of hermits near Vicenza, becoming a Camaldolese monk 
shortly before his death in 1066.61 His vita was probably written, again, within a year or 
two of his death, most likely by Peter of Vangadizza, abbot of a monastery near 
Theobald’s community in northern Italy.62 Theobald was canonized in 1073 (and the text 
in BNF lat. 5290 certainly refers to him as sanctus). Saint-Thibault-en-Auxois, a Cluniac 
priory near Vitteaux, was one of Theobald’s cult centers.63 
These three works comprise only twenty-one of the third section’s eighty-four 
folia. The rest is taken up with a trio of vitae of the important early abbots of Cluny. 
Branch attributes all of these texts, along with the Vita Tetbaldi, to a single scribe, 
otherwise unknown at Fécamp, who writes in “a rather large and squarish hand.”64 To my 
                                                 
61 René-Paul Bernard, “Saint Thibault de Provins. Vie, culte, iconographie,” Provins et sa région 131 
(1977): 89–104. See also Catherine Vincent, “Les mutations de la sainteté de l’ermite Thibaut de Provins 
aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles: la promotion d’un modèle pastoral séculier au temps des ordres mendiants” 
Revue d’Histoire de l’Eglise de France 100 (2014): 279–300 and Dominique Iogna-Prat “La place idéale 
du laïc à Cluny (v. 930–v. 1150): d’une morale statutaire à une éthique absolue?,” in Guerriers et moines. 
Conversion et sainteté aristocratique dans l’Occident médiéval (IXe–XIIe siècle), ed. Michel Lauwers 
(Antibes, France: CEPAM, 2002), 291–316.  
62 Bollandists, Acta Sanctorum Junii Tomus Quintus, 588–606. 
63 Bernard, “Saint Thibault.” 
64 Branch, “The Development of the Script,” 98. 
  
292 
 
eye, this script is very similar to that of the copies of the Vita prima found in BNF lat. 
1240, BNF lat. 18306, and Mazarine 2012. These three vitae include, of course, the Vita 
prima, and also Odilo’s Vita Maioli and Peter Damian’s Vita Odilonis. We might also 
note that these three texts, in this order, would be identical to those texts I have posited as 
“reform manuals”—Mazarine 2012 and Bodley 817—if one were to remove all the non-
narrative (mostly liturgical) material (in a process of editing not unlike Nalgod’s on John 
of Salerno), and also the vita of Empress Adelaide, from these latter. This similarity in 
content and script poses the possibility that these texts might have been copied from a 
work similar to these reform manuals, which might well have been present at Fécamp, 
(re)founded in 1001 by the Cluny-associated reformer William of Volpiano.65 On the 
other hand, this abbatial sub-section uses only token illumination and virtually no 
hierarchy of scripts.66 Simple sloth, changing formatting practices moving in parallel to 
                                                 
65 This supposition must be treated with some care, however, as based on my exceedingly small sample size 
I am inclined to, tentatively, associate these manuals with Hugh’s priory reforms of the second half of the 
eleventh century, as opposed to earlier, more individually-driven, associative, and transitory efforts, such as 
those of Odo’s lifetime or of William’s. Still, even if no such manual was used at Fécamp during William’s 
lifetime or in William’s reform of Mont-Saint-Michel (which, given its association with William and its 
occurrence in the early eleventh century, I would of course not suggest grouping with Hugh’s priory 
reforms), one might possibly have been employed by the “second generation” of abbatial leadership at 
Fécamp. Such epigones often turned to documents as tools for navigating the challenges of abbatial 
succession (see Vanderputten, Monastic Reform as Process, 102–130). William’s successor at Fécamp was 
his nephew, John, who served from 1028 to 1079 and presided over a prosperous period in the abbey’s 
history. But even if no such manual was ever made or used at Fécamp, one could easily have been 
borrowed or otherwise acquired from another Cluny-associated house. For the basic history of the monastic 
institution of Fécamp, with particular emphasis on William’s tenure there, see Véronique Gazeau et 
Monique Goullet, Guillaume de Volpiano, un réformateur en son temps (Caen, France: CRAHM, 2008), 
101–104. The authors of this study, which is concerned primarily with Ralph Glaber’s vita of William, cite 
much of the relevant work, but the contours of the history provided thereby—a Merovingian foundation 
about which almost nothing can be firmly stated, Viking ravages, and degeneration into a lax community of 
canons regular followed by Benedictine reform—should obviously be regarded with skepticism. 
66 Curiously, the only exception is a relatively pronounced square capital explicit to the Vita Maioli on 
121r. 
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changing convetions of genre, or some other concern of time or resources, might explain 
this—or perhaps the abbatial vitae were copied from some other source. 
This third section thus comprises a heavily Cluny-focused dossier, and also one 
significantly more present-oriented than the Roman martyrs and early churchmen (Saint 
Nicholas of Myra) included in the first two. Even the two saints from significantly earlier 
than the tenth and eleventh centuries that appear here, Saint Nicholas and Saint Leonard, 
are really rooted in the eleventh century: Leonard, or at least his developed cult and 
written vita, is almost certainly an eleventh-century innovation, while the Saint Nicholas 
text concerns his translation to Bari in 1087 and the miracles thereafter associated with 
his relics. Again, like the second section, the beginning of the third section shows no 
signs of the wear historians associate with the career of a gathering as an independent, 
unbound libellus. Moreover, this third section itself was obviously conceived as a 
gathering of narrative hagiographical literature; its various constituent texts are closely 
intertwined, often transitioning in the middle of a page or across the rector/verso of an 
individual folio. Its content is thus internally quite coherent, being almost entirely a 
collection of Cluniac texts, and also, in an only somewhat broader sense, coherent with 
the previous two gatherings. This gathering was also likely produced at roughly the same 
time as the prior two; Branch and others have dated these former, on a paleographic 
basis, to the last quarter of the eleventh century. She has suggested the third quarter of the 
same century for this third section, but given the date of Theobald’s canonization (1073) 
and of John’s composition of the Translatio (late 1080s), this must be adjusted back a bit, 
to closely overlap with these other sections.  
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The last two sections of BNF lat. 5290 are quite short. The first of these, and the 
fourth overall, is eleven leaves long, and includes one complete vita, the beginning of 
another, and the end of a third text that I have not identified. The first of this is a life of 
Saint Alexius, a figure purportedly of the fourth and fifth centuries whose cult emerged in 
the West only in the late tenth century from a combination of Greek and Syrian 
traditions.67 Then follows a life of Saint Eustachius and his wife, second-century Roman 
martyrs. The end of this text is missing, as is the beginning of the next (which lacks an 
explicit for easy identification, but does end with the “amen” found at the close of many 
other texts in the manuscript). Thematically, this section thus continues the emphasis of 
the first on early Roman martyrs and on the Mediterranean world, though perhaps a 
distinction should be made between Eustachius, whose name may be draw from an older 
Carolingian tradition of martyrologies and Alexius, whose cult developed outside of the 
Latin West and spread there late in the Carolingian period.68 The layout of this section is 
broadly similar to that of the others; though lacking in the hierarchy of script, it includes 
one particularly immense illumination at its beginning and another substantial one to 
introduce the life of Eustachius, uses a marginal column, and presents thirty or thirty-one 
lines throughout. There is a slight bit of smudging on the first page of this section, but 
overall it appears basically clean and unworn, suggesting that this section did not spend 
significant time as an independent libellus. Both this section and the next, final one 
                                                 
67 See, among others, E. Gordon Whatley’s entry for Alexius in “Acta Sanctorum,” Sources of Anglo-Saxon 
Literary Culture, ed. Frederick M. Biggs et al., vol. 1 (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 
2001): 67–69. 
68 Ibid. 
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include hands identified in other Fécamp manuscripts by Branch.69 As with the third 
section, because one of these hands appearing in the fourth section also appears in BNF 
lat. 2401, Branch dates this gathering to the third quarter of the eleventh century. 
The last section is also quite short, at nine folia. It includes two texts in two 
different hands, which Branch dates to “probably right around 1100.”70 The first of these, 
like the rest of the manuscript’s contents, is a vita. It is devoted to Saint Romanus, the at 
least semi-legendary seventh-century archbishop of Rouen. The feast and cult of this 
figure underwent a major expansion, and “frenzy of text composition,” during the last 
third of the eleventh century, offering some support for Branch’s dating.71 But the second 
of this section’s contents is more unusual: it is only the first two leaves of what appears to 
be a longer copy of Bede’s tractatus on Proverbs. Though it does maintain the single 
block of minuscule familiar from earlier sections, this final gathering presents a subtly 
different impression from much of what has come before. The script is notably smaller, 
fitting thirty-four lines on each page. The ruling also appears significantly straighter, and 
the enlarged initials appear more regular: almost all are precisely two to three lines tall. 
Finally, the first page of this gathering shows a great deal of wear and mess, suggesting 
that this gathering spent some time on its own, or at the beginning of a manuscript, 
exposed to the dangers of independent existence and heavy use. Branch recognizes the 
hand of the very last text, the Tractatus, rather than that of the second-to-last, the Vita 
sancti Romani, as one of Fécamp.  
                                                 
69 Branch, “The Development of the Script,” 98. 
70 Ibid., 99. 
71 Felice Lifshitz, “The Dossier of Romanus of Rouen: The Political Uses of Hagiographical Texts,” PhD 
dissertation, Columbia University, 1988, 96–97. 
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The layout of this vita is also relatively distinctive. The most immediately 
apparent difference from the earlier texts is the greater number of lines per page, but the 
system of initials also, upon closer inspection, stands out. The text of this vita makes a 
sparing use of rubricated initial capitals in the body text; some pages have four or five, 
but many have only one or two. Moreover, the vita uses only its strictly regimented initial 
capitals in the margins. For the first two folia of the text, these are about two and a half or 
three lines tall, with a slight semi-illuminated form of the kind I have termed “token.” 
Afterwards, they become slightly larger, around three lines, and simpler, in many cases 
approaching just large rubricated initials, though sometimes also with nodules or tails. 
Most strikingly, in comparison to the other texts of BNF lat. 5290, initials of a size 
appropriate to the body text—that is, one full line tall—never appear in the margins of the 
Vita sancti Romani. And most of the marginal initials in the vita introduce individual 
words written in a capitalis that differs from the minuscule of the main body text. No 
other work in BNF lat. 5290 is so clear and disciplined in its use of this device. Many 
include quite large and ornate illuminated initials, and almost all employ a large number 
of one-line-tall initial capitals both in marginal columns and in the main body of the text. 
Only a few use mid-sized, decorated-but-not-truly-illuminated initial capitals in their 
margins, and, with one exception, always also employ single-line capitals in the margin 
and body text. The system of capitals used in the Vita sancti Romani is most similar to 
that found in the Vita Odilonis, which does not use normal-sized capitals in either its 
margin or body text (like the bulk of the other Cluniac abbatial vitae), but its marginal 
capitals are rather irregular in size, with some as large as four or five lines and others the 
same two or three of the Vita sancti Romani.  
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BNF lat. 5290 thus presents a relatively homogenous layout and a quite coherent 
thematic. This coherency combines a substantial collection of narrative hagiography 
building on Roman and Carolingian martyrologies with a body of Cluniac abbatial 
literature that, in view of this Cluniac mini-collection’s attestation in manuscripts such as 
Mazarine 2012 and Bodley 817, probably owed much of its coherency and dissemination 
to its role in the priory reforms of Hugh the Great’s abbacy in the second half of the 
eleventh century. Most of this older and more general collection, found in the first two 
sections, probably came from Mont-Saint-Michel, while the Clunaic collection was 
almost certainly produced in the scriptorium at Fécamp itself, which enjoyed a relatively 
direct connection to the broader Cluniac nebula by virtue of William of Volpiano’s 
(re)foundation of the community at the beginning of the eleventh century. Neither the 
second or third sections, at least, appear to have existed on their own for any significant 
period, or at least not to have seen much wear during such a career. To these main 
components of the manuscript is added a short text, reinforcing the prestige of the 
archiepiscopal see at Rouen. Virtually all of these texts, building on and in the case of the 
third section, modifying, Branch et al.’s analysis, most likely come from the last decade 
or two of the eleventh century. The one exception would be the fourth section, which 
includes a Fécamp hand Branch has dated by its appearance in another manuscript to the 
third quarter of the eleventh century—though we note that she has dated the third section 
to this period on the same grounds, and that this section may be confidently re-dated on 
the basis of texts it includes that are firmly datable to after 1073 (the Vita sancti Tetbaldi, 
canonized in that year) and after 1087 (the Translatio sancti Nicholai, made in that year). 
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Of all these sections, only the opening page of the last one shows evidence of the wear 
we would expect of an independent libellus.  
In fact, BNF lat. 5290 has a particularly interesting compositional history; as 
Felice Lifshitz has revealed, this manuscript was likely cobbled together by monks 
working at Fécamp sometime during or after the thirteenth century.72 These monks 
removed the sections surveyed above from several other manuscripts, including one with 
a table of contents (written in a thirteenth-century hand) listing a vita of Romanus 
followed by Bede’s treatise on Proverbs. These manuscripts were generally quite various, 
including a variety of non-hagiographical works (some of which suggest a re-dating of 
the sections to the early or mid twelfth century) such as Hugh of Saint-Victor’s De arche 
noe and epistles of Saint Paul and Seneca.73 The intent of this recombination, therefore, 
was quite obviously to assemble a lectionary from a variety of other texts, removing 
narrative hagiography from combination with other, potentially devotional or meditative 
texts to create a rationalized liturgical handbook. 
What, therefore, about BNF lat. 5290’s position between the customary and 
legendary types? The page layout is very much that of the former. Despite their variety, 
the scripts are all minuscule and of a fairly consistent size, such that all the sections 
present between twenty-seven and thirty-one lines per page. This layout, moreover, is 
that of one simple block of text, rather than the two neat columns found in BNF lat. 
17007 and 3788. Again, despite some variations, there is usually some glimmer of the 
concept of the hierarchy of scripts, and several large illuminations recalling broadly the 
                                                 
72 Lifshitz, “The Dossier of Romanus of Rouen,” 454–455. 
73 Ibid. 
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Franco-Saxon style of the Saint-Martin manuscripts also appear across the various 
sections. But in terms of content, BNF lat. 5290 leans markedly towards the legendary 
typology. Besides the vitae and passiones as para-liturgical texts themselves, it includes 
nothing conventionally identified as liturgical material; no chants, no offices, no musical 
notation, all of which are found in the Saint-Martial troper-proser (and among its attached 
libelli, where the Vita prima is found) as well as in the reform manuals Mazarine 2012 
and Bodley 817. This may seem a fine distinction, but it is in some ways the most crucial 
one to make between the customary and legendary types as I discuss them here: the point 
is that the customary type combines prose narrative efforts to relate the broader 
constitutional conversatio of Cluny with straightforward liturgical resources speaking 
directly to the office of the hours and mass in a way that clearly parallels the main period 
of development of the customary, from the late tenth through the eleventh centuries. The 
legendary type is very different; it gathers only narrative (almost exclusively prose) 
accounts of saintly lives, martyrdoms, miracles, and translations. These kinds of texts, 
and thus the manuscripts that gather them together, certainly have a place in the liturgy or 
the consuetudines of a monastery (generally being read in the refectory in accordance 
with the progression of the Sanctorale). But they are manuals of a particular type, like an 
ordinal, or a breviary, and so on. They are homogenous in internal composition, clear in 
function, and limited in scope. They play a role in monastic life but do not—and do not 
seek—to generally encompass it in all its various aspects. In this aspect, BNF lat. 5290, 
which so much resembles the customary type in its layout, is quite clearly a member of 
the legendary group. Even more, it is a perfect illustration of the transition from the 
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former to the latter, being literally several proto-customary type manuscripts radically 
edited and recombined to form a legendary. 
Two other manuscripts fit the legendary type, in form as well as function; indeed, 
they are commonly recognized as legendaries. Both are generally considered in terms of 
the Cistercian Liber de natalitiis, a particularly important and widely disseminated 
legendary that first appeared in northern France and Flanders towards the end of the 
twelfth century.74  
BNF lat. 17007 is one volume of one copy (comprising, in addition, BNF lat. 
17003–17006) of this immense collection, which often took up as many as five or six 
such volumes. This manuscript encompasses 210 folia, and has been suggested to come 
from, or at least served its medieval career in, Val Abbey (Val-Notre-Dame), the oldest 
Cistercian community in the Île-de-France.75 Going by the description and dating 
provided by the BNF entry, this text is made up of three sections: one (including folia 2–
9 and 198–202) from the fourteenth century, another (the vast bulk, folia 10–197) from 
the third quarter of the twelfth century, and the third (folia 203–210) from the last quarter 
of the twelfth century.76 Despite this range, the page layout found within BNF lat. 17007 
is far more regular than any we have observed save the reform manual of Saint-Martin-
des-Champs (Mazarine 2012). Here, all sections use double columns of equal width. The 
                                                 
74 François Dolbeau, “Notes sur la genèse et sur la diffusion du Liber de Natalitiis,” Revue d’histoire des 
textes 6 (1976): 143–195; Henri Rochais, “Un légendier cistercien de la fin du XIIe siècle: le Liber de 
natalitiis et de quelques grands lègendiers des XIIe–XIIIe siècles,” in École pratique des hautes études. 4e 
section, sciences historiques et philologiques (1976): 1111–1116; Cécile Lanéry, “Nouvelles recherches sur 
le légendier de Clairvaux,” Analecta Bollandiana 131 (2013): 60–133. 
75 Isabell Rosé, “La Vita Gregorii Turonensis d’Odon de Cuny. Un texte clunisien?” Memini. Travaux et 
documents 9–10 (2005–2006), Annexe 1. 
76 Charlotte Denoël, catalogue entry, BNF lat. 17007. 
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quinternion that makes up the third gathering uses forty-seven lines of text in these 
columns, while all the other sections present forty-six. This double column appears in no 
manuscript we have considered so far; indeed, as far as the course of my project goes, 
this feature is most associated with the Carolingian Tours Bibles and the reform Bibles 
produced in their image throughout West Francia over the course of the eleventh century. 
In these works, characteristically, the double columns helped a small and tightly-
controlled script to contain an immense text (the Bible) in a single codex. This would 
obviously have been a concern in the production of a work such as the Liber de natalitiis, 
an encyclopedic collection of narrative hagiography intended to bound the entire 
liturgical year. And there is another device aimed at establishing control over such a mass 
of material, also found in the Tours Bibles and BNF lat. 17007 but in no others so far 
considered: running titles written in the top margins of the manuscript. In the Tours 
Bibles these identify the various books making up the Bible; here, they identify the 
particular vita, passio, translatio, or miracula.77 These are readily apparent in the first 
three sections of BNF lat. 17007, but appear at first to have disappeared from the fourth; 
a closer inspection reveals that they have mostly been cut away, and are visible only in 
the very bottom of the titles that have survived and the recto of folio 210, the last leaf of 
the manuscript. Finally, all the sections use the same scheme of capitals and initials found 
in the Vita sancti Romani, in the last section of BNF lat. 5290: sparse in-text capitals, no 
marginal “normal” (one-line) capitals, and larger marginal initials. These initials are 
sometimes partially illuminated or adorned with tails or other modest decorations, and are 
                                                 
77 It is important to note here that I am not claiming that either of these techniques (double columns or 
running titles) were specifically or consciously adapted for these texts/genres from the biblical exemplars 
(though this is of course possible). 
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almost always two or three text lines tall (though letters with ascenders or descenders, 
such as “H” or “P” may extend several more in height).  
Also important is the extreme difference between the nature of BNF lat. 17007’s 
composition—that is, the circumstances and intentionality behind the gathering and 
combination of its sections—and that operative in the other composite manuscripts we 
have considered, chiefly BNF lat. 1240 and BNF lat. 5290. Unlike in BNF lat. 5290, the 
different sections of 17007 do not correspond to divisions between texts, produced at 
different scriptoria as part of a collective project. Unlike in BNF lat. 1240, the span of 
time stretching between these sections is not the mark of independently conceived and 
produced works, later combined because of a broadly shared (proto-)normative role or 
tentatively emerging archival sensibility. Rather, at least in the case of the first two 
sections of BNF lat. 17007, their most likely role or relationship is the repair of damage 
arising from heavy use. This also addresses the odd combination of these sections, with 
the “first section” actually being two collections of leaves appended to the beginning and 
end of the second. The breaks between the first and second parts of this first section and 
the much longer second section that they bookend fall in the middle of the manuscript’s 
constituent texts. In the first case, the Passio sanctorum quatuor coronatorum runs from 
ff. 8v to 12r, while in the latter the Passio sanctorum Saviniani et Potentiani from ff. 
197v to 202r. This suggests that these later additions to the main body of the manuscript 
were repairs.  
The last section, ff. 203–210, is more puzzling. It probably dates from the end of 
the twelfth century (thus close to the likely date of the main body of the manuscript but 
long before fourteenth-century additions of the first section, the latter of which it 
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follows). This gathering is a straightforward quaternion, beginning on its own leaf and 
ending with the latter half of its second column empty. It also contains only one text, the 
Vita sancti Katherinae virginis,78 and uses a slightly different ruling style (continuing its 
guidelines through the center margin between its two columns, which the rest of the 
manuscript does not include). This gathering also shows extensive damage and mess on 
its first recto leaf, suggesting that it may have spent some time outside of any larger 
gathering or codex. But even more strangely, the first leaf of this gathering begins with 
an explicit for the Passio sancti Petri episcopi. This, along with the layout and dating, 
suggest that this text was originally part of another legendary, a conclusion reinforced by 
the inclusion of a feast day for Saint Katherine, given as the 24 November. Moreover, 
Peter of Alexandria, a full passio text of whom is also found in its proper place in BNF 
lat. 17007 (ff. 114–115v), is generally commemorated, too, on 25 November—what then 
is this Vita sancti Katherinae doing following it? Besides this issue of dating, which is 
most likely explicable by regional variation, this explicit greatly complicates matters; it 
suggests that this gathering was taken from another legendary rather than conceived from 
the outset as a supplement or repair to BNF lat. 17007. But if so, why the empty latter 
half of the final column, which would certainly be filled in were the text part of a 
legendary? Regardless, it does seem probable that this text/gathering, whatever its origin, 
was added to BNF lat. 17007 sometime after the fourteenth-century additions of ff. 2–9 
and 198–202, almost certainly so that the legendary might gain a valued text for use in an 
                                                 
78 The prologue incipit for this text refers to it as a vita, while the main text incipit and explicit call it a 
passio. 
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observance its community had not previously maintained, or at least for which it had had 
to make use of another document theretofore.  
Finally, we note that the placement of the Vita sancti Odonis prima et maior (ff. 
68v–82v) within BNF lat. 17007, like the rest of the texts in the manuscript (except that 
concerning Katherine, as just observed), is governed by the place of its subject’s 
veneration within the liturgical year. Again, the manuscript deviates slightly from the 
modern Catholic schedule, giving Odo’s feast day as 19 instead of 18 November. This 
places it between the Passio sanctorum Romani et Baralis pueri, martyred by Diocletian, 
and the Epistola passionis sancti Eadmundi regis, killed by the Great Heathen Army in 
869 or 870. Significantly if unsurprisingly, BNF lat. 17007 thus breaks the agglomeration 
of Cluniac abbatial literature found not only in overtly Cluniac reform manuals (Mazarine 
2012 and Bodley 817), but also in BNF lat. 5290. We have no reason to assume this latter 
manuscript was specifically associated with reform or even with Cluny itself. Indeed, it 
appears to have shared and to some extent anticipated the function of BNF lat. 17007, as 
a kind of reference repository for narrative hagiographic texts having a role in the liturgy; 
nevertheless, a grouping of Cluniac abbatial literature such as appears in the reform 
manuals had survived transmission into this new context. Thus we note an important 
development of the true legendary type: the organization by date, rather than by either 
thematic connections between individual texts or by the arrangement of these texts in 
earlier manuscript sources from which they were copied or more generally known. In this 
we see that the makers of BNF lat. 17007, and of legendaries in general, were breaking 
free of the earlier traditions that had governed the composition and re-composition of 
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such composite texts, and in fact subjecting those texts to what we can call, confidently if 
also critically, pragmatic or even rational organization.  
In examining this manuscript, we have for the first time crossed the divide, 
treacherous as it may be, between “Benedictine” and Cistercian communities.79 In doing 
so, the attentive reader may have wondered if the innovation (or, more rightly, 
innovations, as we have seen) the legendary type represents might not be considered a 
Cistercian one. After all, the Cistercians do appear to have been innovators over the 
Cluniacs in some important uses of written documents, as well as in the development of 
ordo. However, we do have examples of Benedictine precursors to the legendary type in 
general and the Liber de natalitiis in particular. By way of example, I will consider one—
which contains a fragment of the Vita prima—here: BNF lat. 3788. To better understand 
this manuscript and its relation to BNF lat. 17007 and the Liber de natalitiis in general, 
we must consider briefly some of the work already done on the “genesis and diffusion” of 
the great Cistercian legendary. 
The current account of the Liber de natalitiis as a collection originating in 
northern France and Flanders among Cistercian communities in the late twelfth century, 
is based on the work of Henri Rochais.80 Rochais stipulated that the Liber was not the 
first Cistercian legendary and is better understood as a major expansion of the oldest 
surviving legendary of Cîteaux itself, which dates from the first half of the eleventh 
                                                 
79 “Benedictine” is a questionable, or at least anachronistic, term, either in opposition to Cistercian or as a 
general characterization of early and even high medieval monasticism. 
80 Rochais, “Un légendier cistercien,” 1111–1116. 
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century.81 This new text, the Liber, first appeared at the monastery of Pontigny, one of 
Cîteaux’s four great daughter houses, and then spread rapidly along an axis uniting Dijon, 
Troyes, and Senlis.82 Given its suggested origin (Val Abbey in the Île-de-France) and 
dating (primarily, the second half of the twelfth century), BNF lat. 17007 fits perfectly 
into this model of the initial diffusion of the text. 
The story of BNF lat. 3788 is much more confusing. Rochais, somewhat 
contradictorily as François Dolbeau points out, both identified another manuscript, Rouen 
BM 1381, as a witness of the first volume of the Liber and dated it to the middle of the 
eleventh century—a hundred years or more before the appearance of the Liber at 
Pontigny and even several decades before the foundation of what would become the 
Cistercian Order!83 Rochais goes on to identify this manuscript as the root of a sub-family 
of six Liber witnesses, including BNF lat. 3788.84 Dolbeau suggests, as a way of making 
better sense of these manuscripts and their similarities and differences, that they 
“represent not a certain family of the [Liber de natalitiis], but a type of source collection 
reproduced and enriched by the compiler of the Cistercian anthology.”85 That is to say, 
these manuscripts attest an anthology that began independently of—even significantly 
earlier than—the Liber and the Cistercian Order itself and was later incorporated into the 
Cistercian efforts along these lines. Concurring with Rochais, Dolbeau, on the basis of 
                                                 
81 Ibid., 1112. For a recent important reconsideration of the development of the Liber de natalitiis and its 
relationship to other Cistercian legendaries, see Lanéry, “Nouvelles recherches,” 65–68. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Dolbeau, “Notes sur la genèse,” 151–152. 
84 Rochais, “Un légendier cistercien.” 
85 Dolbeau, “Notes sur la genèse,” 152. 
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the particular saints and texts included, considers this collection best identified with the 
regions of Maine and Anjou.86 
Setting aside at present such important questions as the layout of Rouen 1831 and 
Montpellier BU Médecine 30, and keeping in mind the pre-Cistercian roots not only of 
the Liber de natalitiis but of the legendary in general, we turn to BNF lat. 3788. The 
modern codex appears to include three sections, each of unique provenance.87 Dolbeau 
dates the first two of these, comprised of ff. 1–39 and 180–229 (first) and 48–179 
(second), to sometime in the twelfth century, and the third (ff. 40–47) to the thirteenth. 
Moreover, he asserts that the second gathering’s collection of saints “is more 
characteristic of and oriented towards” Le Mans, whereas the third section suggests Sées 
or Angers. He also suggests that these gatherings were bound together quite late, 
probably in the late seventeenth century when they passed through the library of Colbert. 
Certainly even a cursory survey of the manuscript confirms the impression that these 
texts’ creators did not intend their combination, and that whoever did bind these texts 
together did so with virtually no concern for their future rational employ. None of the 
divisions between the constituent gatherings correspond in the slightest with those of the 
individual texts contained therein; at these junctures, one text merely ends, half finished, 
while a totally different one “resumes,” also in the middle. This post-medieval binding 
thus differs completely from all the other “miscellanies” we have considered so far, for 
                                                 
86 Rochais, Dolbeau, and Levinson all regard pre-Cistercian collections from Burgundy and Franche-Comté 
as the most important immediate predecessors for the Liber de natalitiis. Rochais in particular identifies 
legendaries from Saint-Bénigne of Dijon (Montpellier BU Médecine 30) and the (Benedictine) monastery 
at Montiéramey (Troyes BM 7) as important influences on the first Cistercian legendary, which went on to 
be incorporated into the Liber. Rochais, “Un légendier cistercien,” 1112; Dolbeau, “Notes sur la genèse,” 
143.  
87 Dolbeau, “Notes sur la genèse,” 155–156. 
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while those collections may have appeared arbitrary at first glance, various thematic 
congruencies—and, in some cases, traces of unified conception and intentionality—
quickly suggested themselves.  
However, on the other hand, these disjuncts in the contents of BNF lat. 3788 
make the formal cohesion observable across its various gatherings all the more striking. 
For the consistency found in the page layout of all this codex’s sections is comparable to 
that found in the most unified and coherent manuscripts considered so far (Mazarine 
2012, BNF lat. 17007). In all three sections of BNF lat. 3788, we find the two columns of 
small, even minuscule (or gothic, for the seven leaves of the third section, ff. 40–47). 
Across the sections, the number of lines per page varies from as few as forty to as many 
as forty-five; a greater range than in BNF lat. 17007 (only one line!), but smaller than that 
of BNF lat. 5290 (a range of eight). Even more distinctive is the use of running titles, 
which so far have been found only in the fully-developed legendary type (BNF lat. 
17007) and appear in every section of BNF lat. 3788. So too with the particular system of 
capitals noted earlier in the Vita sancti Romani at the end of BNF lat. 5290 and 
throughout 17007. Though there is some significant variation in the size and 
embellishment of BNF lat. 3788’s larger initials, there are no truly illuminated letters to 
be found. Moreover, while the text does use “normal-sized” (one line tall) rubricated 
initials in the body text and slightly-enlarged marginal initials, often with slight or 
moderate decoration, we find none of these normal-sized initials in the margins, as was 
common in many examples of customary-type texts. 
This manuscript thus represents a very interesting early or even pre-stage in the 
development of the legendary type. It shows many layout features of this type, perhaps 
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most precociously running titles, and obviously shares its special function. On the other 
hand, it is a pre-Cistercian creation; moreover, it only infrequently provides the dates for 
its feasts and is written in minuscule. It also includes some sermons. While the functional 
place of these here in a collection of texts to be read for particular feats is no mystery, 
such an inclusion does represent a tendency towards a looser and more flexible standard 
for inclusion that would later be surpressed or abandoned in the production of collections 
such as the Liber de natalitiis. To my mind, then, BNF lat. 3788 both further 
substantiates my typologies and rough periodizing of their development and transition, 
while also serving as a powerful reminder or illustration that the reality of this schema is 
always messier than its theoretical conception. Various features—in layout, in 
organization, and in which texts and kinds of texts were or were not included—are 
discovered in all sorts of combinations. It is only with an eye to their total effect within a 
gathering or manuscript, and to that manuscript’s place within the wider field of genre 
and relevant institutional contexts, that crucial patterns emerge.  
Here, the overarching story of these two typologies is that of the individual or 
persona as a literary device that, at least in the case of Odo and Cluny and its associated 
houses, operated for a while as the vessel and vehicle of monastic conversatio. In this 
role it could, potentially, help to sustain the reform of some house beyond the immediate 
presence and lifespan of the charismatic historical figures who often leave a large mark 
on the historical record down to the present. In a sense, perhaps, the modern 
historiography that overemphasizes such individuals and ascribes too much enduring 
success to their reforms has understood texts such as the Vita prima exactly as they were 
supposed to: the persona of the great man in its presence at this or that monastery is the 
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substance of reform. By the dual power of his example and authority, he, the individual, 
institutes a new conversatio. But while recent research has very rightly undermined this 
kind of narrative, showing how the reforms of these individuals were more limited, more 
conditional, and rather less lasting in their effects than had been previously thought, it is 
important to note that these vitae were, as texts and physical tools, themselves intended to 
do what we have mistakenly attributed to their subjects: to perpetuate the charismatic 
presence of these individuals in pursuit of reform. Thus we find the Vita prima to contain 
not only many stirring examples of Odo’s virtue, devotion, austerity, and rectitude, but 
also a barely-hidden account of formalized monastic conversatio that overflows the limits 
of the individual, deforming the biographical aspect of the text and even, in Nalgod’s 
view, threatening to cover over the very deeds of its supposed protagonist. The proper 
conduct of rituals such as chapter or meals or of the liturgy itself, which is essentially 
communal and thus actually quite strictly impossible for any individual to perform, is 
imbricated with the episodes of Odo’s life, such that a monk who contemplates and 
studies his example learns them as well, thereby not only perpetuating but actually 
creating, slowly, a Cluniac ethic, code, or praxis.  
Even the limited and impressionistic consideration of the manuscript tradition of 
this vita presented here provides important insights into the history and nature of this 
tool. In John of Salerno’s day, it was likely used on its own as an exemplar for monks. 
Like the Lausiac History, John copied it for his own community at Salerno, which Odo 
had reformed in collaboration with John himself, at the behest of his brothers. The work 
may have been read aloud in refectory or in chapter, perhaps on a liturgical cycle. It may 
have been perused by individuals. And it may even have been consulted during chapter 
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discussions of reprimand and custom.88 Later, we find an eleventh-century copy of the 
vita, which almost certainly began its life and enjoyed some career as an independent 
booklet, has been bound into a tenth-century liturgical collection at Saint-Martial of 
Limoges. As a liturgical resource, this manuscript, BNF lat. 1240, had been superseded 
several times over by the mid-eleventh century; yet it continued to gather libelli into 
itself, and was known more than a century later to the chronicler and armarius Bernard 
Itier. We also know that more up-to-date liturgical collections continued to be checked 
against it, and in at least one case that material it included, even though imperfectly 
grasped by the copyist/liturgist in question, was recopied into one of these later 
collections despite having been skipped over in previous generations of liturgical 
manuals.89 Perhaps then the vita here was conceived as some kind of normative or proto-
normative resource, and for this reason combined with the older troper-proser?  
The idea that this booklet may have corresponded to a second, more intensive, 
mid-eleventh-century Cluniac reform of Saint-Martial by Hugh the Great is supported by 
circumstantial, but not insignificant, evidence. Another copy of the Vita prima, with 
similar layout features and very similar script, is found in what I have called a “reform 
manual,” associated with Hugh’s reform of Saint-Martin-des-Champs in 1079. Here the 
vita appears as part of a quite unified collection of Cluniac lives and liturgical materials, 
                                                 
88 I have not presented—nor discovered—any particular evidence of this. If some citation of the text did 
occur in this kind of context, it is probably more likely that it would have been cited from memory by 
individuals who had studied the text on their own or recalled it particularly well from para-liturgical 
communal reading/recitation. On the other hand, the Rule of Benedict was read in chapter, and customs 
themselves were discussed, debated, modified, and instituted by the community in such a setting, 
suggesting at least the conceptual possibility that normative or semi/proto-normative documents such as 
John’s vita or the reform manuals considered above may have been consulted there. Cochelin, “Community 
and Customs,” 242–243. 
89 Grier, “Roger de Chabannes,” 109–110. 
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Mazarine 2012, of a type that is duplicated perfectly in yet another manuscript (Bodley 
817) of uncertain provenance (but, again, very similar script, layout, decoration, and 
probably age). This trajectory towards standardization and even the medieval version of 
mass production suggests that the role of the Vita prima in communicating a specifically 
Cluniac conversatio, particularly in cases of reform, was gaining in clarity and 
intentionality. Perhaps, over generations, some monks had slowly noticed that offering 
this text to zealous brothers frequently served not only individual but communal reform. 
Is it so unreasonable to suggest that monks, who intended and used vitae for didactic 
purposes, might notice which such texts worked best for this purpose, and accordingly 
focused their efforts on those in particular? Certainly, by the late eleventh century, the 
monks of Cluny had developed the Vita prima as the core (or, at least, bulk) of a 
composite document that not only displayed the prestige of Cluny through a series of 
abbatial vitae, but also instilled certian, perhaps particularly Cluniac, forms of chapter 
and reprimand, of silence and sign language, of individual ethos, and, in combination 
with liturgical texts, communal worship. 
But as the monks came to understand the Vita prima and reform manuals such as 
Mazarine 2012 or Bodley 817 in these terms with increasing clarity, the biographical 
framing presented by John’s text in turn became less necessary, and even began to seem 
strange; thus Ulrich of Zell and Bernard of Cluny were able to produce huge 
compendiums of Cluniac usage with no reference to biography or, in the latter case, with 
no recourse to framing individuals and narratives at all. A few decades later, the monk 
Nalgod, reworking the early abbatial hagiography under the abbacy of Peter the 
Venerable, when confronted by John’s vita, was horrified at its, to his eye, impossibly 
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tangled and disorienting narrative structure.90 And how did he repair the text, to better 
reveal the deeds and person of Odo? By removing precisely the material that addressed 
and related the communal ritual codes that made the Vita prima such a useful teaching 
text in reform contexts. Having delivered its cargo, the individual as literary device found 
its position vis-a-vis monastic conversatio precisely inverted: where once it had stood 
over and above these communal codes, governing their dissemination by presenting itself 
for the contemplation of monks, now those codes deployed it, as merely one illustration 
or iteration among many. 
At the same time—indeed, in the very same space, on the flesh of the page—that 
the role of the individual, of the persona, was changing, the technology of its 
reproduction and retransmission was changing as well. The reform manual had already 
superseded the lone booklet as the receptacle of John’s vita, and now this manual in turn 
was followed by encyclopedic collections of narrative hagiography. In the slow formation 
of this new genre, numerous, far-flung scribes were making new choices, possibly 
influenced to some extent by the example of the Tours Bible, about how to usefully and 
appropriately arrange words on the page: two narrow columns instead of one block, forty 
or forty-five lines instead of around thirty, running titles, less or no illumination, and a 
new system of capitals. None of these numerous changeovers are neatly paired; again and 
again the manuscripts discussed above straddle the relevant inflection points. The Vita 
prima as independent libellus is only evidenced in an older liturgical collection. The 
reform manuals are highly composite texts, yet seem mass produced, carefully organized, 
                                                 
90 Iogna-Prat, “Panorama,” 88. 
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and aimed at the function of customaries. BNF lat. 5290 clearly attests the role of the 
legendary, yet includes virtually none of layout features found in what I have taken as 
more typical or characteristic examples of that type, BNF lat. 17007 and 3788. But from 
this cauldron of experimentation and innovation, the legendary did emerge as a distinct 
and novel form.  
Is it a coincidence that, as the physical position of words on pages was—in the 
most literal possible sense—reoriented, so too was the role of the individual within the 
text? The persona or character of Odo, just as obviously and explicitly a sign to John of 
Salerno or Nalgod as it is to the eye of the early-twenty-first-century historian, did 
different work in the eleventh-century libellus that was later bound into BNF lat. 1240 
than it did in the Liber de natalitiis. The arc of the Odo character’s functional 
development from the proto-customary through the legendary is a progression from the 
trace of a charismatic presence, which not only “reforms” but indeed conducts the 
aspirant to God by its mere proximity, towards an illustration, an episode, or a facet of 
something much larger. In Peircean terms, Odo has developed from an icon or index of 
the divine to a mere symbol of proper behavior; where once he evidenced salvific 
transcendence and the power of God by his actual presence, or even resembled God in 
some way,91 now he is just the liturgical observance of a particular day. This progression 
parallels, in its relationship to wider social and material contexts, an Ongian account of 
movement from orality to literality: Odo no longer embodies a total situation or event 
(the life of a monk or even of an entire community of monks), but has been translated 
                                                 
91 For Hugh of Semur discussed in such terms, see Chapter 8. 
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into and fixed in one, clear, detached realm. In this role he remains basically “important,” 
worthy of veneration, and certainly retains some sense of the individual. Yet he is also 
fundamentally relegated to the cell of his one feast day, a cell he shares with many other 
observances, signs, and texts, and a cell that is essentially identical to those of all the days 
preceding and following it, which contain in their turns Saint Leonard, Saint Katherine, 
Saint Gregory, and all the rest, who each when their time comes round illustrate the same 
ultimate principle as Odo, and in essentially the same fashion. 
The station of this development attested in the legendary type displays a basic 
congruence with, and certainly invites in a way its manifestation in the customary type 
did not, the practice of reference reading. For reference reading dissolves and atomizes, 
as it were, the previously whole conglomerated text as it is approached by a reader 
practicing the meditative lectio divina. A monk sitting down with the Vita prima in 
libellus form would be confronted with a great block of text, difficult to search for a 
particular point or theme within a single page as it would be throughout its whole length, 
with the only readily discernable distinction being made between the prologue and main 
text. In that form, it would invite the reader into a prolonged and involved reading, 
wherein the biography and character of Odo would offer an organizing principle through 
which a depiction of rigidly-ordered communal life might also be unfolded and, indeed, 
remembered. And if this text ever was used for consultation on particular elements of 
proper monastic conversatio (that is, for reference reading), as I have suggested it might, 
tentatively, sometimes have been, the person of Odo himself would not have been the 
object sought, but the search aid, and the course of his biography the index. On the other 
hand, a volume of the Liber de natalitiis virtually begs for “intrusive and rapid, silent 
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perusal of text in the quest for specific information.”92 Running titles, ordering based on 
feast day, narrow columns, and regular marginal capitals all help a reader search both for 
and within the text of the Vita prima. And in this case, it is very much Odo, in all his 
completeness and individuality, who would be pursued by the reference reader. 
Do this correlation and its trajectory have implications even beyond the page? 
Though their suggestion must be tenuous and hypothetical, I will venture them. As I 
argued earlier, ritual can be understood as a kind of training in the use of signs: not 
merely in interpreting or translating them, but in the pragmatics of their use even on a 
mundane, habitual, preconscious level. One example may be of a man who, in learning to 
read words on a page, is provided with a pragmatic cognitive model of how signs are 
grasped and integrated, such that he subsequently comes to read the world—that is, the 
flow of sensory experience—as though it were a book, perhaps even without realizing 
that he now applies a particular model beyond its original purview.93 In terms of the 
current investigation, we can certainly recognize that there are important ritual elements 
at work in many of the contexts wherein an eleventh-century monk at Cluny or an 
associated house might encounter the Vita prima et maior: while eating in the refectory, 
conferring in chapter, or even in private meditative reading. And we have just observed at 
length the various normative and exemplary valences of the vita.  
In light of these insights, and within the theological (and, again, ritual) space 
outlined by the Cluny Bible’s introductory material and by Glaber’s chronicle, which 
together emphasize salvific semiotics, the co-mediation of text and holy individual, and 
                                                 
92 Saenger, Space Between Words, 4. 
93 See Carr, The Shallows, 39–52 for more on this idea. 
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(orthopraxic, historical) institutional context, I suggest that the self-conception of 
sensitive and committed monks, at least, may have developed with and through the 
development of such literary devices as the Odo character. If the goal was to model 
oneself on the examples of the saints, how could they not? That is to say, if John might 
have experienced himself and considered his brothers primarily as complex individuals 
embarked on personal journeys towards God, loosely banded together for mutual support 
and protection and the spiritual benefits of training in obedience, perhaps Nalgod felt 
himself a cog precisely integrated into the vast machine of monastic life through the 
application of minute, detailed, externally directed strictures. Personal salvation remained 
a vital goal, but the twelfth-century brothers of Cluny were also key motivators in a vast 
engine of socially integrative, intercessory prayer and citizens in an emerging, 
constitutional, conciliar ordo that spanned the continent and bridged the divide between 
living and dead, fallen and saved. Like the Odo character, their relationship to the 
monastic life had fundamentally changed over the course of two centuries: once they had 
governed its dissemination, but now it deployed them in a regimented economy of praxis 
and semiosis. 
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CHAPTER IX: RITUAL IN THE CUSTOMARY OF BERNARD 
 
 
I have already briefly discussed the nature of the genre of the customary, in particular 
emphasizing its relationship to the Rule of Benedict. Next, I sketched one genealogy, or 
one part of the genealogy, of this genre, connecting it to the Vita prima et maior sancti 
Odonis and the emerging Cluniac abbatial literature of the tenth and eleventh centuries 
that played such an important part in the development of Cluniac ethos and prestige. The 
essential points here were three: first, genre, in this cultural and institutional context, was 
to some important extent a specific material and semantic form, in fact a technology, that 
could be deployed towards various, potentially conflicting tasks; second, John of 
Salerno’s vita fulfilled some of the functions that would later come to be regarded as the 
preserve of the genre of customary, and specifically not of vita; and third, observation of 
the changing material forms of vitae (especially page layout and manuscript context), and 
of the specific revisions made by an editor such as Nalgod to John’s vita, sheds light on 
the changing role of documents within monastic/Cluniac ritual, normativity, and 
institutional power. 
Another important line of descent in the genre of the customary, also centered on 
Cluny, has been developed particularly by Isabelle Cochelin. This account focuses on the 
four customaries that sought to gather and fix Cluny’s consuetudines, from the first such 
document’s appearance at the end of the tenth century to the culminating works of Ulrich 
of Zell and especially of the mysterious Bernard, known only in his authorship of the 
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customary that bears his name.1 Cochelin has argued that virtually all surviving 
customaries prior to Bernard’s, and, referring to Cluny or not, there are not many, were 
intended to record the usages of a prestigious house or the Carolingian reform program 
for transmission elsewhere. That is, there is extremely little evidence that any Latin 
monastery produced a specific written record of its own customs for its own use before 
the late eleventh century—indeed, before Bernard’s itself.2 Consequently, Bernard’s 
customary “is an exception among the monastic customaries, and constitutes a stage by 
itself or more exactly a turning point in the production of monastic customaries.”3  
As such a turning point, Bernard’s customary represents a particularly interesting 
object for my study. Like the tension between John of Salerno’s vita and Nalgod’s 
furious rewriting, like the shift from the customary style of the vita’s manuscript context 
to the lectionary style, and like the Cluniac effort to adapt and reproduce Alcuin’s re-
imagination of the scriptures as a mighty pandect, this customary is a document that 
grapples with the need, or at least the desire, for stability and continuity in a fluid and 
changing world. In observing it scrabbling for purchase therein, we catch it in the act, and 
can observe the strategies Bernard—and the document itself—deploy to establish and 
maintain and communicate meaning and authority, as well as the assumptions that 
supported the whole project. Moreover, by its very nature, Bernard’s customary offers a 
unique opportunity to observe the decisive Gordian knot of semiosis, ritual, and literality 
my study foregrounds. Accordingly, I begin by considering how Bernard himself 
                                                 
1 Cochelin, “Community and Customs.”. 
2 Ibid., 239–249. 
3 Ibid., 239. Compare also to our discussion of Diem’s work in Chapter 6. 
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conceives and justifies his work, before turning to a detailed examination of ritual at 
Cluny as attested in this document, and then close with a consideration of the relationship 
between that ritual and the customary as a certain kind of tool: namely, a written one.  
Much of Bernard’s explicit understanding of what he is making and why appears 
in the customary’s prologue, which is addressed to Hugh of Semur (1049–1109). In this 
short introduction, Bernard refers to the customary as a “work” (opera), a “little work” 
(opusculus), and something “in one volume . . .” (in unum volumen) “with letters quite 
diligently marked” (litteris diligentius annotatam).4 Throughout the work he frequently 
refers to the arrangement/order (ordo) and way of life/behavior (conversatio) of those 
living at Cluny—often in distinction to visitors, servants, or others who come into contact 
with the monastic community but are not (full) members of it. While these terms had long 
before the late eleventh century come to operate as specific ones for regular monastic life, 
Bernard clearly did not consider the document itself as an ordo, but rather as a vessel for 
or witness to an ordo/conversatio that existed primarily as a body of lived custom(s): 
when describing what has gone into his document, Bernard speaks of customs 
(consuetudines) and opinions, judgments, or ideas (sententias). Moreover, the document 
is explicitly figured as a receptacle when it calls it “one volume” into which he has 
gathered (redigerem) these consuetudines and sententias, and again through biblical 
allusion, when he compares the customary to a “wooden vessel” and a “lead pipe” (ex 
ligneo vase . . . plumbeam fistulam).5 
                                                 
4 Bernard of Cluny, Ordo Cluniacensis, 134–135. 
5 Ibid. 
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Bernard explains the purpose of his work by referencing controversies arising 
among the monks of Cluny. As the older monks die and novices succeed them, disputes 
and uncertainties arise about the proper customs of the monastery. In response to this 
problem, Bernard has sifted through both written and oral testimony to determine the 
proper customs of life at Cluny.6 In this way, the document is explicitly figured as a 
bulwark against the passage of mortal time. Bernard’s evocative phrasing—“with those 
previously living at the Cluniac place entering bit by bit the way of all flesh, and with 
new men/novices succeeding, certain controversies concerning the most wise customs 
have been arising”—suggests that human lives ebb and flow, like the tides, churning a 
sea that threatens to wash away the wisdom of established tradition. Towards the end of 
the prologue, he continues this loose metaphor by imploring his brothers to lean upon or 
be supported by (inniti) the customs contained in his work, that they may not recede 
(recedant) from this true way. For Bernard, valid traditions are something that can be 
clung to against the flux of the corporeal world, and his customary provides the necessary 
purchase. 
The concern for the maintenance of an elaborate and particular standard, in this 
case, of monastic life, offered the opportunity to Bernard to notice the distinction 
between the physical object he helped make, on the one hand, and, on the other, what it 
might contain in a way that the goals of other medieval documentary types may not have. 
The charter, for example, at least up to the time of Bernard’s work, often seems to have 
                                                 
6 “Quoniam, Pater Glorissime, prioribus loci Cluniacensis viam universae carnis paulatim ingredientibus, 
ac Novitiis succedentibus, quaedam de Consuetudinibus saepissime oriebantur controversiae, diversis 
civersa sentientibus . . . diligentia ipsam veritatem investigarem, et sive ex his quae scripta reperirem, sive 
ex his quae didiceram et discere possem,” ibid., 134. 
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commemorated or even symbolically reproduced the charismatic event of a donation.7 
Alternately, though more in earlier periods of powerful Carolingian rulership than in the 
context of its more somnolent Capetian variety, charters could well be dispositive. In 
none of these cases, however, was the document’s role as a container of information 
particularly important—the realities of the exchanges and agreements suggested by these 
documents were closer to a coherent and self-sufficient oral, lived experience. An 
important reason for this difference lies in the objects of representation aimed at by 
charters as opposed to those pursued by the customary. The former sought to suggest 
clusters of rights over land and the labor of people, while the latter aimed at the behavior 
of a community of humans in a far more exhaustive and absolute way. In a sense, who 
was allowed into chapter assemblies and who controlled the wine cellar and how 
assiduously the brothers lived up to their vows was Cluny; where a lord might prefer to 
receive as many dues and privileges as possible, he did not risk loss of his essential lordly 
status by failing to maximally exploit his holdings. Merely some observable exploitation 
was generally sufficient.8 Moreover, the cultivation of land and the collection of dues 
from mills, mints, mines, and so on are radically simpler and more reliable systems than 
that represented by an individual human being, let alone a community of them hemmed 
in by a thick web of forbidden and mandated behaviors. Ultimately, because his work’s 
object was many times more complex and resistant to control, Bernard and those sharing 
his general task of monastic reform had many more opportunities to notice disjunction 
between their ideal and its contact with lived material reality than did those concerned 
                                                 
7 Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record, 26–43; Bedos-Rezak, When Ego Was Imago, 9–37. 
8 Bisson, The Crisis of the Twelfth Century, 68–83. 
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primarily with performing lordly dominance or dynastic expansion and secondarily with 
enjoying the concrete fruits thereof. The greater difficulty of their task drove the creation 
of more detailed documents, which only sharpened the contrast and, in the end, 
increasingly articulated a norm and called attention to the fact that this norm was 
nowhere fully in evidence.  
But the development of this distinction in the customary should not be 
exaggerated. Changes in use and conception of documents proceeded slowly, and the 
historical record shows more hybrids and half-way points than it does paradigmatic 
benchmarks. Gert Melville, in particular, has discussed the slow changing normative 
function of Cluniac documentation.9 Surveying the progression from the eleventh-century 
customaries through the statutes of Peter the Venerable, produced in the second quarter of 
the twelfth century, to the thirteenth-century, conciliar ordo statutes, Melville argues that 
the customaries themselves held no particular normative power. Rather, they recorded 
lived, traditional praxis, wherein actual normativity lay.10 Perhaps Melville overstates the 
customaries’ his case a bit. Bernard frequently employs a seemingly normative 
subjunctive mood and both positive and negative usages of the verb debere (to ought). 
And he clearly intends his document to resolve disputes about proper praxis. Thus, I 
would qualify Melville a bit: it is, as he says, the actual lived traditions of the Cluniac 
conversatio that are normative. But Bernard’s text, as a detailed representation of those 
traditions, could potentially reflect, imply, or even exploit that normativity.  
                                                 
9 Melville, “Action, Text, and Validity.” 
10 Ibid., 80. 
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Along these lines, the hybridity of Bernard’s customary, its ghostly proto-
normativity, can be interestingly compared with that of William the Conqueror’s 
Domesday Book, which was produced around the same time. Both these works tried to 
fix huge and varied objects of representation in writing—one the behavior of a rapidly 
growing community, the other a whole new-won kingdom—in order to create reference 
works when the documentary order of the day was more commonly commemorative or 
symbolic. Yet at this time it was still very difficult, or perhaps even impossible, to 
imagine a document that was authoritative in what it said as a document, rather than as 
the decree or revelation of an authoritative person, or as the commemoration or symbol 
of an authoritative event. So these documents awkwardly straddle normative and positive 
accounts of their objects.  
Thomas Bisson has suggested comparison of Domesday Book and Peter the 
Venerable’s efforts to survey and reform Cluny’s holdings around the second quarter of 
the twelfth century. According to Bisson, Domesday responded to the perception that 
customary rents and dues were falling badly behind the increasing productivity of the 
eleventh-century English economy. It attempted to capture this change over time by 
providing records of output for each area surveyed in the time of Edward the Confessor, 
again when the Conqueror re-distributed the lands after his invasion, and at the time the 
Book was written. Bisson argues that this proves the new problem of customary rents and 
dues failing to keep pace with a growing eleventh-century agrarian base was noticed 
“earlier there than anywhere else in Europe.”11 But Bernard had clearly recognized a 
                                                 
11 Bisson, The Crisis of the Twelfth Century, 331.  
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similar problem in the community at Cluny—not fifty years later than Domesday Book, 
but contemporaneous with it. Though his concern was an incredibly complex and 
extended mass orthopraxy rather than lordly surplus extraction, and though his customary 
aimed to stand firm against the tide of changing times rather than rise smoothly (and, 
more importantly, proportionally) with it, in both cases we observe the deployment of 
documents in response to the perception of temporal drift and its destabilizing effects on 
the world of humans. And within the cloister, Bernard certainly had every opportunity to 
experience the general growth of eleventh-century society: the number of monks at Cluny 
increased from between sixty and eighty in 1049, when Hugh’s abbacy began, to more 
than 300 by 1122, and it is likely servants and other non-monks associated with the 
abbey, with whom Bernard’s customary is no less concerned, grew proportionately.12  
But Bernard gives a second reason in the prologue for compiling his work, one 
very different from a concern for preserving tradition in changing times. Further on in the 
prologue, Bernard relates that Hugh has commanded him to set down the Cluniac ordo. 
Accordingly, this writing fulfills the command accepted by Bernard from Hugh (vestra 
mihi auctoritas imperaret . . . a vobis accepta iussione impleto). We may rightly question 
how much Bernard’s experience of this command and his work in fulfilling it differed 
from that of a secular tenant or sworn free man under his own lord—it is common, in this 
customary as in many other period sources, to refer to abbots as dominus or domnus 
abbas. Bernard’s prologue is addressed to “most revered . . . preeminent lord abbot 
                                                 
12 Constable, The Reformation of the Twelfth Century, 89–90; for more on the documentary relationship 
between Cluny and its surrounding lay population, see Constable, “The Abbot and Townsmen of Cluny in 
the Twelfth Century,” in Church and City, 1000–1500: Essays in Honour of Christopher Brooke, ed. David 
Abulafia, Michael Franklin, and Miri Rubin (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 151–
171. 
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Hugh” (reverendissimo . . . praecipuo domno hugoni abbati), and both medieval and 
modern observers have highlighted similarities between regular-clerical and lay 
lordship.13 Obedience to one’s superior is a universal bedrock of Christian monasticism, 
then as now, and Bernard writes in his prologue that he will persevere in obedience to 
Hugh his whole life (vobis obediendo usque ad moretem perseveravero). Moreover, the 
customary itself admonishes monks to prostrate themselves “with their whole body” 
(prostrato toto corpore) and seek indulgence or mercy if they should so much as sense 
anger or indignation from the abbot.14 Indeed, Bernard appears to perform this self-
abasing subordination in (and through) his prologue itself; much of what remains of it is 
concerned with emphasizing his own smallness (meae parvitatis) in contrast to Hugh’s 
greatness and attributing whatever measure of success he has achieved to Hugh himself.15  
Though these two motives (creation of a material tool to preserve right orthopraxy 
in changing times and obedience to the command of a superior) are not contradictory, 
they are distinct. And the relationship between them Bernard establishes is somewhat 
perplexing. He begins the body of the prologue with the word quoniam—“since.” Then 
follows his description of the coming and going of generations within the community and 
the controversies that have been arising; finally, Bernard writes that “supposing your 
authority commanded me, that with as much diligence as I could muster I should 
investigate this very truth . . .” (operae pretium judicavi, si vestra mihi auctoritas 
imperaret, ut cum quant possem diligentia ipsam veritatem investigarem). The reader is 
                                                 
13 Bisson, The Crisis of the Twelfth Century, 197–212. 
14 Bernard of Cluny, Ordo cluniacensis, 137. 
15 Ibid., 135. 
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thus presented first and foremost with Bernard’s own understanding of the necessity and 
worthiness of his task, and the suggestion that he embarks upon it to address problems he 
himself has noticed and found worrisome. The quoniam with which the text begins 
strongly suggests a causative role for Bernard’s observations about the controversies 
besetting the Cluniac community—since he has seen these things, he judges this labor 
valuable. Meanwhile the si which first introduces the notion of Hugh’s command is both 
odd and weak, making a command that in just a few lines will become that of a towering 
lord (a lord explicitly described as a personal mediator between Bernard and God and 
even as a figuration of God) into something hypothetical.  
This doubling-of-purpose and the uncertainty which results are significant. 
Modern readers may be inclined simply to understand that Hugh was motivated to 
resolve once and for all the controversies concerning custom arising in the monastic 
community as a result of its growing size and increasingly complex orthopraxy, so that he 
commanded a monk, Bernard, who understood this motivation perfectly well, to compile 
the customary. While this is certainly a plausible, understanding, it nevertheless adds 
something significant to the text, establishing a complex subordination of purpose and 
even a chronology not actually present in the historical document. In so doing, this move 
occludes important features of Bernard’s distinctively medieval diction. Recall the 
tendency towards additive rather than subordinating syntactic structures, which Ong 
suggested as characteristic of oral discourse or writing in a still heavily-oral culture. Ong 
used a comparison of the 1610 Douay Bible’s version of Genesis 1:1–5 with that of the 
1970 New American Bible—the former, closer to the Hebrew original (mediated through 
Latin), begins sentences and independent clauses with “and” nine times, while the latter, 
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“adjusted to sensibilities shaped more by writing and print,” replaces most of these with 
more specific connectors such as “when,” “then,” “thus,” or “while,” thereby orienting 
clauses and phrases in a much more precise web of causal, logical, and narrative 
relationships.16 The case of Bernard’s two purposes presents a similar kind of additive 
redundancy. The modern reader is left uncertain as to the relationship of these two 
seemingly independent motivations because that reader is located more deeply in literate 
culture; but despite Bernard’s literacy, his life is lived in a more oral social world, one in 
which language has not been so extensively reorganized along literate lines. 
Most historians have simply regarded the customary as the product of Hugh’s 
command, ignoring or discounting the suggestion of Bernard’s own initiative. Cochelin, 
however, has taken notice and suggested that Bernard began the customary on his own 
and later sought Hugh’s permission or blessing, or that Bernard’s reference to Hugh’s 
command was otherwise “more laudatory than reliable.”17 In addition to harmonizing 
both suggested motivations, this explanation also fits with Cochelin’s sense of this 
customary as a key turning point: virtually all of the older customaries she discusses give 
no indication of an abbatial participation in their production; Cochelin suggests that 
Bernard’s customary is also tied to a rise in abbatial leadership and authority vis-a-vis 
customs. This would be a feature not merely of Bernard, Hugh, or Cluny, but of the 
second type of customaries outlined by Cochelin, of which Bernard’s is the first, or a 
transitional, example.18 This second type, in addition to being intended for the use of the 
                                                 
16 Ong, Orality and Literacy, 37. 
17 Cochelin, “Community and Customs,” 241–243. 
18 Ibid., 242–243 and 250–252. 
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monastery where it was produced and on whose conversatio it was based, also figured a 
far larger and more powerful, authoritative role for the abbot, specifically in the 
establishment of licit and correct custom.19 
Finally, we consider the depiction of Hugh himself in the prologue. For Bernard 
has made Hugh an integral part of the process of creating—and, implicitly, of using—the 
document. The passage dealing with Hugh begins with Bernard declaring that his work 
fulfills Hugh’s command, as cited above, and that he has drawn upon Hugh’s excellentia 
in compiling it.20 Bernard then figures Hugh as a vital intermediary between himself and 
God: “Certainly your grace to me, after God, is the greatest mercy: because I trust in his 
compassion, if I persevere in obedience to you up to my death, that led by your 
[unspecified] I will be able to come up to the very one [God or Christ], in place of whom 
I recognize you, and of whom I receive the person.”21 Thus Hugh, for Bernard, operates 
as a kind of stand-in for God: not only is Hugh’s grace greatest after God’s, not only will 
obedience to Hugh lead Bernard to God, but Bernard recognizes, acknowledges, or even 
discerns God in Hugh. This semiosis is quite important, and I do not think it would be too 
far a stretch to suggest that Bernard “reads” Hugh. For he continues:  
 
                                                 
19 Ibid. See also Cochelin, “On the ‘Path’ to Salvation: Writing Down, Making Up, and Keeping Customs 
in Eleventh-Century Cluny,” in Rule Makers and Rule Breakers: Proceedings of a St. Michael’s College 
Symposium, ed. Joseph Goering, Francesco Guardiani, and Giulio Silano (New York, NY: Legas, 2006), 
25–41; Vanderputten, “Monastic Reform, Abbatial Leadership, and the Instrumentation of Cluniac 
Discipline.”  
20 Bernard of Cluny, Ordo Cluniacensis, 135. 
21 “. . . vestra quippe gratia mihi post deum est merces maxima: quia confido in eius misericordia, si vobis 
obediendo usque ad mortem perseveravero, quod ducatu vestro ad ipsum pervenire potero, cuius vicem in 
vobis agnosco, cuiusque personam recipio,” ibid., 135. 
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. . . For whatever I learned concerning the order, whatever I grasped concerning 
the path of religion, was more of your gift of God’s inspiration than of my 
industry, and little would my zeal have profited me, had not your paternity 
subjected me to rule and institution, in which gift from God it was as though I saw 
with my finger the expression of God, [that] whatever I read in sacred books of 
virtue, I might be able to touch in some way what I understand concerning what is 
written, if I attend vigilantly to the lines of your way of life.22  
 
Bernard is offering here a complex account of the work of research and editing 
that went into his customary. First, he reads sacred books of virtue. But these writings are 
not intelligible to him on their (or his) own; rather, Bernard proposes a two-stage process 
of understanding: he must touch, feel, or even caress what he understands from reading. 
This tactile apprehension of the virtue he finds in books is provided by his own regular, 
monastic life, and by his perception of Hugh’s unrivaled example of that same way of 
life. This perception, too, can be understood as a reading, not least since Bernard refers to 
the “lines” (lineas) of Hugh’s conversatio, and because he finds “as though [seeing] with 
[his] finger” in “rule and institution” the “expression” of God. Without this layered 
semiosis, reading texts by reading lives, which includes eyes-on-parchment research as 
much as the experience of right orthopraxy as much as mystical revelation, all Bernard’s 
zeal and effort would have come to naught.  
                                                 
22 “. . . quidquid enim de Ordine didici, quidquid de Religionis tramite apprehendi, vestri potius muneris ex 
Dei inspiratione, quam meae fuit industriae, parumque mihi studium meum profuisset, nisi vestra me 
regendum et instituendum Paternitas suscepisset, in qua Deo donante quasi digito Dei expressum video, 
quidquid in libris sacris virtutum lego: ut palpare quodammodo possim, quod de scripturis intelligo, si 
vestrae conversationis lineas vigilanter attendo,” ibid. 
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What does this account of Bernard’s process suggest about how Bernard, for his 
part, imagined the customary itself was to be used? Perhaps Bernard imagined his 
document could not stand without the lived example of conversatio that Hugh had 
provided for him, and thus that the customary was understood as one component in 
reforming or spreading the Cluniac ordo—the other being actual monks well-experienced 
in truly living that ordo. And this is how reform often operated in this period, by monks 
coming along with a customary, as opposed to sending it off unassisted.23 But perhaps 
Bernard also understood that his own experience of living this conversatio and his 
contemplation of Hugh and of God through orthopraxy was vital specifically in that it 
allowed him to discern among the presumably incomplete and even contradictory written 
record upon which he drew which customs were holy, more true, or more discriminate 
(sancta, verior, discretior) and which were mere accretion.24 Thus, by this process of 
layered experiential reading, he had produced a single volume which may be trusted 
throughout (in unum volumen redigerem, sicque aequitatem confideratam), that his 
brothers might know which opinions to lean upon (ut sciant quibus sententiis inniti 
debeant). In that case, the document would be conceived quite clearly as one which could 
take the place even of the holiest of monks: if not an artificial intelligence, perhaps an 
artificial praxis. Rather than a reference work, the customary was a dialectical partner for 
the continual process of monastic training, operating in chapter just like a brother monk, 
alternately reproving and forgiving.  
                                                 
23 Cochelin, “When Monks Were the Book.” 
24 Constable, The Reformation of the Twelfth Century, 169–173; Rosenwein “Rules and the ‘Rule.’” 
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Bernard’s prologue thus presents a hybrid work. Like the most advanced secular 
administrative documents of its day, it responds to the perception of the passage of time 
and the disorder with which this passage threatens earthly institutions. Moreover, the 
prologue reproduces an ambiguity fundamental to the structure of medieval society, for it 
shows both a sense of official or institutional duty, in Bernard’s concern for monastic 
harmony and orthopraxy, and a more personal and affective sense of power and 
obligation, in Bernard’s relationship to Hugh. Grammatically as well as conceptually, the 
relationship and relative domains of these two notions of authority is not clear. Rather, 
they tumble over one another, sometimes reinforcing, sometimes undermining. Finally, 
while perhaps recommending itself for a process of reference reading in chapter, the 
customary was not understood, by Bernard at least, as a mere innate repository, but as a 
living assemblage that reproduced the ideal monk precisely in the place he was most 
needed: chapter. 
We now move to consider how the customary represents what it is concerned 
with: namely, the customs of the Cluniac ordo or conversatio. Bernard’s customary is 
divided into two parts (pars prima and secunda), each in turn divided under numerous 
sub-headings that range from a paragraph to several pages in length. The first part 
receives no subheading, but the second does: “Concerning the ministry of the church 
through the year” (de ministerio ecclesiae per annum).25 And indeed, the second division 
betrays a much more obvious organization. Each sub-heading deals with a certain point in 
the liturgical year and the ceremonies, feasts, and other observances that the monks carry 
                                                 
25 For the presence of this heading in a medieval manuscript of the customary, see BNF lat. 13875 122r. 
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out at that time. These begin with the weeks of Advent, and continue in order through 
Christmas, Lent, Pentecost, and so on. The first part is much more eclectic, in this way 
recalling Benedict’s Rule itself, with sub-headings dealing with a variety of official and 
semi-official positions held by monks within the community, with the operation of the 
infirmary, the instruction of novices and boys, burial practices, and in general a dizzying 
range of topics. The order of these treatments seems random in the extreme to the modern 
reader, with many of the most important offices appearing first but several remaining to 
be scattered throughout the rest of the first part, among a number of sections concerning 
liturgical matters such as masses and communion that might seem to belong in pars 
secunda. Though this disorganization is unlikely to have appeared as such to medieval 
readers and listeners, it is nevertheless significant that the liturgical calendar appears to 
have offered the only truly stable organizing principle for monastic practice. Bernard 
grouped his descriptions of the various offices concerned with the operation of the 
monastery itself at the beginning of pars prima—he begins with the abbot, and follows 
with the greater prior, the prior of the cloister, the circuitors (circuitores) responsible for 
enforcing basic discipline (mainly silence) on the brothers, the chamberlain, the cellarer, 
the grainer, the custodian of wine, the hospitaller, the gardener, the manager of the 
refectory, the constable, the eleemosynarius, the almoner, and the head librarian. Those 
that appear later in pars prima are sextons and cantors associated with the operation of 
churches included in the larger Cluniac burg, as well as the regular cook (coquinae 
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regularis).26 But after this first grouping of these officers—which receives no 
intermediary division as such—the full eclecticism of pars prima is on display. 
To make my way in this dense forest, I focus on the notion of ritual. Studying 
ritual in Bernard’s customary is particularly complex because I am aiming at the object of 
Bernard’s own quite conscious and motivated representation. Whereas in the case of the 
vitae of Odo I could compare one text to another in order to see how different authors 
grappled with the object of representation, bearing different assumptions and reaching 
towards different ends, here the effort is to study two different objects—ritual at Cluny 
and the literate practices deployed to fix and retransmit it—through observation of only 
one of them. In the context of medieval ritual, both Buc and Pössel place special 
emphasis on this difficulty, of distinguishing between “ritual-in-performance” and 
“ritual-in-text,” calling for researchers to consider carefully the specific relationship 
between (written) text and ritual event.27 Fortunately, this is a task to which Peircean 
semiotics is well-suited. Therefore, to pursue this doubled inquiry, I will closely analyze 
two passages from Bernard’s customary that deal with individual rituals. In the case of 
each, I will first consider the ritual specifically as an assemblage of concrete signs and 
sign-uses. Next, I draw some intermediate conclusions about that ritual as it relates to 
semiotic ideology and the other theoretical concepts I have discussed. Upon finishing 
with these examples, I will consider them in comparison to one another, before bringing 
this analysis into conversation with Bernard as author and his text as a document. This 
encounter will yield larger conclusions about monastic ritual in its key semiotic valence 
                                                 
26 Bernard of Cluny, Ordo Cluniacensis, 236. 
27 Buc, Dangers of Ritual, 10–11; Pössel, “The Magic of Ritual,” 124. 
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and about the nature of the customary and its relationship to lived monastic experience 
and concrete ritual performance. 
I begin with Chapter 32 of Bernard’s customary, “Concerning Processions due 
to/for the sake of Tribulation” (De processionibus pro tribulatione). As the title indicates, 
this chapter describes how a procession, specifically in response to some difficulty or 
tribulation, is conducted: “When there shall be a procession anywhere on account of/for 
(a) tribulation. . . .” (Quando sit processio pro qualibet tribulatione).28 Bernard’s account 
contains few surprises, at least concerning what we would regard as “the ritual itself.” 
The monastic community assembles in a church, gathering to itself relics (reliquiae), 
reliquaries (filacteria), feretory or bier (feretrum), as well as holy water, a cross, a 
candelabrum, and (implicitly) a censer.29 Certain hymns, songs, antiphons, and prayers 
are performed there, and then the procession sets out, still singing. Bernard gives no 
information at all about what kind of route it takes, only referring to “the church to which 
the procession goes,” (veniatur prope ecclesiam, ad quam vadit processio) in such a way 
that makes it clear this is not, or at least not necessarily, the same church from which the 
procession set out.30 Upon reaching this church, another set of hymns, songs, psalmody, 
and prayers occur. The procession then “goes back” (recedit processio). This terse recedit 
essentially ends the description of the ritual, though Bernard adds several rather 
                                                 
28 Bernard of Cluny, Ordo Cluniacensis, 216. An argument could be made for translating qualibet 
tribulatione as “any kind of tribulation,” though this seems unusual to me. As will be examined shortly, 
Bernard’s description includes a modular approach to location, suggesting that he intends to describe a 
ritual that may indeed be performed more or less “anywhere.” 
29 Bernard does not refer directly to a censer, but only writes “this same bier ought to be administered with 
incense” (debet ipsum feretrum incensari). A more classical translation would render this “this same bier 
ought to be set on fire,” but this is obviously not correct.  
30 Ibid., 217. 
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disconnected and puzzling lines about the general provision of rods or staves (baculi) to 
the monks and their dress in processions, labor (opera manuum), the litany, and mass. 
Thus, like much of monastic life (particularly as viewed through the prism of Bernard’s 
voluminous customary), this ritual is a dizzying welter of texts, special objects and 
equipment, and choreographed actions, all tying together various points in mundane and 
sacred time and space. It is a ritual par excellence, where the semiosis comes thick and 
fast.  
The complex of texts referred to in this description clearly recall the liturgy, 
certainly the central experience of monastic life. Some texts, such as vitae or various 
patristic works could play an important role in monastic life without necessarily invoking 
or referring to the liturgy. But while a precocious monk might read, for example, the 
Confessiones of Saint Augustine on his own, a text with no direct connection to his daily 
participation in the divine office and mass, the assemblage of texts in the procession for 
tribulation Bernard describes suggested the liturgy in various ways. First, the kinds of 
texts were very much those of the liturgy: sung psalms and antiphons, more general songs 
(cantus), at least one introit (intoritum), and the Pater Noster. The arrangement of these, 
too, corresponded broadly to how the liturgy deployed its constituents: psalms paired 
with antiphons, hymns accompanying the procession (literally, “processionals”) as they 
would the entrance of the celebrants during mass, and the introit sung when entering the 
destination church are obvious correlates. Overall, there is no element of the ritual to 
which Bernard devotes more attention and detail than the careful pairing of these clearly 
liturgical elements with points in the performance of the (other) physical acts that make 
up the procession (gathering, carrying the relics and other equipment, marching to the 
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destination church). To what extent such a procession would have been distinct from the 
liturgy itself in the minds of its participants is an interesting question; one can easily 
imagine its psalms and hymns bleeding into those of the office of the hours, at least 
among the conversi, infantes, or less engaged brothers. Surely its greatest distinguishing 
features would have been the use of relics, its place beyond the monastery compound, 
and, above all, its unscheduled and singular nature. 
These important elements will gain greater clarity as we uncover more of the 
ritual’s semiosis; first, I consider the texts prescribed by Bernard for processions of this 
kind. The first set of these are sung in the choir of the church from which the procession 
begins (the assumption would be that this is the monastic church, though Bernard does 
not specify any particular one, either because the one to be used is so obvious, because 
any of several could be used, or because he intends his description to be entirely modular 
and thus allowing the use of any church), and are immediately followed by its departure 
therefrom. These texts obviously relate in very important and direct ways to the ritual as a 
whole: Bernard refers specifically to the antiphon Exurge (which follows an unspecific 
oratio) and the psalm Deus in adjutorium (69 in the Clementine Vulgate, henceforth CV). 
Here we find further confirmation of the possibility that the singing of this psalmody 
threatened to “bleed into” the liturgy more broadly: Bernard is careful to note that, having 
finished singing the Deus in adjutorium, the psalm Deus misereatur (69, CV) is not sung 
(facta, sicut mos est, oratione, et finita antiphona Exurge; et psalmo, Deus in adjutorium, 
sine Deus misereatur . . .), suggesting that some might wrongly assume this psalm would 
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naturally follow Deus in adjutorium—presumably because it does so in some part of the 
constant cycle of psalms that comprise the liturgy.31  
Exurge, assuming that this terse designation is an incipit, is likely expanded and 
translated “Arise, O Lord, (and) help and liberate us through your name” (Exsurge 
domine adjuva nos et libera nos propter nomen tuum).32 This antiphon is obviously 
appropriate for such a ritual/procession, and the imperative in particular is striking, for it 
specifically addresses and calls God, even giving Him a command. In a certain 
intentional and semiotic sense, this text reaches out and touches God, implicitly drawing 
the monks and God closer together, and making the divine more immediately present in 
the proceedings. Moreover, this antiphon does not merely call on God to help, as the 
Deus in adjutorium does with imperatives of its own (“intend towards,” intende, and 
“hurry,” festina), but actually seeks to stir the almighty from an implied quiescence of 
whatever nature: “Arise!” This imperative thus not only calls for aid in the face of 
tribulation, but also demands a particular kind of action that the procession itself then 
immediately performs. Bernard continues that, with this psalmody completed, incense 
applied to the feretory, other objects (holy water, cross, etc.) gathered up, the 
procession’s participants properly ordered, and “some song of the saint begun” (incepto 
aliquo cantu de sancto), the feretory is, of course, carried out of the choir: the saint has 
arisen!33 This potent interplay between imperative (quoted, biblical) text and direct 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 217. 
32 Corpus antiphonalium officii, ed. René-Jean Hesbert, nr. 2822. 
33 Bernard of Cluny, Ordo Cluniacensis, 216. 
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physical action thus creates a powerful event, wherein the divine itself not only erupts 
into action but, in crossing the threshold of the church, invades the mundane world. 
With this first phase of the ritual completed, we encounter the significant fact that 
Bernard names some specific texts for certain parts of the ritual, while in other cases he is 
specifically general, offering a kind of “modular” paradigm for much of the procession 
(“with some [aliquo] song of the saint begun”). There are several such modular textual 
moments (or opportunities) in Bernard’s description: first, when leaving the church as 
just related, then, with this song finished, “antiphons concerning tribulation are begun” 
(incipiuntur antiphonae de tribulatione), and finally several texts at the entrance to 
whatever church (here a spatial module) the procession culminates in. In this last case, 
Bernard seems to assume that any destination church will be dedicated to Saint Mary and 
also to some other saint. Both of these saints, as well as that whose relics are being 
carried, must be acknowledged with song:  
 
. . . then if the church in honor of two saints is dedicated, that is [videlicet] in 
honor of Saint Mary and any/some other [alicujus] saint, first will be sung an 
introit of Saint Mary, then of this saint in whose honor is the church. With these 
finished, the priest follows with prayers [orationes] concerning the saints, sent 
forth from the headings [praemissis Capitulis], just as the song preceded. . . .34 
                                                 
34 “. . . tunc si ecclesia in honore duorum Sanctorum est dedicata, videlicet in honore sanctae Mariae, et 
alicujus Sancti; in primis cantabitur ad introitum de Sancta Maria, deinde de illo Sancto in cujus honore est 
ecclesia; his finitis, Sacerdos Orationes prosequitur de Sanctis, praemissis Capitulis, sicut cantus pracessit. . 
. .,” Bernard of Cluny, Ordo Cluniacensis, 217. I remain puzzled by this praemissis capitulis, which 
Herrgott has set off as its own clause or appositive. Perhaps it means these prayers have been set out in 
advance, possibly using the kind of written guides or tabulae that the armarius/cantor prepared each week 
to guide the choir monks in the liturgy. Or perhaps it somehow clarifies that these prayers should concern 
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What these various songs, antiphons, and prayers—these texts—might have been is 
beyond the scope of the present examination, but, for Bernard at least, their relevant 
character was their relation to tribulation itself (in the case of the antiphons following the 
song devoted to the saint whose relics were being employed) or to the specific saints 
encountered by the procession. These songs and prayers may or may not have specifically 
addressed (as opposed to merely concerning) the saints in question (I think it likely they 
often did), and they may or may not have employed the imperative (again, it would be 
surprising only if they never did); their main function was clearly to correspond to the 
complex of physical objects (relics, churches) that themselves, in turn, corresponded to 
the saints. And for this function, these texts drew relatively little on what we think of as 
their primary feature or power: the communication of denotative or symbolic signs, of 
linguistic statements to or about their subject. In that regard, perhaps it would have been 
enough for them to merely be “about” (de) their subjects; building on this very basic 
semiosis then, what this part of the ritual offered would be the ability for the procession’s 
members to perform and participate—participate physically, by singing and hearing—in 
this about-ness (not merely in the procession more generally), and to extend the rich 
semiosis of the whole production into the aural range. The main work of the sign here is 
incorporative, not communicative.35 
This complex of modular texts brings the procession to the destination church, 
though Bernard suggests, by omission, that the procession does not actually enter this 
                                                 
the saint whose relics are carried, as I think the last clause “just as the song preceded” (sicut cantus 
praecessit) also suggests. 
35 In this it calls up again the idea of the textual community, which highlights the formation of a community 
over the communication of information. 
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church. In any case, with these texts completed, the procession comes to the last 
assemblage of texts. In contrast to those just finished, and in complement to those 
performed in the choir and church where the procession began, this last group is fully 
fixed by Bernard. First comes the Pater Noster, made by the whole “convent either on 
knee or bowing towards the ground, if the authority of the day requires (it).”36 I do not 
attempt here to determine the exact recension of this prayer intended by Bernard, if he in 
fact meant to insist on a particular one.37 But even without delving into this question, we 
may say that the Lord’s Prayer directly invokes not only the Bible but the personal and 
direct instruction of Jesus Christ. It, moreover, communicates a strikingly clear and direct 
set of propositions and requests; these are submission to God and then three 
supplications: for basic sustenance, divine grace or forgiveness with the promise to 
forgive in turn, and deliverance from evil and temptation. The theology implicit in this 
prayer and the whole huge range of its history and orthopraxy are well beyond the scope 
of this study, but, again, this prayer as a sign or set of signs plays a powerful role at this 
point in this ritual not only because of the specific claims and statements it makes. It also, 
I think, can be understood to circumscribe an even more special and holy ritual space 
within the larger elaborate production of the procession. For the prayer both bares the 
individual and the community before God in a direct sense (not through invocation of or 
address to some intercessor), comprising total submission, total confession, and abject 
                                                 
36 “. . . facit conventus breven orationem, aut ad terram super genua, aut acclinis, di diei auctoritas 
expostulat, expectato vero a Priore quod Pater noster possit finiri,” ibid., 217. 
37 In the Gospels, this prayer appears in two different forms: Matthew 6:9–13 gives a longer version as part 
of the Sermon on the Mount, while Luke 11:2–4 presents a shorter version as part of an exchange between 
Jesus and the disciples. This does not, of course, even begin to consider the immense issue of the 
manuscript tradition or, indeed, the possible for variations stemming from the prayer’s participation in 
various semi-independent, semi-oral monastic and clerical communal traditions. 
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supplication for sustenance and protection, and also draws the individual/community 
back before Christ himself, whether on the Mount or in private conversation with the first 
Christians. Saying it directly repeats the words of Christ and then immediately fulfills his 
injunction: “Pray then in this way. . . .”38  
The idea that the Pater Noster here initiates a new sub-ritual, high within the 
larger ritual of the procession, is further substantiated by the return to psalmody that 
follows it. Bernard calls for the psalm Lauda anima mea Dominum (CV 145). This psalm 
begins with a declaration of lifelong praise to God, followed by a contrast between the 
weakness and finitude of earthly princes and the eternal, all-creating power of God. Next 
comes a list of those God will help, elevate, or heal: the wronged, the hungry, the 
enslaved or imprisoned, the blind, the just, strangers, orphans, widows, etc. And finally 
the psalm ends with an affirmation of God’s eternal rule. This psalm, therefore, does not 
involve an imperative or even any address to God at all.39 In its symbolic operation, it 
merely declares a variety of propositions; the closest it comes to concrete action is in 
stating the speaker will do something (praise the Lord), specifically in the future 
(laudabo, fuero). Nevertheless, these propositions in their symbolic valence offer an 
appropriate point of culmination for the procession ritual: (re)affirmation of the eternal 
omnipotence and omnibenevolence of God is a fitting (perhaps the only fitting) 
conclusion to any Christian ritual, and doubly one that seeks relief in the face of some 
tribulation.  
                                                 
38 Matthew 6:9. 
39 Actually there is one imperative, aimed at earthly audiences: “Put not your trust in princes” (nolite 
confidere in principibus). Though this could be discussed in the terms of my investigation here, I do not 
consider it particularly important for my line of argument. 
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An appreciation for the semiotic forces at work through the whole ritual, however, 
deepens this point significantly. I speak particularly of the shifts in grammatical tense and 
mood, above all from the antiphon to Psalm 145, Exurge, which opens the ritual by 
summoning (even commanding) God and the relevant saint(s) to action. The semiosis of 
the ex(s)urge and libera, as imperatives, refers explicitly and inescapable to an entirely 
present and concrete moment, a moment (seemingly) inextricably mired in the mundane 
world. Affliction reigns. So the monks martial their forces (in a variety of non-textual 
ways, as we will examine) and call upon God to stir Himself. This they then quite openly 
perform, or even we might say cause to actually happen, by carrying the relics of the 
saint out of the church and along whatever course to the destination church they might 
chart. Along this route the saint him or herself is acknowledged in song, and then in turn 
Mary and whichever other saint is associated with the destination church. This being 
done, the assembled community places itself both before and even as Jesus Christ in 
praying as he specifically instructed them to do, this prayer also placing them in a 
position of total submission and abject supplication appropriate for semiotic approach to 
the divine itself. This account offers a firm retort to the accusation of saint-worshipping 
polytheism: the procession has carried in reverence the relics of the saint and sung songs 
concerning him or her, yes, but the antiphon Exurge is addressed only to God, and the 
culmination of the ritual itself, Psalm 145’s assertion of divine omnipotence, 
omnitemporality, and omnibenevolence, is demarcated from commemoration of the 
various saints by the individually ritualized and re-enacted address of the divine to itself 
(Christ praying to God).  
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And this culminating psalm is also, above all, demarcated from the rest of the 
preceding ritual by its temporal shift, reflected grammatically: in marked contrast to the 
here-and-now of the Exurge’s imperative, Psalm 145 offers up present- and future-tense 
verbs (laudabo, fuero, custodit, inluminat, regnabit) paired with adverbial prepositional 
constructions that evoke eternity (in sempiternum, in aeternum, in generationem et 
generationem). These two grammatical points, embodied and linked by the corporeal 
pumping and contortion of numerous human bodies, quite literally express the stirring of 
the divine, and perhaps the mortal along with it, up out of fallen and concrete temporality 
into perfect and unchanging eternity. Therefore, in this transition Psalm 145 erases and 
obviates the specific pleas for relief from whatever transitory earthly tribulation has 
provoked the ritual; rather than actually calling down the hand of God to smite some 
persecutor or distribute mana (or fish and loaves), what the ritual accomplishes is the 
communal, triumphant enunciation of the proposition that justice will be done, that the 
princes of the earth will be overthrown, and that the faithful will be protected and 
rewarded.40  
Following this triumphant psalmody, Bernard calls for the prayer Deus cujus 
misericordia to be said by a priest. I have not established the text of this prayer, but it 
                                                 
40 With this in mind, one could further assert that the Pater Noster functions as a gatekeeper in another 
more sense: in giving the Lord’s Prayer in the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus specifically enjoins against 
specific requests in prayer: “When you are praying, do not heap up empty phrases as the Gentiles do; for 
they think that they will be heard because of their many words. Do not be like them, for your Father knows 
what you need before you ask him” (Matthew 6:7–8). The ritual of procession for tribulation described in 
this chapter of Bernard’s customary itself could plausibly be taken as such a specific request, and thus 
perhaps itself constitutes a transgression that must be confessed and forgiven, through the Pater Noster, 
before culminating in a statement of God’s grace and justice that erases all requests for those same through 
its strength and lack of condition or qualification. In Luke 11:1–4, Jesus does not precede the giving of the 
prayer with this injunction, though later on in that same chapter appears a famous passage, which evokes 
“the lilies of the field” to make much the same point (11:22–30). 
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clearly concerns and possibly evokes the mercy of God (“God, whose mercy . . .”). 
Moreover, Bernard specifies that it is said “for the souls of those resting in the cemetery” 
(pro animabus in coemeterio quiscentium). This is an extension of the supplicatory act of 
the procession to encompass the dead, structured intercessory prayer being a particular 
feature of Cluny, especially in the minds of the laity.41 Depending on actual text of the 
prayer, it likely either figured the dead as part of the group seeking mercy (the 
procession) or as the targets of the intercession of the living. It would be interesting to 
know which, as this would deepen and clarify our understanding of just how the much 
studied Cluniac networks that spanned the abyss of death worked. Bernard writes that the 
litany (litania) is to follow this prayer immediately, but gives no further details of exactly 
what this includes. Nevertheless the presence of these highly formalized petitions is not 
surprising.42 This is not only the last text used in the ritual but essentially its end; 
Bernard, tersely concluding his description of the procession’s itinerary, writes “. . . the 
litany is begun and, with Saint John the Baptist named, the saint of this same church and 
monastery is named twice, and the procession goes back” (. . . incipitur Litania, et 
nominato sancto Joanne Baptista, nominatur bis Sanctus ipsius ecclesiae et Monasterii, 
                                                 
41 Dominique Iogna-Prat, “The Dead in the Celestial Bookkeeping of the Cluniac Monks Around the Year 
1000,” in Debating the Middle Ages: Issues and Readings, ed. Lester K. Little and Barbara H. Rosenwein 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998), 330–339. 
42 Many of the most famous elements of the litany or the various litanies, such as the Kyrie elesion (“Lord, 
have mercy”), are extremely general in their requests; I thus regard their position here after Psalm 145 as no 
particular difficulty for my suggestion of that text as the infinitive culmination of the ritual. One could even 
suggest that the extremely unspecific nature and extensive repetition of the elements of the litany further 
develop this move towards the atemporal: that is, away from the particular and situated supplication of the 
Exurge. On the other hand, it is interesting to wonder if this (or other) parts of the procession ritual might in 
some cases have provided a venue for more spontaneous outbursts and petitions on the part of either 
members of the procession or onlookers, which might in turn attract the attention and ire of reformers, or at 
least “sticklers” formally educated in rule, custom, and liturgy, such as Bernard. Comparison to the 
dynamics of other, culturally and geographically far-flung “rituals” (always a fraught endeavor) might 
make this seem more likely, but for now it can be nothing but largely ungrounded speculation. 
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et recedit Processio).43 The invocation of John the Baptist here seems to require some 
explanation: accepting the idea that Psalm 145 forms the core or culmination of the ritual, 
the reference to John thus comes to parallel or reflect, across the ritual center of Psalm 
145, the introit devoted to Mary performed by the community upon reaching the 
destination church. Mary and John are, of course, two of the most important figures in 
Christianity, but their juxtaposition is especially ensconced in the traditional image of the 
Deisis. This depiction of Christ flanked by Mary on the (viewer’s) left and John on the 
right was widely produced in Eastern Christian icon painting throughout the Middle 
Ages, though it failed to widely penetrate Western art. If we read the Pater Noster as a 
sign of Christ, could the ritual procession here be taken as a trace or echo of the Deisis, or 
at least as sharing some tangled, sunken genealogy with it? After all, the term deisis itself 
is Greek for “prayer” and, more specifically, “supplication,” and the outstretched, 
upraised hands of Mary and John in the image signify their intercession with Christ on 
behalf of humanity. 
Texts and language are thus clearly very important in the complex semiosis that 
animates the procession ritual. Many moderns, whether specialists in history or 
anthropology or not, notice these elements first and are inclined to devote the bulk of 
their attention to them. But, while I also began by considering these and have obviously 
given them great weight, the crucial caveat of semiotic anthropology and Peircean 
thought in general bears repeating: language is not the fundamental or ultimate form of 
semiosis, but rather merely one among many kinds of sign-functioning. It is to the other 
                                                 
43 Bernard of Cluny, Ordo Cluniacensis, 217.  
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valences of semiosis, equally vital for the functioning of the ritual of the procession, that 
I now turn. 
The necessity of the Peircean caveat is proven by the fact that it is at all 
conceivable that one might consider the ritual of the procession without devoting 
significant attention to its most brute physical fact: a crowd of people carrying objects 
along some route. This fact is vitally necessary in order for the texts considered above to 
function the way I have argued they do. A full semiotic consideration of the relic in 
medieval Latin culture is well beyond the scope of this inquiry, but the idea that not only 
the saints associated with relics but even the relics themselves might move and act as 
though alive, and even that in a true theological sense they were alive, or at least animate, 
was widespread and is well-documented.44 It is this principle that operates so crucially 
and in such close conjunction with the Exurge antiphon above: the relic, with all its 
cultural significance, and the fragment of liturgy work together to show not merely a 
saint rising to life in testament to the central Christian promise (resurrection), and not 
merely the sacred invading the fallen corporeal world, but indeed all this occurring 
specifically at the command of the assembled monastic community. 
This community, its command, and the results of its command all appear and 
operate, of course, through signs. Some of these signs are the texts discussed above, and 
they operate in important and distinct respects both through the actual symbolic, 
linguistic statements of the texts qua texts (the “Arise!” being a key example) and the 
physical sign-vehicles (in this case, the singing or speaking voices of the priest, prior, and 
                                                 
44 Geary, Furta Sacra; Ashley and Sheingorn, Writing Faith. 
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community as a whole). As above, the communal act of singing is essentially an 
integrative, participatory act disguised as a communicative one. The physical fact of the 
group singing, in conjunction with the simple “about-ness” of a given text, (re)creates the 
community around and within reference to a saint. This creation is much more significant 
to the ritual than whatever propositions are actually enunciated by the text that enables it 
(at least in the case of the cantus sung for the saint during the procession’s transit to the 
destination church). Similarly, the group enunciation of the Exurge, paralleled by the 
communal carrying of the feretory, places the locus of power to mobilize the sacred quite 
specifically with the monastic community as a community—not, that is, with any 
individual or office-holder within that community.  
This is not to say, however, that gradations within the community are denied or 
concealed; on the contrary, they are offered up for ready comprehension to even the most 
dim or uninformed lay observer. For Bernard stipulates quite unambiguously the 
marching order of the procession as follows: “the brothers [fratres] exit the choir, at the 
head of the procession. . . . The oblates [infantes] follow with their teachers, [and] after 
these all the lay brothers [conversi], and the cantors [cantores], just as is the order of 
these.”45 This established order would have complemented certain obvious physical 
differences, mainly that the infantes/oblates would be children between two groups of 
adult men, to communicate the distinct sub-groups comprising the procession. This order 
would likely suggest some sense of rank and status to onlookers; full brothers occupying 
the prestigious front position and bearing various important ritual objects (not least the 
                                                 
45 Bernard of Cluny, Ordo Cluniacensis, 216. 
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feretory itself), children placed before conversi, and those doing—or at least leading—the 
singing at the rear.46 It certainly would have to the members themselves: when Bernard 
writes “just as is the order of these,” he is referring to a hierarchy with many resonances 
inside the monastery and numerous manifestations in the course of its daily rhythms. 
Conversi were generally full members of the monastic community at Cluny, including in 
wearing the habit. Perhaps paradoxically, however, they generally did not participate 
directly in the liturgy (that is, sing or read), since they did not have the extensive training 
from boyhood in these areas possessed, rather, by the oblates. This was their chief 
distinction from the oblates: they entered the monastery as adults, with all the advantages, 
disadvantages, and dangers this entailed. Within the monastery, therefore, there were 
special rules for the conversi during the liturgy, special rules for new adult novices, and 
special rules for young boys.47 Given that these rules focused primarily on who could go 
where, and who could talk to whom, in the monastery when and under what 
circumstances, the expression of this rank in marching order would have followed very 
naturally from the actual experience of such status distinctions.48 
                                                 
46 Issues surrounding the relations and distinctions between oblates, conversi, famuli, and full or senior 
brothers are some of the most interesting and important in the history of Cluny in the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries. For more on these issues, see Cochelin, “Peut-on parler de noviciat”; Constable, The Reformation 
of the Twelfth Century, 77–80; Giles Constable, “Famuli and Conversi at Cluny,” Revue Bénédicte 83 
(1973): 326–350.  
47 Principally but not exclusively, Bernard of Cluny, Ordo Cluniacensis, 164–169. See also Cochelin, 
“Peut-on parler de noviciat.” 
48 For more on monastic regimes of surveillance and control, see Hugh Feiss, “Circatores: from Benedict of 
Nursia to Humbert of Romans,” American Benedictine Review 40 (1989): 346–379; Scott Bruce, “Lurking 
with Spiritual Intent: a Note on the Origin and Functions of the Monastic Roundsman (Circator),” Revue 
Bénédictine 109 (1999): 75–89; Nira Gradowicz-Pancer, “Le ‘panoptism’ monastique. Structures de 
surveillance et de contrôle dans le cénobitisme occidental ancien (Ve–VIe siècles),” Revue de l’histoire des 
religions 216 (1999): 167–192. 
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The gathering together, while yet maintaining internal divisions of status and 
rank, of the whole monastic community thus suggested that the monastery itself was on 
the march, like a hermit crab abandoning its shell or a besieged garrison making a sally. 
Not only God and His saint, through the medium of the relic, but the Church itself had 
arisen and erupted out of the sacred space provided by the buildings devoted to them, 
crossing into the fallen world outside. This move would be underscored by the presence 
of key devotional objects carried by the monks. In these ways the sacred space of the 
monastery and the church was gathered up by the monks and heaved out into the world 
beyond. The procession could then deploy this newly mobile sacred space wherever it 
was needed: to a troublesome lay or episcopal opponent or a space associated with one 
(perhaps there to humiliate the saint’s relic), to a blighted field or dried-up well, or on 
some route around or through an area meriting special protection from some imminent 
threat. Whatever the route might be, this would be associated with the specific petition of 
the Exurge and drawn into the culminating assertion of divine power, Psalm 145.  
The ritual of procession for tribulation, then, as related by Bernard, presents to its 
monastic practitioners a certain fairly customizable template or frame. Several core 
elements, the frame, are always the same: most of the texts that open and conclude the 
procession, the constitution and arrangement of the participants, the carrying and 
presentation of certain special objects, and the origin and destination of the procession in 
churches. These elements make sure that a certain course of events takes place every time 
the ritual is performed. God, and by extension the saint whose relics are being deployed, 
is always commanded to arise, to stir Himself to action in response to the suffering and 
supplication of worshipers. These worshippers are always the monastic community, 
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whose distinctive nature is highlighted in their dress and marching order, which 
reproduces the internal gradations of the monastery. Similarly, their privileged command 
of the sacred is evidenced by their carrying of a range of sacred objects, not least the 
feretory and relics themselves. When this whole production reaches the destination 
church, the monks first invoke Mary, then assume the place of Jesus and perform his 
command by saying the Pater Noster. Besides charting a progression of the procession 
itself from Mary to Jesus (and thus implicitly towards God), this prayer also apologizes 
for and thus erases the transgression of having selfishly and willfully presumed to seek 
God’s help for some transitory earthly concern. The community thus makes its final 
approach to the divine both ritually confessed and absolved and even having explicitly 
rejected the particularity of worldly interest, an act that finds its culmination in the 
triumphant declaration, rather than invocation, of God’s eternal, unchanging power and 
justice. This summit is then followed by a prayer for the dead, thereby drawing these as 
well into the ritual community as it makes its passage, and finally by a torrent of 
repetitious, unspecific supplication for simple mercy, the litany, perhaps suggesting the 
only possible response of the fallen human encountering the infinite divine.  
At the same time, the ritual varies depending the saint whose relics are actually 
carried, the saint to whom the destination church is dedicated, and the route taken by the 
procession itself. Songs about the saint whose relic was carried would offer the 
opportunity for the community to participate more directly in the process, even to 
inscribe themselves, through the proxy of their holy patron, therein. Whether members of 
the procession other than the cantores sang is unknown, and doubtful, but they could at 
least listen (as could lay onlookers). In this way, the experience of the saint was extended 
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from the merely visual (observing the feretory and reliquaries), to include the aural 
range.49 And though Bernard gives no detail about what kind of itinerary a procession for 
tribulation might make, it seems extremely likely that, in many cases, the course of the 
procession would correspond to and invoke in some way the specific tribulation that had 
provoked the procession. In this way temporal and spiritual or sacred matters would be 
brought into contact with one another; a lord or bishop demanding some concession in 
matters of authority or property from the monastery might be confronted personally by a 
marching, singing army, bearing the saint him or herself. The monastic community and 
the furnishings of its church, indeed of any church, would leave their accustomed setting 
and suddenly be found out in the world, threatening to work their power upon the 
immediate physical reality of field or palace. 
Ultimately, however, or at least in most cases, the ritual did not actually “work” 
by summoning up the magical powers of the relic or calling down the observable wrath 
or mercy of God. These particular elements, above all the concerns and struggles of the 
monastic community against others and the general difficulty of medieval life, were 
gathered into the signifying nexus of the procession and carried along to the destination 
church. There, with the specific petition that had given rise to the procession, they were 
expunged through a series of invocations ascending through the saints, Mary, and Jesus 
towards God. In the process, both the legitimacy and even the necessity of the petitions 
were rejected. This was a ritual that used the liturgy, in the texts that comprised it, the 
objects that accompanied it, the space in which it took place, and the community that 
                                                 
49 The ritual is even extended into the olfactory range; Bernard’s concern that the feretory be carefully 
perfumed with incense is likely aimed at evoking the “odor of sanctity,” the sweet smell believed to 
emanate from the corpses of saints in denial of the corruption of death. 
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performed it, to frame and enunciate a concrete petition. Through the mobility of those 
performing the ritual, the petition incorporated the physical situation that gave rise to the 
petition and carried both to the place of asking, the destination church. But there the ritual 
quite concretely rejected and released its petition, instead seeking forgiveness for the 
temerity of asking, of willing any particular situation on earth. Textually, the community 
performed an ascent to the divine presence, and there gave over to self-abnegating praise 
and a simple request for mercy verging on glossolalia.  
The ritual thus can be regarded as training its participants in a quintessentially 
Christian habitus: that of striving despite, and perhaps with full knowledge that, the 
assurance both of personal failure and of its overcoming through dispensation of 
unearned grace. Such a habitus or posture can be found in many places within the 
Christian tradition. Indeed, only a few verses after giving the Lord’s Prayer, Jesus tells 
his disciples:  
 
So I say to you, Ask, and it will be given you; search, and you will find; knock, 
and the door will be opened for you. For everyone who asks receives, and 
everyone who searches finds, and for everyone who knocks the door will be 
opened. Is there anyone among you who, if your child asks for a fish, will give a 
snake instead of a fish? Or if the child asks for an egg, will give a scorpion? If 
you then, who are evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much 
more will the heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to those who ask him!50 
                                                 
50 These famous verses appear not infrequently without those concerning the child (11–13); they are 
crucial, however, in emphasizing the helplessness of the seeker (Luke 11:9–13). 
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This theme also appears in Jerome’s letter to Paulinus, considered in my chapter on the 
Cluny Bible. There Jerome praises Paulinus’ interest in the Bible quite specifically not 
because of what Paulinus might learn, that is, because of the potential results of Paulinus’ 
own action (reading and intellection): “What is of importance to me is not what you find 
but what you seek to find. Wax is soft and easy to mold even where the hands of 
craftsman and modeler are wanting to work it.”51 Even Bernard himself, in the prologue 
of his customary, reiterates this fruitless-striving-culminating-in-grace; addressing Hugh 
the Great, he writes:  
 
. . . For whatever I learned concerning the order, whatever I grasped concerning 
the path of religion, was more of your gift of God’s inspiration than of my 
industry, and little would my zeal have profited me, had not your paternity 
subjected me to rule and institution, in which gift from God it was as though I saw 
with my finger the expression of God, [that] whatever I read in sacred books of 
virtue, I may be able to touch in some way what I understand concerning what is 
written, if I attend vigilantly to the lines of your way of life. . . .52 
 
The crucial difference between these citations and the ritual of the procession for 
tribulation, of course, is that these are mere words. The procession was performed. These 
texts, though likely read by some monks and, at least in the case of the Bible verse and 
perhaps Jerome’s letter, might have been sometimes read aloud to the community as a 
                                                 
51 See Chapter 4, note 70. 
52 See Chapter 8, note 22. 
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whole, still operated under serious limits to their dissemination. In the procession, 
however, all would experience in the most direct way possible, by being and doing the 
signs at work—carrying the feretory, singing, kneeling or bowing before the destination 
church—the specific petition and then the rejection and overcoming of fruitless human 
striving, its giving way in joyous assertion of divine power. Reading or hearing Jerome or 
Luke would be instruction in this core Christian doctrine; the procession was training in 
it. 
Bernard’s account of the procession for tribulation possesses a particular discrete 
quality; that is, it has a clear beginning and end. And rather than stemming from any 
particular authorial intervention or re-framing, this is clearly because the ritual itself 
presents relatively little ambiguity in what it includes and what it excludes. No observer 
now, and probably few observers of processions in the eleventh century, would be 
confused about which actions are part of the procession and which are not. Bernard’s 
description is able to hew cleanly and easily to the contours of the ritual itself. This 
recalls part of the definition of ritual given here, as set apart or aside from the broader, 
all-encompassing scope of day-to-day living. But much of Bernard’s customary is given 
over to rituals, which, if they can ultimately be distinguished from non-ritual behavior, do 
present more of a challenge to doing so. We might say that these rituals are more closely 
integrated into daily monastic life and experience, and that they threaten to bleed through 
into mundane behavior. 
Take, for example, Bernard’s discussion of Cluny’s deans (decani). From the 
outset, this account presents striking contrasts with that of the procession. Rather than 
appearing in its own delineated section or chapter (caput), as the latter does, Bernard’s 
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description of the deans is subsumed within the chapter ostensibly devoted to the greater 
prior (prior major). This chapter appears very near the beginning of the whole customary. 
It follows only the prologue and the chapter concerning the abbot, and thus falls within 
the collection of chapters devoted to the senior offices of the monastery. Despite its 
incipit, at least half of the text is given over to the responsibilities and especially the 
conduct of the deans. Accordingly, it is not centered on one or two complexes of 
actions/semiosis. The cohesive pageantry of the procession, or of a mass, or of the 
dedication of a church is nowhere to be found; rather, Bernard presents only a very 
loosely connected series of short strictures for deans: how to dress, how to ride a horse, 
how to interact with property and various individuals or classes of individuals. 
Nevertheless, as we will see, very many of these are recognizable as rituals, or perhaps 
micro-rituals. 
The first part of the chapter discusses the process by which the greater prior is 
chosen and invested with his office, and gives some general statements about his 
responsibilities and rank in the monastic community. These establish that the prior is 
second to the abbot in all things, and that the other officers of the monastery should obey 
him. They also bar him from receiving any kind of gifts from anyone (at least while he is 
outside the refectory), but also suggest that he may well maintain “obediences” or duties 
to people and interests beyond the monastery itself (Si perrexerit ad obedientias quae 
sunt prope in circuitu. . . .).53 This somewhat puzzling pair of directives makes more 
sense in light of Bernard’s discussion of the deans. Bernard writes “Moreover those 
                                                 
53 Bernard of Cluny, Ordo Cluniacensis, 139. 
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brothers (set) to temporal matters (are) suffragans of his [the greater prior’s], who are the 
overseers of villas/villages, and who according to our custom we call deans . . .” (Ejus 
autem suffraganei ad temporalia sunt illi tratres, qui villarum sunt provisores, et quos 
pro more nostro decanos appelamus).54 Given that much of Bernard’s discussion of the 
deans concerns their intercourse with the world beyond the cloister, we may conclude 
that the primary area of the greater prior’s responsibility is the supervision of these 
special monks who manage the various properties and temporal rights of the monastery. 
The prior would thus need to frequently, or at least regularly, travel outside the monastery 
and, moreover, maintain authority over those brothers best-placed to offer him bribes. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the overwhelming majority of the various micro-rituals 
prescribed by Bernard for the deans seem focused on mediating this dangerous 
intercourse with the outside world that their duty requires. The first discussed of these is, 
like key parts of the procession ritual, para-liturgical—or, rather, not a separate 
performance that resembles the liturgy, but a set of minor addenda or modifications to 
certain parts of the normal liturgy itself. Bernard stipulates that all deans who live within 
half a day’s journey are to come to the monastery every Saturday before Vespers (the 
evening prayers conventionally taken as the beginning of the liturgical day). There they 
participate in some, seemingly variable, number of the hour services throughout “that 
day” (eo die),55 performing also the special monastic bow.56 Bernard also lists a number 
                                                 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. Bernard writes that they are to “go through each hour” (redeunt per singulas horas), but later seems 
to suggest that the deans may leave at various times, whenever they might decide to and having received 
the permission of the abbot or prior. 
56 Bernard refers to this at many points in the customary, calling it “to make the back and forth” (faciunt 
ante et retro). He describes it in detail in the sixteenth chapter, “Concerning novices taken beyond the 
monastery.” Bernard writes “therefore with no little study is any novice to be instructed, that he shall know 
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of versicles said for the attending deans (dicenda est pro eis) at these hour services. These 
are sung as some part of (perhaps following) the collect “Omnipotent eternal God, pity 
your servants” (Omnipotens sempiterne Deus miserere famulis tuis).57 The first half is 
always the same, “Make saved your servants” (Salvos fac servos tuos), with one of 
several options following in response: “Turn, O Lord, how long, [and be entreated in 
favor of thy servants]” (Convertere Domine usquequo, the first part of CV Psalms 89:13, 
which I have completed here), or “Behold how good [and how pleasant it is for brethren 
to dwell in unity]” (Ecce quam bonum, the first part of CV Psalms 132:1, which I have 
completed here); or “Blessed are they that dwell in your house, O Lord” (Beati qui 
habitant in domo tua, Domine, the first part of CV Psalms 83:5, which I have not 
completed, as Bernard does not write etc. after this incipit as he has in the other cases). 
There are also special versicles for when the deans indicate to the abbot or prior that they 
should depart, and receive permission to do so, via hand signs. These include Salvos fac 
                                                 
to bow regularly [correctly], specifically not with back arched, as is customary with certain negligent ones, 
but thus that the back shall be laid as the thighs/waist, and the head laid as the back [i.e., all straight, on the 
same level]; this bow we call according to this very use ante et retro, since it begins facing the east, and 
finishes facing the west; which we do first before Nocturns, and after Compline, specifically after three 
prayers” (igitur non pravo studio quilibet novitius est instruendus, ut regulariter sciat inclinare, scilicet non 
dorso arcuato, ut quibusdam negligentibus est familiare, sed ita ut dorsum sit submissus quam lumbi, et 
caput submissus quam dorsum; quam inclinationem nos per ipsum usum ante et retro appelamus, quia 
incipit contra orientem, et finit contra occidentem; quam et agminus primo ante nocturnos, et post 
completorium, scilicet psot tres orationes), ibid., 168–169. 
57 The Latin here is a bit uncertain. The complete passage, parts of which I have already discussed, goes as 
follows (my translation): “On this day when they go through the hours one by one, they make the back and 
forth, and for together as one is to be said as versicles here from the collect ‘Omnipotent eternal God, pity 
your servants, etc.’ The versicles which are permitted are two, of which one is always first: . . .” (Eo die 
quo redeunt per singulas Horas, ante faciunt et retro, et dicenda est pro eis una simul cum versiculis de his 
collecta; Omnipotens sempiterne Deus miserere famulis tuis, etc. Versiculi qui praemittuntur sunt duo, 
quorum semper unus est primus. . . .), ibid., 139. This description is confusing and appears to leave some 
important elements unstated. When exactly in the collect were the versicles to be sung? Do the deans 
participate in singing the psalmody, the collect, or the versicles? Since many may well have been conversi, 
it is quite possible they did not sing, but perhaps they could have been expected to manage a few simple 
versicles, the responds of which were, in general, sometimes sung by the choir and sometimes by the entire 
congregation. Bernard also does not specify the actual physical location or position of the deans. 
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servos tuos again, but also “Send help to them, etc.” (Mitte eis auxilium, etc.) and “Attend 
to [our, their?] supplications, O Lord, etc.” (Adesto Domine supplicationibus, etc.).58 
While some elements of Bernard’s description remain unclear (again, relying 
heavily on lived experience transmitted orally and through training even in this 
innovative and comparatively exhaustive document), the central conceit of this addendum 
to the massive, complex, and continuous ritual of the liturgy quickly suggests itself. 
Those deans who are posted in close proximity to the monastery return to it frequently 
and regularly, every week, for they are based there in a profoundly important spiritual—
and more specifically, soteriological—sense. Weekly participation in the liturgy, for a 
(liturgical) day, or at least a fraction of one, rejuvenates, sustains, and protects them in 
their monastic rejection of the world. They are all the more in need of this replenishment 
precisely because they live out beyond the cloister, and even are required to concern 
themselves to a significant extent with the management of the monastery’s property. A 
military metaphor, such as foragers for an army on the march, forward pickets, or even 
commandos working far behind enemy lines, would not at all be out of place. After all, 
the Rule of Saint Benedict itself describes anchorites or hermits in such terms: “Thanks to 
the help and guidance of many, they are now trained to fight against the devil. They have 
built up their strength and go from the battle line in ranks of their brothers to the single 
combat of the desert. . . . they are ready with God’s help to grapple single-handed with 
the vices of body and mind.”59 And while the deans are not hermits, their position is 
                                                 
58 I have not identified from which, if any, psalms these versicles are drawn.  
59 RB 1980, 168–169. We have encountered this quotation before, in discussing John of Salerno’s 
description of the conversatio of the hermit Adhegrinus, companion of Odo. For an introduction into 
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similar in that they must exist out beyond the relative safety and support of the cloister, 
taking on extra challenges not in the form of solitude but in intercourse with the world. 
Moreover, all the liturgical elements stipulated for performance during the dean’s 
weekly attendance at the hours seem thematically linked to the role and position of the 
deans. The collect, the first part of the versicle pairs (Salvos fac servos tuos), and one of 
the possible versicle responses all feature imperatives directed to God specifically for the 
sake of “servants” (servi, famuli) and their state of salvation. These quite clearly refer 
both to the deans’ duty as administrators of monastic properties, while also expressing a 
particular concern for their spiritual well-being. Ecce quam bonum, in turn, emphasizes 
the benefits of community and the ties between the “brethren,” while Beati qui habitant 
in domo tua, Domine asserts the spiritual benefit of living in the house of the Lord. In 
context, this obviously suggests the monastery, and like the Ecce quam bonum serves to 
reassure and reiterate that even those brothers who spend much of their time physically 
beyond the walls of the monastery are indeed members of the community that dwells 
within. These versicles thus address the deans both by explicitly referring to servants, 
members of a community, or inhabitants of the Lord’s house and by corresponding to 
them in a physical and temporal sense (that is, as indices): they are sung when the deans 
are present and, at least according to Bernard’s gloss of the practice, “for” (pro) them. 
Perhaps also the deans themselves may have sung the responds of the versicles.60 
Through this correspondence, the liturgy itself performs or parallels integration, or 
                                                 
Cluniac militaristic or violent conception of prayer, see Barbara Rosenwein, “Feudal War and Monastic 
Peace.” 
60 See note 57 earlier in this chapter. 
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regular re-integration, of the deans into the monastic community based within the 
cloister. Just as the deans return each week to physically participate in the liturgy, so are 
special verses that refer and correspond to them and their particular situation integrated 
into the liturgy. In the most direct way, this ritual or annex to the ritual of the office of the 
hours encompasses the formation and maintenance of a particular community, and here in 
an area where that community’s cohesion is most threatened. Meanwhile, the versicles 
that accompany the departing deans, besides repeating the imperative concern for their 
ultimate salvation, also deploy imperatives that refer to their special and dangerous 
advance duty, admonishing God to pay special attention to their entreaties and send them, 
in particular, help. Again, the imperative directed at God serves as an index of His 
correlation to or posture towards particular earthly supplicants, making of indexicality a 
conduit of grace. 
Special provisions for the liturgy concerning these deans extend beyond the choir, 
too. Bernard stipulates that, if a dean who has left the church or refectory and is preparing 
to make the journey back to his post should hear the “sign” (signum, generally taken in 
such contexts to refer to a bell tolling or gong being struck) for any regular hour while he 
is yet within the walls of the monastery, he is to dismount, set aside his travelling 
equipment, and return to participate in the hour.61 Bernard offers no explanation for this 
custom, as usual. But I would suggest that to leave during an hour service, rather than 
between completed services, would be experienced (perhaps only unconsciously) as a 
threat to the ceremony’s power to integrate the deans into the monastic community and 
                                                 
61 Bernard of Cluny, Ordo Cluniacensis, 140. 
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thus, even more alarmingly, to the salvific power of the liturgy, vis-a-vis the deans, itself. 
A monk not present at the monastery is one thing. The deans’ regular trips to the 
monastery and their special liturgical addenda performed their membership in the 
community even in the face of their absence during the weeks; but leaving in the midst of 
the ceremony would be, by the same token, to perform their separation. Bernard’s 
invocation of the monastery’s walls as the relevant boundary may provide some support 
to this reading.62 The issue is not strictly whether the dean can hear the signum, which 
presumably he can hear just beyond the walls as well as just inside them, but whether he 
has traversed the key spatial demarcation between the monastery and the world beyond.  
This carefully policed departure from the monastery also manifests in Bernard’s 
insistence that the deans not leave without obtaining permission from the abbot or prior, 
which they do by means of a hand sign at the end of whichever hour they last perform in 
the choir.63 This invocation of abbatial authority/monastic obedience lays the command 
of the abbot alongside the physical border between the sacred, transcendent space of the 
monastery and the temporal world outside, reproducing and reiterating one of the abbot’s 
key functions (especially in post/neo-Carolingian monasticism): mediating between the 
community and the world beyond.64 Crossing this border without the proper permission 
would, therefore, threaten the constitution of the community and the salvation of the 
individual in just the same linked way as doing so in the midst of an hour service. That is, 
by rejecting the necessity of the mediating institution (abbatial authority/monastic 
                                                 
62 “. . . and if he should be located within the enclosure of the walls. . . .” (et adhuc sit positus intra septa 
murorum), ibid., 140. 
63 Bernard of Cluny, Ordo Cluniacensis, 139. 
64 Rosé, Construire une société seigneuriale, 561; Jestice, Wayward Monks, 172–173. 
  
363 
 
obedience or the liturgy itself), the radical distinction between the two spheres, and thus 
the transcendental potentiality of the monastic one, is itself challenged. 
Further developing this complex intersection of sacred and profane 
space/community and its maintenance through prescribed and carefully choreographed 
semiosis, Bernard also relates special monkish practice for travelling on the road (in via 
positus). Deans—and presumably all monks—are expected to observe the liturgy of the 
hours with special abbreviated performances: they “seek indulgence” (veniam petit), 
remove caps and gloves, sing the hours “as they may” (quamlibet horam cantaverit), 
make the sign of the cross, and say the Lord’s Prayer.65 However, Bernard writes that 
they are not to make the ante et retro unless they are in a monastery or church; apparently 
this particularly reverent bow is reserved for the closer proximity to God found in such 
sacred spaces.66 This adaptation of the full liturgy thus took on a doubled significance. 
On the one hand, it signified like the liturgy: through the performance of psalms, 
confessions, and prayers, it invoked God and various saints, while also making claims 
about the individual enacting it, the fallen and heavenly worlds, salvation, Christ, and 
various other theological concepts. But it also referred to the liturgy itself. It was a 
fragment or abbreviation of the full liturgy, which normally encompassed a whole 
community located within special buildings and mobilizing a nexus of ritual equipment—
none of which would be present with the lone monk kneeling on the side of the road. Like 
                                                 
65 Bernard of Cluny, Ordo Cluniacensis, 140. Note also that John of Salerno’s Vita prima et maior sancti 
Odonis included accounts of Odo leading his travelling companions in the singing of psalms. 
66 And therefore, perhaps, to perform the bow outside the cloister would be to undermine the key 
distinction between sacred and mundane space, thus threatening the monks’ access to the former and its 
special proximity to the divine or to soteriological power. 
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the procession, this portable mini-liturgy carried sacred space out into the mundane 
world. But it also shifted the locus of ritual, with its signifying and transcendental 
behavior, from the community to the individual. Crucially, it did this not through a new 
ritual specially designed for the individual, but through the adaptation of a communal 
one.  
This strange liminal position of the dean produces the odd and contorted snippets 
of ritual found throughout the rest of Bernard’s account of his distinctive conversatio.67 
Our chief example is the attention devoted to the deans’ clothing.68 There are special 
rules for dress while travelling on horseback: “Before ascending onto his horse [to leave 
the monastery], he dons a little cape which shall/may encircle his frock with a cord. He 
ought not to ride without little bindings/wrappings [on his legs] more than one league. . . 
.” (Super caballum ascensurus prius cappam induit quam froccum corrigia praecingat. 
Non debet equitare sine fasciolis plusquam una leuca. . . .).69 Obviously clothing while 
travelling may well have a pragmatic function, yet if Bernard refers to a cope by the term 
cappa, he means a garment that generally holds significance as a marker of basic clerical 
or regular status and often plays a liturgical role. The reference to fasciola, wrappings 
worn on the legs, too, is more likely included here against pragmatic concerns; on warm 
days monks might well prefer to ride much further than one league without wearing 
them—to counter this natural desire, Bernard deploys his preferred normative verb, 
                                                 
67 The term in this context is mine; I mean it in the sense I understand Bernard to use it, but he does not do 
so here specifically. 
68 Others, such as the prohibition on causing a horse to gallop, information about the dean’s servants, the 
way he takes his meals, and so on, could be provided, but most of these take up only one or two lines and 
so I focus on the extended treatment of the deans’ clothing. 
69 Ibid. 
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debet. Along these lines, he notes further on that “For no time in summer does he ride 
without a frock, only in his hood” (Pro nullo aestivo tempore equitat absque frocco, in 
sola cuculla).70 As referenced above, monks are also ordered to remove their gloves and 
hoods when performing the liturgy on the road, further attesting to the ritual—signifying, 
non-useful—concerns attached to their dress. These concerns follow the dean into his 
day-to-day life and business during the week:  
 
In the place of the deanery, where he [unspecified] administers food and drink to 
him [the dean], never is he [the dean] only in [his] hood, or only in underwear, 
unless indeed a tunic or covering and leather boots shall be worn, or some other 
vestments, which are placed over the undershirt.71  
 
And they also play a special role when he encounters women. Bernard discusses a 
number of special rules for deans who are approached in their residences by women “to 
whom it is not possible to deny hospitality” (cui hospitium negara non possit).72 Some of 
these concern where he sits when they eat or their movements around the deanery, but, 
again, they focus primarily on his dress:  
 
                                                 
70 Ibid. 
71 “In ispo loco Decaniae qui ei cibum et potum administrat, numquam in sola camisia est, vel in 
femoralibus solis, nisi etiam tunica vel pellicio sit indutus et caligis amictus, sive alia veste, quae camisae 
superponatur. . . .” ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
  
366 
 
. . . He neither eats nor drinks in his hide without a frock and [with] naked feet. . . 
. If his hood is removed in the day as in the night, [he or she?] makes no word; 
[he] observes indeed that [he] should place it where it shall not be separated from 
him more than a cubit. If due to the heat he should go out from his frock, then he 
should be able to sit in his hood, but so, that unless he should work, neither cloak, 
nor hide shall he have underneath, nor anything other than his undershirt.73 
 
The material here is difficult. Bernard assumes a basic familiarity not only with monastic 
living but even with the conversatio and circumstances of the deans themselves. But 
some of the difficulty also seems to come from the grasping pursuit Bernard makes after 
many minute contours of the deans’ lives and persons. Ritual, as I have defined it and as 
it is often understood more generally, and as it fits so neatly the event of the procession, 
is challenged by Bernard’s goals in this realm. Its relevance cannot be doubted: clothing 
was often taken as a highly significant medium in monastic or regular living.74 Moreover, 
Bernard is obviously pushing against what basic pragmatism and comfort would dictate 
in many of these situations (above all, wearing layers of heavy garments in hot weather). 
And the situations on which he focuses—travel beyond the cloister, performance of the 
liturgy, eating, encounters with women, and labor—all concern key elements of monastic 
praxis and identity. Perhaps Bernard conceives, or even understands unconsciously, 
                                                 
73 “. . . nec comedit, nec bibit in pellicia sua sine frocco, et nudis pedibus. . . . Si est cuculla exutus tam in 
die quam in nocte, nullum verbum facit; observat etiam ne quoqum ponat eam, ubi a se longius separata sit 
quam cubito uno. Si pr calorem froccum exerit, in cuculla sedere poterit, sed ita, ut nisi opera faciat, nec 
gunellam, nec pellicium subtus habeat, nec aliud quam stamineum suum,” ibid. 
74 John of Salerno spends some of the Vita prima relating teachings of Odo, and miraculous visions, on the 
importance of proper monastic dress. Sitwell, Being the Life, 71–74. 
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clothing as the last line of distinction (signification) between the dean, as a monk, and the 
fallen world where he spends most of his time. Along with his performance of the liturgy, 
the conduct of his meals and his conversation, and the commands to avoid profiting by 
his post or labor, clothing forms a specialized conversatio that adapts and summarizes the 
Cluniac way of life, making it portable for the individual sent beyond the cloister on a 
special mission.  
The dean thus represents a very different ritual paradigm from that of the 
procession, extrapolating the millennial reform principle of monk-in-the-world beyond 
the role of the abbot.75 This paradigm ultimately grapples with a situation that demands 
extensive and radical revision of what ritual means and does. As defined above, ritual is, 
first, a discrete act that, second, manipulates signs in order to, third, traverse and thus 
reaffirm significant boundaries (social, ontological, etc.) and provide a normative guide 
to semiosis, thereby—or coincidentally—fourth, (re)producing community or 
communities. The procession is a perfect example. It begins and ends cleanly and 
unambiguously, comprising distinctive, not-directly-useful semiotic acts: the enunciation 
of pre-established texts, the enactment of an unnecessary—and ultimately reversed, self-
erasing—itinerary, the brandishing of useless objects. It performs the irruption of sacred 
presence and power into the mundane world, a performance that both requires and re-
inscribes key spatial and social distinctions: between sacred and mundane spaces, of 
course, but also between the monastic community and society at large, between churches 
as social and physical demarcations of the divine, and even between subsets of the 
                                                 
75 Jestice, Wayward Monks. 
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monastic community itself. And, ultimately, it trains the monks in the central Christian 
habitus and approach to experience. 
Crucially, the deans’ rituals subvert and overturn many of these key elements, 
while remaining almost entirely cloaked in just the same words and gestures. The dean’s 
behavior is highly purposive and completely pragmatic: he is a crucial link in the 
exchange networks that provision the monastery not only with resources needed for ritual 
purposes, like oil and perhaps metalwork, but also with those needed for sustenance in 
the most basic sense. He uses no special objects, other than his clothing (which is ritually 
policed, as recorded/reiterated by Bernard). And he operates largely alone—or, not alone, 
but merely adjoined to, rather than constitutive of, the distinct communities maintained 
by the rituals he performs and in which he participates. For he is neither the lay member 
of the village-family conglomerate whose productive work he oversees and expropriates, 
nor is he a regular or permanent member of the monastery; he lives beyond its walls, and 
not even, like the hermit, within the walls of a hermitage or cave, at some basic distance 
from the laity. The liturgy, whether in the form of his addenda performed weekly during 
his presence within the monastery or in the modular form alone on the road/beyond the 
cloister, sets him apart. In the latter case, of course, he is only some lone monk, already 
distinguished in dress, kneeling in the dust. And in the former the community calls upon 
God to direct the divine’s special attention and assistance to him, specifically—and not to 
all of them together. For the pragmatic reality of the dean’s role has fundamentally 
reshaped ritual; perhaps the key, overarching difference between his and the procession’s 
or the congregation’s is that his must be chopped up and parceled out, distributed 
throughout his days and years, constantly and intimately, minutely reapplied precisely 
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because his work removes him from communities and sets him fundamentally between 
them. Thus his proper analogue is neither the celebrant or the member of the procession: 
they use ritual to mediate between. He, rather, mediates between. In some sense, he is 
ritual.  
Moreover, if the procession (and much of Latin monastic life in general) is an 
example of training in the renunciation of will and intentionality, without the concomitant 
renunciation of action or striving itself, the dean is again trained in something very 
different. The veins of ritual with which his life is, ideally, shot through, are less training 
and more talisman. They protect him from what he must do, they sanctify his life, which 
otherwise in so many ways resembles that of the secular lay tenant or overseer. They 
allow him to move in the world while still renouncing it, reinscribing his activity rather 
than replacing it. In this, casting a far glance over dimly-lit territory, I see the forerunner 
of the modernist, Cartesian account of the self and the yawning, protective chasm it opens 
between the soul and the body/world. Here the spatial metaphors of the eleventh century 
do not yet mobilize a language of interiority; the monk’s soul is not hidden in a jar, but 
rather anchored within the cloister. But unlike the monks who dwelt there also in body, 
for the dean, ritual and ritualized behavior served as a spectral tether, like the air hose of 
a nineteenth-century diving suit. This allowed him to move beyond the cloister safely, 
inhabiting with ultimate intimacy the contours of worldly life while paradoxically 
maintaining the essential monastic denial of the world that so many of his actions 
contravened. The point here is two-fold: the essential self (the mind, the soul, or even 
one’s state of salvation itself) and the (mundane, fallen, fleshy) world/body are 
increasingly distinguished and contrasted, relative to the differing understanding of their 
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respective periods, by Descartes and by reform monasticism; yet at the same time, this 
emerging distinction, in both cases, serves as the grounds for an increasingly-developed 
articulation of the way in which it is bridged and overcome.76 For Descartes, the chasm 
was bridged by a hybrid of biology and theology, the soul working through the pineal 
gland in the brain. For eleventh-century monasticism, it was mediated a body of ritual 
praxis that played on distinctions of dress and institutional space. The actual shared 
genealogy of Descartes and the (crisis of the) early modern self and of reform 
monasticism is obviously only hypothesized and proposed here. But the transformation or 
radical refiguration of Cluniac ritual between its appearance in the procession for 
tribulation and in the conversatio of the dean is well-established. 
Finally, as it relates specifically to the rituals it describes for us, what are we to 
make of the customary itself? What of the document? One very important difference 
between it and the records of rituals studied by Koziol, Buc, and Pössel is that it purports 
to describe the programs or forms of various rituals, rather than the actual event of any 
particular, individual ritual. Bernard’s description of the tribulation procession is intended 
as a description of the ideal tribulation procession, of any and every tribulation 
procession. This is quite different from the various polemical accounts of ninth-century 
Carolingian political rituals (crownings, public penances, and so on) that have played 
such a prominent role in the debate on ritual among medieval historians.77 Part of the 
                                                 
76 My thinking on this matter, particularly as regards Descartes and the early modern (1500–1700) period, 
owes a great deal to Paul Monod’s discussion of it in his excellent The Power of Kings: Monarchy and 
Religion in Europe, 1589–1715 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), esp. 47–54, 81–88, 193–
204, 279–287. 
77 Mayke de Jong, The Penitential State; Buc, Dangers of Ritual; Koziol, Begging Pardon and Favor; 
Pössel, “The Magic of Ritual.” 
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difference is that tenth- and eleventh-century monastic ritual was, in most cases, more 
frequently and more regularly performed than the kinds of events that surrounded, for 
example, the struggle between Louis the Pious and his turbulent sons. Monastic ritual 
enjoyed a concrete existence in the living tradition of the community, precisely by virtue 
of the fact that, even besides the regular performances, it was always in the midst of 
being passed on to the next generation. But another important aspect of the difference, 
once that relates more directly to the question of Bernard’s customary as a document, was 
that the monastic community was essentially defined by its basis on written documents. 
This is not to suggest that the monks constantly glanced at the written word to guide them 
through every minute of every day, or even that documents played a primary role in their 
education in monastic living.78 But the principle was certainly that the nature of monastic 
life and the constitution of the monastery as a community was set forth in the Rule, and 
that it was this fact that made monks and monasteries monks and monasteries. That this 
definitive conception was largely a Carolingian innovation had probably been forgotten 
by the time of Cluny’s foundation, let alone by that of Bernard—“forgotten,” that is, as a 
rather intentional part of the broad ideological project of the Carolingians itself.79 In this 
basis lay already, more than two hundred years before Bernard wrote his customary, the 
profound setting-aside of rituals and ritual behavior that made both so powerful in 
monastic life: the things that make monks monks by virtue of doing them are done, and 
are done the way they are done, because they have been instituted by unimpeachable, 
ancient individuals of exceptional holiness, indeed sainthood. They are not done because 
                                                 
78 Boynton, “Oral Transmission of Liturgical Practice”; Cochelin, “Peut-on parler de noviciat.” 
79 Diem, “Inventing the Holy Rule.” 
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the monks have decided so for themselves. Such would be an unacceptable assertion of 
individual will, and ultimately an abrogation of the category of monk.80  
In its overall character and intent, then, perhaps Bernard’s customary was not 
much of an innovation over the (Carolingian conception/recension of) the Rule. As we 
saw when considering Bernard’s prologue, he understood the document as a vessel that 
contained customs and, ultimately, an ordo. His specific language of materiality and 
containment is interesting, but what first set forth the customs of Cluny to him, such that 
they might be placed in some receptacle, was the Carolingian establishment of 
orthopraxy as rooted absolutely in written text and the essential setting-aside this 
establishment engendered. From this viewpoint, the most immediate difference between 
Bernard’s customary and the Rule of Benedict (whatever its origin) is the former’s 
length: Bernard’s customary is vastly longer than the Rule.81 And this is a case in which a 
difference in quantity is so great that it spills over to become one in quality as well. For a 
great deal of this extra length stems from Bernard’s pursuit of a vastly more minute, 
detailed, and intimate grasp of the living bodies of his subjects. We observed some 
measure of this pursuit in the case of the deans. Along similar lines, Bernard’s customary 
has no analogue for Benedict’s chapters on “Obedience,” “Restraint of Speech,” and 
                                                 
80 RB 1980, 169–171. 
81 My estimation here is exceedingly rough, but the difference is so immense as to overwhelm such 
concerns. In the 1980 edition of the Rule edited by Timothy Fry, the Rule itself runs from page 156 to 297, 
in facing-page translation. It is thus seventy pages long, each usually comprising around thirty lines in 
Latin. Herrgott’s edition of Bernard’s customary, on the other hand, runs from page 134 to 364, without 
facing-page translation, thus totaling 230 pages. Moreover, the print is markedly smaller than in the 1980 
Rule, with section headings and footnotes taking up much less space. As a result, most pages in the 
customary edition include about fifty lines. By these rough measures, Bernard’s customary is almost 
certainly at least four or five times the length of the Rule. 
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“Humility.” In these chapters of the Rule, we find brief and rather general ethical 
treatises. For example: 
 
Let us follow the Prophet’s counsel: ‘I said, I have resolved to keep watch over 
my ways that I may never sin with my tongue, I have put a guard on my mouth. I 
was silent and was humbled, and I refrained even from good words’ (Ps 38[39]:2–
3). Here the Prophet indicates that there are times when good words are to be left 
unsaid out of esteem for silence. For all the more reason, then, should evil speech 
be curbed so that punishment for sin may be avoided. Indeed, so important is 
silence that permission to speak should seldom be granted even to mature 
disciples, no matter how good or holy or constructive their talk, because it is 
written: ‘In a flood of words you will not avoid sin’ (Prov 10:19); and elsewhere 
‘The tongue holds the key to life and death’ (Prov 18:21). Speaking and teaching 
are the master’s task; the disciple is to be silent and listen. 
Therefore, any requests to a superior should be made with all humility and 
respectful submission. We absolutely condemn in all places any vulgarity and 
gossip and talk leading to laughter, and we do not permit a disciple to engage in 
words of that kind.82 
 
This is the entirety of the Rule’s “Restraint of Speech” chapter.83 Compare it to the 
introduction to Bernard’s account of the sign language used at Cluny: 
                                                 
82 RB 1980, 191.  
83 The other main treatments of silence in the Rule occur in the chapter concerning “The Reader for the 
Week,” (236–239) that is, during mealtimes, and in that entitled “Silence After Compline” (242–243). In 
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He [the novice] also has the work that he shall learn diligently the signs, with 
which it is possible to speak silently, in a certain fashion, since after he shall be 
together with the Convent, it is permitted to him most rarely to speak; and so in 
the cloister as for the Office, in which it is given and fixed by our fathers, that a 
perpetual silence ought to be maintained, that is, in the church, dormitory, 
refectory, and regular kitchen; in these each, both in day and in night, if even one 
word spoken is heard by anyone, one does not deserve easy indulgence without 
judgment; and if any antiphon or responsorium, or anything else without leave is 
enunciated, being absent in a book, and in a book at the same time the emission of 
[that] word is not seen, concerning this nothing other than complete silence is 
considered.84 
 
Or compare the Rule to another place in the customary, also concerning novices and 
silence, where Bernard writes: “While speaking moreover if he should hear the regular 
sign [the bell for the regular hour], and if he is in the cloister, the very word which he has 
                                                 
these passages, the rule of silence in the specific times and places that the chapters concern is reiterated but 
not given much consideration beyond that. 
84 “Opus quoque habet ut signa diligenter addiscat, quibus tacens quodammodo loquatur, quia postquam 
adunatus fuerit ad Conventum, licet ei rarissime loqui; et tales in claustro Officinae sunt, in quibus traditum 
est a Patribus nostris et praefixum, ut perpetuum silentium teneatur, id est, ecclesia, domitorium, 
refectorium et coquina regularis; in his singulis, tam in die quam in nocte, si vel unum verbum quoquam 
audiente loquitur, non facile veniam absque judicio meretur; et si vel unam antiphonam, vel responsorium, 
vel aliud quid tale absque libro nominavit, et in libro simul cum emissione verbi non viderit, de hoc non 
aliud quam plane silentiu, censetur fregrisse,” Bernard of Cluny, Ordo Cluniacensis, 169. 
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in his mouth, he does not complete, but immediately he is silent, and hurries off to be 
present at prayer.”85 
These passages from the customary are striking not only in their strictness but 
also in their detail. Bernard lists all the specific places within the monastery where 
speaking is not permitted, forbids the speaking of even one word, and even goes so far as 
to prohibit the finishing of a word begun before the summons to the office. More 
strikingly still, he directs his reader’s attention to the liturgy precisely as it is given in 
(other) liturgical books: singing some part, even a single word, of the liturgy out of its 
proper place is as much a violation of monastic silence as frivolous talk in the dormitory. 
Bernard thus weaves a nexus of increasingly normative written texts around monastic 
life, which even penetrate the borders of the sacred speech of the liturgy. Within that 
sacred vocal/linguistic space, speech is policed no less and by the exact same means. Part 
of this strictness and specificity stems from the extreme implementation of monastic 
silence at Cluny, a practice that even in the tenth and eleventh centuries was sometimes 
criticized as opposed to the Rule.86 But there is something else at work here too; it is not 
only that the customary adds strictures not included in the Rule, but that the whole 
approach of the Rule to the people and behavior it aims to regulate is different. The 
chapter on “Restraint of Speech” cites scripture for the value of silence, even over, in 
some cases, virtuous speech. This is a simple ethical precept, the suggestion of a basic 
personal posture directed at the reasoning and intentionality of the individual. It is 
                                                 
85 “Inter loquendum autem si signum audierit regulare, et si est in claustro, ipsum verbm quod habet in ore, 
non persicit, sed continuo tacet, et occurrit ad orationem interesse,” ibid., 178. There are several other 
references to silence in the customary, but these are the primary treatments. 
86 Bruce, Silence and Sign Language, 152–157. 
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emphatically not the minute dictation of practice on a moment-by-moment, motion-by-
motion scale. It is concerned with the whole person of the adherent or reader, with 
guiding him towards a general appreciation of silence through citation of general 
proverbs (literally, Proverbs): “Here the Prophet indicates that there are times when good 
words are to be left unsaid out of esteem for silence.” Bernard’s customary, on the other 
hand, bypasses the whole self, even the agency and intentionality of the monk, to 
legislate the movements of the body directly. And crucially, when it does direct the 
reader towards another (written) text, here a liturgical manual rather than scripture, it is in 
order to precisely delimit the exact contours of what is enunciated, to remove the 
ambiguity inherent in leaving the adjudication of which times are the times “when good 
words are to be left unsaid out of esteem for silence” up to the individual. Convincing the 
mind or soul of the value of the ethical practice of silence generally has been set aside for 
simply telling the individual exactly when and how to speak. 
Was the introduction at Cluny of regularly separated writing, so crucial to the fast 
scanning and intrusive searching of reference reading, incidental to this development? 
Paul Saenger has convincingly argued that this innovation appeared at Cluny around the 
end of Abbot Odilo’s reign, in the 1030s or 1040s.87 And Bernard certainly seems to 
suggest, in his prologue when he frames the customary as a solution to the disputes 
breaking out in chapter over various particular customs, that his work is to be combined 
with the practice of reference reading.88 Moreover, if Bernard, as some have 
                                                 
87 Saenger, Space Between Words, 215–221. 
88 In that he implies monks will refer to his customary in case of dispute or confusion, Bernard of Cluny, 
Ordo Cluniacensis, 134–135. See note 6 earlier in this chapter. 
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hypothesized, was an oblate who became armarius before beginning his customary, he 
would have entered the monastery as a child during or soon after the introduction there of 
separated writing, and thus perhaps have been raised in the use of this new form of page 
layout.89 And there does exist a certain practical or pragmatic parallel between the 
regularized and clear distinction of individual words on the page, on the one hand, and a 
formulation of monastic behavior so precise as to grasp the individual movements of 
individual bodies, on the other. In learning to apprehend and integrate a welter of 
individual words, Bernard, the central ritual choreographer of the massive Cluniac 
community, may well have learned also to apprehend individual humans with a new 
power, discernment, and confidence. To seize the individual movements of individual 
bodies, Bernard needed some more precise tool than the long semantic blocks of aerated 
script employed by preceding generations: he needed the individual word and the 
regularity of its Boolean shape. These atomized fragments of meaning and action, in turn, 
could be smoothly reassembled into a vast ordo that sacrificed none of its harmony for 
the sake of complexity and comprehension. 
From this perspective, perhaps the most decisive development of the customary 
was its role in the formulation of behavior as a text, even as sacred and written text. True, 
it was only one key inflection point in an ambiguous, fitful, long-churning trend. John of 
Salerno’s Vita prima et maior posited the conversatio of Odo as readable, indeed as 
comprising a kind of proto-customary. And the gathering of Cluniac abbatial literature 
into reform manuals, to be distributed to the priories reformed by Hugh the Great, too, 
                                                 
89 Boynton, “Oral Transmission of Liturgical Practice,” 80. 
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suggested that the lives and deeds of men might be read as salvific examples. Jerome and 
especially Ralph Glaber positioned Jesus Christ himself as a sign that, once read, could 
decode the scriptures (or vice-versa) and thereby nudge the human closer to God. Bernard 
himself had figured Hugh the same way, in even more explicit terms, in his prologue to 
the customary. But Bernard’s customary went a step beyond all these, because it 
dissolved this salvific conversatio to an unprecedented extent, to the level of the 
individual act. In doing so, perhaps by accident, it combined the set-aside-ness of the 
principle of the Rule under a neo-Carolingian paradigm with the living tradition of 
Cluniac praxis. As a result, it subsumed all monastic behavior into one giant ritual, 
imbuing every act with transcendental meaning and salvific power. In this combination of 
precision, integration, significance, and transcendence, the ritualized life of the monk 
perhaps came to approximate the fundamental text, the Bible.90 And in this way, all the 
transcendental power that might have remained locked within the cultic object of the 
giant Bible or the ritual performance of the Eucharist was diffused across the body of the 
individual and even into every nook and cranny of the wider, fallen world. 
Drawing on a long, heterogenous Latin, Christian, and monastic tradition that had 
always suggested a close relationship between semiosis and salvation, and mobilizing a 
crucial new literate technology, the customary doubled or even tripled down on the 
Rule’s normative pursuit of the Christian soul or self, so intensifying the drive to fix and 
organize praxis on the basis of right texts that was the essence of the Carolingian reforms 
that it ended up in entirely new territory. In attempting to capture and fix the Cluniac 
                                                 
90 For another conception and treatment of this idea, see Cochelin, “When Monks Were the Book.” 
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ordo that had sprung up as a kind of lived commentary on the Rule, specifically in 
response to the new influx of conversi into the great Burgundian house, Bernard 
transformed the loose and open structure of the Rule, with its passages on virtues based 
on biblical verses, into an almost Taylorist account of the body. It increased the 
resolution at which an emergent and comprehensive Latin Christian normativity viewed 
the human, or even viewed raw praxis, and as a result produced a far more precise and 
complete set of strictures about the body as well as the soul or whole self. And through 
this process, unlike in the development of Cartesian mechanics or Hobbesian political 
ethics, the ritual—which, as we have seen, was joined under the aegis of Latin 
Christianity so intimately to transcendence, salvation, and signification—was developed 
and extended rather than dispelled. If those early modern intellectual developments 
decreased the significance (moral and soteriological, as well as semiotic) of behavior, 
thereby opening it up to an increased pragmatism and helping to smooth the rising 
primacy of political over confessional community, under the neo-Carolingian, or reform, 
or Cluniac paradigm, the trend was precisely the opposite: the transcendental significance 
ritual brought to human behavior first spread from the performance of the liturgy and of 
the Eucharist, from (the reading of) the Bible, into the full scope of lived monastic 
experience, and then far beyond, into the wider lay world, manifesting itself in 
phenomena as diverse as crusading, Waldensianism, and, in the ultimate paradox, the 
preaching, itinerant monks of Saints Dominic and Francis.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Over the preceding pages, we have traced a complex ideological and practical co-
development. Keeping the introductions in mind, the reader will recognized this dual or 
parallel development as essentially one, two-sided, process: an evolution of the 
primordial (human) activity, (anthropo)semiosis, which as such cannot help but take 
influence from and find expression in the whole range of subsidiary human practices and 
abstracted fields of concern. In the fifth and sixth chapter, we examined primarily the 
ideological facet of this process as attested in, respectively, the Cluny Bible’s 
introductory material and Ralph Glaber’s chronicle, the Historiarum libri quinque. The 
Bible’s composite preface combines writings by Jerome and Alcuin of York to outline a 
sophisticated conception of the Bible and Bible study; from this follows the key identity 
of Christ as Logos as well as a complex account of the social context in which Bible 
study is best pursued. Over the course of his chronicle, Glaber develops both of these 
principles much further. He foregrounds man’s rational capacity as the use of signs, and 
then places semiosis as such at the heart of Christ’s incarnation and the dispensation of 
grace he represents. Together, these two sources even posit the Bible as a second 
incarnation. Glaber also develops much further Jerome’s relatively terse and disorganized 
reflections on the proper social context of Bible study, promoting a specifically monastic 
context and even outlining the trajectory of a crucial historical tradition, that of the 
Carolingian reformation and Benedict of Aniane.  
In chapters seven and eight, this explicit ideological, intellectual, or literary 
approach was abandoned. Instead, we developed an analysis of genre and physical (that 
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is, manuscript) context as an entree into the history of the actual social, monastic use of 
texts. This revealed the rise and fall of the literary device of the individual persona as 
organizing principle and direct vehicle for proto-normative monastic behavior. John of 
Salerno’s Vita prima et maior sancti Odonis, with its billowing digressions and confusing 
chronology, was revealed as something, functionally, rather like the customaries 
produced at Cluny more than a hundred years later. That is, it included both liturgical 
directives and increasingly detailed instructions for the proper conduct of institutionalized 
communal life. This latter in particular is striking, for while there was already a long 
tradition of ethical or “virtue” literature in monastic exemplary writing (narrative 
hagiography), the hint of legislative, rather than revelatory or contemplative, and 
communal, rather than individual, tone in John’s text presaged the particularly distinctive 
nature of the later customaries. John delivered all this information through the character 
and biography of Odo, and this reading found some circumstantial support in the 
manuscript context of what I have called “reform manuals,” collections of hagiographic 
literature and technical treatments of individual feasts. But over the course of the twelfth 
century, especially from its middle decades onwards, we found John’s vita more and 
more commonly spun into encyclopedic legendary collections typified by the Cistercian 
Liber de natalitiis. These texts preserved, even perpetuated, the celebration of Odo, but 
they stripped him of his status as vehicle for normative accounts of communal behavior. 
The persona was no longer needed in this capacity.  
Finally, the ninth chapter synthesized these two different tacks, bringing their 
alternate emphases on content and form together to contextualize and examine the 
remarkable novelty of Bernard’s customary. Here, not quite a century and a half after 
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John of Salerno’s work but still roughly seventy years before the take-off of the 
legendary type, Bernard still nodded towards the ghost, at least, of the crucial role of the 
individual person. Echoing Jerome’s letter to Paulinus as well as John, he posited Hugh 
of Semur as a revelatory guide to and confirmation of the body of monastic custom that 
he, Bernard, had learned from both literate study and daily training in the monastery. He 
even went so far as to figure Hugh’s conversatio specifically as legible text. But Bernard 
also—and first—gave as his motivation for producing the great document the confusion 
and discord increasingly found in Cluny’s chapter room, as proliferating novices clashed 
with a dwindling (if only relatively) core of older, veteran, perhaps primarily oblate 
brothers. Like Domesday Book, and unlike John of Salerno’s Vita prima, Bernard’s 
customary was an attempt to preserve or rebuild stability and right order (even hierarchy) 
in the face of social and temporal change. To do this Bernard translated his extensive, 
even exhaustive knowledge of the customs of Cluny the institution onto the page, 
creating a dizzyingly literalate, precise account of a ritualized tradition of daily living and 
training that had been elaborated for almost two hundred years. His account of a 
procession ritual is highly interesting, but even more so his description of the conduct of 
the Cluniac deans. There, we found ritual, which I defined as set aside from daily living 
and constitutive of communities, disassembled into small, modular components and 
parceled out to individuals on the road.  
A new fluency in literalate modes, perhaps contributed to significantly by the 
introduction of canonical word spacing at Cluny, encouraged and enabled this process. It 
was hardly the only important cause. Also vital was the ideology that set monks apart 
from the social and ultimately even corporeal world, that established and ratified a 
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Carolingian and Benedictine tradition, and that obsessed them with signs and right 
semiosis just as a drowning man is obsessed with a raft. So too the transformations, broad 
and deep, making themselves felt across eleventh-century Europe: increasing wealth, 
increasing population, and an increasingly assertive and puritanical church. But while 
changing “material realities,” changing ideas or ideologies, and even the quantitatively 
increasing use of documents have all received their due in recent historical scholarship, I 
have tried to highlight something subtly different here: changes in the nest of unexamined 
assumptions about documents—and about humans and human behavior—that 
undergirded every interaction involving them, in the semiotic ideologies at play within 
the cloister, in the posture towards or culture of documents. What can be said, in 
summation, about these topics? 
First, there is the development of the text, or more properly the document, as its 
own organizing principle. We see this most clearly in the progression from Vita prima to 
its three offspring: the legendary, the customary, and the Vita reformata. In each of these 
three lines, Odo is reduced in his importance and, if we may speak of such in terms of 
literary characters, in his agency. In the first, he becomes merely one among many, called 
up in his turn and set aside when that turn is over. He is indicative only of himself as an 
individual and of the grace and power of God in a very general way. From the second he 
has disappeared. There he is no longer needed at all; newer and more efficient—more 
literalate—tools, the customaries, do the same job better. In the third, we find him 
thoroughly domesticated, in his proper proportions, moving as expected and right, as it 
were, on schedule. But we may also observe this assertion of the text or document in the 
great Reform Bibles, of which the Cluny Bible is an early example. Alcuin’s poems, 
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reproduced there, speak to the newness of the form of the single volume, all inclusive 
biblical pandect, and even perhaps, in the poems confident assertion of the pandect as a 
new form, to the potential for its reticence and rejection by Alcuin’s contemporaries. 
These poems also instruct in the nature of the Bible and of its various, multitudinous 
parts. No longer Chronicles and Kings here in this volume, a work of divinely guided 
history, the Gospels, organized according to the liturgical calendar and so essentially a 
service book, over there in that one, with the Psalter besides. A more convenient, 
intuitive, guided-by-concrete-use format has been supplanted by the majesty and special 
significance of a single massive tome. Living people had to make their peace with it; they 
accorded themselves to the text. 
But more important, and far more subtle, is the extremely fine and extensive 
synthesis of behavior and text these developments produced, the “explosive alchemy” 
referred to earlier. I used this gaudy coinage to characterize the development of the Bible 
as a filter or a machine through which experience may be fed and so transformed into 
something possessed of transcendental significance and even eternal life. My point here 
might be taken as perhaps the inversion of McLuhan or Ong (or, for that matter, Weber): 
magic may dwell primarily in the realm of the oral, but the truly supernatural or 
otherworldly only becomes possible once sufficient literality has opened the horizon of 
some other plane. Magic in the oral world of the flesh can only be natural. The 
foundational principle in this development in the Middle Ages is that of figura, which we 
found attested, in varying detail, throughout the Cluny Bible’s prefatory material, for it is 
this principle that draws the concrete and worldly into rarefied, transcendental spheres. 
But the carrying capacity of the Bible machine, when limited to deploying the classical 
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figura, is rather limited. One must take a whole act or event, usually in full social context, 
and translate it into a similar context in the scriptures. A donation, a wedding, a dream, a 
battle—there are many examples of figura in medieval literature that seem like rather 
dubious interpretative stretches to the modern reader, but all must grapple with the 
essential fact that figurae are complete events, virtually always with a germ of narrativity 
and an implicit sociology contained within. Moreover, they are usually comprised of 
parallels between two discrete and specific events: Alcuin’s (or Franco’s) production of 
the Giant Bible for Charlemagne (or Odilo) resonates with the poor widow’s donation of 
two coins, as related by Jesus in the Bible. Drawing on the examples considered from 
Bernard’s customary, the procession for tribulation is a ritualized form of the classical 
figura. It unfurls a whole narrative. The saint, and God Himself, is called up, and taken or 
accompanied on a particular earthly itinerary corresponding to the particulars of the 
fallen, temporal situation. But the culmination of this ritual, as in any proper figura, is the 
rejection or negation of precisely these fleshy particulars: all stories are in fact the only 
story, and God’s power and goodness are so absolute that even petition becomes an 
effrontery in need of forgiveness. 
The Cluny Bible’s preface pushes against this early limitation of the machine 
somewhat when Alcuin figures the reading of each verse of the Bible as a prayer for him 
(Alcuin). Even if this is not properly a figura (since it does not play on any biblical 
episode), it seems to appropriate the basic principle of the device, that is, on the assertion 
of an esoteric similarity and unity in the face of seeming distinction and individuation, for 
a novel and open-ended ritual task. Yet other than this tentative step, the Cluny Bible’s 
preface remains conservative from our perspective. It is the Bible that is the secret 
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blueprint and cipher of all things; anything may be accessed through it (just as the fallen 
Christian may be saved through it), but this passage is strictly one-way. Glaber advances 
the process a bit further, crucially (re)injecting the ghostly Neoplatonic tradition into 
Cluniac thought to posit the order of creation in general as evidence of God as its creator 
and man as essentially a user of signs, and going so far as to imply a connection between 
right semiosis, humanity, and salvation. The scriptures are important here, but not the 
fundamental locus of signifying and signification. Rather, Glaber’s most important 
contribution to the development of this machine, this alchemy, is his treatment of the 
monastic institution as such. In this realm, Glaber posits a licit tradition (essentially the 
Carolingian one), distinguishes between rule and custom (or between principle and 
implementation), and shows that seemingly minor variations in this tradition (celebrating 
the feast of the Annunciation on the wrong date) could have dire and indeed 
transcendental consequences. In effect, therefore, the twinned issues of proper 
implementation of the Rule of Saint Benedict and proper maintenance of the monastic 
tradition as a tradition begin to, implicitly or analogically, at least, take on the 
characteristics of Bible study and reading as outlined in the writings of Alcuin and 
Jerome: they are signs, whether literalate (the Rule) or lived/oral (the tradition, the 
customs), which must be properly interpreted for the sake of basic humanity and, indeed, 
salvation. 
These issues remain largely absent from the vitae Odonis, at least as my readings 
have examined them. This may be an index of the relatively worldly focus of these texts, 
especially John of Salerno’s. Whether in the older register of miracles performed and 
virtues exemplified by Odo, or in his more innovative practice of relating institutional 
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praxis through the person of the abbot, John aimed to provide concrete and practical 
models for monks living in this world. Archetypes of these models that themselves 
guaranteed the possibility of salvation through their essential and explicitly 
transcendental nature—Christ and the Bible—already existed; for this Odo was not 
needed. Working him into Jerome’s sociology of Bible study, Odo served an 
intermediary between individuals (in this case, monks) and those larger, miraculously 
incarnated divine dispensations—themselves still ultimately intermediaries. In fact, this is 
precisely the place given to Odo’s late eleventh-century successor, Hugh of Semur, by 
Bernard in the preface to his customary. Or, rather, Bernard goes a step further, 
suggesting Hugh as a more direct intermediary: without reference to the Bible or Jesus, 
Bernard makes Hugh a conduit of divine revelation and grace. 
This promotion of Hugh, as it were, charts both the synthesis of behavior and text 
and the rising soteriological importance of monastic conversatio as such; and indeed, by 
this point Bernard has also greatly increased Glaber’s emphasis on the monastic life and 
institution. He suggests, in the course of his praise of Hugh, that either “rule and 
institution” are tools Hugh has used to conduct Bernard eventually to God, or that Hugh 
and the monastic way of life are co-equal and complimentary in their salvific function. 
The point is less the specific place of Hugh in this hierarchy and more that Bernard has 
accorded such a prominent place to conversatio, to a code of behavior he is in the very 
midst of gathering, organizing, and stipulating to an unprecedented extent. Here the two 
different approaches, one pursued in the fifth and sixth chapters and the other in the 
seventh and eighth, come to a point. For Bernard both offers the most precise account of 
charismatic leadership as legible and of the code of monastic coversatio as transcendental 
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encountered so far. In this he develops radically the ideological lines of all the texts 
surveyed here, and also codifies that conversatio in a document that, if not quite 
completely novel, remains more or less unprecedented and transformative in its role and 
comprehension. In his work, in other words, form and content are both together summed 
up and decisively advanced.  
By imparting such importance to the details of daily monastic life and also by 
setting those details down in written representation, for each suggests or perhaps requires 
outright the other, Bernard makes of general monastic behavior—conversatio—a text of 
transcendental significance. Not of some behaviors in some contexts, but of each and 
every minute deed. Like the deans, thrust into the dangers of the world by the duties that 
call them beyond the cloister, for the monks of Cluny ritual becomes a constant 
companion, a thick coating laid over every move and thought, a performance of 
distinction, identity, and community that never ceases. So the long germinating seeds of a 
new and revolutionary spirituality, their fruits best recognized at present in the paroxysms 
known as the Reformation, are laid. For even in Bernard’s customary, with such events 
centuries in the future, the bridge between the fleshy and heavenly spheres is less and less 
restricted to particular events, places, individuals, or even rituals as generally understood. 
Discrete moments of orchestrated communal transcendence increasingly give way to a 
supersaturation of individual, daily life with eternal and absolute significance. The monk, 
and eventually the Christian, will perform himself every day, revealing by the most 
minute and humble contours of his conversatio just what kind of person he is. And in 
this, the lasting influence of the technology of the document, employed as just one ritual 
implement among many by generation after generation of monks, reveals itself. Like a 
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written text, behavior now becomes a code laid out before the observer, who stands back 
like a diviner to interpret it. It is increasingly distinct from the individuals, whatever we 
understand them to be, who instantiate it—or are instantiated by it. And it rests within a 
vast but ultimately navigable field, the subject of a relentlessly developing discipline of 
record and interrogation and optimal rearrangement: the monastery, perhaps, as the 
blueprint for all Foucault’s modern disciplinary institutions, which made meaningful, as 
he said, by distribution in space—just like writing.1 In this we have run well beyond the 
scope of the present study. The long, slow, and intensive progression of this posture, this 
culture, beyond the cloister walls is not the subject of this project; my goal has rather 
been to show its prehistory and development therein. 
                                                 
1 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 141. 
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